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COMPLIMENTARY

English Records of Maratha History
Poona Residency Correspondence

Volume 5
Nagpur Affairs
1781-1820

MASTHAN

PARY

Edited by

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MR. J. H. HARRIS, JR.

FOREWORD.

The Maratha principality of Nagpur came into existence independently of the Peshwa and in direct opposition to him. Its founder, unlike the Brahman Peshwa, was a Maratha by caste and claimed kinship with the House of Shivaji through a younger branch of the same Bhonsle family. From the inception of this State its attitude to the Peshwas was one of violent non-co-operation. In the war and diplomacy of the Maratha empire, the Bhonsle of Nagpur was for long always found ranged on the side of the enemies of the Peshwa. There were many cases of open warfare between these two Powers, besides usurpation of each other's jagirs. The Peshwa Balaji II and the first Rajah Raghuji Bhonsle had personally fought against each other in Bengal in 1743. While Sindhia, Gaikwad and Holkar shed their blood on the field of Panipat, not a single soldier from Nagpur took part in that national struggle with the common enemy of Maratha hegemony. On the contrary, the Nizam could count upon a Nagpur contingent's co-operation in every campaign against the Peshwa.

This state of chronic antagonism lasted so long as there was any vigour left in the royal house of Nagpur, and if the Bhonsle became complaisant to the general policy of the Poona Court after 1770, he never rendered any active or useful support to the latter. Thus, the independent State of Nagpur acted as a source of weakness to the general cause of the Maratha nation. The political insight of Warren Hastings at once perceived this fact, and he thrust himself into this line of cleavage. He neutralised the Bhonsle with a bribe during the First Maratha War, and thus every anti-British pact hatched at Poona or Haidarabad was betrayed to him by his ally at Nagpur. As the Governor General wrote in 1784 :

“The Booslah family, possessing a constitutional claim to the sovereignty, a more ascertained right of separate dominion, and but a scanty revenue, stand in awe of the superior state (i.e., the Peshwa) and of every member of it around them, occasionally uniting their interest with each other, but principally with Nizam Ally Cawn, whose territory lies intermixed with

theirs, and who is no less an object of their apprehensions. Their connection with the Government of Bengal, which originated in advances made by Shabajee Boosla in the year 1773, was continued with his successor Moodajee, and has subsisted undisturbed to this time. The interest which they felt in it was manifested by many substantial and uncommon instances of kindness." (W. H.'s *Memoirs relative to the state of India*, Forrest, ii. 52.)

But the State of Nagpur was really a phantom of power. Its revenue was deplorably small and precarious; its army was second rate in number and fighting capacity; its undefined frontiers impinged upon several powerful States whom it was most unsafe to provoke; and within its borders there were many unsubdued tribes and semi-independent principalities of olden days; its ruling caste of Marathas was far inferior in intellectual power to the Brahman Peshwas and their counsellors and generals of the same brainy caste. Above all, the royal house of Nagpur, like that of Shivaji, began very early to be torn by internal dissensions among its members for the supreme control of the State. Moral decay set in in this dynasty, and from 1773 onwards it merely dragged on a benumbed existence, powerless for good, incapable of progress, incapable even of self-defence, and, like the Scottish landlords during the Jacobite risings, anxious only "to prevent the estate from going out of the family".

The dread which the Bhonsle Rajah of Nagpur had excited among his neighbours in the early days was solely due to his power for mischief. The enormously extended southern frontier of British Bengal from Mirzapur to Jalesar would have required half a million men in arms ever on the alert, if it was to be sealed effectually against the myriads of light horsemen and Pindari looters that a word from Nagpur could have let loose on any point of it. And such a break-through, however short and ineffective in its military effect, would have done incalculable loss to the economic life and settled order of the southern districts of Bengal, Bihar and Allahabad, as Warren Hastings conclusively proved in his despatch dated 30 April 1781. (Forrest, *State Papers*, London ed., ii. 259.)

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During the English wars with the French and Hyder Ali in the Carnatic, reinforcements from Bengal could reach Madras and return thence most quickly and conveniently overland through the Bhonsle province of Orissa. Hence, the British authorities from the days of Vansittart to those of Cornwallis were anxious to buy that province for cash or exchange of territory or even to take a lease of it. But the Nagpur Government would never consent to part with this territory.

There was a second cause of friction between them. By the treaty of June 1751, Alivardi Khan, the Nawab of Bengal, had ceded Orissa to the Rajah of Nagpur and bound himself to pay an annual tribute of 12 lakhs of Rupees as *Chauth* for Bengal, in return for the Rajah's agreeing not to raid Bengal in future. The English, as the keepers of the puppet Nawabs of Bengal after Plassey, actually paid this tribute for a few years. During their war with Nawab Mir Qasim (1763) they offered to stand security for the *Chauth* if the Nagpur Rajah denied that ex-Nawab help or asylum in his dominions. The Rajah did his part of the contract, but when the danger blew over, the East India Company did not keep their promise and the *Chauth* due from Bengal was discontinued for ever after their acquisition of the Diwani from the Emperor in 1765. The long and fruitless negotiation for this money, with the many changes of mood in the rulers of Nagpur and the varied policy of the different Maratha governors of Orissa from 1759 to 1772, especially the pranks of Shiva Bhatta Sathé (the "Sebut" of the English records),—can be read in the *Calendar of Persian Correspondence* and have been summarised in my *Bihar and Orissa during the Fall of the Mughal Empire*, pp. 116-123.

But the English Government was really in need of the friendship of the Nagpur Rajah. First, during Warren Hastings's rule it was imperatively necessary to safeguard the southern frontier of Bengal from predatory incursions and also to secure the smooth passage of troops and supply of provisions from Bengal through Cuttack to the Carnatic. In both these objects he succeeded. In 1780, when Hyder Ali burst upon the Madras plains sweeping everything before him, an anti-British alliance was formed with him by the Peshwa

and the Nizam. Mudhaji the Rajah of Nagpur was instructed by the Peshwa to send an army under his son Chimnaji to invade Bengal through Cuttack and thus prevent aid from being sent to Madras. Hastings rendered the plot abortive. As he writes, "In the month of October I secretly furnished him (Chimnaji) with three lakhs of Rupees to relieve the pressing wants of his army, and gave him expectations of a larger supply, if Moodajee issued orders either for the junction of the army under Chimnajeel with ours (in Sir Eyre Coote's campaign against Hyder Ali) or its recall (from Orissa to Nagpur)". David Anderson was deputed from Calcutta as "our special minister to Rajah Chimnajeel Bhonsla....now in the province of Cuttack" by a letter dated 14th January 1781.

The success of this golden diplomacy was immediate and complete. The needy Chimnaji Bhonsle secretly informed Hastings of the directions received from Poona and assured him that he was going to circumvent them by marching at a snail slow pace from Nagpur to Cuttack, and that instead of making then an immediate dash into Bengal, he would engage in a long and harassing campaign against the Rajah of Dhenkanel, so that Bengal would enjoy a long respite. In the meantime, a Bengal force under Colonel T. D. Pearse marched through Orissa to the Carnatic, receiving every assistance and a profusion of supplies from Chimnaji's agents throughout the province. Hastings could point with justifiable pride to "the liberal manner in which Chimnaji has acted to Colonel Pearse, of which the Colonel writes his testimony." From the military point of view no less than the economic, this friendly neutrality of Chimnaji was purchased rather cheaply for 16 lakhs of Rupees, namely three lakhs furnished to Chimnaji in October 1780 and 13 lakhs advanced as a "loan" to his envoy Raja Ram Pundit at Calcutta on 2nd April 1781.

Cornwallis in the pursuit of his policy of the encirclement of Tipu Sultan, wanted to rope in the Rajah of Nagpur, though he was well aware of the real weakness of that State. As Warren Hastings had noted in 1781, "the object of the temporizing policy of the Bhonsle is to obtain the acknowledgment of the

* Despatch, 28th February 1781.

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claim of the Government of Berar to the *Chaut* of Bengal." The Governor General had openly repudiated the Maratha claim to *Chauth* from Bengal and Bihar, and a regular alliance between these two Powers never took place. But in pursuance of Cornwallis's policy of friendship, a British Resident was sent to Nagpur, at first temporarily and made permanent there only in Wellesley's time.

It was only in consequence of the general revulsion of feeling among the Maratha potentates at the Peshwa's acceptance of British paramountcy by the treaty of Bassein (December 1802) that Raghuji Bhonsle II of Nagpur was at last induced by Daulat Rao Sindhia to rise against the English, though it was against his better judgment and the true interests of his State. The result was the disaster of Argaon and the loss of his richest provinces,—Berar (for its fertility, as cotton was of little value before the modern age of mechanical transport and vast foreign exportation) and Orissa (for the pilgrim tax at Jagannath Puri). Busawan Lal, the Hindu biographer of Amir Khan (the founder of the Tonk State) says that the Berar Rajah contrived to keep himself aloof from his ostensible ally Daulat Rao Sindhia as long as he could and gave him no help in the campaign of Assaye, so that Daulat Rao retaliated by leaving Raghuji in the lurch at the battle of Argaon ! From the date of this battle the history of the House of Nagpur loses all political significance. But the administration, usages, economic condition, folklore, etc., of the province during the century of Maratha rule, must possess an abiding interest for Indian readers.

Jadunath Sarkar,

General Editor.

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INTRODUCTION.

The Marathi sources for the history of the Bhonsle kingdom of Nagpur are rather unsatisfactory and meagre. In contrast with the wealth of contemporary dispatches and other state papers that we possess for each of the Peshwas, the Marathi records relating to the Bhonsles discovered in the Peshwas' Daftar come to only a single volume of 304 short letters, (*The Bhonsles of Nagpur*, being volume 20 of the *Selections from the Peshwas' Daftar* series) and a few more letters scattered through some other volumes of that series (such as No. 17). The official archives of the Bhonsle Government perished in the fire which destroyed their palace. In 1822, under orders of Mr. R. Jenkins, Kashirao Rajeshwar Gupte composed his *Nagpurkar Bhonslyanchi Bakhar*, printed by K. N. Sane in 1885*. But it is, in most parts of it, "a mere gossipy traditional work", as Sir Jadunath Sarkar has rightly remarked. The historical letters recovered from the leading families of Nagpur were published under the editorship of V. D. Oak in 1889 as *Nagpurkar Bhonsalyanchya Sambandhache Kagadpatra*. These letters with several others have been reprinted in a revised and corrected edition by Sardesai, Kulkarni and Kale (*Aitihāsik Patravṃyavahar*, 1932). Some Nagpur letters are also to be found in V. K. Rajwade's *Sadhanen*, volume 3.

But from 1788 when the first regular British representative arrived at Nagpur, we begin to receive abundance of light on the Bhonsle State and its affairs from British despatches, and thus the English records come to our rescue just where the Maratha sources fail us completely. The present volume is an attempt to collect these valuable historical materials together in a complete and properly arranged form.

The first British Resident, properly so called, was posted to the Court of Nagpur in January 1788, but the line of permanent Residents began only in January 1804 after the treaty of Deogaon. In the intervening sixteen years there were long periods when the British Government had no accredited representative with the Bhonsles. Before 1788 special embassies had occasionally been sent by the British

* Recently reprinted by the Nagpur Research Society.

Government, mostly during the First Maratha War in order to persuade the Nagpur Rajah to side against the Peshwa in these hostilities, or at least to maintain a friendly neutrality towards the British Power. Some of the early English visitors to the Nagpur territory were not ambassadors, but mere travellers or explorers, like T. Motte who was sent by Lord Clive to report on the diamond mines said to exist in Sambalpur. (His report* has been published in full in the *Asiatic Annual Register*, vol. I, 1799). David Anderson's short but successful embassy to Chimnaji Bhonsle's camp in Orissa is described in Hastings's minutes (Forrest, London ed., vol. ii). Other English officers of this class are included in a small volume published by the Central Provinces Government in 1924 under the title of "*The Early European Travellers in the Nagpur Territories*." C. U. Wills's collection of records, "*British Relations with the Nagpur State in the 18th century*" (Nagpur Government Press, 1926) is indispensable for the study of this early period (i.e., before 1788), as also are the *Calendars of Persian Correspondence* (5 volumes, covering 1759-1780), Forrest's *Selections from Papers in the Foreign Department, 1772-1785*, in 3 volumes (Calcutta), and W. Hastings's *Memoir and Minutes* included in Forrest's London edition of *Selections from the same Governor-General's State papers*, volume ii.

The records included in the present volume reveal to us some of the principal characteristics of the British statesmen, which made them superior to their Indian competitors in every respect. Their wider outlook, accurate observation of men and matters, their zeal and devotion to their country's cause, their superior sense of discipline and selflessness can be amply seen from these pages. While authorising Malet to make "liberal presents in money to any of the Ministers (of the Maratha Court) who could give a decisive assistance in forwarding the accomplishment of the object," Lord Cornwallis hesitates even to relax the orders against receiving presents by the Company's servants. On the other hand, British gold made even the Sena Sahib Subah of Berar go against the national cause in the First Maratha War, as we have seen above. Chapman, Colebrooke, Forster and Collins are given detailed

*See also Wills' "Nagpur in the 18th Century" Chapter III.

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(Nos. 1, 7, 13, 14)

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and definite instructions for the conduct of British negotiations with Nagpur, which they carry out strictly within these bounds. (Nos. 1, 7, 18, 33).

The low morals to which even high Indians were then reduced made it very easy for the British to use their spy system to the greatest advantage. The Marathas, on the other hand, never got any clue to the secrets of the British.

The system of reproducing almost word for word important interviews by the British Residents and their munshis with the Indian princes and their ministers, is so well carried out in their despatches that we almost feel that we are witnessing them ourselves.

Warren Hastings, Cornwallis, the Wellesley brothers, Elphinstone and Jenkins present a striking contrast to Mudhoji and Raghuji Bhonsle and their courtiers in almost every quality that makes a statesman or a man of action. The short-sighted policy followed by the Indian chiefs, contrasts most painfully with the prudent and wider outlook of the British leaders, as these pages demonstrate.

These records also illustrate how the Indian princes and statesmen in that age were completely ignorant of current European politics. Their knowledge of men and events was confined to India, and did not extend even to the whole of India. British Residents occasionally made mention of some events in Europe which were favourable to the British cause, in order to influence the Indian chiefs in favour of the British, but these chiefs took only a languid and superficial interest in these things, in which they had no intellectual curiosity.

The present volume of records ends with Appasaheb's accession, the conclusion of a subsidiary treaty with the British in 1816, his rupture with the British, his arrest and escape. The events of the attack on the British Residency, the battles of Sitabaldi and Nagpur, the surrender of Appasaheb and his reinstatement, the approach of Bajirao Peshwa towards Nagpur, the seizure of Appasaheb's person by the British, his flight from captivity (1818 A.D.) and miserable end (1840) and the annexation of Nagpur in 1854 are matters which are the subject of numerous books and pamphlets already available

*

in print. A few letters, however, relating to the escape of Appasaheb and his close search are printed in this volume.

The following summary of events will help the reader in making his way through the correspondence printed in this volume.

BRITISH RELATIONS WITH NAGPUR, 1781—1802.

British relations with the State of Nagpur began with the attempts of Janoji Bhonsle to recover the Maratha *chauth* from the Nawab of Bengal according to the treaty of 1751. The English having gained complete ascendancy in Bengal in 1765 when they secured the Diwani of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, Janoji made several vain attempts to secure the arrears of *chauth* through the British Governor. The province of Orissa or Cuttack was under the rule of the Bhonsle, and the British tried to secure that province in order to connect their possessions in Bengal with those in the Madras Presidency. The negotiations between Lord Clive and Janoji through their respective vakeels revealed that the British would not exert their influence in the matter of the payment of the *chauth* unless Janoji ceded to them the province of Orissa, either permanently or on lease. Both parties, however, were firm in their terms, and in the end each saw that it was useless to press its demands on the other.

These negotiations and the proximity of the possessions of both parties, however, brought the two States closer to each other. The Bhonsle's vakeels resided in Calcutta and British ambassadors freely visited Nagpur as necessity arose.

Lord Cornwallis, after his arrival in India (September 1786), foresaw that a rupture with Tipu was inevitable and secured the permission of the Company to form a defensive alliance with the Maratha Chiefs and the Nizam. To secure this end he deputed Mr. George Forster, a Madras civilian, to the Court of Nagpur about the end of October 1787, with instructions to make definite proposals of a mutual defensive alliance in the event of a rupture with Tipu. (No. 2).

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Forster arrived at Nagpur on 15th January 1788 and remained there till 10 February 1789. A report* by him on the weak condition of the Bhonsle's government and the absence of any immediate necessity for the conclusion of the alliance led the Governor-General to recall Mr. Forster.

Raghuji was invited to Poona by the Peshwa's Minister Nana Fadnavis, in order to take concerted action against Tipu, and he was in Poona from 23 March to 7 May 1789. Malet, the Poona Resident, was instructed to show special attention to Raghuji and to see if it would be possible to induce Raghuji to cede the province of Cuttack to the British with the consent of the Poona Darbar. (No. 6.)

The long contemplated alliance between the British, the Nizam and the Peshwa's Darbar against Tipu, was eventually ratified on 1st June 1790 at Poona. The necessity of sending the Bengal troops through Cuttack again arose. Mr. Forster was again deputed to Nagpur by Lord Cornwallis. He was asked to go *via* Cuttack and stay there till the Bengal detachment under Colonel Cockerell had passed through Cuttack, and then only to repair to Nagpur. A letter of apology for not securing the previous permission of the Bhonsle to the passing of the British troops through his territory was also sent to Raghuji, coupled with an invitation to him to join the alliance against Tipu. (Nos. 7, 8.)

Forster left Cuttack after accomplishing his object there and arrived at Nagpur on 3rd January 1791. He had, however, caught a violent cold and fever on the way and died at Nagpur only two days after his arrival. (No. 10.)

His remains lie buried in that city.

Forster's report to the Governor-General during his first embassy had disclosed the military weakness of the Nagpur State. The successful termination of the war with Tipu with the help of the Nizam and the Poona Government left no immediate object to be gained by placating the Nagpur Raja. But in 1799, Lord Mornington (afterward Marquis Wellesley)

* See Wills' *Nagpur in the 18th century*, Chapt. VI.

started his vigorous policy of introducing the subsidiary system into the Indian states. The weaker states readily entered into such treaties one after another, Mysore in 1799, the Nabob of Oudh in 1801, and the Gaikwad in 1802. In pursuance of this policy Wellesley sent Kirkpatrick to Hyderabad and Henry Thomas Colebrooke to Nagpur to negotiate defensive alliances against Daulatrao Sindhia, whose designs the Governor-General had reason to apprehend and whose military power had alarmed him. (Nos. 18, 20.) The Nizam entered into a subordinate alliance with the British and accepted a subsidiary force in 1800. Colebrooke who remained in Nagpur from 1799 to 1801, although sanguine at first, saw clearly at last that nothing but immediate danger would induce the Nagpur Rajah to accept a subsidiary force or to agree to the terms of a defensive alliance with the British. He was therefore recalled and returned to Calcutta in May 1801.

THE EVENTS OF 1802 AND 1803.

The attack of Yashwantrao Holkar on Poona, the flight of Bajirao to Bassein, the attempts of the ministers at Poona to set up Vinayakrao, the son of Bajirao's brother Amritrao, as Peshwa and the treaty of Bassein (31 December, 1802) made by Bajirao admitting a British subsidiary force, took place in rapid succession and gave a rude shock to the Maratha confederacy. In spite of the assurances given by the British authorities to Sindhia, Bhonsle and Holkar that their independence was in no way jeopardised by the treaty of Bassein, these Maratha Powers suspected, perhaps rightly, that the reduction of the Peshwa to whom they looked up as the head of the Maratha confederacy to a position of subordination to the British Government, would be a death-blow to the independence of the whole Maratha Raj including themselves. Sindhia hastened to the Deccan and summoned Raghuji Bhonsle to a conference on the western border of Berar. Holkar was in Khandesh, and Raghuji was first asked to use his influence in bringing about a reconciliation between Yashwantrao and Daulatrao Sindhia.

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NEGOTIATIONS WITH SINDHIA AND BHONSLE.

The Governor-General sent Colonel Collins to negotiate with Daulatrao Sindhia. Collins arrived at Burhanpur on 27th February 1803. The Governor-General's instructions to him issued on 26th January 1803 required him to offer to Sindhia the same terms of defensive alliance as the Peshwa had accepted, on condition of his consenting to an arbitration by the English with regard to the claims of Yashwantrao Holkar against him, and at any rate to see that he (Sindhia) did not obstruct the completion of the arrangements arrived at with the Peshwa by the treaty of Bassein.

Similarly, the Governor-General, on the recommendation of General Wellesley selected Mr. J. Webbe, who was acting as Resident at Mysore, to go to Nagpur as Resident for the same object. He did not however join his post, as subsequent developments and the march of Raghuji Bhonsle to join Sindhia on the western frontier of his possessions rendered the mission unnecessary. Collins therefore carried on the negotiations with Bhonsle as well.

Attempts were also made to reconcile Yashwantrao Holkar and Amritrao, brother of the Peshwa. Amritrao yielded to the offers of General Wellesley and was silenced, but Yashwantrao would listen neither to the persuasions of the British nor to those of Sindhia and Bhonsle. He, however, withdrew his troops from Poona and went to Khandesh after lingering for some time near Aurangabad.

Whilst these negotiations were going on, General Wellesley arrived at Poona and Bajirao was peacefully reinstalled on the musnud of Poona on 13th May 1803. While arrangements were being made for this installation, the Governor-General sent conciliatory letters to Raghuji Bhonsle, explaining the circumstances under which the treaty of Bassein had been concluded and intimating his firm resolution to complete the arrangements contemplated by the treaty and to open hostilities against any Power that might attempt to defeat those arrangements.

In spite of remonstrances from Colonel Collins, Sindhia and Bhonsle long put off making up their minds whether they should have peace or war with the British. They were waiting to secure the cooperation of Yashwantrao Holkar in a confederacy against the British. Raghuji took upon himself the difficult task of reconciling Holkar with Sindhia, but failed. His patience entirely worn out by Daulat Rao's evasive policy, Colonel Collins left his camp on 3rd August 1803 under pressure from General Wellesley, who was eager and ready to strike the first blow.

The second Maratha war then followed and was concluded by the Treaty of Deogaon with Bhonsle and that of Surji Anjangaon with Sindhia. The account of the battles of Assaye, Argaon and Gawilgad fought in the course of this war and the detailed correspondence connected therewith have been printed in Wellington's despatches at great length and are therefore omitted from this volume.

As a result of this war, Raghuji lost the fertile province of Berar, ceded to the Nizam, and the strategically important province of Cuttack which was annexed by the British. A British Resident was permanently posted at Nagpur, and Mr. Mountstuart Elphinstone, Persian Interpreter to General Wellesley, became the first holder of this office.

THE EVENTS OF 1804-1817.

It is no doubt true that Maratha history after the war of 1803-1804 loses the political importance and national interest which it had before that momentous and decisive trial of strength; the Maratha Power is henceforth decentralised and manifestly eclipsed by British paramountcy. But this later history is no less rich in interest and instruction when looked at from another point of view than that of war and territorial expansion.

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During this post-1803 period the activities of the Bhonsles were confined to a mere adjustment on their part to the great political change that Wellesley's masterly personality had imposed upon the Indian world, a change in facing which they often exhibited impotent rage at their humiliation and severe resentment in bowing to the dictates of a superior power when the memory of their past liberty was so fresh. For the Residents, on the other hand, a new era of administrative settlement and peace now dawned, which taxed their capacity to the utmost. One clearly notices the forbearance, circumspection and tact with which the British officials in these states handled often difficult situations and safeguarded the interests of their own masters. Elphinstone, Jenkins and others who worked as Residents at Nagpur have left long, full and masterly despatches which afford instructive reading and which, when published, will hold a high rank among the writings of the eminent builders of the British Indian Empire. The policy of non-intervention which succeeded the vigorous advance of Lord Wellesley brought with it fresh evils, a desire for revenge on the part of those who had suffered and a crop of free-booters like the Pindaris, who often joined hands in an anti-British outburst and started a kind of guerilla warfare with the intention of putting down British supremacy before it became too firmly established.

The resources of Raghuji's government were greatly crippled by the loss of his territories in the Second Maratha war. His finances had long been badly managed. The payment of his troops was very irregular and it was a common sight in those days for the starving soldiery to confine their chiefs. An extreme case of it is seen (No. 55) when Raghuji himself experienced this fate. The murderous attack on Mudhoji at Ellichpur by the Pathans of his army is another glaring instance.

Raghuji tried to obtain either Berar or Cuttack from the British as a reward for his loyal conduct after 1803, but, as he should have foreseen, it proved futile. Sambalpur and Patna were however restored in 1806 by Sir George Barlow, in accordance with a promise held out to Raghuji by Lord Cornwallis in 1805.

The military weakness of the Bhonsle exposed him to the aggressions of the Pindaris from the northern frontier of his dominions. The correspondence between the Resident and the Governor General for the next fifteen years is mainly concerned with this subject. The Rajah's army was by no means capable of meeting the large hordes of the Pindaris, whose numbers sometimes swelled to thirty thousand men drawn together by the hope of plunder.

The British tried to come to Raghuji's help in his impotence by offering him a subsidiary alliance, but the Rajah declined it. The British, however, sent some troops to Khandesh in 1804 and afterwards Colonel Close himself proceeded from Poona to the Narbada in 1809 to check the advance of the Pindaris under Meer Khan, though the British were under no obligation to do so. This, however, proved to be only a temporary check, and as soon as the British troops were withdrawn, the Pindaris renewed their depredations. Even the British Resident Mr. Jenkins thought it prudent to reinforce his Residency escort by a strong detachment from Jalna, for fear of the Pindaris (No. 197).

It was, however, reserved for Lord Hastings to take concerted action against the Pindaris and ultimately to crush them. In this connection Jenkins' proposals dated 30th December 1811 are worth notice (No. 211).

CONQUEST OF BHOPAL.

The only military aggression attempted by Raghuji was the conquest of Bhopal jointly with Sindhia. The Nawab of Bhopal when almost crushed, entered into a subsidiary alliance with the British. A report on his territories was called for, and the views of Jenkins on the political relations of Bhopal with its neighbours can be gathered from his despatches to the Governor General, (Nos. 177, 178). The Nawab's defensive alliance with the British had a magical effect on Sindhia and Bhonsle, who immediately gave up the attempt. Bhopal was thus saved from extinction.

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AFFAIRS OF CHATTISGARH.

During the progress of the Second Maratha War the British had entered into agreements with the feudatory chiefs and zamindars in Cuttack and Chhattisgarh who owed allegiance to Bhonsle. After the treaty of Deogaon, Chhattisgarh districts (Sambalpur and Patna) were to be restored to Bhonsle. It was not however without great hesitation that the Governor General restored these districts to the Nagpur Government. The zamindars, however, were refractory and would not willingly submit to the Nagpur Government. Troops had to be sent to these parts to reduce them to submission. The Rajah of Sambalpur and his son were confined by Nanasaheb, the Bhonsle Rajah's brother, but the Ranee held Sambalpur by force and would not admit the Nagpur officers unless her husband and son were released. Another zamindar Jujarsing, was equally defiant and ultimately went under British protection. The Ranee of Sambalpur similarly took refuge in British territory when expelled from her fort. Bastar, another feudatory of Nagpur, also took this opportunity of defying the Bhonsle's authority and had to be reduced to submission by force. The Bhonsle's claim to Shahgarh,* another zamindari in Bundelkhand was rejected by the Governor General, after a prolonged correspondence. Raghuji's attempt at securing Garhakota was also foiled by Sindhia's General, Baptiste.

After the Second Maratha War, Raghuji maintained a strictly neutral attitude and never gave any provocation or cause of offence to the British. He knew his own weakness and the futility of any attempt against the British either singly or in combination with others. He thus never yielded to the temptations and hopes held out by Sindhia and Holkar and kept them at an arm's length. On the other hand, he did not yield, even under trying circumstances, to the pressure brought to bear upon him by the Residents and the counsels of his ministers for entering into a subsidiary alliance on the lines of

* *Shahgarh*, in the Sagar District of C. P.; its chief town named Shahgarh being situated about 40 miles North-East of Sagar. held, in 1808 by a descendant of Hardi Sah, the third son of Chhatra Sal Bundela.

Poona and Hyderabad, and thus freeing himself from the standing danger of the Pindaris. Perhaps it was due to this practical wisdom of his that he maintained his independence, precarious as it was, till his death. So jealous was Raghuji of the British intervention, that it was with great reluctance that he permitted even the stationing of British troops within his boundaries.

Raghuji's domestic life was by no means happy. It is described by Jenkins. There were dissensions in his house. His brother Nanasaheb and his (Nanasaheb's) wife and son were never friendly towards him. So was also his sister's son Gujaba Gujar. His only son Parsoji, Balasaheb, was both mentally and physically weak and was dragging on a miserable existence. Nanasaheb and Appasaheb were both eager to succeed Raghuji, as Balasaheb was physically and mentally unfit to rule. Nanasaheb even wanted to establish his separate Court.

The death of Raghuji II brought the long sought for opportunity for a subsidiary alliance within easy reach. The struggle for supremacy between Appasaheb and Bakabai, the widow of Raghuji II, drove Appasaheb into the arms of the British and he immediately entered into an alliance as regent on behalf of the imbecile Raja Parsoji. By the admission of a British force and by the other terms of the treaty of 1816, Appasaheb accepted a position of positive subordination to the British Government. Soon after the event Appasaheb succeeded to the gadi on the death of Parsoji. He however entered into intrigues with Bajirao against the British. An open rupture took place and Appasaheb's troops attacked the British force at the Sitabaldi hills, but were repulsed. Another battle, fought on the plains of Sakardara near Nagpur, annihilated the military power of Appasaheb, who surrendered himself to the Resident under some conditions and was replaced on the masnad. Consequent on discoveries of his complicity with the Peshwa Bajirao who was advancing towards Nagpur,

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the Resident thought it prudent to arrest Appasaheb and put him out of harm's way. Appasaheb was arrested and sent under a guard to Allahabad. He escaped on the way and never returned to Nagpur. After wandering for some years evading pursuit, he took refuge at Jodhpur where he died in 1840 A.D.

After Appasaheb's flight Raghuji III, a son of the daughter of Raghuji II, was proclaimed Raja, and he having died without issue, in 1853, the Nagpur State lapsed to the British Government.

Y. M. KALE.

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164	Vazir Mohamed Khan, Nabab of Bhopal.	Governor General	1 July 1810	295
82	Wallace (Col.)	Col. Close	9 November 1805	125
180	" "	"	20 November 1805	349
181	" "	Elphinstone, Res., Nagpur	21 November 1805	350
182	" "	Col. Close	23 November 1805	350
123	Wellesley, Arthur (General)	"	19 December 1804	220
124	" "	Res., Nagpur	19 December 1804	220

GOVERNORS GENERAL CONCERNED WITH NAGPUR.

1. Warren Hastings—20th October 1774 to 1st February 1785.
2. John Macpherson—1st February 1785 to 12th September 1786.
3. Lord Cornwallis—12th September 1786 to 28th October 1793.
4. Sir John Shore—28th October 1793 to 6th April 1798.
5. Earl Mornington, Marquis Wellesley—17th May 1798 to 30th July 1805.
6. Lord Cornwallis—30th July 1805 to 5th October 1805.
7. Sir George Barlow—5th October 1805 to 31st July 1807.
8. Lord Minto—31st July 1807 to 4th October 1813.
9. Lord Hastings—4th October 1813 to 1st January 1823.

1. Parson
2. Kimber
3. Raghun
4. Janojir
5. Mudhu
6. Raghun
7. Vyank
8. Khand
9. Parson
10. Appa
11. Raghun

1. Elliott,
2. Wathers
3. Anderson
4. Chapman
5. Forster
at N.
6. Colebu

1. Mountain
March
2. Richard J
3. Capt. W.
4. F. Wilder
5. Capt. A.
6. H. S. Gro
7. Lieut.-Col
8. R. C. C.
9. Major Tho
10. Colonel A.
11. Capt. G. R.
12. T. R. David
13. C. G. Man
14. Capt. E. K. F.
annexation
MO-III B. C. I

IMPORTANT DATES.

1. Parsoji Bhonsle, 1st Sena Saheb Subah, 1707—1709 A.D.
2. Kanhoji—1710—1730 A.D.
3. Raghuji I—1730—14th February 1755 (*d.*)
4. Janoji—1755—16th May 1772 (*d.*)
5. Mudhoji's death—19th May 1788.
6. Raghuji II from 1772—22nd March 1816 (*d.*)
7. Vyankoji's death at Benares—20th July 1811 A.D.
8. Khandoji Chimna Bapu—*d.* 16th August 1789.
9. Parsoji II (Balasaheb)—14th April 1816—1st February 1817 (*d.*)
10. Appa Saheb—21st April 1817—deposed 15th March 1818 ; *d.* 15th July 1840.
11. Raghuji III from May 1818—11th December 1853 (*d.*)

British Embassies.

1. Elliott, A. K.—1778. Died on his way to Nagpur.
2. Watherstone (Lieut. D.)—1778.
3. Anderson (David)—1781.
4. Chapman (Charles)—22nd January 1782.
5. Forster (George)—15th January 1788 to 10th February 1789 and again 1791 January (died at Nagpur on 5th January 1791).
6. Colebrooke (H. T.)—18th March 1799 to 18th May 1801.

British Residents at Nagpur.

1. Mountstuart Elphinstone—1st January 1804 to 25th January 1807 and again March 1808.
2. Richard Jenkins—25th January 1807 to 29th December 1826 (except March 1808).
3. Capt. W. Hamilton—29th December 1826 to 12th April 1827.
4. F. Wilder—12th April 1827 to 19th February 1830.
5. Capt. A. Gordon (Act.) 1830, March to June.
6. H. S. Græme—June 1830 to 1833.
7. Lieut.-Colonel J. Briggs—31st May 1834 to 1835.
8. R. Cavendish—1835 to 13th November 1839.
9. Major Thomas Wilkinson—13th November 1839 to 12th September 1844.
10. Colonel A. Spiers—1st December 1844 to 1847.
11. Capt. G. Ramsay—January 1847 to 12th March 1849.
12. T. R. Davidson—12th March 1849 to August 1850.
13. C. G. Mansel—1850 to 4th March 1854.
14. Capt. E. K. Elliott—Resident and first Commissioner from 5th April 1854 the date of annexation.



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NAGPUR AFFAIRS

SECTION 1

Beginning of closer relations with the British

1781-1803

No. 1—Warren Hastings deposes Charles Chapman as an envoy to the Court of Nagpur in order to persuade the Raja to mediate between the British and the Marathas with a view to terminate the war. Mr. Chapman was to act in concert with David Anderson who was deputed to the Court of Mahadji Sindhia.

FROM—WARREN HASTINGS,

TO—CHARLES CHAPMAN.

Benares, 12th November 1781.

The Raja of Berar having expressed a desire that one English gentleman in my confidence may be sent to his Court, I have thought proper to comply with his request, and depute you thereto accordingly. Your credentials are enclosed.

You are to consider the object of your commission to be to strengthen and increase the friendship and alliance virtually subsisting between the Company and the Berar Government. You will be furnished by the Secretary at the Presidency, with copies of all the papers that are material to your information respecting the relation in which the two Governments stand to one another, and the Persian translator has orders to give you copies of such part of the correspondence between them as you may require.

Should any circumstances occur that may present a favourable opportunity to the Rajah to act offensively against Hyder Ally, and he or his Minister should show a disposition to employ the Berar forces in

doing so, you will encourage it, and acquaint the Board with any reasonable conditions on which such aid may be proffered.

The indecisive conduct of the Berar Government, subsequent to its offer of mediation and guarantee of peace between the Company and the Maratta State, having thrown the credit and honour of such interference into other channels, you can now only accept of the assistance which the Raja's influence, as a member of the Maratta State, may enable him to afford for effecting a speedy termination of the war, unless the other members of the Maratta State should require or approve his guarantee, of which you will be advised by Mr. Anderson, and in this and on every other occasion which may result from his negotiations, you will act conformably to his advice and requisition.

Should the Rajah, as he declares his intention to be, pay a visit to Poona, and invite you to accompany him you will comply with his desire, but as Mr. Anderson has been deputed by this Government with full powers to conclude a treaty of Peace with the Maratta State, you are on no account to enter upon any negotiation but at his express requisition, and you are in every respect to consider yourself as subordinate to him, and to promote the object which (he has) been appointed to accomplish.

In this qualification of your powers, I know that I conform to your own wishes, but should any unforeseen accident happen to Mr. Anderson that will prevent him from being present at an assembly of the efficient members of the Maratta State, or otherwise acting on the orders given him, and he shall write to you to that effect, and you yourself be on the spot, and find them disposed to accommodate their disputes with the Company, the powers entrusted to Mr. Anderson are in such cases to devolve to you, and you will act in conformity to these instructions, a copy of which is given to you enclosed, and to such further instructions as he shall give you.

Mr. John White is appointed your assistant on this deputation, and he and yourself are authorised to draw the full allowances usually given to persons employed in your respective capacities.

No. 2—Cornwallis informs Malet of his having deputed Mr. George Forster to the Court of Nagpur in order to ascertain the Raja's disposition towards the Company and, if possible, to conciliate his goodwill in a confederacy to be formed against Tipu.

FROM—EARL CORNWALLIS,

TO—CHARLES MALET.

On the Ganges, 28th October 1787.

Moodajee Bhosla, the Rajah of Berar, having lately in a letter to me expressed a strong desire to continue and strengthen the subsisting

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friendship between him and our Government, and having also intimated a wish to make some confidential communications to me through his old Vakeel Beneram Pundit, whom he ordered to repair to him for that purpose, I have very willingly upon this occasion availed myself of the opening which has been given by Beneram Pundit's having declined, on account of his great age and infirmities, to undertake the journey from Benares to Nagpore, to depute a Company's servant to Moodajee in order to ascertain, as far as we can, his real disposition toward us and to conciliate his good will and attachment to our interests. Mr. George Forster has accordingly been appointed to this office and in a few days hence he will begin his journey from Cawnpore. He is furnished with two letters from me to Moodajee.

The first is in the usual form of a credential letter and the second letter is provided for the event of a rupture with Tippoo, in which case only it will be delivered. I have in that letter confined myself to a general declaration of my desire to form a close connexion and alliance with the Mahratta Chiefs for carrying on the war against Tippoo as a common enemy; and Mr. Forster is instructed to be extremely cautious in making any specific propositions unless he should see great reason to believe that they would meet with a favourable reception. Should he find Moodajee well inclined to enter into our measures, Mr. Forster is instructed to consider it as the principal object to obtain his utmost exertions to prevail on the Poona administration to take the lead in a general confederacy of the Mahrattas to renew the war; and he will throw out to him nearly the same inducements that you have been empowered to make to the Poona Ministers. But he is not to form a separate connexion with Moodajee, even if desired, without a previous communication of the proposed terms to this Government, as from your description of the suspicious temper of the Poona Durbar I think it possible that Nanna may at first entertain some jealousy of our carrying on a closer correspondence than usual with Moodajee. I have been the more particular in explaining my motives for deputing Mr. Forster as well as the substance of his instructions, that you may with confidence assure the Minister that they contain nothing inconsistent with the personal esteem for him, or with the close connexion and friendship with the Peshwa's Government, which I conceive to be for our mutual advantage, and which I have ever professed it to be my inclination to maintain. Mr. Forster is instructed to correspond with you, and you will from time to time convey such communications to him as may appear calculated to promote the purposes for which you are both employed. Enclosed is a cipher with its explanation in the public cipher for your correspondence with Mr. Forster.

The new cipher shall be forwarded in a separate dispatch.

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Jan.

No. 3—Forster writing to Malet from Nagpur intimates that he would soon quit the place, that the Court of Nagpur was fast declining in strength and activity, and that the Peshwa's ministers eagerly embraced the opportunity to effect the dependence of the Nagpur Raja on the Peshwa's state. The Raja was going to visit Poona shortly.

FROM—GEORGE FORSTER,

TO—CHARLES MALET.

Nagpur, 11th January 1789.

I had the pleasure of writing you on the 18th December, since which time I have been officially recalled from this place which I shall leave about the 1st February.

But before I quit the station, I consider it my duty, as well as an act of friendship, to lay before you a sketch of the Nagpur Durbar at this juncture. Ragojee will proceed in a few days to Berar where he talks of celebrating the Hooly festival and thence will go on to Poonah with a small body of troops.

The cause of this journey, he alleges to me, proceeds from a desire of concerting with the Peshwah's Ministers, some fixed plan for the mutual aid and benefit of the two States, and of procuring a conference with Nizam Ali, who, it is said, purposes to meet the Peshwah at Punderpur. Other intelligence which I have received and am induced to reasonably credit, intimates that the Peshwah has peremptorily required Ragojee's attendance at Poonah that he may personally receive his homage, and publicly exhibit to the southern states the vassalage of the Berar Government, and that he has also declared that if Ragojee does not come to Poonah, he will go to Nagpur. The fact, I believe, is that the Peshwah's Ministers seeing what is conspicuously evinced in these parts, the Rajah's delinquency in strength and activity, and that his avarice and seeming incapacity of governing have produced a common dislike of his person, eagerly embrace the occasion of effectuating his dependence on the Mharatta State at large; which his father, by a more extensive ability, warded off with no ill success.

He has expressed to me a wish that until his return from Poonah I should continue my residence at Nagpur, which, he thinks, will give a respect to his Government and more forcibly aid him at Poonah. As he apprised me of his intention to address Lord Cornwallis for such permission, I held it incumbent on me to inform His Lordship that any earnest attention to the interests of Berar under its present Chief might not improbably obstruct the measures of our Government, in any meditated closer connection with the other Powers of the Deccan.

Tho' no difference of moment exists, I believe, at this period between Ragojee and the Nizam, yet this prince will no doubt attempt to extract every possible benefit from the present weak condition of the Bhosillah,

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and endeavour to recover those territories in Berar, which the old Ragojee wrested from the Nizamut.

Chimnaje, however ill disposed he may be to his brother, does not now evince any inclination of raising public disturbance ; but, perhaps, may aim at something during the Poonah visit.

Into whatever quarter of the world I may, my dear Malet, be thrown, for surely I was born under a wandering planet or a shooting star, I intreat you to ever class among your faithful and affectionate friends,

George Forster.

PS.—I have just received advice of the total overthrow of Gholam Kadar and his escape with a small party to Ghous-Ghur.

No. 4—Forster expresses to Malet his concurrence in the latter's suggestion of encouraging Hindu pilgrimage to holy places by granting special exemption from the tax.

FROM—GEORGE FORSTER,

TO—CHARLES MALET.

Nagpur, 4th February 1789.

In reply to your last, I can only say, that your ideas on the benefits that will result to your Government from a liberal encouragement of Hindoo pilgrimage and granting specific immunities to the Bhoslas, wholly coincide with mine. Much good must arise from it, at an almost nameless expense.

Ragojee, who is very dilatory in his movements, being yet within the sound of Nagpur music, will, if possible, put off the Poonah journey. As I finally purpose to leave this place in four days, whether our chief be nolens or volens†, this probably will be the last Nagpur letter from yours ever, George Forster.

No. 5—In this his last communication from Nagpur Forster communicates to Malet the Raja's confession of his weakness and urges upon him (M) the advisability of not allowing the Peshwa to enfeeble the Raja.

FROM—GEORGE FORSTER,

TO—CHARLES MALET.

Nagpur, 10th February 1789.

Since writing you on the 4th I have been favoured with yours of the 27th January enclosing duplicate of the 17th ditto, and I have, now, the pleasure of informing you that I have received from Ragojee a very kind

† Whether he will or not.

and cordial leave which gives me much satisfaction, as it would have been mortifying to me, after the expense that has been incurred and the endeavours that I have unremittingly exerted to please him, to have left Nagpur in a cold and cloudy manner.

But the total reverse is the fact.

Ragojee's movement to Poonah proceeds virtually from the cause noted in my letter of the 11th January, "other intelligence," etc., and I have by a frank and close directed conversation *compelled* the Rajah to confess the truth.

As he sees our extent of power and believes in our influence at your quarter, he desired me to give him a letter to you in behalf of aid and countenance which I cannot do, but must honestly mention to you that though the house of the Bhonsla is not now strong or respectable or capacitated to afford us aid, it may take a better form, and that I do not hold it sound policy to permit the Peshwa to demolish or greatly enfeeble it. You may revolve this sentiment in your own mind and confide in your good judgment and good faith.

In a long and unreserved conversation at parting I intimated to Ragojee, that in the probable event of a proposal made to him at Poona in behalf of the Company, that I deemed his interest concerned in an acquiescence, and though at the first aspect he might not discover the benefits accruing from it, that he might rest assured the English were not unmindful of offices of friendship and goodwill.

I said no more; nor can say more to you as I have one foot in the stirrup and am agreeably to a lady phrase "in a mighty fussation".

Believe that your correspondence and friendship will be always deemed an honour by your *George Forster*.

No. 6—Cornwallis advises Malet not to evince to the Peshwa's Court an eagerness on the part of the Company to acquire Cuttack from the Raja of Nagpur and concurs in Malet's suggestion of offering the Peshwa facilities for Hindu pilgrims proceeding to the north.

FROM—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

TO—CHARLES MALET.

Fort William, 23rd February 1789.

I think it only necessary on the present occasion to answer the parts of your letter which relate to the means of forwarding our views upon Cuttack.

The consideration of the value of that province both to the Company and to the Bhonsla family, offers so many grounds for apprehending difficulties in obtaining a voluntary cession of it from the Marrattas, that

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I cannot bring myself to be sanguine in the hopes of immediate success to our wishes ; but I am clearly convinced that our best chance will arise from the eagerness and anxiety of the Peshwa, and from a constant appearance on our part of indifference to the event of the negotiation for the proposed exchange.

Upon this principle I do not wish that any steps should be taken directly by you to prevail upon Ragojee to consent to the cession, but that the Poonah Ministers should understand that you are instructed to leave all the preliminary parts of the transaction entirely to themselves.

If Ragojee should execute his declared intention of making a visit to Poona, the long connection which has subsisted between the Bhonsla family and this Government, will require that you should clearly manifest a disposition to show him marks of particular attention and respects. But to avoid giving ground for suspicion or jealousy to the Poona Minister, my wish is that you should consult Nana and even be guided by him, unless you should see any very material objection to it, in all steps that you take to give public proofs to Ragojee of the consideration in which he is held by this Government.

You will, however, be studiously careful to suppress all appearance of anxiety to obtain this consent to the cession, unless Nana should, in explicit and earnest terms, request your interference and assistance. And even in that case it will tend most to promote the success of our real wishes, that you should uniformly appear to lend your aid in the negotiation more from a spirit of accommodation and friendship to the Poonah Government, than from any impatience on our part to acquire the province.

I concur in a great measure with your opinion that it may be wise in this Government to devise means for encouraging a spirit of pilgrimages among the Hindoos of Hindoostan and the Deccan to the Company's dominions, and for that reason, if you could come to the discussion of conditions for the cession of Cuttack, I should have no objection to grant particular privileges or even exemptions from all Government duties to Marratta subjects or religious visitant pilgrimages to Benares and Gayah and to Jaggenaut when surrendered to us.

The acquisition of Cuttack would be of so much real importance to the Company, that I should not scruple to furnish you with the means of making any liberal presents in money to any of the ministers who could give a decisive assistance in forwarding the accomplishment of the object in question : and I should be much guided by your opinion in determining the extent of the sums to be so applied, as you would be qualified to form the best judgment on the mode of applying such sums in the most efficacious manner for inciting different individuals to make their utmost exertions to bring the negotiations to a successful termination.

[Feb.

No. 7—Cornwallis once more deposes Forster to Nagpur to induce the Raja to acquiesce in the passage of an English detachment passing from Bengal through Cuttack to Madras.

FROM—EARL CORNWALLIS, G. G.,

TO—GEORGE FORSTER.

Fort William, 28th February 1790.

The state of public affairs, and the confidence which I repose in your good conduct, having induced me to determine, with the concurrence of the Council, to depute you to Nagpur to reside there on the part of this Government, in the same office that you held by my appointment in 1787, you are to proceed to that capital by the way of Cuttack.

On your arrival at Cuttack you will send notice thereof to Sadasheo Rou or the principal Officer, whoever he may be, of the Berar* Government in the absence of the naib Rajah-Ram Pundit, acquainting him that my friendship with his Master has induced me to send you to Nagpur, and that you have stopped at Cuttack in order to explain to him the necessity I have been under, notwithstanding the letter from Sadasheo Rou and a translated copy of which is herewith sent with my answer to it, to order the march of Colonel Cockerell's detachment to the southward without delay. You will acquaint him that I have a proper sense of the friendly sentiments expressed in his letter, and as it is my earnest wish that the people of the Cuttack country should not suffer any inconvenience from the circumstance of the Company's troops passing through it, it shall be at his option to receive payment in money for any grain that may be supplied in his district to our detachment or payment in an equal quantity of the articles provided on a certificate of it from Colonel Cockerell. You will also inform Sadasheo Rou or the Principal Officer of the Berar Government at Cuttack, that desirous to give proofs of my regard and friendship for the Rajah I shall be very well disposed, if the distress which he mentions from a scarcity of grain should continue, to forward and encourage the supply of it to Cuttack from the Company's provinces in any way that may be thought best.

You will continue there until the detachment shall have passed the southern frontier of the province and you will communicate to Lieut. Colonel Cockerell whatever you may judge deserving of his notice.

Upon leaving Cuttack you will make the best of your way to Nagpur and deliver a letter inclosed in this to Ragojee Bhonsla with a few presents that will be sent to you for that purpose. You will acquaint him that I have thought this a proper time, when the Company are engaged in a war against our common enemy Tippoo in the defence of the rights and interests of an ally of the Carnatic, to mark their friendship for the Rajah

*A term wrongly used for Nagpur by the British, though the Bhoslas never called themselves Rajas of Berar.

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No. 8

FROM
TO

You will
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of Berar and their consideration for the station he fills among the Powers of India, by deputing you to him, for the purpose of facilitating the correspondence between us, and advising him of any circumstances, occurring in the course of the war, that I should wish him to be properly informed of. You will satisfy him upon the point of our detachment passing through his country, the occasion not admitting of my delaying its march until his answer to the letter, which I wrote to him on the subject, should arrive, a formality the less necessary between friends, situated at a distance from each other, but interested in whatever may tend to the benefit of either State. You will acquaint him also, in the course of your conferences, that if, in consequence of the friendship subsisting between the Peshwah and the English, the forces of the Maratta State should act with ours in the prosecution of the war against Tippoo, I shall persuade myself that the Rajah of Berar will co-operate with us, as far as it may be in his power.

It will be satisfactory to yourself, and pleasing to the Rajah, to be informed that my selection of you to proceed to his capital has been founded on my approbation of your conduct when you were last there, and on the testimony which he also has borne to it.

You will write to me constantly, advising me of any occurrences of an interesting nature, whenever they happen, and you will also correspond with the Government of Bombay and Fort St. George, and the Residents at Poona and Hyderabad and with Sindia upon any subjects appertaining to the interests of the Company under their direction. The cypher now in use in the secret correspondence of the different presidencies and public Ministers, is enclosed.

The Secretary has orders to show you the several proceedings of this Government, since intelligence arrived of Tippoo's attack on the lines at Tellicherry.* He will also inform you of the rules under which you are to regulate your disbursements in the office to which you are appointed.

No. 8—The G. G. explains to the Bhonsle Raja the purpose of his deputing Mr. Forster and the circumstances under which British troops had to march through the Raja's country without his previous consent. He also proposes to enter into an agreement securing mutual honour and advantage.

FROM—EARL CORNWALLIS,

TO—RAGHUJI BHONSLE.

Fort William, 5th March 1790.

You will have received and understood the contents of my last letters, written 29th January and 2nd February.

* Should be Travancore.

The custom that has tended to establish a firm friendship between the Company and your late father and since his death with you of making known and communicating upon, without restraint, all subjects that occur, has at various times induced me to write you the most friendly letters, and to adopt such other modes as appear to me most conducive to strengthen the good understanding existing between us.

You will recollect the proof I gave of this friendly disposition by the deputation of Mr. Forster about 3 years ago to Nagpur, and that when I conceived that you were fully convinced of my desire for this object, and that the end of it had been obtained in a manner that it was not in the power of incidents to affect it, I requested you would give him leave to return to Calcutta. The conversations I have had with Mr. Forster since his return have given me very great satisfaction; and his repeated assurances of the friendly treatment he received from you during his stay, with the regret you expressed at his departure, have not only convinced me of your friendly disposition towards the English Government and myself, but have evinced your inclination for the residence of Mr. Forster with you in preference to any other gentleman. I have in consequence determined to depute that gentleman to you whenever his presence there may appear necessary.

By my letters you will have learnt of the unprovoked breach of engagements lately exhibited by Tippoo Naik, with my resolution of going in person to Madras to punish him for his faithless conduct; and that in consequence of the nomination of General Medows, an officer in whose abilities I have the highest confidence, I have postponed that intention. In order however to prove to the world, that the Company are steadfast to their engagements and will hesitate at nothing to defend their friends and allies from insults and injuries, I thought proper to depute a large detachment to Madras at a very considerable expense, and as the success of a war depends on the exertions and measures on the commencement being carried on with vigour and without any delay, I resolved on sending the detachment by the way of Cuttack without waiting for an answer to my letter to you on that subject, for I rely too much on your repeated professions of friendship to doubt your ready and cheerful acquiescence. Notwithstanding the confidence I place in your friendship, it has occurred to me that during a war in which the Company, however well inclined to live at peace with all Hindostan, are involuntarily involved by the present unprovoked breach of faith in Tippoo Naik, I should be deficient in my respect to you, as an old and sincere friend, were I not to mark my friendship for you and my consideration for the station you fill among the Powers of Hindostan, by deputing a gentleman high in my confidence, and who, I have such assurances, is pleasing to you, to reside with you for the purpose of facilitating the correspondence between us, and for maintaining the mutual communication of all occurrences, which is a proof of friendship and a means of strengthening and increasing it. I therefore

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adding this account
a copy of the letter

have sent Mr. Forster to reside with you. He possesses my entire reliance on his abilities and on his respect and friendship for you, and has my instructions to satisfy you fully on the point of the detachment under Colonel Cockerell passing through Cuttack without waiting for your answer to my letter, a formality the less necessary between friends, situated at so great a distance from each other and interested in whatever may tend to the benefit of either state. He is instructed to proceed by the way of Cuttack that he may explain to the Naib there the necessity I have been under, notwithstanding the letter I received from him urging objections to this measure, of ordering the troops to march that way without delay, and both Mr. Forster and Colonel Cockerell who commands the troops have my positive orders to advise upon the most efficacious measures of preventing all inconveniences to the inhabitants and ryots by the march of the troops, as well in choosing proper places for them to halt as in procuring the supplies necessary for them.

By the blessing of God this faithless conduct of Tippoo will afford me an opportunity of proving my attention to treaties, and my determination to protect my friends against an enemy whose ambition is known to the world, and whose injuries to the Marratta State have been very great, and I have no doubt but the Marratta Chiefs will consider it to be their duty as well as their interests to take this opportunity to obtain reparation and to recover their territories that were unjustly seized by his late father, and will join in punishing a man who is the enemy of all mankind, and whose heart is bent on the destruction of every sort, as well Hindoo as every other. If in consequence of the friendship subsisting between the Peshwah and the Company the Marratta State should act with ours in the prosecution of the war against Tippoo, I have not a doubt but you will co-operate with us as far as it may be in your power. In this case Mr. Forster is fully authorized on my part to enter into agreements that will promote our mutual honour and advantage.

For further particulars I refer you to Mr. Forster who is charged with a few articles, which tho' unworthy of your acceptance but as tokens of friendship, I trust you will consider them in that light, and make me happy by receiving them.

No. 9—Malet informs the G. G. of his having taken note of Forster's arrival at Nagpur and writes of his efforts to persuade the Poona Government to speed up their preparations for war.

FROM—C. MALET,

TO—CORNWALLIS, G. G.

Poona, 2nd July 1790.

On the 29th ultimo I was favoured with a letter from Mr. Forster advising his arrival at Nagpur and on the 1st instant transmitted him a copy of the treaty of Poona for his information.

[Jan.

In consequence of an application from Colonel Abercromby to procure a supply of cash for his Government at an exchange anything better or even at ninety, I have this day granted Bills on the Resident at Benares for Rs. 20,000 for 18,250 here, or exchange at $91\frac{1}{4}$.

I am credibly informed that several large sums of money have been paid to this Government by Tippoo's Vackeels since my last address, and in reply to my expostulations am told in addition to what has been already said, that this money being arrears of tribute due from a period preceding the conclusion of the present treaty, has no connexion therewith. I suffered not this language to pass unanswered. But Your Lordship is by this time sufficiently acquainted with the spirit of this Court to conclude that no language can operate in prevention of the gratification of its ruling passion.

My instances are constant on the point of preparation, to which I receive the usual answers that the invasion of the Marratta troops rests on the receipt of advice of General Medows' commencement of hostilities, and that though for the greater conveniency of forage they have not yet assembled their forces, yet are they all in readiness and will be prepared for action in eight days at farthest after the receipt of the intelligence that is to regulate their motions.

No. 10—Lieut. Davidson communicates to Malet Forster's death at Nagpur on 5th instant.

FROM—J. DAVIDSON, IN COMMAND OF FORSTER'S ESCORT,
TO—CHARLES MALET.

Nagpur, 7th January 1791.

It is with much concern that I have to inform you of the death of your worthy friend and acquaintance, Mr. George Forster, Resident with the Nagpur Government. He died on Wednesday morning the 5th instant about 5 o'clock after an illness of only six days. He was seized with a cold while we were on a party at Geerar* about 40 miles from Nagpur, and a violent fever followed, which soon reduced him to a very weak state.

We arrived at Nagpur on Monday, and hearing of the arrival of a French gentleman, a surgeon from Hyderabad, I called in his assistance, and the moment he had seen Mr. Forster he declared his situation to be past remedy.

I have taken charge of Mr. Forster's public and private papers, and I find by his instructions from our Government, that he is directed to correspond with your Residency, and to be informed of any circumstance that may happen regarding the present war carrying on to the southward.

* *Girar*, in Wardha district, containing the tomb of Shaikh Khwaja Farid, a great pilgrim centre.

I thought it therefore necessary to acquaint you of the unfortunate event of Mr. Forster's decease, and at the same time to (nearly 2 lines torn) Government as Mr. Forster's life time, until the pleasure of the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council of Fort William be known, to whom I immediately communicated the event of Mr. Forster's death by the shortest route to Calcutta.

On perusing your letter to Mr. Forster in date the 14th ultimo, it does not appear to me that he had owned the sight of that letter which he received on the 28th of the month at Geerar, the day before he was taken ill. I therefore beg leave to acknowledge the receipt of that letter, and as nothing of consequence has happened at this Durbar since Mr. Forster wrote you on the 20th ultimo, he left me little more to say than that I am with much respect, etc.

No. 11—Cornwallis writes to Raghuji Bhonsle a letter of strong remonstrance against the conduct of Venkoji Bhonsle in detaining a British subject in custody and causing his death in a violent manner.

FROM—EARL CORNWALLIS,

TO—RAGHUJI BHONSLE.

Fort William, 9th October 1792.

I have received your letter relative to Madhoji Naik Cauleah* and also your letter addressed to Mr. Stuart written in reply to Mr. Stuart's letters on the subject of the disputes occasioned by the zemindars of Nowaguddah and Bahapoor towards Ganjam, and those in the neighbourhood of Chutteesghur.

It affords me very great pleasure to observe your readiness to put a stop to disturbances on the boundaries which, while they occasion great injury to the welfare of the state, are equally detrimental to the inhabitants of the villages thereabout. It is highly incumbent on the intimacy which has subsisted between us for so many years to inculcate on the minds of our respective subjects residing on the confines of our territories, that a friendship exists between the two States, equally with the view to their protection and quiet as to the happiness and welfare of the Governments under which they live; and I request that you will rely on this Government for the necessary injunctions to its subordinate officers to enforce this maxim.

I have paid great attention to your letter relative to Madhoji Naik Cauleah. The circumstances of this affair had been reported to me prior to the receipt of your letter, and I must confess, occasioned me great

* Madhavji Naik Kale having banking business at Nagpur and Benares.

concern. It has been the particular object of my attention to render the city of Benares, which is a place held in high veneration by the Hindoos and much resorted to by them for religious purposes, as secure to them and to the large body of merchants of all nations who follow their profession there as possible; and with that view, a system of Government with an Adawlat has been established for the sole purpose of protecting the city and the travellers who may arrive there. It is not necessary for me to explain to you that such an institution, established for the benefit of all ranks and classes of people, ought to be held most sacred, and every possible means should be adopted to prevent its laws and rules from being infringed in any respect. On the contrary the Adawlat being for the general benefit, every one must submit to its institutes, whatever be his rank.

But, exclusive of the great delicacy which ought to be observed towards a court of justice, you are also a ruler, can determine how much respect is due to the sovereignty itself of a country. The English Company are at all times anxious that their Government should protect the stranger who visits their territories, and will ever be ready to receive him with civility and to treat him with kindness, but at the same time they must insist on a rigid observance of their administration, and will never submit to see their sovereignty slighted or treated with contempt; for it is that alone that can protect the stranger or keep peace and tranquillity in their dominions.

Altho' I am sensible that Rajah Wenkajee Bhoosla had no intention to slight, or in any respect to act contrary to the established Government of Benares, or that he was desirous to overturn a court of justice instituted for the public benefit, and am ready to believe that he was instigated by the evil advice of officious and thoughtless people to detain Goburdass under a guard, during which detention he died*, yet I request that you will reflect how much the Government of a country must lose its respect, among its own subjects and its good intentions be frustrated by such a step, and how much the respect for the Adawlat must be diminished in the eyes of the public by the exercise of a power by others which is vested solely in its own officers. Compare these reflections on the Company's Government with your own State, and your own experience will induce you to coincide in opinion with me. How can any one have a respect for a Government or a confidence in the justice administered by a Court, when the institutes of one and the powers of the other are suffered to be infringed, or the officers allow themselves to be biassed by any influence but that which proceeds from the regulations laid down for their guidance. These regulations are framed to answer every purpose, and consequently any injunctions, even from the Government, can have no effect but to invalidate itself so long as its officers perform their duty. These are the principles on which the Government of Benares and the

* V. yankoji's version of this affair appears on p. 140 of the Nagpur Bakhar.

Court of Justice established by it are founded, and I flatter myself that you will observe that, conformably to them, the letters which you require to Mr. Duncan and to Ally Ibrahim Khan can answer no purpose.

After what I have said, and depending on your well known wisdom in Government, and your experience in the benefits arising to your own state from a just support to your own administration, I am confident that you will give full weight to my observations, and admitting the propriety of them, I doubt not that, influenced by your friendship for the Company, you will strenuously support my endeavours for the prosperity of the city of Benares, by giving positive injunctions to those who may come there from your territories to pay implicit obedience to the laws and Government established, which the Company, in consideration that they are calculated for the happiness of every individual, whether stranger or inhabitant, are determined to support.

It has been long the established custom between us to communicate freely, and without reserve, on all occurrences. On this account, and desirous to increase our intimacy, I have written my sentiments on these subjects unbiassed by any but friendly motives, and I trust that you will put no other construction on my letter. Further particulars will be explained by Bissember Pundit.

No. 12—The Nizam sends a note of warning to the Bhonsle Raja for having encroached upon his rights in Berar.

FROM—MEER ALLUM,

TO—THE RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

25th April 1793.

Translate of a paper received by Sir John Kennaway from Meer Allum, respecting Berar—

The state of the business with Berar is this, that between His Highness the Nizam's Government and the Bhonslah, agreeably to treaties, the mode of collecting the revenue jointly in the said country was formerly fixed and established; and though many treaties have been written, yet the purport and meaning of them is reduced to one, namely that concluded after the battle of Boorgan Manjoo* fought between His Highness and Janoojee Bhonslah, for all the other treaties refer to it. For some time past, on account of want of opportunity and Tippoo being on the look-out for favourable moment, His Highness has not marched to the said country; the Bhonslah, particularly Ragojee, broke through the paths of rectitude

* Borgaon Manjoo (Akola District).

and passing the limits of the said treaty took a crooked route, caused various disturbances and has demanded more than his established right. On this side, as hitherto no opportunity of prevention occurred, such has been the extent and still is, of winking at the encroachments, that even in the eyes of people of little discernment our spirit is called in question; and notwithstanding the repeated representations and threats made and still making through Ragojee's Vakeels directly on the part of His Highness and through the Peishwah's Ministers, no sort of satisfaction has been derived. At this time that the encroachments exceed all bounds and that further neglect of them is highly improper, they being considered as the source of disturbances, it is undoubtedly necessary to think of apprizing Ragojee as far as possible by negotiation either with or without the mediation of others. If the business can be adjusted agreeably to the above treaty, the Nizam will never desire to create trouble or disturbance, except in case of necessity and the failure of all means of negotiation. At all events the arrangement of the country of Berar, the adjustment of affairs, and removal of disturbances will be brought about by whatever means may be in our power. As you enquired for a statement of the business of that quarter the particulars have been written, his Highness's wish is this, that you would give him notice of whatever may be the opinion of the Company's Chiefs in this business. they are the affectionate friends of his Highness's Government.

No. 13—This is a report of an interview which took place at Poona between Raghuji Bhonsle and Malet's Munshi, in which the situation at Poona as viewed by Raghuji was discussed.

Meer Nizam-ud-Deen's report to C. W. Malet of a conference with Ragojee Bhosla 6th January 1797 at 10 a.m.—

After delivering my message as stated in my despatch to the Governor General of this date Ragojee replied in the following terms, viz.—

The friendship of the Company and the Peshwa is well known, but mine is still greater and of long standing, in which there never has been, nor will be, any deviation. On the contrary where the intercourse is kept up through such a channel as C. W. Malet it will increase daily. With respect to your enquiries of the present state of affairs here, the general objects of discussion are so publicly known as to require no explanation, nor can they be unknown to you or your master. Nana acknowledges that Badjirou is his Master, and Badjirou expresses himself with the greatest respect to Nana acknowledging him his senior. The only cause of contention may be a difference of opinion on measures. But as by the grace of God there is a perfect friendship between the Company, the

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Peshwa, the Nazim and me, everything will end happily, and a settlement of the Peshwa's Government is grateful to friends, and those who are wise will perceive who in this State is capable and experienced, and whose words and actions are befitting the affairs of Government. Therefore there is good ground for representing to Badjirou that these matters, on which the prosperity of the State depends, should be assented. For a wise man takes the straight road but does not puzzle himself in crooked and narrow paths; for after all the straight road is the best to arrive at the object. Truly C. W. Malet in these days well discharged the duties of friendship as I have learnt not only from report but from Nana himself, who has assured me that his friendship had exceeded his (N's) expectations, for that without waiting for instructions he had manifested the most friendly disposition. The prosecution of this friendly spirit therefore is incumbent, which on all accounts is expedient. What you say of Nana's retiring is true. It is his intention to do so. But how can the Company, the Nazim and myself, who are desirous of the settlement and prosperity of the Peshwa's Government, assent to his withdrawing when there is nobody to supply his place in the administration of affairs. As there is the most entire unanimity between us, I will in future communicate matters and shall expect the same from C. W. Malet. After this discourse the Raja asked if C. W. Malet had had any intercourse with Nana on this subject, to which I replied that the intercourse between Nana and C. W. Malet had been constant through the long period of 11 years. He then asked the Nizam's disposition, to which I replied that as there was the firmest friendship between the States he could have no other disposition than to increase it. The Raja replied all wise men had the same object.

No. 14—Malet communicates to the Governor General the position of affairs at Poona as disclosed by Raghuji to the former's Munshi. A disposition to accommodate conflicting parties was reported.

FROM—C. MALET,

TO—THE HON'BLE SIR JOHN SHORE, BART.

Poona, 20th January 1797.

I had the honour to address you on the 27th instant and on the 28th my Munshy waited on Ragojee Bhosla by appointment with your letter announcing the intended march of the Bengal Detachment to Madras.

I embraced the opportunity of evincing our friendly disposition to this Chieftain by generally communicating to him at the same time the substance of what had passed between the Peshwa and the other Chiefs and myself on the subject of accommodation, which he received with lively marks and expressions of satisfaction, but without any particular signs of curiosity about any of the parties except Azim-ul-Omra*, of whose

*Azeem-ul-Omrà, Nizam's minister.

disposition he made particular enquiry, to which my Munshy could only reply that like all the other parties it seemed entirely accommodating.

Knowing that the substance of your letter would soon be circulated from the Bhosla Durbar, I thought it would not be inconsistent with the friendly character always maintained and more particularly lately assumed toward all parties, to make known to them the intended movement, which has been well received by all and by some with enquiries of its cause, my answer to which shall be regulated by a proper modification of your letter of the Novr. to R. Bhosla.

Not having heard anything further from Daulat Rao Sindia or Nana Fadnis on the important subject of reconciliation, I yesterday reminded them of my anxiety for the gratification of those hopes that they had encouraged me to entertain, and this morning I have received a very civil answer from Nana Fadnis the substance of which is that he expects to be able to give me the satisfaction I wish in a few days.

It is certain that Nana is disbanding his troops which can only be accounted for in a real or pretended coalition with Sindia. The former may be detrimental to Azim-ul-Omra as it appears to me necessarily to involve some sacrifice of his interests, the latter may be to lull Sindia into a security in the consequences of which Raghuji Bhosla and Azim-ul-Omra may expect to participate with Nana.

An event of considerable importance occupies the present attention of all parties but more especially the Brahmins, the marriage of Badjirou, which, by management and considerable expense it is said, will take place on the 8 of this Moon (this being the first) with the daughter of the late Dadjee Furkia, which family being closely connected and originally dependent on Nana, may, in such a situation, be expected to be conducive to the re-establishment of his influence.

My Munshy at his last audience of Badjirou in company with Moro Pant asked the latter if he should mention to Badjirou Nana's wish of sending military store, etc. to Raighur, to which he at first assented, but recollecting himself said he would consult Nana on the subject, and there the matter now rests.

No. 15—Colebrooke is appointed Resident at the Court of Nagpur.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,

TO—H. T. COLEBROOKE.

Fort William, 23rd July 1798.

Whereas it has been judged proper to appoint a Minister on the part of this Government to the Court of Maha Rajah Raggojee Bhoosla, Rajah

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of Berar, I, the Right Hon'ble Richard Earl of Mornington, K.P., Governor General in Council, in virtue of the powers vested in me by the King and Parliament of Great Britain and by the East India Company to direct and control the political affairs of the Company's settlements in India, relying on your fidelity, prudence and integrity, have appointed you my public minister to remain at Nagpore or such other place where the Rajah may reside, and in this capacity to do and transact all such business as shall be given to you in charge by me, and I hereby vest you with full powers to that effect, declaring that I will confirm whatever you may transact with the Rajah in my name and on my behalf according to the instructions with which I have furnished or shall furnish you for that purpose.

Given under my hand and the seal of the Company at Fort William in Bengal, the 23rd day of July in the year of Our Lord 1798.

No. 16—Colebrooke's interview with Raja Raghuji ; explanation of the object of his mission. Raja consents to the march of British troops through Cuttack. Preliminary discussion about a quadruple alliance against Tipu.

FROM—THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—THE EARL OF MORNINGTON, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 26th March 1799.

I had yesterday a private conference with Raghojee Bhoonsla, at which his Dewan, Moonshee and Chittanwees were present, and I beg leave to report the particulars of it from minutes taken immediately after my return from the Durbar.

At this, as at the preceding interview, the conversation was for the most carried on through the medium of the Moonshee, who spoke to me in Persian and to the Rajah in the Marhatta tongue. The Rajah seems unwilling to speak Hindoostanee, with which he is not very conversant and he himself desired me to use the Persian language.

After some consultation with the Ministers, the Moonshee opened the conference by saying Your Lordship has intimated that some particulars, not trusted to epistolary* correspondence, would be explained by my verbal communications, and the Rajah was therefore solicitous to hear what I had in charge to communicate. In reply I observed that he had announced the wish of disclosing his sentiments on some important subjects which occupied his mind, and in consequence thereof to assure him of Your Lordship's friendly sentiments I attended his Court, but, if more agreeable to him, I would ask the previous explanation of his sentiments. After a short consultation the Raja told me the Moonshee

*By letters.

should deliver what had been the object of his (Ragojee's) requesting my mission. Sridher Pundit accordingly proceeded to state that when the Rajah wrote the letter alluded to, the Peshwa as well as the Nizam had been called upon by the British Government to prepare for reciprocal defence against the hostile designs of Tippoo Sultan, but no intimation had been given to the Rajah, although as an ancient and faithful friend he took so great an interest in what concerned the Company. On the subject of this pretended slight he enlarged, but not so as to lead me to believe that it had been really felt as such, but rather that he wished to become a party to the alliance against Tippoo. I offered immediately to reply, but he proposed first to complete the explanation of the objects of the Rajah's letter of April last.

He then proceeded to say that the distracted state of affairs at Poona had engaged the Nizam's and the Rajah's attention at a distance and on the spot. That ultimately Bajee Raw was raised to the Peshwaship and Ragojee had acquiesced therein, but after his return from Poona (Nana?) had been imprisoned and affairs had become more confused than ever. It therefore seemed expedient that the Rajah should write to concert such measures as the circumstances of the times called for. These were, he said, the two points which gave occasion to the letter above mentioned, and the whole of what the Rajah had directed him to communicate.

I replied that there had not been the smallest grounds for thinking himself slighted, that measures such as he had stated had not been taken at the time he mentioned. This the Rajah would perceive on referring to Your Lordship's declaration. That, meantime it had been determined to depute to his Court, which had rendered the communication of intelligence through another channel unnecessary, and that what I might probably have had your orders to inform him of verbally had I arrived earlier, was superseded by the turn affairs had now taken, of which the earliest notice had been given to him by Your Lordship's letter delivered to him at the last interview.

Under the impression I had received of the real drift of what had been said, I judged this to be a better opportunity than I had even expected for opening a negotiation as commanded by Your Lordship. I, therefore, added that so far from making a secret to him of measures taken to defeat the designs of Tippoo, Your Lordship considered him as a party to the existing defensive alliance with the Paishwa, in which he as a Marhatta State was included. That since the enemies of the allied States had shown their hostile disposition, it seemed advisable for the common defence to defend by a treaty of quadruple alliance, on the basis of the triple one, his engagements as a party virtually included in the existing treaty with the Peshwa and the Nizam.

On the other topic of the Moonshee's discourse, I endeavoured to give the most guarded answer by saying that Your Lordship would no doubt

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always see with regret any distraction in the affairs of Poona and would certainly have great pleasure in securing Bajee Raw's full enjoyment of his power and authority.

The Moonshee by the Rajah's directions told me in reply that the proposition I had hinted of a treaty between the two States was highly gratifying to the Rajah, and the very thing he most wished ; that after the conclusion of it [and not] during the negotiation, would be the best time to consider and discuss other matters ; that this conference having advanced so far, he would propose two or three other meetings on the subject thus opened, and at which everything might be discussed and adjusted. In the course of his reply the Moonshee seemed to disclaim the Rajah's being virtually a party to the existing treaty or any otherwise engaged to us than as an ancient and sincere friend.

Apprehending inconvenience in the progress of the negotiation from an apparent misapprehension which struck me in the term used by the Moonshee, "between the two States", I asked him whether he had expressed to the Rajah the term I had employed, a treaty of quadruple alliance. He said he had not, and asked what occasion there could be to make four states parties to a new treaty when we already had a treaty of alliance with two of them, and which very treaty I named as the basis of the new one. In reply, I repeated what I had already said respecting the Rajah's virtual engagements, and added that a separate treaty would constitute an alliance with the British Government only, instead of being with all the allies, and to obviate an answer he seemed prepared to make I further said that it might, perhaps, be deemed uncandid to make a separate treaty unknown to or exclusive of the other allies. He asked me, whether it was indispensably necessary to make both the other States acquainted with and parties to the treaty. I answered, that whether it were made known to the Peshwa immediately or not, it would, I supposed, be proper to comprehend him and this might be done by concerting the treaty with the Nizam and allowing the Peshwa the option of acceding to it when he judged proper. I added that I mention this merely by way of explanation, not for the purpose of inducing a present discussion when the Rajah had already deferred the further consideration of the subject to a future conference. Sridher Pundit explained this to the Rajah who acquiesced, but his countenance indicated that he would have been better pleased with the negotiation of a separate treaty, and that he felt some disappointment in my having proposed a joint one.

I could have wished to have obtained more full disclosure of the Rajah's sentiments before I added anything to what I first said, but the misapprehension arising from the Moonshee's suppression of a single term rendered an explanation necessary, and it seemed the more strongly so as the Rajah's motives for wishing a separate rather than a joint treaty may possibly be incompatible with his duties to the Peshwa. His

unwillingness to acknowledge himself bound by the existing engagements of the Peshwa, the terms used in removing the acknowledgments of such an obligation, that which was employed in speaking of Bajee Rao's elevation, joined to the hint I received from Bissumbur Pundit and which I had the honour to mention to Your Lordship, all co-operated with the impression of Your Lordship's particular injunctions on my mind to make me under necessity of being so far explicit with the view of discouraging in the earliest stage of the business any sentiments the Rajah may have entertained, inconsistent with his duty to the Peshwa.

I have reason to believe that in every other respect, and I am perhaps unfounded in making any exception, the Rajah's disposition, as well as his interests, are such as Your Lordship wishes them to be. I cannot however yet hazard a decided opinion on his secret views, nor even on his strength and resources.

I beg leave to inform you that the Rajah has given the consent required of him, for the march of troops through Berar*.

No. 17—Copy of the Governor General's letter to the Resident at Hyderabad is sent by him to the Resident at Nagpur in order to keep him well posted with the affairs at Poona and Hyderabad in proposing an alliance with the Raja.

FROM—GOVERNOR-GENERAL (MORNINGTON),

TO—THE RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD.

Fort St. George, 26th April 1799.

The accounts which I have received from yourself and from the Resident at Poona respecting the treacherous designs of Dowlut Row Sindia, either singly or in concert with the Paishwa, against the Nizam in the first instance, and ultimately against the Company, have induced me to transmit to Colonel Palmer and Mr. Colebrooke (the Resident at Nagpore) the instructions of which copies are enclosed.

I refer you to those instructions for a knowledge of the light in which I view the conduct of the Paishwa and Dowlut Row Sindia, and of the general measures which I have determined to pursue in consequence.

You will immediately assure the Nizam and Azim-ul-Omrah at a private audience, of my determination not only to support His Highness whenever circumstances shall admit, with the whole force of the Company against any power whatever, which shall dare to disturb His Highness's dominions while he is engaged in the faithful and zealous discharge of his engagements to the British Government, but also to join with His Highness in inflicting the most signal chastisement on the

* Meaning thereby the Raja's territory viz., Orissa. [Ed.].

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aggressor. And when the occasion may appear to you to require it (which would be when the designs of Sindia were openly avowed) I authorize you to repeat the same assurances to the Nizam in the most public and impressive manner.

You will lose no time in entering with Azim-ul-Omrah upon the consideration and discussion of the treaty which I propose to conclude between the Company, the Nizam, and the Rajah of Berar. The general principles on which I propose to found this treaty, are stated in my letter of the 25th instant to the Resident at Nagpore, with whom you will communicate with a view to the arrangement of the articles in detail.

You must be particularly careful to insist on the article by which I propose to reserve to the Paishwa the right of acceding to the new alliance.

I have great satisfaction in enclosing an extract of a letter which I have lately received from General Harris, respecting the conduct of His Highness's troops serving with the army in Mysore. I desire you will communicate this extract to His Highness and to Azim-ul-Omrah in public Durbar, accompanying the communication with suitable declarations of my satisfaction on the occasion.

No. 18—The Governor General with a view to crushing the growing and menacing power of Sindhia proposes forming an alliance with the Nizam and the Raja of Nagpur, and explains to the Resident the principles upon which such an alliance should be formed.

FROM—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL (MORNINGTON),

TO—HENRY COLEBROOKE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR.*

Fort William, 25th April 1799.

You will herewith receive copies of two letters and inclosures lately received from the Resident at Poona and dated the 8th and 12th of April. You will also receive a copy of a letter to me from the Resident at Hyderabad dated the 17th instant.

The proof furnished by these papers of the hostile designs of Sindia against the Nizam, in the first instance, and ultimately against the Company, demands the adoption of immediate measures for repelling any attempt which Sindia may make upon the Nizam's territories.

With this view I direct that you arrange with the Court of Nagpore, in concert with that of Hyderabad, as speedily as possible, a treaty of defensive alliance between the Company, the Nizam, and the Rajah of

* Similar letters despatched by the Governor General to the Residents of Poona and Hyderabad on 3rd March 1799 in connection with the same subject have not been reproduced here as they have been printed by Martin, Vol. I, CL and CLI.

Berar, and their successors expressly framed to counteract the hostile projects of Dolut Row Sindia.

The sole object of the treaty must be the mutual defence of the territories of the contracting Powers against any attack of Dolut Row Sindia. But care must be taken to provide that the attack of any part of the territories of the Nawaub of Oude shall be considered as an attack upon the Company's possessions.

With respect to the participation of eventual conquest from Dolut Row Sindia, in case of any rupture between him and the contracting Powers, this and other details cannot, perhaps, be better adjusted than upon the principles of the treaties of Pangul and Poona.

An article must be inserted in the treaty for the purpose of enabling the Peshwa to accede to the alliance within a period of one month from the date of his being invited to do so by the British Government.

The Resident at Hyderabad will receive instructions from me to communicate with the Nizam on the subject of the present instructions, and to transmit to you with all practicable despatch the result of the deliberations of the Court of Hyderabad on the occasion.

You will observe that the absence of the greatest and most efficient part of the Nizam's forces in Mysore, joined to the inability of the Company in the present conjuncture to afford him any prompt assistance in troops, leaves His Highness's territories considerably exposed to the attempts of Sindia. It is therefore extremely desirable, and it must be nearly the object of your care to engage the Rajah of Berar to place his army without delay in such a position as may best enable him, in the event of hostilities with Sindia, to afford the Nizam most speedy and effectual aid either by a junction with the Nizam's forces, or by a powerful diversion on the side of Sindia's possessions in Malwah.

No. 19—The Resident reports his interview with the Raja. The Raja expressed willingness to join in the alliance on the condition of a share in the conquests from Tipu.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL, (MORNINGTON).

Nagpur, 26th April 1799.

On the 20th instant I sent a message to remind the Rajah that a long time had elapsed since our last conference. He prevented the delivery of the message by himself appointing the next morning for an interview, apologising at the same time for the delay which had occurred. I waited on him accordingly, and he opened the conference by fully acceding

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to the proposal of a treaty of alliance, which he said, was highly proper and acceptable, since it would confirm and strengthen the bonds of friendship and would not only be satisfactory to the Nizam and Peshwah, but would also increase the existing friendship with those Powers. The Moonshee then proceeded to ask in the Rajah's name a fuller explanation of the form in which I proposed that the treaty should be formed. I stated in reply that it would contain a reciprocal guarantee of the possessions of the contracting parties, including the rights of their allies, so that in case of aggression by an enemy of the allied states they would all co-operate to repel the enemy.

2. The Rajah acquiesced therein, and after many apologies for introducing the subject said that the territories of the Company, Nizam and Peshwa bordered on those of Tippoo, that his (*territories*) did not; that the allied states had partaken of the distresses and hazards of a war in which they were all immediately interested and they had participated in the fruits of victory. If then, in consequence of the alliance now agreed on, he should share the afflictions, he ought also to participate in the benefits of war. That he did not state this as an excuse or objection, for he was at all events ready to enter into the proposed alliance.

3. I replied that although he was less immediately exposed to the hostile attempts of Tippoo, yet he had an ultimate interest in the common defence against an ambitious foe, and that my proposal having been confined to a defensive alliance, there seemed no occasion to consider a subject which belonged to a treaty of offensive alliance. He replied that as defensive engagements might sooner or later involve him in a war, it was desirable to provide now for so probable a contingency. He proposed to me therefore to consider the subject at my leisure or to report it to Your Lordship and wait your orders. I intimated that I should report what had been now said to Your Lordship. He then desired that to prevent mistakes, I would communicate to him what I might state as the substance of his discourse. I proposed that he should rather give me a written note of it, and I would on compliance with a wish he had before intimated to me, deliver a similar note of the proposal I made at the former conference. This was agreed to and accordingly I next day sent the unsigned note, a translation of which is enclosed. The Raja appointed an interview for the following day, but the death of a relation obliged him to postpone it, and he this morning sent his Ministers who delivered to me a note recapitulating the conversation which passed at the last conference. I enclose (No. 2) a translation of so much of it as recites the proposition made by the Rajah.

4. In the course of the conversation of this day's meeting, the Ministers confirmed to me that the Rajah accedes without reservation to the proposal of a defensive alliance, and offers moreover to take an immediate part in the offensive operations against Tippoo, but submits to Your Lordship's

consideration the question of his participation in subsequent conquests. I can perceive in the conversation both of the Rajah and of his Ministers great eagerness and solicitude which, if permanent, would fully meet Your Lordship's wishes. Should you, in the event of the war being protracted to a second campaign, think it advisable to call for the Rajah's co-operation, he has desired that the negotiation may not be made known to the Courts of Poona and Hyderabad in its present state. I shall inform Captain Kirkpatrick how he would wish it to be represented until Your Lordship's pleasure be known.

No. 20—Colebrooke reports another interview with the Raja when he discussed a defensive alliance against Sindhia.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

Nagpur, 25th May 1799.

I have had the honour to acknowledge your instructions of the 25th ultimo received on the evening of the 14th instant. For the reasons mentioned in my address of the 16th I did not demand a private audience of Rajah Raghojee Bhonsla until the 20th, on which date I had the satisfaction to receive copies of Your Lordship's instructions to Captain Kirkpatrick and information from him of the result of his deliberations with the Court of Hyderabad, all which prove to have been as necessary for my guidance as I expected to find them. I immediately sent a message to the Rajah requesting a private audience and met him that day by appointment and again the following evening. His Dewan, Moonshee and Chittanwees and my own Moonshee were the only persons present, besides the Rajah's son, who both days came in towards the close of a very long sitting.

The first day I opened the conference by saying, that it was incumbent on States connected by friendship with Nizam Ali Khan to concert measures for the defence of his dominions against the meditated aggressions of secret or avowed enemies, that on a former occasion the Rajah had himself expressed such sentiments, and that the present circumstances being similar, I had no doubt his sentiments were still the same. He assured of his sincere attachment to the Nizam and asked who meditated aggressions. I named Dowlut Row Sindia. The Moonshee Sridher Pundit then repeated what I had the honour to report to Your Lordship in my last address relative to the different aspect of affairs now and last year. He added that Dowlut Row Sindia was sufficiently employed by his domestic contests now fomented by Pursaram

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Bhow, and could not be at leisure to resume hostile designs against the Nizam, and he asked, if these projects were real, did the Peshwa authorize or connive at them.

Not having Your Lordship's instructions to disclose the Peshwa's treachery, I said, was it possible that one who was bound by the obligations of treaties, should give any sanction to hostile designs against his own ally. This was received as a direct denial, and I therefore took a subsequent opportunity of insinuating that under the awe of Dowlut Row Sindia's power the Peshwa might perhaps be compelled to give an apparent sanction to proceedings which, in his heart, he disapproved. As I seemed to mean only a future possible contingency the hint appeared to make no impression on the Rajah's mind, and I did not venture to make it more pointed.

In the meantime the Moonshee had said, by the Rajah's directions, Dowlut Row Sindia was a servant of the Peshwa. If then he should form designs against the Nizam's territories without or against his Superior's consent, he would be forbidden by the Poona Government, and should he disobey, measures must be then resorted to for the purpose of reducing him to obedience, in which case the Rajah would doubtless be called on to support the Peshwa's authority. However, no orders had been yet received from Poona on this subject.

I replied that if the Peshwa fully possessed a due control over Dowlut Row Sindia circumstances might have been very different. But far as Dowlut Row Sindia was from pursuing the conduct which became him as a subordinate member of the Mahratta Empire, it would not be sufficient to rely on the means the Rajah had pointed out for checking his designs, and more effectual measures must be taken.

Hitherto the subject had been treated with a coldness very inconsistent with the sentiments I previously supposed the Rajah to entertain, and I had therefore advanced with caution towards the object of my instructions; but at this period of the conference the Rajah observed that the subject was of a very delicate nature, and more than usual precautions were necessary to prevent the conversations being overheard. After such precautions had been taken and the Rajah had consulted long with his Ministers, he said he was himself bound by defensive engagements to assist the Nizam, in case of his territories being invaded. If then Dowlut Row Sindia should proceed to execute the projects ascribed to him, he, Raghojee, would co-operate in chastizing him. I said prevention would be better than punishment, and present measures should therefore be concerted which may force Sindia to relinquish his designs, or if he should pursue, that might facilitate the repelling of his aggressions. Being asked what measures I meant to recommend, I then proceeded to the proposal of a treaty of defensive alliance in the terms of Your Lordship's instructions. The Rajah expressed himself well disposed to accede to the proposal, but desired to postpone the further discussion of this matter until the next day, after he should have maturely considered it.

In the course of the conversation when I had remarked that the Peshwa possessed not a due control over Dowlut Row Sindia's conduct, Sridher Pundit asked me whether he should state it to the Rajah as a proposition for concerting measures to restore the Peshwa's authority. I said I had mentioned it incidentally, but had no objection to the present discussion of that subject and to hear the Rajah's sentiments upon it. As he did not in my presence interpret this to the Rajah, I have not reported it in its place as a part of the conversation. Perhaps an inference may be built on this passage that the Rajah would be willing to concert the measures of restoring order to the Poona Government, although he does not propose the subject himself.

The next day the conference was opened on the part of the Rajah by saying it would be better to give the Peshwa the proposed option before the conclusion of the treaty. If he acceded to the invitation the treaty might be at once framed in the shape of a quadruple alliance, or if he refused, one of triple alliance might be subsequently arranged; the Peshwa would have just right to complain of clandestine proceedings, if the Rajah entered into the proposed engagements without such previous option being given to him.

To the various arguments I used against this proposition, he answered that the delay would be productive of no such ill consequence as I objected, since he considered himself as already bound by his verbal declaration, and would act promptly if hostilities should in the mean time be actually commenced. Secondly, when I objected that written engagements would be more definite, he said, "Did I doubt his faithful adherence to a verbal promise?" Thirdly, when after complimenting him in Your Lordship's name on his known probity I objected the possible misconception of a verbal communication, he said this might be obviated by his perusing and acknowledging a statement thereof drawn by me. Fourthly, when I urged that the present confused state of affairs at Poona not permitting the previous communication to the Peshwa, he said that the British Government was ever faithful to its engagements and attentive to the dues of friendship and therefore insisted on a clause comprehending the Peshwa, if he chose to accede. The Rajah would not acknowledge that the state of affairs at Poona was such as could justify him in not previously consulting the Peshwa, so long as Bajee Row has not deserved such neglect from him.

The Rajah endeavoured to vindicate his own consistency in agreeing to the former proposal of a similar clause and objecting to it in this instance, by saying that as we already had defensive engagements with the Peshwa and the Nizam against Tippoo, and he was in alliance with those Powers, the British Government and himself were in respect of each other the only new parties, but that defensive engagements against Dowlut Row Sindia were new to all the parties intended to be comprehended in the treaty now agitated.

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In an earlier stage of the conversation Sridher Pundit had asked me whether this was to be a separate treaty or blended with that before proposed; I said a separate one, at which the Rajah showed much satisfaction, and on this, as on several other occasions, he expressed great solicitude to be made early acquainted with Your Lordship's sentiments on the proposition repeated in my address of the 26th ultimo.

During this conference I took an opportunity of recommending to the Rajah to place his army in a position to afford to the Nizam the most speedy and effectual aid. He said he already had near the Nizam's frontier a sufficient force, I said it would be nevertheless advisable that his army should make a movement which might serve to awe Sindia. He acquiesced, but the choice of the post was reserved for further consideration.

The Rajah proposed to send a confidential person with a letter to Sindia written in strong terms, declaring that if Dowlut Row Sindia invaded the Nizam's dominions, the Rajah would employ his whole force to chastize him. This, he said, would more than probably induce Dowlut Row Sindia to relinquish his designs. I at first declined the offer on the ground that it might prematurely make known to Dowlut Row Sindia the detection of his scheme. I afterwards took the proposal in reference to Your Lordship, and said I should report and inform the Rajah of Your Lordship's sentiments on it.

At the close of the conference I again reverted to the proposal I had made, but with no further success. The arguments used have been already briefly stated in the 9th paragraph of this address. Finding it impossible to prevail unless I could disclose the treachery of the Peshwa I desisted, and the sitting broke up at a very late hour.

The next day Sridher Pundit told my Moonshee in confidence that the Vakeel at Hyderabad informed the Rajah of deliberations having been there held; a similar proposition would, the Vakeel added, be opened by me, but the negotiation would not improbably fail at Hyderabad, it being only suitable to Azim-ul-Omrah's own views and not likely to be approved by the Nizam himself. The Vakeel has been evidently misinformed and has mistaken the project of a defensive alliance for that of an offensive one. I have directed my Moonshee to make this remark to Sridher Pundit in pointed terms. I apprehend the impression must nevertheless remain and continue to render the Rajah averse from acceding to the proposal in its full extent, until I can announce to him the Nizam having agreed to it and made known to him Bajee Row's treachery.

On the 23rd, having completed a Persian statement of the substance of both conferences for a purpose explained in the 9th paragraph of his address, I sent it by my Moonshee to be perused and its accuracy acknowledged by the Rajah. I left blanks for the name of the place and for the date to which and when the army is to move, and I directed him

to urge the immediate filling up of those blanks with my concurrence. But he has not yet seen the Rajah, who was that day indisposed, and who still remains encamped near the Cunhan river where I shall rejoin him if his stay there be prolonged.

I hope Your Lordship will approve my not acknowledging that Bajee Row authorizes or connives at Dowlut Row Sindia's projects. I believe the negotiation would be sooner successful were that fact made known to Ragojee, but not having had any confidential communications from him of his real sentiments respecting affairs at Poona, nor instructions from Your Lordship for disclosing to him Bajee Row's treachery, I could not take upon me to do so. In the answer I gave to the question mentioned in the 11th paragraph of his address I was governed by the consideration that Your Lordship's instructions of the 3rd March and 25th April are separate, and if the former instructions are superseded by the last, it may be Your Lordship's pleasure that the former negotiation should be dropped, or perhaps, on the other hand, that it should be pursued independent of the present one.

No. 21—Colebrooke expresses a hope of winning the confidence and help of Sridhar Pandit in the object of his mission.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL IN COUNCIL.

Nagpur, 25th June 1799.

I had last the honour to address Your Lordship on the 30th ultimo. Rajah Raghojee Bhoonsla went two days afterwards on a hunting excursion from which he only returned to partake with the Musalmans of his Court in the ceremonies of the Mohurram. For the reasons which I had the honour to mention in my letters to Your Lordship of the 25th and 30th ultimo, I have not yet thought it advisable since his return to ask an audience on the subject of the last private conferences, and the sickness of my principal Moonshee (who has been compelled by ill-health to return to Benares) prevented my prosecuting the negotiation through him with the Rajah's Minister.

2. On the departure of my principal native servant, I directed my other Moonshee to cultivate Sridher Pundit's acquaintance which he seems to have done successfully, and I have lately received from Sridher the strongest assurances of his devotion to the British Government and of his zeal to forward the views I may have at this Court. His professions are so very strong that I should much distrust their sincerity, were I not

No. 22—Colebrooke's
Complaint
FROM C. H. N. A.
TO—THE RESIDENT

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satisfied that he is guided by his father Kishen* Rao, in whom, I am well assured, I may confide. Kishen Rao and Sridher have great influence with the Rajah, and their opinion chiefly guides him in his foreign transactions. On this account I foresee great advantage in prosecuting negotiations through their intervention. It appears to be the best mode of obtaining Kishen Rao's assistance as he never attends the Durbar, and is therefore consulted at second hand on the matters discussed at my conferences with the Rajah.

3. Upon these considerations and with the view of putting Sridher's sincerity to the test, I instructed my Moonshee to ask of him and Kishen Rao a free communication of the Rajah's sentiments respecting affairs at Poona, and their advice for bringing to a successful issue the negotiation opened at the last private audience.

4. The despatches I yesterday received from the Resident at Hyderabad determined me to adopt this measure, preparatory to the further steps I shall be enabled to take on the receipt of the promised letter from the Nizam or Azim-ul-Omrah. The same despatch likewise furnished me with proofs of Sindia's hostile conduct, which I may adduce to convince the Rajah's minister that such is Sindia's disposition; my instructions to the Moonshee are founded thereon and he is also prepared again to urge arguments similar to those I employed at the conferences formerly reported to Your Lordship.

5. He has this day had a short conversation with Sridher Pundit which was interrupted before he had made much progress in fulfilling his instructions, but from his report of what passed, I am encouraged to expect very good effects from the step I have taken.

No. 22—Colebrooke is directed to settle the frontier question between the Company's territory and the Raja's, near Midnapore.

FROM—G. H. BARLOW, ESQ., SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,
TO—THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR.

17th June 1799.

I am directed by the Hon'ble the Vice-President in Council to transmit to you the enclosed extract of a letter from Lieutenant Colonel Watson, respecting a late inroad made by some marauders from the Mahratta territories contiguous to the frontier of Midnapore, and to desire that you will make the necessary application to the Rajah of Berar to take effectual measures for preventing similar incursions in future and for punishing the authors of the present outrage.

* His real name was Laxman. Colebrooke corrects it subsequently in his despatch dated 9th August 1799. Ed.

The frays and disputes, which occur between the zamindars on the Midnapore frontier and those under the Mahratta jurisdiction, having been ascribed in a great degree to the villages and lands of the respective States on the frontier being so intermixed, that a village or tract of country belonging to one State is often situated at a considerable distance within the general line of the other, a copy of all the papers on this subject will be forwarded to you for your information, and the Vice-President in Council will suggest to the Right Hon'ble the Governor General in Council for his consideration how far it may be expedient to authorize you to enter into a negotiation with the Rajah of Berar for an exchange of the villages or lands in question, so as to form a regular and an uninterrupted line of frontier between the two countries and thereby remove the ground of the evil in question.

No. 23—Colebrooke sends to the Raja copies of documents seized in Tipu's palace showing his faithlessness and enmity towards the British, the Nizam and the Marathas. Sridhar Pandit assures Colebrooke's Munshi that Daulatrao Sindhia does not entertain any hostile designs against the British.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL IN COUNCIL, (MORNINGTON).

Nagpur, 11th July 1799.

I had the honour to receive the printed documents found in Tippoo Sultan's palace (and translations of three of them) which were forwarded to me by Your Lordship's commands. Conceiving it to be your pleasure that the documents alluded to should be communicated to this Court, I intimated to Raghojee Bhonsla that I had received such papers, and would send a translation of the substance of them for his perusal. He expressed much curiosity to see it. In preparing a translation in abstract of the remaining papers (whereof a literal version had not been received), I took care to insert all passages which manifest the inveterate enmity and ambitious projects of Tippoo Sultan against the British Government, the Nizam and the Marhatta States; and I directed my Moonshee to weigh upon such passages at their perusal and upon others which as fully prove the faithlessness of Tippoo Sultan in soliciting an offensive alliance with France immediately after the conclusion of the peace of Seringapattam, in frequently renewing his solicitations without the pretence of injury or infraction of treaties, and finally in sending an embassy to France at the very time when he professed a desire to receive an ambassador from the British Government.

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These documents seem to have made all the impression upon this Court, which could have been wished from them. The remarks of Rajah Raghojee Bhonsla and his ministers on the subject of them have been apposite, and such as shew a just notion of the late Sultan's ambitious and malignant temper and of his unprovoked aggressions on the English Government. The Rajah has returned his acknowledgments for the communication.

Sridher Pundit has not yet fulfilled his promise of giving the information which was required of him as reported in my last address. My Moonshee reminded him of the subject by my orders, but he again postponed it. He assures me that authentic intelligence has been received of Dowlut Row's having withdrawn his troops from the Nizam's frontier, and remarks with some self-approbation that the event confirms the Rajah's and his own opinion of Dowlut Row's not having entertained hostile designs. He adds that Sindia will soon return to Hindustan. His intelligence was partly confirmed by what Captain Kirkpatrick had lately communicated to me; but I did not think it necessary to make any immediate answer combating the inference Sridher Pundit draws from the present pacific measures of Sindia.

No. 24—The Resident reports to the Governor-General on the strength of the Raja's army, revenue and treasure. He comments on the Nagpur military and other services as ill paid, lax of discipline and inefficient.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOK, THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,
TO—THE EARL OF MORNINGTON, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 9th August 1799.

Having now obtained more accurate information than I had been able to procure, when I had the honour to address Your Lordship on the subject of the Rajah of Berar's strength and resources, I beg leave to correct the information then submitted to Your Lordship, and shall again resume the subject when I have succeeded in procuring authentic returns of his forces and genuine accounts of his revenues. From the nature of the Government I have found it necessary to observe delicacy and precaution in these researches, lest the Rajah, who is punctually informed of everything done by me, should entertain a jealousy of my inquiries, but I have at present reason to expect every authentic information through channels which will remain unsuspected.

2. The persons from whom I first received intelligence respecting the military establishment of Berar*, stated it to me at its full compliment without a sufficient deduction for the deficiencies of the several corps which compose the Rajah's army. Some time ago he raised two Brigades, the

*Meaning thereby the Nagpur State. (Ed.)

complement of which was fixed at two thousand men each including regular horse, and it was intended to augment their strength to 12,000 men. But neither Brigade has been ever completed, nor have they been regularly recruited. Being ill paid, many of the soldiers have deserted or taken their discharges and the Brigades are from this and other causes, much reduced. I consider their strength as overrated at 15,000 men; and I have some grounds for thinking, that the aggregate force of both corps falls two or three thousand short of that number. The troops are very imperfectly disciplined, and the artillery attached to the Brigades is far from being well appointed. The only conspicuous trial of them, hitherto made, was at the siege of Hoshangabad; and so little progress was then made by the besiegers, that the place, though strong neither by nature nor by art, would not have been taken, had it not been voluntarily surrendered by the garrison, who found themselves abandoned by the chieftain of Bhopal.

3. Besides these Brigades, the Rajah of Berar has several corps, which constitute what might be termed his household troops; namely, a body of Arabs; another of Pathans; one of foot soldiers armed with carbines; a few companies of sepoys clothed, as well as armed, after the European model; and several corps of Mahratta horse serving as guards. The establishment of infantry under one of the commanders was originally fixed at 4,000 men. The remaining corps of infantry never equalled that number. All are now much reduced through desertions occasioned by disgust at the want of punctuality in the payment of their allowances.

4. The Mahratta horse, I am credibly informed, does not now exceed ten thousand. Upon intelligence first obtained here, I stated a greater number; but I now find that the estimate included troops which are employed in the local duties of remote districts, and which cannot be counted in the effective strength of the Rajah's army.

5. On reviewing the whole of the information which I at present possess, there appears sufficient ground for thinking, that the Rajah might bring into the field the number of troops mentioned in the letter I had the honour to address Your Lordship on the 14th April last, but the utmost strength of his present army does not exceed that force. The troops, which compose it, are neither well appointed nor properly disciplined and the infantry, especially, is far inferior to the regular corps in the service of other native Princes, who have engaged European officers to discipline their forces.

6. With my former statement of the amount of the Rajah's revenue, I remarked that the information I had then received, was much exaggerated. I am now fully confirmed in that opinion and the most correct intelligence, which I have yet obtained, leads me to believe that the Rajah does not annually realise one crore of rupees. His treasure, deposited in the fort of Gawil*, would be the resource for any unusual exigency and having

* Gawilgarh, near the present hill station Chikalda in Berar. (Ed.)

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already recurred to it on two occasions, he would probably do so again upon emergency. I have not made it an object of particular inquiry, but its reputed amount is three crores of rupees, and this does not appear an exaggerated estimate when the frugality of his predecessors is remembered.

7. I have already had the honour to mention to Your Lordship that the troops in the Rajah's service are ill paid; the same want of punctuality pervades every department of expenditure. It is attended with some degree of meanness in the Rajah's dealings with those who have demands on his treasury, and the instances of such meanness, which have come to my knowledge, are so numerous, that I cannot but attribute its prevalency as much to his own temper, as to the disorder in which his finances are seemingly involved. With the habit of administering his own affairs and attending to the detail of trivial matters as well as important business, he could not shut his eyes to any real disorder in his finances, and it is difficult to believe he would deliberately frame a scale of expenditure surpassing his resources, while no state exigency calls for extraordinary efforts. Opposing this reflexion to the appearance of pecuniary want, I still doubt whether his revenues be really inadequate to his standing expenses, and I beg leave to postpone offering a decided opinion on this point until I have seen the genuine accounts, which I hope to procure.

8. The rumour of an intended visit to Poona is still very current among the Rajah's own servants, and the preparations which are here made (apparently for a journey) tend to support its credibility. But the Ministers continue to deny that any such intention is really entertained, my Moonshee has gathered from their conversation, that intelligence has been received from Poona relative to projects there agitated for invading the Nizam's dominions immediately after the close of the rainy season, and I learn through the same channel that Raghojee Bhonsla entertains serious apprehensions of likewise becoming the object of Sindia's ambitious views. Last year whilst Nana was imprisoned, Raghojee Bhonsla dropped the expression that Sindia was mistaken if he supposed Nana had no defenders, for he (Raghojee) would approve himself the true friend of that Minister. This expression was reported to Dowlut Row, and is supposed to have co-operated with other circumstances to embitter the mutual jealousy which previously existed between Sindia and the Bhonsla. I have not yet learnt what further and immediate grounds the Rajah has for his present apprehensions.

9. On reverting to the copy of the cyphered despatch which I had the honour to address to Your Lordship under date 25th June, I observe the error of a name, which I now beg leave to correct. Sridher Pundit's father was there mentioned by the name of Kishen Row instead of Lachman Pundit. The error arose from an inadvertency in the cyphering of that despatch, for which I beg leave to apologize.

No. 25—Colebrooke's estimate of the military strength of the Nagpur Government and its defects.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, THE RESIDENT, NAGPUR,

TO—THE EARL OF MORNINGTON, G. G.

Nagpur, 1st October 1799.

I have the honour to acquaint Your Lordship in my last address, that the Raja of Berar has sent forces to protect his territories from the depredations of Holkar's troops. I supposed Jeswant Rao Holkar to be meant, because this chieftain has possessions near Hoshangabad and because he lately permitted his people to plunder in the neighbourhood of Oojain. However I now learn that the persons who have made incursions in the Rajah of Berar's territories belong to Casee* Rao Holkar, who is himself at Poona and is not supposed to have in any manner authorised their present proceedings.

2. The detachment which has marched from this place does not much exceed two thousand infantry. It is accompanied by a small train of artillery and will reinforce a more considerable body of troops already stationed at Gurrah Mundla. Some further arrangements have been made by the Raja of Berar to put other parts of his western frontier in a posture of defence. The detail of these arrangements and the Rajah's particular motives for now making them have not yet come to my knowledge. Rumours do indeed prevail of hostilities impending in other quarters besides Hoshangabad, but what I have yet heard upon this subject does not appear to me entitled to my credit.

3. The Rajah's Moonshee, Sridher, has of his own accord communicated to me the object of Narain Rao's† mission to this Durbar. He says, that the habit of mutually communicating all matters of importance being established between this Court and that of Poona, it has been thought proper to make the Rajah of Berar acquainted with all the particulars of the late arrangements between Sindia and the Peshwa. Narain Rao has accordingly brought for his perusal documents containing the terms upon which an accommodation has been effected, with others explanatory of the transactions which led to the present adjustment. Although this communication has been made voluntarily and with every appearance of candour, I do not think it improbable that the chief object of Narain Rao's mission may be different.

*Tekoji Holkar's eldest and legitimate son.

†Vaidya, the Peshwa's Vakil at Nagpur.

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4. During the last and specially since troops have been in motion to proceed towards the frontier, I have had better opportunities than before of forming an opinion of the military strength of this Government. That part of the Raja of Berar's infantry which is armed with muskets, though constituting in the Raja's own opinion his chief strength, does in reality add little to his military power. The sepoys are so very imperfectly disciplined, that they cannot be said to have learnt the use of firearms; and they are wholly ignorant of manœuvres. The corps of dismounted carabineers, were it even numerous and well disciplined, would be insignificant, because their arms which are more properly blunderbusses than carabines, are ill-suited for a body of infantry. Concerning the corps of Arabs and of Pathans, it is sufficient to say that they are armed and accoutred in the oriental manner, and are not accustomed to a discipline which can fit them for acting with effect in the field. The Artillery is (as I have already had the honour to inform Your Lordship) ill-appointed. The guns do indeed appear to be well cast; and good cattle is allotted to the ordnance department; but the gun-carriages are ill-constructed, and the ammunition and service of the artillery have all the defects common to the ordnance of native Powers.

5. The Cavalry is the most efficient part of the Rajah's military establishment, his ^{his} Pagga horse and that furnished by Siladars or partisans, do not seem inferior to the cavalry entertained in the same mode by other Mahratta chieftains, but the Pindarra or irregular horse adds more to the numbers than to the strength of his army.

6. On this subject I have received some information from an intelligent officer who lately held a principal command in the Rajah's service. He reckons the whole military establishment of Berar* at 55,000 men, including the irregular horse and the permanent detachments in Cuttack and in other remote provinces. I deem this information correct, and Your Lordship will perceive that it does not differ materially from that which was formerly submitted to your consideration.

7. The radical defect of the Rajah's military establishment appears to be the irregular payment of the army. I am now fully convinced that the Raja's own temper, not the want of funds, is the cause of his withholding their pay from the troops. The pecuniary resources are more than sufficient for his expenditure. The rental of his possessions exclusive of late acquisitions, exhibits a gross revenue of 160 lacs of rupees. How much it will be increased by collections from Gurrah Mundla and other recent annexations is not yet accurately known. I do not implicitly credit the estimates which have been mentioned to me, and which state the revenue expected from Gurrah Mundla at forty lacs of rupees. But upon a review of all the information I have lately obtained, I cannot reckon the gross revenue of the Rajah of Berar's territories at an amount much

*Meaning Nagpur.

less than two crores of rupees, and after making every necessary deduction, the net revenue which is realized by him must be rated higher than was done by me when I had before the honour to address Your Lordship upon this subject. It cannot be less than 125 lacs from his ancient dominions, and will probably amount to 150 lacs when the revenue of Gurrah Mundla is fully collected.

P.S.—I am this moment confirmed in the conjecture mentioned in the 3rd paragraph of this address. Sridher has promised a fuller communication on the subject when the further objects of Narain Rao's mission have been discussed. He says, they have not been yet opened to the Raja; but has given no hint of their nature. I shall have the honour to address Your Lordship as soon as I obtain more certain information on this point.

No. 26—The Raja asks the Resident to supply him with a copy of the treaty of Salbye and of the subsidiary treaty with the Nizam.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, THE RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

TO—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

23rd October 1799.

Since the date of my last address to Your Lordship, Sridher Pundithas explained the Rajah of Berar's motive for requesting a perusal of the treaty between the Company and the Nizam, and has added, on the part of the Rajah, a request for copies of the subsidiary treaty with the Nizam, and of that of peace and alliance concluded with the Marhatta Empire through the mediation of Mahdajee Sindia.* Sridher says that in the expectation of soon proceeding to the arrangement of a treaty of alliance with Your Lordship's Government, the Rajah is anxious to prepare himself for the consideration of the terms in which it may be proposed to him to conclude it, that not having hitherto formed written engagements, though always the sincere friend of the British Government, he has no former treaties to refer to for the purpose of making himself previously acquainted with the terms in which they are usually framed; that he has therefore carefully perused such copies as he possesses of treaties between the Company and other Powers of Hindustan, but he doubts whether his Marhatta version of the subsidiary treaty with the Nizam be sufficiently accurate, and, after the most diligent search, he cannot find a transcript of the treaty of peace and

*Treaty of Salbye, 17th May 1782.

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alliance with the Marhattas in which, he observes, Moodajee Bhonsla concurred, and to which he was indirectly a party.

2. Although these reasons seem plausible and not open to much exception, I did not think it expedient to acknowledge that I had a copy of the treaty of Hyderabad, and I therefore replied, that I would address Your Lordship on the subject and solicit copies of both treaties for Rajah Raghojee Bhonsla's information. If Your Lordship should see no objection to a compliance with his request, I beg leave to solicit your orders to the Secretary of Government to furnish me with English and Persian copies of the treaty mediated by Mahdajee Sindia and of such other treaties as Your Lordship may approve of my communicating to the Rajah of Berar, in case his present application should be followed by other similar requests.

3. He continues to manifest great solicitude by his daily inquiries whether I have yet received instructions from Your Lordship. My answers, with little variation in the terms of them, are framed on the grounds of that which I had the honour to report to Your Lordship in my last despatches.

4. Intelligence of the discomfiture of Shehamet* Khan has been received from Berar. I do not give full credit to what has been announced by the Rajah's Ministers as the news received from that quarter, because further reinforcements have since marched in that direction. Preparations are still made for sending a train of field ordnance thither; and two of the Rajah's best battalions of sepoys, which arrived yesterday from the camp near Gurrah, together with one which arrived earlier, are now encamped under orders for marching at a moment's warning.

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No. 27—The Raja repeats his request for a copy of the treaty with the Nizam which Colebrooke evaded complying with as not being authorised by the G. G. The Resident reports an inroad of the Pindaris in Berar.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—THE EARL OF MORNINGTON, GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Nagpur, 17th October 1799.

I had yesterday an interview with Rajah Raghojee Bhonsla by invitation. After renewing his congratulations upon Your Lordship's safe arrival at Fort William he repeated his usual inquiry whether I had yet received any commands from Your Lordship, or when I expected them. I replied in the terms of my last message to him which was reported in my address of the 13th instant, and I added that I had daily expectation of receiving

*A Pindari chieftain nominally subordinate to Holkar.

your commands. He expressed much gratification and acknowledged the expedience of the negotiation having remained suspended; he added that, whenever it was resumed I should find him ready to enter into the proposed engagements. The expression was ambiguous and might signify his readiness to accede to a part or to the whole of the proposition formerly made; wishing to avoid any immediate discussion I did not seek more explicit assurances but expressed in general terms my satisfaction at this declaration, and I find from what Sridher said this morning to my Moonshee, that it was meant as a pointed and unreserved assurance of the Rajah's solicitude to conclude a treaty of alliance.

2. The Rajah then asked whether I had any knowledge of the negotiation which was lately carried on by Colonel Palmer at Poona. To this direct question I thought it necessary to give a candid reply, but without entering into the detail of the negotiation before I am instructed by Your Lordship to communicate it to him, in whole or in part. I accordingly said that I should hereafter make known to him further particulars and should now therefore mention only the principal feature of the negotiation. I proceeded to say that a share of the Mysore conquest had been marked out for the Peshwa, not that he had entitled himself to it by an active co-operation in conformity with the obligations of treaty, but solely through Your Lordship's generosity. That matters not having been satisfactorily adjusted the share would, I supposed, now remain with the Rajah Kishen Roy.*

3. Raja Raghojee Bhonsla hinted a question whether the share which had been marked out for the Peshwa was equally valuable with the portion allotted to the Nizam, or with the territories reserved for the Company. I immediately said that the territories reserved as a compensation for the expenses of the war were moreover charged with Jaghires for the sons of Tippoo and for Kummer-ud-Deen, and on this account and other reasons, proportions were not made equal.

4. The Bhonsla inquired whether it had not been proposed to station a body of troops at Poona on the same terms as at Hyderabad. I said that several points had been discussed in the course of the negotiation, the chief object of which I had just now communicated to him. That the full detail of all particulars had not yet reached me, but I should take an early opportunity of communicating it to him.

5. The subject was here dropped, but he proceeded to ask me whether I possessed a copy of the treaty between the Company and the Nizam, adding that he himself had a copy of it. * * * *

6. Although no forcible objections occur to me, yet I hesitate in complying with this request (so far as it may regard the latest treaty) without Your Lordship's permission, or an opinion from the Resident

*Of Mysore (Ed.).

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8. Intelligence has been very lately received here that Shehamet Khan has invaded and is now plundering the Rajah's territories in Berar proper. Vigorous preparations are making for the immediate march of a large reinforcement to that quarter. A camp has been this day formed on the skirts of the town and the troops are expected to march so soon as an issue of pay shall have been made to them. The Bhonsla has, as I am credibly informed, received a communication from Dowlut Row Sindia, describing Shehamet Khan as a rebel for the chastisement of whom he himself has taken the necessary measures, and recommending it to the Bhonsla to adopt such measures as he may judge proper for the purpose of chastising the rebel, if he invades his territories. It is, however, confidentially reported that the standard of the State will be shortly erected to indicate Raghojee's intention of taking the field in person. Though I do not entirely discredit the rumour, I am confident that the Rajah has no real design of taking the field at this juncture, and the incursions of the banditti under Shehamet Khan are certainly not of sufficient importance to call for that step.

No. 28—Yashwantrao Holkar threatens to invade the Raja's territory to avenge his confinement at Nagpur. The Raja pays his unpaid troops to allay their discontent and prepare them to take the field. He is holding his nephew under strict surveillance.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—THE EARL OF MORNINGTON, GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Nagpur, 20th November 1799.

Rajah Raghojee Bhonsla set off yesterday to meet his mother on her return from a pilgrimage to the temple of Juggunnat. He had previously requested me to wait his return here instead of accompanying him on this excursion, saying that his absence would be very short and that he should travel by forced marches, which it would be inconvenient for me to follow. I declared myself ready to attend his motions, but finding it was evidently his wish I should remain here, I acquiesced therein.

This excursion and another to the temple of Ramtek has been long in agitation; both have been repeatedly postponed by the Rajah after fixing a time for his departure, and that with so much seeming caprice, that even yesterday after making some progress in his first march, he returned to Nagpur and again set off after an hour's stay. The uncertainty of his motions was, I believe, his chief reason for requesting me to wait his return at this place.

2. The numerous marauders who call themselves soldiers of Holkar continue to threaten the north-west frontier of the Bhonsla's dominions. They are headed* by an illegitimate son of the late Tuckojee Holkar, named Iswant Rao, who bears the most inveterate animosity to the Rajah of Berar, because he was last year confined at this place for several months at the requisition, it is said, of Dowlut Rao Sindia. He escaped in disguise, and has been since employed in collecting an army of irregular troops with the supposed intention of taking vengeance for the inhospitable treatment he received here when he sought refuge at this Court from the oppressions of Sindia. The Rajah of Berar does not view with indifference these hostile preparations, but intends to chastise the marauders so soon as he shall be at leisure from the arrangement of some affairs which he thinks more urgent. I here repeat a distant intimation received from his Minister, but I conceive the only cause for delaying this very necessary measure is the discontent which has long prevailed throughout the Rajah of Berar's own troops. They have been lately very clamorous for their pay, but large part of their arrears has been now issued to them and the remainder seems to be in a train of daily liquidation.

3. Nothing further has transpired since the date of my last address to Your Lordship, relating to the correspondence of the Rajah's nephew† with disaffected persons. Though not confined he is very strictly watched and is considered as a prisoner at large.

No. 29—The Sagar Chieftain cedes Mandla to the Raja for protection against Meer Khan.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—THE EARL OF MORNINGTON, GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Nagpur, 9th December 1799.

In my last address I had the honour to acquaint you that Rajah Raghojee Bhonsla had proceeded on an excursion to meet a part of his family

*The reference is to the bands of Pindaris under Meer Khan and others. They were not in fact headed by Yashwantrao. (Ed.).
†Gujaba Gujar. (Ed.).

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returning from Cuttack. Nothing has since occurred here of sufficient moment to be reported to Your Lordship, except a cession of the Fort Mundela, which has been yielded to the Rajah of Berar together with some territory by the chieftain of Sagar. The intelligence of this event was received here the day preceding the Rajah's return to Nagpur, and as he early intimated to me an intention of addressing a letter to Your Lordship on the subject, I have waited until this day, expecting to transmit it with the present despatch. I am informed that the Chieftain of Sagar has made this cession as the purchase of protection from the Rajah of Berar against the depredations of Iswant* Rao Holkar, and that the territory ceded by him purports to be fourth part of his possession, but I do not learn that any effectual steps have been yet taken to chastise the depredators.

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No. 30—The Sagar Chieftain further gives up Tejgarh to the Bhonsle's officers, in return for the latter's help against Meer Khan.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—THE EARL OF MORNINGTON, GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Nagpur, 6th January 1800.

I have the honour to acquaint you that Rajah Raghojee Bhonsla returned yesterday from an excursion to the temple at Ramtek after an absence of little more than a week. As the object of the excursion was the performance of religious ceremonies at that temple the Rajah requested me to remain at this place during his absence, but to give him immediate notice, should I meantime have anything to communicate to him by Your Lordship's commands. I made no difficulty in acquiescing in this request.

2. Nothing of sufficient importance to be reported to Your Lordship has occurred since the date of my last despatches. The western frontier of the Rajah's dominions has been sometime relieved from any present danger of further depredations by Shehamet Khan in one place, and by Meer Khan in another. The last named partisan has not again ventured to face Raghojee Bhonsla's troops which were sent to the relief of Sagar, and has entirely evacuated the territories of Raghonath Rao. I do not learn that any final arrangements have been yet made regarding the proposed cession of a part of Sagar to this Government, but the fort of Tejgarh† with the territory contiguous to it has been surrendered to the Bhonsla's officers by the Chieftain of Sagar.

*These were the depredations of Meer Khan who claimed to be a general of Holkar. (Ed.).
†See Nagpur Bakhar, p. 158. (Ed.).

No. 31—The Resident makes a representation to the Bhonsle Raja against the perverse conduct of the Raja of Sirgooja.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—THE EARL OF MORNINGTON, GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Nagpur, 17th March 1800.

Immediately on the receipt of Your Lordship's commands conveyed to me by the Persian translator under date 12th ultimo, I sent a message to Rajah Raghojee Bhonsla desiring an audience for the purpose of delivering Your Lordship's letter to him respecting the conduct of the Rajah of Sirgooja. A mourning having intervened, I could not see him until yesterday evening, but in the meantime, to obviate a needless loss of time, I communicated, through his Minister Kishen* Row, the papers explanatory to the Rajah of Sirgooja's former contumacy and present menacing attitude.

2. After Your Lordship's letter had been read to him, the Rajah immediately assured me that he would write to the Rajah of Sirgooja in strong and peremptory terms to forbid the assemblage of troops on the Company's frontier, he added that the Rajah of Sirgooja had on his part represented that the zamindars of Chhota Nagpur were encroaching on his limits and continuing to do so, he requested therefore that orders should be issued to the zamindars to forbid encroachments. I replied that the Rajah of Sirgooja's representation was obviously a subterfuge to palliate his own conduct and was therefore entitled to no credit. I then reminded Rajah Raghojee Bhonsla of the inattention shown to his order respecting the restoration of plundered cattle. He promised to reiterate those orders in very peremptory terms and to furnish me with a duplicate of them, which I shall transmit to the Persian translator, that it may be forwarded, if Your Lordship should think it proper, through the Magistrate at Ramgarh.

No. 32—Colebrooke reports how the strong place of Sambalpur was surprised by the Raja of Berar's troops.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—THE EARL OF MORNINGTON, GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Nagpur, 6th April 1800.

Intelligence was yesterday received that the fort of Sumbalpore has been surprised by the Rajah of Berar's troops and taken with little

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resistance ; this occurrence has been deemed of sufficient magnitude to be announced by a salute, which was yesterday fired from the park of artillery.

2. Sambalpoore was the principal fortress of a chief of mountaineers who takes his title from that place, and who holds an extensive tract of country between Chhatteesgarh (i.e. Rattanpore etc.) and Cuttack. He was nominally subject to this Government, but did almost maintain independency and only paid small tribute very irregularly. Governing a numerous tribe of hardy mountaineers and possessing such a stronghold as Sumblepore, he had been hitherto able to elude the power of the Rajah of Berar, and all attempts to subdue his country had been invariably foiled, the reduction of his strongest fastness will, it is thought, be now followed by his speedy submission and by the full establishment of the Marhatta authority throughout his territories.

3. The sudden attack which has been thus successful, was not preconcerted ; Chundojee Bhonsla, an officer of the Rajah's troops, being in that neighbourhood strayed with two rocket-men into the forest of bamboo canes which surrounds the fort, and coming unexpectedly upon it, found it carelessly guarded and remarked that the wall had fallen into the ditch in one place. He wantonly threw a rocket into the fort, by which the thatched buildings it contains were accidentally set on fire. Observing that the garrison was busied in endeavouring to extinguish the fire, without suspecting the occasion of it, Chundojee sent for troops from the camp who arrived in time to surprise the fort. They made themselves masters of it and put the garrison to the sword.

4. Should this success be followed by the complete reduction of the country belonging to the chief of Sambalpoore, it must certainly be considered as an important event to the Rajah of Berar, since the strength of his dominion will be much increased by thus connecting different parts of them which were in a manner cut off from each other, while an almost independent chief occupied an intermediate extensive tract of country.

No. 33—The Resident is urged to negotiate an alliance with the Raja as a counterpoise to Sindhia's hostile designs and to propose to him an exchange of the province of Cuttack.

FROM—COL. KIRKPATRICK, SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,

TO—THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR.

Fort William, 16th April 1800.

I am directed by the Right Hon'ble the Governor General to transmit to you the accompanying copies of letters written by direction of His Lordship on the 12th instant to the Residents at Poona and Hyderabad.

2. These letters will disclose to you the present views of the Governor General at the Courts of Hyderabad and Poona, and you will also perceive by them the degree of importance which His Lordship attaches to the accession of Raghojee Bhonsla to the alliances which His Lordship proposes forming with those Courts, and particularly to the new treaty which Captain Kirkpatrick has been authorized to negotiate with His Highness the Nizam.

3. The objects to be attained by the proposed connection with the Court of Nagpur are the same as they were in February 1799, when the hostile designs, which Sindia was suspected on sufficient ground to entertain against the Company and the Nizam, suggested the expediency of an union of those Powers whose interests were most endangered by the violence and ambition of that Chief.

4. Circumstances have hitherto prevented Sindia from carrying into execution the hostile designs then imputed to him, but there is abundant reason to apprehend that the same designs continue to be entertained by him, and that he only waits a favourable occasion for giving them effect.

5. The death of Nana Fadnawees having recently removed one of the principal barriers to the ambitious projects of Sindia, the probability of an early renewal of those projects in his mind is considerably increased.

Whatever the powers and resources of the Peshwa as sovereign of the Marhatta Empire may be, they must now be regarded as having passed completely into the hands of Sindia, whose means of disturbing the neighbours are consequently proportionately augmented.

6. The advances which you made on the occasion referred to, appear to the Governor General to have been received by the Court of Nagpur in a manner sufficiently favourable, and the danger of the Berar Government from the violence and ambition of Sindia, being rather increased than diminished since that period, His Lordship concludes that you will experience no difficulty in renewing the negotiation or in conducting it to the desired issue.

7. The British Government has always maintained a good understanding with the Government of Berar, and the policy of cultivating the friendship of a state whose means of disturbing us, in consequence of its local position with respect to our richest and most valuable possessions are very considerable, is sufficiently obvious. It is also evidently the interest of His Highness the Nizam to cultivate the utmost intimate friendship and union with the same State.

8. Although it is on one hand true that as the armies of the Company and of the Nizam are no longer occupied in the prosecution of a distant and arduous war, but are entirely at liberty to watch the motions of Sindia, there is not now the same necessity for strengthening ourselves against

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that Chief by an alliance with the Government of Berar, which existed in February 1799, yet it is equally clear on the other side, that in every other respect the motives to such a connection continue no less forcible than formerly, if they be not rather increased in consequence of intermediate events, and of the additional proofs which have since appeared of the dangerous temper and hostile designs of Sindia.

9. The Governor General is but imperfectly informed with regard to the nature of the differences existing between Sindia and the Rajah of Berar, but His Lordship generally understands that Sindia has long viewed with jealousy and dissatisfaction both the acquisitions made of late years by the Bhonsla in the Malwa quarter and the favourable disposition which he has generally manifested towards the late Nana Fadnaweess.

How far or how soon these or other circumstances are likely to induce Sindia to attack Raghojee Bhonsla is uncertain, but the danger of the Berar State from the restless ambition of Sindia appears to the Governor General sufficiently urgent to render it advisable for that Government to provide against it as soon and as effectually as possible.

10. It is sufficiently obvious that the Court of Nagpur could not in any other manner so effectually guard against the danger described as by engaging the Company and the Nizam to guarantee its territories against Dowlut Row Sindia.

It would at the same time be equally the interest of the Company and of the Nizam to enter into such a guarantee.

11. For the aggrandizement of Sindia in whatever form or in whatever quarter it shall occur, must be always prejudicial to our interests and to that of the Nizam. It would be particularly injurious to us whenever it shall tend to weaken any of the barriers at present placed between us, but it will be in an eminent degree dangerous to us, should it involve the actual removal of any of those barriers, and especially of that one which would lay open to a needy and unprincipled chief the rich and flourishing provinces of Bengal. It follows from hence that we are scarcely less interested at this time in the safety of the Berar State from any hostile attack on the part of Sindia than we are from averting the same danger from the Government of Hyderabad.

12. For these reasons the Governor General is decidedly of opinion that it continues to be highly expedient that a defensive league should be entered into by the Company, by the Nizam and by the Court of Nagpur against Sindia expressly, or against their enemies generally.

13. As the security which the Rajah of Berar would derive from the proposed guarantee would be of the most permanent and effectual kind, it is reasonable to suppose that he would not be unwilling to purchase it at the price of such a compromise of his claims on the Court

of Hyderabad as this Court has long wished to effect through the interposition of the Poona Government, and as without essentially affecting the right or revenue of the Rajah would be calculated to establish and maintain harmony and good-will between the two States. It is also, the Governor General thinks, reasonable to conclude that in return for so important an advantage, the Rajah would make no difficulty in consenting to such arrangements with the British Government for a permanent settlement of all boundary questions and for the improvement of the commercial intercourse between the two countries, as should appear likely to promote their mutual benefit and quiet.

14. There are other objects which it is the anxious desire of the Governor General to carry at the Court of Nagpur. The principal of these objects consists in the acquisition by the Company of the province of Cuttack for an equivalent in money or otherwise. His Lordship recommends the subject to your constant attention, and desires you to endeavour to obtain whatever information may be practicable (consistently with the caution necessary in so delicate a case) relative to the probable sentiments and inclinations of the Court of Nagpur with regard to the cession or exchange alluded to.

15. As the objects of the British Government in the proposed treaty with the Rajah of Berar would be essentially promoted and secured by the establishment of a British subsidiary force in the Rajah's dominions, the Governor General directs you at a proper and convenient stage of your negotiation to sound the disposition of the Court of Nagpur on this head, but without urging or even plainly proposing the measure, if you should find it at all disagreeable to that Court. In the event however of the Rajah's being disposed to receive subsidiary force from the Company, His Lordship thinks it necessary to apprise you that he would readily accept a security for the payment of the subsidy of the troops, and even prefer to any other arrangement an assignment of such part of the province of Cuttack as should be adequate to the purpose, and should place under the management of the Company such a tract of territory as should establish the continuity of their dominions from Bengal to the northern Circars.

16. The Governor General deems it necessary to add that two regiments of native Infantry with the usual proportion of artillery is the force which His Lordship would wish to establish at Nagpur, and that he will not consent to furnish to the Government of Berar a smaller subsidiary detachment than one regiment of native Infantry.

17. In the event of the Rajah's assent to the establishment of a subsidiary force at Nagpur His Lordship authorizes you to detain the native infantry of Bengal now on its march through Berar, and a conditional order will be forwarded to the Officer Commanding the Regiment directing him to obey your requisition. The establishment of a subsidiary

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force in Berar is a point of such importance in the present moment, that His Lordship authorizes you to agree to any reasonable conditions which the Rajah may annex to such an arrangement, and to accommodate the assignment of funds for the payment of the troops to His Highness's convenience as far as may be practicable. You are therefore empowered to waive the considerations of any or of all the points stated in the preceding paragraphs excepting a reasonable accommodation of the Rajah's claims on the Nizam, which the Governor General deems essential to the permanence of the proposed triple alliance, provided such sacrifices shall facilitate the establishment of a body of our troops in Berar.

18. If the Court of Nagpur should consent to receive a permanent subsidiary force, and if the 10th Regiment of Bengal native infantry should by that time have advanced too far on its way to Cawnpore to be recalled for this service, the Governor General will adopt the necessary measures for furnishing the required force with the least practicable delay.

19. In conducting the present negotiation, you are first to sound the disposition of the Court of Nagpur with respect to such a treaty as the Resident at Poona has been authorized to conclude with the Peshwa, and whenever you shall learn that such a treaty has been actually consented to by the Peshwa and acceded to by the Nizam, you are formally to invite Raghojee Bhonsla to accede to the same, on such terms with respect to the Company as have been generally described in the preceding part of this letter, and with respect to the Nizam on such conditions as may have been previously concerted between you and Captain Kirkpatrick. The concessions to be made to the British Government will not be required in the first instance to be more particularly expressed than they have been in the foregoing paragraphs. That is to say, it will be sufficient in addition to the mutual guarantee, if suitable stipulations be introduced in the treaty binding the Court of Nagpur to come to an early and satisfactory settlement with the Company on all points relative to boundary questions, and to take without delay the necessary measures in concert with the British Government for the purpose of establishing a free and well regulated commercial intercourse between the two countries.

20. The proposed treaty with the Peshwa failing or not being likely to take place, Raghojee Bhonsla is then to be invited to accede to the separate defensive engagements which Captain Kirkpatrick has been instructed to conclude with the Nizam. The conditions on which the Court of Nagpur is to be admitted to a participation of the benefits of these engagements, will be the same as in the case of the proposed treaty with the Peshwa, and as described in the last paragraph.

21. In every event a power is to be reserved to the Peshwa of acceding to any defensive alliance which shall be formed between the Company, the Nizam and the Rajah of Berar, whenever he shall think proper to do so, on the conditions enumerated on the project of the treaty contained

in my letter of the 12th instant to the Resident at Poona, with the addition of such other stipulations as the allies may judge proper to require of the Peshwa, in consequence of his rejection of their first proposals.

22. You are authorized to detain the 10th Regiment at the requisition of the Court of Nagpur previously to the formal conclusion of the proposed defensive alliance between the Company, the Nizam and the Rajah of Berar, provided you should be perfectly satisfied of the disposition of Raghojee Bhonsla to enter into that alliance on the prescribed terms.

23. You are to ascertain, as soon as possible, the precise views of the Court of Nagpur in the present conjuncture, and the footing on which it would be willing to enter into engagements, respectively with the Company, with the Nizam and with the Peshwa, of the nature described in the present despatch and in the enclosed letters to the Residents at Hyderabad and Poona, and you will communicate with the utmost practicable expedition, every necessary information on these points to the Governor General, to Colonel Palmer and to Captain Kirkpatrick.

No. 34—Colebrooke reports the secret correspondence going on between the Prince of Delhi and Raghuji for an asylum to the former in the latter's territory.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 23rd April 1800.

I have reason to believe that a correspondence has been opened between the Court of Delhi and the Rajah of Berar in consequence of an offer from the Bhonsla to afford an asylum to, one of Shah Allum's sons. Despatches were very lately received here from Mirza Acber Shah, and an answer was yesterday sent with uncommon mystery and without the intervention of the Ministers who are usually employed. On the object of this correspondence, I derive my information from a person who is much trusted by one of the Rajah's most confidential servants, and who is paid by me for secret intelligence. According to the information received by him, the measure of * * * one of the King's sons was agitated at this Court some months ago, and he was made acquainted with it because it was once in contemplation to send him to Delhi upon this errand. I do not give implicit credit to the information, because I am aware of motives which might induce him to amuse me with fictitious intelligence. But as his information was antecedent to that of the arrival of secret despatches from Delhi, I think it sufficiently probable.

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2. The Rajah's chief object in taking this step must be connected with his jealousy and hatred of Sindia. His usual good sense prevents my attributing it solely to the vanity of rendering his Court more conspicuous by giving refuge to a Shahzadah. He may no doubt promise himself some advantages, though they could not be important from the presence of a Prince of the royal blood in his camp, should he be forced into hostilities by the aggressions of Sindia.

3. I have received no further intimation since my address to Your Lordship dated 28th March of an intended overture from this Court upon subjects arising out of the accounts which were expected to follow the demise of Nana. It does not indeed appear from the most recent intelligence which has reached this place that anything decisive has yet happened at Poona, and so far as his personal interests only are concerned, the Rajah of Berar has no cause of immediate apprehension, since the season is now so far advanced, that even if the demand of pecuniary contributions should be now made, no attempt to enforce it by arms need be apprehended until after the rainy season.

4. The freebooters formerly countenanced by Jeswant Row Holkar and heretofore headed by a Chief Pindarah who is now in confinement at this place, have recommenced their depredations on the territories of Raghojee Bhonsla. Forces have been sent to repel their incursions. Troops and artillery have likewise proceeded to Sumblepore to garrison the fort; which was taken by surprise in the manner related in the despatches I had the honour to address to Your Lordship under date 6th instant.

No. 35—The Resident informs the Governor General of the Raja's willingness to join the defensive alliance, but of his having postponed further proceedings.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,
TO—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT.

Nagpur, 6th July 1800.

I beg leave to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated 17th ultimo enclosing an extract of a letter from the Most Noble the Governor General to the Resident at Hyderabad under date 15th ultimo.

2. I request you will acquaint His Lordship that the Rajah of Berar has now declared in explicit terms his willingness to accede to an alliance for the purposes indicated in the overture made to him on the 21st May last. At an interview appointed yesterday for the express purpose of giving an answer to that overture, he declared his acceptance of the proposition it contains, and he observed that, since he himself belongs

to the same empire with His Highness the Peshwa, he must naturally take a great interest in the welfare of His Highness' Government, and that he therefore cannot view with indifference the proceedings of Dowlut Row Sindia, however unconcerned he might otherwise be in the probable consequence of that Chieftain's transactions. I did not think it necessary to make any reply to these and other similar observations, because their apparent scope was merely to impress me with the notion that he feels no apprehensions from Sindia's ambition and hostility. But, in answer to diverse questions, which the Rajah's Minister asked me in his name relative to the progress of negotiations at Poona, I informed him that the Peshwa is sufficiently apprized of the terms upon which he can be admitted to an alliance with the British Government, and will probably accede to them so soon as he becomes sensible of his true interests. I added that there was no necessity for waiting the result of the Peshwa's deliberations, since the necessary arrangements might meantime be concerted between the other states, so as to be prepared for affording aid to His Highness the Peshwa when required; or simply for securing themselves against the ambitious designs of Sindia, if such aid should not be required by the Peshwa.

3. My motive for adding this remark was, that I might thereby gain an immediate opportunity of making overtures on the subject of stationing a subsidiary force in the Rajah's dominions. But he postponed to a future day a further proceeding in the negotiation, alleging that the proposition was weighty and required deliberation.

4. On the subject of the last paragraph of your letter of the 17th ultimo, requiring my opinion on the number of troops it would be reasonable that the Rajah of Berar should be required to furnish at the commencement of hostilities, I beg leave to offer it as my opinion, that 10,000 cavalry in addition to the British troops he may have agreed to subsidize, would be a force proportionate to his military strength and general resources. But should he be admitted to the Company's alliance without having accepted a British subsidiary force, I should think it not unreasonable in that case to require so large a number as 10,000 Infantry and 10,000 Cavalry, provided the seat of war be not remote from his own frontiers. His resources would not, I apprehend, be found adequate to maintain a great force on distant enterprises; and it might be therefore necessary in either case to admit a clause for reducing his contingent if the seat of war be in Hindoostan; that is, to the northward of the Bind* hills. I do not propose Infantry as a part of his contingent, exclusive of British subsidiary troops, because he would perhaps disband his present Infantry so soon as he shall have agreed to subsidize a British force, and only retain a small secondary establishment and his pagah and Silehdaree cavalry.

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No. 36—The Resident thinks that the recent changes in the Poona ministry would facilitate his negotiations for a subsidiary alliance with the Raja.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—THE MARQUIS WELLESLEY, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

24th July 1800.

I have this instant received private intelligence which leads me to think, that this Court has now formed a correcter opinion of the recent events at Poona than I had reason to believe, when I had the honour to address Your Lordship, on the 17th instant. The Rajah of Berar considers Morobah* as likely to become a mere instrument of the will of Sindia, by whose influence he has been placed in his present situation. The Rajah also apprehends the inveterate enmity of Moroba against himself on account of his avowed attachment to the late Nana Fadnawees, and he thinks the whole of Sindia's late conduct is only calculated to impose upon Bajee Rao and to lull his suspicions, whilst Sindia confines his person under the pretence of guarding it.

Being credibly informed that such is the Rajah of Berar's opinion of recent transactions at Poona, I may hope that no delay will arise from this cause, when the conclusion of a treaty at Hyderabad furnishes the occasion for a formal tender of the proposed alliance to this Court.

No. 37—The Resident reports the deputation of a vakeel from Sindhia to the Bhonsle Raja.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR;

TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY, K.P., GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 28th July 1800.

Having received intelligence that a Vakeel has been deputed by Dowlut Row Sindia to this Court, I directed my Moonshee to obtain from Sridher Pundit the confirmation of this intelligence. Sridher yesterday anticipated his inquiries by acquainting him, for my information, that a Vakeel named Murar Rao Dowlut is now on his way from Poona. Without explaining in what manner this Vakeel's mission has been announced, he intimated that the Rajah of Berar sees through the views of Dowlut Row Sindia and will not be diverted by that Chieftain's artifices from the resolution of forming a close alliance with the British Government. My Moonshee hinted to him my expectation, that everything relative to this mission should be fully communicated to me, and Sridher gave him assurance that such was the Rajah's intention. The hurry of a very short interview prevented any further communication on this subject.

*Surnamed Fadnavis, cousin of Nana. (Ed.)

2. Since Sridher's recovery within a week past, several festivals have been alleged as reasons for postponing the audience to which the Rajah promised to invite me, in continuation of that which was reported to Your Lordship so long ago as the 6th of the current month. I have taken various occasions to enforce by suitable hints the necessity of early defensive arrangements, but although the Rajah seems convinced of that necessity he still continues to procrastinate. Two days ago, however, Sridher showed my Moonshee an extract of a letter from the Rajah's Vakeel at Hyderabad informing him that a treaty has been recently concluded there by Col. Kirkpatrick, and promising a transcript of it by a future despatch. Sridher requested I would communicate that treaty, if I possessed a copy of it. In reply I yesterday informed him by message that I had not yet received similar intelligence; but that the chief object of the treaty which was, I hope, signed at Hyderabad as the Vakeel informed him, was a triple defensive alliance, containing clauses for stationing subsidiary troops and for assigning funds for their pay and also for admitting the Peshwa to accede to the treaty, and even Sindia, provided he shall give satisfaction and competent security to all the other contracting parties.

3. Your Lordship will perceive my motives for thus describing the objects of the proposed treaty. I wished to intimate that clauses respecting troops and the assignment of funds for their pay are required from the Rajah of Berar as well as from the Nizam, and that his promise of acceding to the intended arrangements makes him already a party to the existing negotiations.

4. Sridher assured me, in answer, that I should receive a communication from the Rajah on this subject within two days, and added that it was the Rajah's intention to make that communication verbally to me. After experiencing so much procrastination I cannot confidently trust that the negotiation will now proceed more expeditiously, but should delays be still interposed, I shall now think it necessary to use pressing instances, both on account of the advanced season of the year and for the sake of concluding the negotiation, if possible, before the arrival of Sindia's Vakeel.

No. 38—Sindhia's Vakil Murar Rao Daulat being on his way to Nagpur, the Raja postponed negotiations till the Vakil's arrival. The Raja's apprehensions of danger from Sindhia are diminished.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 31st July 1800.

I beg leave to report to Your Lordship a message this day received from Rajah Raghojee Bhonsla. My Moonshee waited on him this morning by appointment and had a private audience. The Rajah desired him to inform me, that Murar Row Dowlut is now on his way from Poona as Vakeel on the part of Dowlut Row Sindia to this Durbar. He wished to

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have given me the earliest intelligence of it, but had hitherto waited for information from his own Vakeel at Poona that Murar Row had actually set off. He had not indeed yet received direct information of it, but would nevertheless invite me to an interview on the 3rd of next month (the intermediate days being occupied by religious fasts) for the purpose of making some communications on this, and also on other topics. He added that he would always acquaint me with every matter and occurrence, trivial as well as important; for the greatest regard subsisted on both sides and he desired the friendship of the British Government above all others, and was most attached to it.

2. Notwithstanding the very explicit terms of this message, I suspect that the Rajah has already resolved to conclude nothing definitively until he has learnt what Murar Rao has it in charge to propose. This conjecture is founded on some rather vague expressions dropt by Sridher Pundit. Should I however, in the meantime, receive intelligence of the conclusion of the treaty at Hyderabad, I shall use every endeavour, and I hope not without success to obviate this delay.

3. Although this Minister and Kishen Row continue to hold nearly the same language, they at first did, respecting the power and importance appendant on Moroba's office and his disposition and abilities to conciliate parties and to maintain tranquillity in the Mahratta Empire, yet the private information, reported in my address to Your Lordship of the 24th instant, is sufficiently confirmed. The intelligence of Murar Row's mission rather than that of Moroba's appointment must be the real cause, that the Rajah of Berar's apprehensions of immediate danger to himself from Sindia's proceedings, are so apparently diminished. His jealousy of that Chieftain's predominant power is by no means decreased, and the tranquillity which may follow the Peshwa's unreserved submission to Sindia's guidance, is not such a system of good as the Rajah of Berar desires to see established in the Mahratta Empire.

No. 39—The Resident reports to the Governor General of the Raja having evaded further discussion of the subsidiary alliance on account of the mission from Sindhia.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 7th August 1800.

After two further postponements the Rajah of Berar gave me an audience in the evening of yesterday, but with no intention, as I soon found, of treating of the terms of the proposed alliance. He eluded the advances I made for introducing this topic, and, as I have no intelligence that the treaty has actually been concluded at Hyderabad, I had not grounds for insisting on the present discussion of this subject. In the course of the desultory conversation that took place, I found that the information

received by him from his vakeel at Hyderabad was premature, and the severity of the weather for several weeks past having rendered the roads impassable, I have no later intelligence from that, nor from any other quarter.

2. The Rajah confirmed to me the information that a vakeel has been deputed by Dowlut Row Sindia to this Court. His arrival may be expected, he said, within a fortnight. The mission of Murar Rao has been announced to him, he acknowledged, both by letter and verbally through his own vakeel at Poona, but both notices referred him for the object of the mission to the verbal communications of the vakeel. He promised to acquaint me with everything that may pass and to consult me upon whatever propositions Murar Row may bring forward. He observed that great as may be Sindia's power, it will not avail against the concert of other states, and that the mission of Murar Rao would accelerate, instead of retarding the, accomplishment of the views of the allies, meaning himself and the British Government.

3. Intelligence lately received of Amrut Rao's abrupt departure from Poona was mentioned. The Rajah thought it probable that this step has been taken with the privity of the Peshwa, and he inferred from it the probability of the Peshwa's acceding to the proposed alliance.

4. Upon the whole it is evident, that the Rajah is pleased with the mission of a vakeel by Sindia, and that he wishes to delay the adjustment of the articles of alliance until he has heard what the vakeel is instructed to propose to him. I do not however think he entertains sanguine hopes of accommodating his differences with Sindia, or any inclination to recede from the projected alliance with the Company and the Nizam, but he is probably encouraged by the step which Sindia has taken, to expect that his own situation will become less critical, and that he shall be under no necessity of accepting a British subsidiary force; nevertheless, should I soon receive intelligence that the proposed treaty has been accepted at Hyderabad, I shall not wholly despair of inducing the Rajah of Berar to accede to it upon the terms annexed to it by Your Lordship's instructions to me, before the arrival of Sindia's vakeel.

No. 40—Yashwantrao Ramchandra voluntarily supplies information to the British Resident. Sridhar Pandit explains away the delay in the negotiations. Gujaba offers to visit the Resident secretly, but meets with a refusal.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY, GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Nagpur, 24th August 1800.

I have received direct confirmation of the opinion I ventured to offer in my address to Your Lordship dated 7th instant. The Rajah of Berar continues to avoid any further discussion of the terms of the projected

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alliance and does not intend to proceed in the negotiation opened here, until he has learnt what Sindia's Vakeel is sent to propose to him. But I am taught to believe that this does not arise from a want of sincerity on his part, nor from any formed design of temporising. He merely hesitates on taking a step which must, according to his notions, subject his future counsels and measures to the guidance of the British Government; the policy of this Court has always hitherto been to maintain its independency by cultivating the relations of amity with all surrounding states, without forming a decided connexion with any one. Though the Rajah of Berar be sensible that the season is now past in which that policy could be successfully pursued, yet he feels much reluctance in finally abandoning it.

2. A person named Jeswant* Row who possesses influence at this Durbar, though his connections render him more dependent on the court of Hyderabad than on that of Nagpur, frequently communicates information to me of his own accord relative to the views of this Government. I place much reliance on intelligence received from him, because I know his means of information to be good, and because I am not aware that he can have any motives for deceiving me. From him I learn that the Rajah of Berar has actually resolved to prolong until the Dassera, his deliberation on the measures to be finally adopted by him. Until then, it is the Rajah's plan to watch events and to consult with his advisers.

3. A message yesterday sent to me by Sridher Pundit on the Rajah's part, is consistent with this notion of the present views of this Court. He entreated me not to misconstrue the present delays, but Sindia's Vakeel is daily expected, and I must be sensible that it is necessary to hear what he has to say. Sridher, besides expatiating on his own zeal, added as from himself that the Rajah has nothing more at heart than to cement an alliance with the Company, the value of which he well knows. In answer to an observation hinted to him, that the negotiation which was deferred for two days has remained suspended for two months, he said the expected arrival of Sindia's Vakeel was the sole cause of the delay, but in the end, this mission can produce no effect, for defensive measures are indispensably necessary. Sindia's enmity to this and the other states is inveterate and measures must be concerted to guard against it. In reply to this message I have expressed my satisfaction at the assurances it contains, adding that I wish no ill consequences may follow the past and present delays, which appear to me inconsistent with the real interests of this Court.

*Yashwantrao Ramchandra, who subsequently became an important intermediary between the British Residents and the Rajas of Nagpur and who negotiated the treaty of Deogaon with General Wellesley. (Ed.)

4. I had the honour to report Your Lordship on the 17th ultimo the answer I sent to a letter from the Rajah of Berar's nephew. The next day I received a second note from him desiring I would appoint a time for him to call on me, and he again recommended secrecy, without which he observed there can be no counsel. As it seemed improper to receive a visit from him by stealth or to carry on a secret correspondence with him, I declined, in my answer to this note, being made a party in his secrets and counsels. On the following day he nevertheless sent a confidential person, who again urged me to receive his visit and listen to his application; I told him that I would receive with pleasure an avowed visit from him; but, being acquainted with the object of it, I thought it necessary he should be apprised of what had been already intimated to him; namely, that I could not in this business act a part which, when known to the Rajah of Berar, might give him just cause of dissatisfaction.

5. This trivial matter has here ended, and I have not found further reason to believe that the suspicion mentioned in the 3rd paragraph of my last address to Your Lordship is well founded. That discontent prevails among the members of the Rajah's family is certain, but whether it had yet proceeded to the length of a concerted enterprise against his authority, appears to me doubtful, and I believe I have laid too much stress on a very obscure expression in the first note received from the Rajah's nephew.

No. 41—The Resident hopes to meet with success in his proposals to the Nagpur Court on account of despatches received by the Raja from Bajirao Peshwa requesting him to concur in the measures being taken for his relief, hinting thereby at the alliance with the Company.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 14th September 1800.

I beg leave to acquaint Your Lordship that despatches have been received at this Court from that of Poona, containing a request from Baajy Row that the Rajah of Berar would concur in measures to be concerted for his relief. This intelligence has been communicated to me through a private channel of information with the remark, that the Rajah of Berar waited for some hints of this sort from the Peshwa to authorize his entering into engagements with the Company and the Nizam. It serves to explain an intimation received two days since from Sridhur Pundit, who informed me through my Moonshee, that the long wished-for event of Baajy Row's avowing his disgust at the conduct of Sindia has at length taken place. He added, that the expectation of this event was what had been so often hinted to me.

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2. It is true that both, the Rajah and he, have frequently thrown out obscure hints, which I can now explain on this ground; and it is not improbable that the expectation of such a communication from Poona, as has been now received, may have been the chief cause of the Rajah's procrastination. Many reasons might make him solicitous for the Peshwa's sanction to the engagements he wishes to conclude with the Company, and although he might have ultimately yielded to the necessity of affairs in concluding a treaty without or even against Baajy Row's consent, he would naturally be disposed to delay this step, as long as circumstances should admit, while he retained expectations that the Peshwa would either advise the measure or give his consent to it. In one case he might apprehend the Peshwa's resentment; in the other, he will make a merit with Baajy Row for complying with his wishes, while he, in fact, pursues his own interests.

3. Although I am willing to believe that the cause now assigned for the past delays has been a principal one, I still apprehend that the Rajah has not been wholly uninfluenced by the motives which I before attributed to him. However, in the expectation of receiving early overtures from him in consequence of the present communication from the Court of Poona, I have postponed the steps I intended to take, as mentioned in my last address to Your Lordship, and I have recalled the instructions I had given to my Moonshee, who very properly deferred the fulfilling of them upon receiving the hint above mentioned, from Sridher Pundit.

No. 42—The Resident at Hyderabad reports the arrival there of Sindhia's agent to counteract the British move.

FROM—J. A. KIRKPATRICK, RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD,

TO—LORD WELLESLEY, G. G.

Hyderabad, 1st October 1800.

Azim-ul-Omrah having expressed a desire to see my Moonshee yesterday, he in consequence waited upon him, and I have herewith the honour to enclose for Your Lordship's notice, translation of his report of what passed on the occasion, together with a copy and translation of Rajah Ragojee Bhonslah's letter to His Highness the Nizam therein treated of.

The Minister's verbal reply, through the Berar Rajah's Vakeel, to the letter above alluded to, appearing to me sufficiently unobjectionable in every respect, except in his intended communication to Rajah Ragojee

Bhonslah of the treaty about to be concluded between Your Lordship and the Nizam, I propose intimating as much to him, and hinting at the same time that Mr. Colebrooke will be duly furnished with a copy of the treaty in question, and must be the best judge of the expediency of making an unreserved or partial communication of it to the Court he resides at.

Mr. Colebrooke in his latest dispatch to me, which is dated however so far back as the 10th ultimo, makes no mention of this intended mission of the Berar Rajah's principal Minister to Poonah.

On the 27th ultimo I received accounts from my newswriter, of an agent from Dowlut Row Sindia having arrived in the neighbourhood of the city, and on the following day, his arrival was officially announced to me by the Minister, who sent for my perusal a translation of a note in Mahrattah from this agent, who is named Gobind Rao Soobraojee, to Anund Rao Subbapatty (the Deputy of Rajah Ragotim Rao), in which he describes himself as deputed hither by Dowlut Row Sindia to Azim ul Omrah, and as desirous of communicating as soon as possible the objects of his mission.

The inauspicious period, however, that entirely fills up the space between this and the 12th instant, the day appointed for the exchange of instruments, cannot well admit of any transaction of business with this new comer, in whose favour I do not imagine the Minister is at all disposed to make an exception. He is, as far as I can learn, an obscure man, and there is certainly nothing in his retinue that bespeaks the contrary.

No. 43—This is a report sent to the Governor General by Kirkpatrick of his munshi's interview with the Nizam's minister who, realizing the danger from the Maratha chiefs uniting for a common cause, tried to discountenance the mission of the Nagpur Raja to Poona.

30th September 1800.

Translation of Moonshy Azim Oolah's report of his conference with Azim-ul-Omrah on the 30th September 1800.

After the usual friendly enquiries the Minister said, that he had desired me to wait on him in order to inform me that His Highness had yesterday received a letter from Rajah Ragojee Bhooslah, notifying his intention of sending Sreedhur Pundit* and Kishen Rao† (his Ministers) after the festival of the Dusserah to Poona, at the express and repeated desire of Baajy Row, who wished to consult with them on the state of affairs in that quarter, adding that he observed by the Poonah Ackbars, that the Peshwa and Dowlut Row had lately held two private conferences, and that it was reported at Poonah that all their differences had been thereby concluded.

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Should this prove the case, continued the Minister, and these Chiefs endeavour to co-operate, it will be absolutely necessary for some measures to be adopted on our part to prevent, if possible, such alliance from taking place. I have also, in consequence of the late letter from Ragojee Bhooslah, desired his Vakeel to inform him that I regard his not having intimated to His Highness the proposed mission of his two Ministers until it was finally determined on, as inconsistent with the long existing friendship between the two Governments, that I therefore judged it expedient to inform him that the present close connection between His Highness's state and the British Government, was about to be considerably strengthened by a treaty, copy of which would be sent for his perusal in the course of ten days or a fortnight, when he would, of course, take such steps as he might deem requisite for the mutual interests of his own and His Highness's state, but that his sending his two ministers to Poonah in such a hurry, did not appear to me at all proper or advisable. Azim-ul-Omrah concluded by assuring me that he would use his utmost endeavours to prevent the mission in question, and that he thought it would be as well for you (Captain Kirkpatrick) to address Mr. Colebrooke with the same view, since were a sincere union to take place between all these Chiefs, matters that might otherwise be effected with ease, would be attained with difficulty. I replied that I would of course report to you what His Excellency had mentioned, when he desired I would make him acquainted with your answer. I then requested the Minister would permit me to peruse the letter from Ragojee Bhooslah he had alluded to, which he accordingly did, and I took a copy of it.

I next informed Azim-ul-Omrah that the Commanding Officer of artillery had fixed on a convenient spot of ground on the road to the hill, called Imaum Zemin, for the gun practice, and that if he would grant the necessary Perwannah, the creation of the Butt and the requisite preparations should be commenced immediately. The Minister replied that after having consulted His Highness he would send the order.

I then arose and withdrew.

No. 44—Raghuji Bhonsle informs the Nizam of his having deputed two confidential agents to Poona in response to an urgent call from the Peshwa.

FROM—RAJAH RAGHUJI BHONSLE,

TO—HIS HIGHNESS THE NIZAM.

Received 19th September 1800.

Translation of a letter from Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah
to His Highness the Nizam.

After compliments.

Intelligence of the arrival of Kundoo Muckund, on the part of Row Pundit Pardhan will, ere this, have been communicated to Your Highness

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by Aristoo Jah Bahadur, and now a letter from the abovementioned Row has reached me, directing me in the most peremptory terms to dispatch my confidential Ministers Sridher Pundit and Kishen Row on affairs of such secrecy and importance, as not being proper to be committed to writing, can only be imparted to persons acquainted with the secrets of the state. Although in such an affair Your Highness's opinion and consent are doubtless, above all things, requisite, yet as delays are productive of dangers, I resolved on account of the period of consultation being near at hand, and in consideration of the union and connection of this Rauje and the Mahratta state, to dispatch the Ministers before mentioned, and have written to Row Pundit Pardhan that Kundoo Muckund has been ordered to return, and that the officers alluded to, shall be dispatched immediately after the celebration of the Dusserah feast. Of course, the result of their consultations will be determined after their arrival at Poona, and I trust that when communicated to your enlightened mind, will meet with your approbation and consent.

Further particulars will be personally represented to you by Aristoo Jah Bahadur.

May the sun of your life and prosperity continue to increase from the horizon of splendour and dignity.

No. 45--The Nizam sends a protest against the Bhonsle sending a mission to Poona without previous intimation.

FROM--THE NIZAM,

TO--RAGHUJI BHONSLE.

2nd October 1800.

Translation of a draft of a letter from His Highness the Nizam to Rajah Ragojee Bhonslah, communicated to the Resident.

Your letter has been received.

The fact is this, that my beloved son Aristoo Jah Bahadur has ever since his arrival from Poona taken every opportunity of representing to me, as he ought, the extent of your treaties and agreements, and the sincerity of your attachment to my Sircar. From that period to the present moment I have continued to bestow on you my favour and protection.

When coming to the determination as you have done of sending your Ministers to Poona after the celebration of the Dusserah feast, it would have been proper had you previously apprized and consulted me on the subject.

Although I am sincerely and earnestly interested in the well-being of the Mahratta state, yet let it be remembered that the dispatch of your

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Ministers was without my previous knowledge or consent. Bearing in mind the protection and favour that has been conferred on you, I have written this letter. You will learn further particulars from your Vakeels, Row Madharow and Kesherow.

No. 46—The Nizam communicates his disapproval of their mission to the agents of the Bhoonsle Raja.

FROM—THE NIZAM,

TO—SHRIDHAR PANDIT AND KRISHNARAO.

Translation of an answer of His Highness the Nizam, to the address of Sridher Pundit and Kishen Row.

Your Arzee acquainting me with the resolution of Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah to send you to Poona after the celebration of the Dusserah feast, and that whatever may be the result of your consultation, will be represented to me by my beloved son Aristoo Jah Bahadur, has passed under my inspection, and sundry other particulars have been submitted to me in detail by the said Minister.

With respect to the nature of the treaties and engagements of Rajah Ragojee Bhoonslah, his firm adherence to the same, and the responsibility moreover which he now takes upon himself, viz., that he should adopt no measure without giving previous intimation to me; it is surprising to me that (matter of detail out of the question) he should determine on affairs of importance without making the reference previously agreed upon, and then content himself with apprizing me thereof in vague and indiscriminate terms.

Interested as I am in the welfare of the Ra'ah whom I, with my own hands, established and confirmed in his principality, I have been induced to commit these particulars to writing. The event, perhaps, may lead you to consider the observations I have judged proper to make, as tending to your advantage.

No. 47—The Raja is sending his ministers to Poona to consult the Peshwa about the proposed alliance. The ministers promise to contribute to the success of the negotiations at Poona and to inform the British Resident there about the progress of their negotiations.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 8th October 1800.

For the reasons which I had the honour to state to Your Lordship in my last address, I made representations to the Rajah of Berar by message

on the 3rd instant and enforced them by further arguments at an audience yesterday morning. As the conversation was long, I shall endeavour to comprise the substance of it in a concise report instead of troubling Your Lordship with the whole detail.

2. In the representations I made I was careful neither directly to oppose nor assent to the measure of sending the ministers to Poona, and remarked that I could give no positive opinion on its expediency, because I neither knew what the Peshwa intended to propose, nor what point the Rajah of Berar might wish to carry at Court. I continued to avoid noticing repeated intimations that the Rajah's ministers would negotiate there to accomplish the objects Your Lordship has in view. I argued from the situation of affairs at Poona, that some decisive event must probably happen there before the ministers reached that place; I urged the ill consequences of delay at a season which no longer admits of it, and at the very moment when the treaty of alliance to which the Rajah of Berar has promised to accede, is on the point of being concluded. I hinted, that if the present opportunity of concerting defensive measures be suffered to pass, it may not hereafter be possible to recall it. I placed the several topics in various points of view, and endeavoured to convince the Rajah that any further delay was now inexpedient.

3. In the course of conversation and by way of answer to these representations, the Rajah declared himself confident that in less than six weeks he should receive intelligence of the result of the present mission. In two interviews with the Peshwa the real intentions of His Highness would be ascertained. He said the Peshwa was resolved to temporize until the arrival of the ministers, whose mission he had requested. Until then nothing decisive would take place at Poona. Baajy Row now felt the irksomeness of his situation, controlled and oppressed as he is by his own servant. He therefore looked around him for the means of extricating himself, but whatever overtures he might make, he would conclude nothing until measures were concerted by him with the ministers now deputed to his Court.

It is the object of the allies to accomplish that which Baajy Row is now sincerely desirous, should be effected. If the Peshwa, as is probable, accedes to the alliance after giving audience to the ministers now sent, the quadruple alliance will be soon concluded. If contrary to expectations the Peshwa should still waver, he himself (the Rajah of Berar) who is not a servant, but a brother of the Peshwa, would conclude the proposed triple alliance. No inconvenience could possibly arise from the intermediate delay and the views of the British Government would probably be advanced, not retarded by it. The Rajah of Berar made the strongest protestations of sincerity and professed himself governed by disinterested zeal and friendship for the Peshwa and the British Government. He requested I would be cautious in making known what he had now

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communicated to me relative to the Peshwa's present views, lest it should by any means become public; and obstacles thence arise to the success of the negotiations with the Peshwa.

4. In the foregoing summary, the Rajah's promise of acceding singly to the projected alliance should the Peshwa waver, is expressed in more explicit terms than he himself then employed, but his words were sufficiently clear, and the promise was repeated to me this morning by a message couched in the most explicit language. My Moonshee called on Sridher Pundit by the Rajah's desire. Sridher said that the Rajah was most anxious to obviate any dissatisfaction at the step now taken by him. He supposed me to be displeased at the measures having been adopted without previous consultation. He said, that the Rajah being so closely connected by friendship with the British Government, would have previously consulted Your Lordship, had it been practicable. It had been likewise impossible to give me earlier information of the mission of the ministers to Poona. Perhaps I doubted what might be the event of this mission, and how far the Peshwa and the Rajah of Berar might be induced to cooperate with Sindia in his unjust projects, instead of opposing him in conjunction with the other states. Sridher pledged himself by the most solemn asseverations of the Rajah's sincerity. My Moonshee assured him that not the least doubt, such as he has supposed, had been, or could be entertained.

5. Sridher then said he judged that I apprehended wilful procrastination, nothing could be further from the Rajah's intention. It was not for the attainment of any objects of his own that he now deputed ministers to Poona, but to accomplish the views of the British Government at the court of Poona. He solemnly affirmed that the Rajah was sincere in his promise of acceding to the alliance, and he assigned two months as the utmost limit of further delay. My moonshee assured him that I only regretted the occurrence of any delay when the season for deliberation was already passed. Had the present embassy to Poona been sent six months earlier, I should perhaps have been the first to recommend (waiting) for intelligence of the result of the negotiations which may be opened. But I saw no sufficient reason for now postponing measures which the just crisis of affairs at Poona rendered immediately necessary.

6. In the course of these conversations both the Rajah and his ministers have thrown out several hints, that they are confident of the Peshwa's ultimately acceding to the terms, which are required of him. I can perceive that the acceptance of a subsidiary force is the sole point alluded to. They do not seem fully aware of any other conditions to which he is unwilling to agree. They invariably profess zeal to forward Your Lordship's views at the Court of Poona and constantly manifest eagerness to be employed in the negotiations at that Durbar. Sridher has solicited me to intimate to Colonel Palmer that he shall consult him

and be governed by his advice in any difficulty that may occur in the course of his own negotiations at Poona, and at all events will give the British Resident there full information of his own proceedings. I shall mention this circumstance in a letter to Colonel Palmer, and I have little doubt that the Rajah's ministers will really endeavour to assist in bringing the negotiations opened at Poona to a satisfactory conclusion, but I thought it impossible without knowing Your Lordship's sentiments either to encourage or discourage the expectation of being employed in forwarding the success of negotiations, more especially as I could not (do) it without tacitly consenting to the intermediate suspension of negotiations here.

7. The Rajah of Berar has addressed a letter to Your Lordship to communicate his intentions of deputing his ministers to Poona. The letter will be laid before Your Lordship by the Persian Translator, to whom it has been this day forwarded. The Rajah's ministers begin their journey this evening for form's sake. They will probably depart in the course of three or four days.

8. I beg leave to mention that the Rajah has announced to me his intention of making a progress through the northern parts of his dominions, that is, through the jungle of Gurrah and Mundela. He intends to begin the journey a fortnight hence and has invited me to accompany him.

No. 48—The Resident advises the Raja to postpone the departure of his ministers to Poona, as the Peshwa had refused compliance with the proposed alliance.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR;

TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 21st October 1800.

Yesterday on my return from an interview with Rajah Ragojee Bhonsla I received despatches from Hyderabad, by which I learn that the Peshwa has finally refused to accede to the terms of an alliance proposed to him, and that there is reason to believe a reconciliation between him and Sindia has taken place.

As the intended mission of ministers from this Court to that of Poona, which seemed to me a measure of very doubtful expediency even when there was ground for expecting that the Peshwa would be induced to accede to the proposed alliance, now appears to be open to forcible objections, I immediately sent a message requesting another audience this day, or if that were for any reason impracticable, inviting a visit from the Rajah's ministers. As the Rajah remained yesterday at his gardens, the message could not be delivered to him until this morning. He immediately appointed an interview at noon, and I waited upon him accordingly.

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2. Before I report to Your Lordship the representations made by me at this audience, I beg leave to mention that the audience to which the Rajah had invited me yesterday, produced no new communication on his part. He made strong professions of his attachment to the British Government and of his zeal to forward Your Lordship's views at the Court of Poona, and said that all the states being now united by a conformity of sentiments nothing remained but to reduce Sindia to his duty, and thus remove the *thorn* which still disturbs the general tranquillity and safety. He asked what answer should be given by his ministers to a question which the Peshwa would probably ask, whether the British Government is willing to afford him assistance on his application. I replied that the Peshwa was already sufficiently apprized of the disposition of the British Government to afford him permanent aid. I added that as the Nizam's requisition for assistance had been fully complied with, so would a similar application from another ancient ally be received with equal complacency.

3. It is necessary to inform Your Lordship that I had been previously apprized that this question would be asked me, and my informant thought that the object was to sound whether such an application from this Court would be complied with. Though I did not believe his conjecture to be well founded, yet I judged it proper to make such an answer as would not be unsuitable to that view, because Sridher in several conversations with my moonshee has been very explicit in solemnly pledging the Rajah of Berar to accede to the treaty of Hyderabad within the space of two months, should the Peshwa not immediately yield to the endeavours he and his colleague would use to persuade him to accede to the proposed alliance, and because he hinted at the same time but in terms rather obscure, that the Rajah of Berar has it in contemplation to solicit assistance from the British Government.

4. The Rajah yesterday repeated his former declarations that his Ministers would negotiate at the Court of Poona for Your Lordship, not for him. To prevent his misunderstanding the complimentary answer I made and his considering it as an acquiescence on my part, in the proposition hinted by him, I recommended that the ministers should consult Colonel Palmer, if any thing relating to the interests of the British Government should be discussed in the course of other negotiations with the Peshwa.

5. The Rajah's total silence as to the change in the disposition of the Court of Poona, though intelligence of it ought to have reached him, and his own tardiness in communicating his intention of deputing Ministers thither, and his neglect of consulting Your Lordship and the Nizam before he resolved on that measure, furnish some grounds for doubting his present sincerity. Yet on comparing the date of the communications he made to the Nizam with that of the change that has taken place in the Peshwa's views, and on considering the very solemn

declarations made by him and his Minister, I thought it improbable that the Rajah should have adopted so dangerous a policy, as would be that of prosecuting crooked and invidious designs. I therefore determined to be unreserved in the communication of the reasons, upon which I found my objection to the measure of sending ministers to Poona. The representations this day made by me were guided by these considerations.

6. After a suitable introduction in which I alluded to the Rajah's professions of friendship for the Company, and his declarations that the mission was intended to promote Your Lordship's views at Poona, I said that the declared object of the mission would not be at all forwarded by the ministers immediately proceeding on it. I observed that the event has in fact confirmed my former opinion on the inexpediency of this mission, although the turn affairs have taken at Poona, is the exact reverse of what was wished and expected. The Peshwa, while he required the Rajah of Berar to depute ministers to his Court for the purpose of concerting the means of retrieving his authority, had also made overtures to other states. But after opening a negotiation with Colonel Palmer, he had suddenly reconciled himself with Sindia and broke off the negotiations with a formal refusal of acceding to the terms proposed to him. I remarked that the present disposition of the Peshwa is wholly different from that in which he had called for the mission of ministers, and which the Rajah supposed when he resolved to depute them. The unsteadiness of his temper renders it not improbable that he may hereafter resume his former intention, but until such a change takes place, and intelligence of it be actually received, it would not be expedient that the ministers should proceed on their journey. I called the Rajah's attention to the answer I had yesterday given to the question he then asked; that answer was made with a knowledge of Your Lordship's sentiments on the expected application from the Peshwa. He has now made that application and receded from it. Though we may infer from Your Lordship's generosity that you will not resent the Peshwa's conduct if he should resume sentiments conformable to those of the allies, yet I could not now take upon me to authorise the ministers to make such answers to the Peshwa's questions as had been proposed to me at the three last audiences. For all these reasons, I offered it as my advice that the ministers' departure should be postponed until intelligence be received of a change in the Peshwa's disposition, and until Your Lordship's sentiments be made known.

The Rajah said he found it necessary to deliberate on the advice given by me, and would invite me to an interview one or two days hence for the purpose of communicating the result of his deliberations. He added compliments and general professions. I shall lose no time in reporting to Your Lordship by expresses the Rajah's answer to these representations, but I hardly doubt that he will consent to the proposed delay in the departure of the ministers.

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No. 49—The Resident communicates to the Raja and his ministers the conclusion of a treaty of general alliance between the British and the Nizam. The Raja is unwilling to accede to the arrangement unless the Peshwa agreed.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,
TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 12th November 1800.

On the first instant I had the pleasure to receive from Captain Kirkpatrick the important intelligence that the treaty of general alliance has been finally concluded at Hyderabad. The Rajah of Berar had previously proceeded on an excursion to diverse places of worship in the neighbourhood, from which he returned to Nagpur on the 9th instant. The next morning I notified to him the conclusion of the treaty by a message to Sridher Pundit. This Minister solicited with some earnestness the immediate communication of it and I afterwards found that either a translation or an abstract of it in the Hindee language has been already received.

2. For the sake of obtaining through intercourse with the ministers as much information as possible previous to the formal communication of the treaty, I had predetermined to allow Sridher a private perusal of the chief articles. Accordingly my Moonshee repeated his visit in the evening of the same day, carrying a copy of the 1st, 2nd, 15th, 16th, 18th, 19th and 20th articles with the preamble. He was instructed to draw Sridher's particular attention to the conciliatory disposition manifested by the contracting parties, so different from the views which that minister had ascribed to Azeem Ul-Omrah in a former conversation.

3. In answer to inquiries concerning the 3rd and following articles my Moonshee informed him, that they relate to arrangements between the Nizam and Company for the augmentation of the subsidiary force and for the assignment of territory equivalent to the subsidy; as the Rajah of Berar is not directly interested in these arrangements, the immediate communication of them was deemed unnecessary. From the reply made by Sridher it is likely that the Rajah of Berar will request the communication of these articles also. For this reason and not being aware of any objection to it, I purpose to communicate the treaty itself, without waiting for that request, at an audience from the Rajah which is fixed for the 15th instant.

4. From the report I have received from my Moonshee, of a further interview with Sridher Pundit yesterday evening, and of what past the preceding day, I learn that the design of deputing the minister to Poona

is not finally abandoned, and that some propositions on this subject will be made to me, to be submitted to Your Lordship. I perceive also that serious apprehensions are entertained by this Court (partly in consequence of recent suggestions from Poona) as to the situation in which all the members of the Marhatta Empire will be placed, if they do not accede to the alliance concluded between the Company and the Nizam. At the same time, the Rajah of Berar seems to be at present unwilling to accede to it unless in concert with the Peshwa. He retains the opinion that Bajy Rao is not really averse from British alliance, and he consequently hopes to arrange a joint treaty with the Company and not to be reduced to the necessity of concluding a separate one and thereby giving offence to his feudal superior.

No. 50—Here is a lengthy despatch from Colebrooke giving a full description of his interview with the Raja and his ministers at which the treaty with Hyderabad was discussed at great length. The Raja offers to become a mediator between the Company and the Peshwa to bring about a quadruple alliance.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 16th November 1800.

Agreeably to the appointment noticed in my address to Your Lordship under date of 12th instant, I attended the Rajah of Berar yesterday evening and had a private audience at which his son, brother and Ministers were present. Sridher Pundit had previously returned the extract from the treaty of Hyderabad for the purpose of its being communicated to the Rajah. I thought it unnecessary therefore to present a copy of the treaty at large, but delivered to the Rajah the extract above mentioned. At the same time I observed to him, that it contained the chief articles of the treaty recently concluded on the term for the ends I had already intimated to him at various times, and that permanent tranquillity and uniform harmony and concord will be the happy fruit of the general alliance, of which this treaty is calculated to be the basis.

2. The several articles were read and interpreted to the Rajah by Sridher Pundit and as request was made, which I did not refuse, for the communication of the remaining articles of the treaty from the 14th on another day, the Rajah himself expressed his congratulations on the present happy event, and Sridher then informed me by the Rajah's directions, that he was instructed to converse with me on points of great delicacy, which

would be best discussed in the presence of fewer persons. Having acquiesced in this suggestion, I retired with Sridher and Kishen Rao to an adjoining room.

3. Sridher introduced the topics of this private interview by mentioning the relation in which the Rajah stands as a friend or rather as an ally of all the Powers of the Deccan, the Company, the Peshwa and the Nizam. He did not include Sindia among the Powers of Hindoostan, because he considered him as a servant only of the Peshwa, not as an independent chieftain. Being equally attached by the ties of friendship to the Company and Peshwa, the Rajah of Berar found it necessary in the present posture of affairs to use no concealment. Thoughts and doubts which ought perhaps to be suppressed, must be communicated, and he deprecated any misconstruction of the Rajah's candour. With further apologies and with many compliments to the British Government, he proceeded to say that intelligence had been received of warlike preparations at Hyderabad. He specified the equipment of troops, the raising of men, levies and in particular the assemblage of forces on the frontier of the Nizam's territories towards those of the Peshwa. He adverted to diverse clauses of the treaty as indications of an alliance offensive as well as defensive. The identity of the two Powers, the Company and Nizam, as mentioned in the preamble and the explanatory clauses of the 2nd article were particularly noticed by him. He hinted at former transactions, and observed that any misunderstanding between the Nizam and the Peshwa, or the Nizam and Rajah of Berar, such as formerly had occurred and possibly may again occur through the hasty proceedings and temporary irritation, sometimes of one, sometimes of the other party, might now interrupt the harmony subsisting between the Company and the Peshwa or Rajah of Berar. He asked, whether future negotiations with this Court and that of Poona were subordinate to those with the Court of Hyderabad, and subject to the control of intermediate consultation with the Ministers of His Highness the Nizam. He said the welfare of the several Marhatta Powers was now in my hands; that it was in my power to become the channel of cementing a close alliance between the Company and the Marhattas. He mentioned but in a slight, rather than serious manner, that the Rajah of Berar declared he would himself go and with my aid establish harmony and peace. He hinted that the Rajah of Berar has received from the Peshwa and Sindia intimations of their wish for his interposition. He said they were now disposed to be guided by the Rajah and to maintain the relation of amity with all parties. He concluded by requesting, I would report to Your Lordship what had been now said.

4. During the discourse, of which brief abstract has been here submitted to Your Lordship, I manifested impatience at the suggestion that the treaty covers the engagements of an offensive alliance, and that His Highness the Nizam's Government is now assuming a menacing

attitude. I did not however interrupt Sridher, but when he had concluded, I began my reply by treating the intelligence said to have been received from Hyderabad as the idle communications of misinformed persons. I appealed to the whole tenor of the treaty for proof that the alliance was truly defensive, and I pointed out the various passages in it which manifest the real disposition of the contracting parties and which fully provide against the possibility of such consequences arising from it, as he had suggested. I endeavoured both by distant hints and by a direct question to draw from him a more explicit communication of the intimations said to have been received from the Peshwa and Sindia. This he evaded, and without using the opening I gave him for the mention of what else he might be instructed to say, he repeated the proposition that I would report to Your Lordship what had now passed.

5. A short pause ensued, during which I considered the impropriety of receiving in reference a question as to the object of real or imaginary preparations for the equipment of forces, and reflected on various objections against encouraging the Rajah of Berar to interpose between the Company and the Peshwa, more especially as a mediator for him and perhaps for Sindia. Should circumstances more urgent than the obvious objection here alluded to, induce Your Lordship to approve of his interposition, no inconvenience can probably arise from not having now encouraged the offer of it. Upon these considerations I took up the subject when Sridher had left it, and told him I saw nothing in what had been said by him, which I could with propriety report to Your Lordship. It was not fit Your Lordship should be made acquainted with the groundless apprehensions which had been entertained, and the utility of which I again remarked to him as doubtful, and enforced by various topics. In his answer he desired me to consider myself as fully delegated by the Rajah of Berar, and to communicate so much of what had passed as should appear best adapted to the object of the communication. I replied that the object of it was not yet intelligible to me and I requested him to state it explicitly. He rejoined that supposing a case of private life, should two of four friends combine without cause against the third, what must be the situation of the fourth, who is anxious to preserve the friendship of all. I instantly exclaimed against the insinuation, and with emphasis declared the scope and object of the alliance to be exactly the reverse of what was now insinuated by him. The design of it was to promote and maintain universal tranquillity by a general alliance of all the Powers of Hindustan and the Deccan, accompanied by the adjustment of every matter which had been or could probably become the cause of interrupting general harmony.

6. Sridher and Kishen Rao expressed great joy and satisfaction at this declaration and proposed our immediate return to the apartment where the Rajah was sitting. Sridher there made his report of the conversation, and the Rajah, after hearing it, expressed great satisfaction

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also, and turning to me said that he made me the depository of his most secret thoughts and implicitly trusted to my discretion. He then launched out into praises of the British nation and paid many compliments to Your Lordship after reciprocal compliments, which were indeed more than usually profuse throughout the whole of the interview. I closed the business of it by requesting that after the articles of the treaty, and the 18th in particular, should have been sufficiently considered, the Rajah would be pleased to make known to me his sentiments on the clause which expressly concerns him.

7. Since the foregoing paragraphs of this address were written, I have received a hint from Sridher Pundit, through my Moonshee, from whom he invited a visit this forenoon, that the offer of the Rajah of Berar's interpositions will be forthwith renewed. He still insists that aggressions are mediated by the Court of Hyderabad against the Peshwa, and even against the Rajah of Berar. He asks why I decline reporting to Your Lordship the passages of yesterday's interview and offers to communicate the letters, by which the Rajah of Berar is so authorised by the Peshwa to tender his interposition. He adds that formal letters to that effect are daily expected from Poona and clearly indicate the wish of the Rajah of Berar to negotiate, on his own part and on that of the Peshwa, a treaty with the Company, in which Sindia shall be comprehended. It is apparent also that either he or the Peshwa is averse from taking the recent treaty of Hyderabad for the basis of the negotiation they wish to open.

8. This intimation was not received by my Moonshee as a formal message. He recommended that the articles of the treaty should be again considered. The Rajah of Berar would find sufficient evidence in the very terms of the treaty that his fear of aggression on the part of the Court of Hyderabad were groundless, and would also find there the fittest opening for negotiation with the British Government, as had been already hinted to the Rajah by me at the close of the interview yesterday. Sridher consented to reconsider the matter before the message should be delivered to me.

9. As I cannot put a direct refusal on the request to make known to Your Lordship the Rajah's offer of interposition, I shall be ultimately under the necessity of consenting to do so. In the meantime I beg leave to submit to Your Lordship's consideration some observations on the past conduct of this Court. During the whole of last winter the solicitude of the Rajah of Berar for the British alliance was extreme; the Rajah or his Ministers daily inquired whether I was authorised to proceed in the negotiation, and continued to do so almost until the moment when I made overtures for the renewal of it in the month of May last; those overtures were received with great complacency and the minister

more than once proposed that the project of a treaty should be immediately drawn out. During the whole of this period and until the commencement of last month, and even to a later period, the Court was openly and avowedly inveterate against Sindia, and unreserved in applauding the projected alliance to which it was ready to accede, or to which, in the figurative language here employed, it had already acceded. From the time when a reconciliation took place between the Peshwa and Sindia, the sentiments of this Court have undergone a change, which has been gradually developed. By what means a similar reconciliation between Sindia and the Rajah of Berar has been effected, I can only conjecture. The Peshwa has certainly been the channel of it, and the Rajah's views have been altered from the moment when Sindia seriously prepared for quitting Poona, and the Peshwa declared himself satisfied with the near prospect of being left to the free exercise of his legitimate authority. The Rajah's persisting in the design of deputing his ministers to Poona after such a change in the politics of that Court, although the design was formed in circumstances wholly different, and his present offer of interposition on the part of the Peshwa indicate some participation in the counsels of the Court of Poona, yet there is no reason to suspect him of participating in designs inimical to the interests of British Government and its allies. He is blinded by the prospect of exaltation as the mediator of a treaty of alliance between the Peshwa and the Company. In the contemplation of this prospect he is become as tender of the interests of Sindia as he professes to be of the interests of those Powers to which he tenders his interposition, and he has listened more readily than was credible to the suggestion that hostile views are entertained by the Court of Hyderabad. During the last week the consultations of the Court, so far as I obtain information of them, and even the Minister Sridher's communications to my Moonshee, exhibit incoherence, which shows the Rajah of Berar to be confused and unable to resolve on the part he should take in regard to the alliance offered to him. It is even agitated to reinforce the troops on the Rajah's frontier towards the dominions of the Nizam, and the information I have received on this subject is sufficiently authentic for me to ground on it an unofficial expostulation, which I have accordingly instructed my Moonshee to make at his next interview with Sridher Pundit. I shall also give this Court an opportunity of explaining, if possible, the total inconsistency of its present conduct with its past professions, continually made and repeated until the moment when the conclusion of the new treaty of alliance was formally announced.

10. For the purpose of expediting the future despatches, which I shall have the honour to address to Your Lordship in the further progress of negotiation here, I shall take measures for placing a temporary dawk between this and Benares, which I hope Your Lordship will approve of.

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I am informed that the despatches dated 12th instant have been miscarried by the carelessness of the cossids*. A duplicate of them accompanies the present despatch.

No. 51—The Resident reports to the Governor General further developments at Nagpur. The Raja has been invited by the Peshwa to meet him and Sindhia on the Godavari. He gives it as his opinion that the offer of the Raja to negotiate an alliance between the Peshwa and the British should be encouraged.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,
TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 20th November 1800.

In answer to the unofficial expostulations made by my Moonshee conformably with the instructions mentioned in my last address to Your Lordship, Sridher Pundit has acknowledged that the measure of augmenting the forces on the Raja's southern frontier has been agitated. In the midst of alarms many suggestions, he said, become the subject of deliberation, but in this matter the Rajah will act according to what I shall say. Notwithstanding this, which indeed is but an ambiguous assurance, I do not find that the measure is certainly abandoned. I shall therefore make formal remonstrances should there be any further appearance of a movement of these troops.

2. Having cause for believing that the Rajah has been invited to meet the Peshwa and Sindia at Tryembec† Nasec on the bank of the Godavary, I had directed my Moonshee to sound the intentions of the Court. From Sridher's conversation when this subject was hinted, it appears almost certain that such an invitation has been received, but the Rajah has no present intention of accepting it.

3. In the course of subsequent conversations Sridher revived the topics which were discussed at the last audience with which I was honoured by the Rajah, and desired my Moonshee to deliver my message not so formal as that proposal by him at their last interview, but soliciting me with earnestness not to decline reporting to Your Lordship what passed at my interview with the Rajah on the 15th instant.

4. For reasons which I shall have the honour to state in the sequel of this address, I sent my Moonshee yesterday evening to Sridher with

* Messengers.

† Nasik Tryambak.

written instructions to make the following answer on my part :—" To my own thinking I have already obviated the doubts and apprehensions which were stated, and have left no room for the continuance of them ; to retain such doubts and suspicions is wrong. As to the other object which was mentioned, I have not refused to report it. But since there is no misunderstanding between the Rajah and His Highness the Peshwa, and on the contrary good will towards him has been most fully evinced, I hinted the enquiry (as to) what is the object of the interposition thus tendered, and there the subject was dropt on your side."

5. Sridher desired permission to make known this message to the Rajah in the words in which it was delivered to him, and my Moonshee having waited on the Rajah this morning at Sridher's tents, found that it had been communicated to him and that he now seems satisfied with the assurances of his apprehensions being groundless, and much delighted with the expectation that his offer of interposition will be reported to Your Lordship, and he declares himself confident it will be favourably received. He made strong professions of attachment to the Company and of his zeal to cultivate the friendship of the British Government and to render essential services to the Company. He said if the Peshwa should aggress, he himself would be the foremost in opposing such aggressions by force. His whole army he said would, in that case, be at my disposal. In short, if there were not too many reasons for distrust, his professions are so strong that a favourable opinion of his uniform sincerity might be presumed.

6. As the avowed partisan of the late Nana Fadnavees, the Rajah of Berar was certainly heretofore inimical to Dowlut Rao Sindia. So long as he dreaded that Chieftain's resentment and his ascendancy in the Marhatta empire, the Rajah of Berar was really solicitous for the protection of the British Government and would have been willing to make concessions in return for it. He hoped to earn it with few or even without any concessions when the Peshwa's resource opened to him new prospects to his view. Since the unexpected reconciliation of the Peshwa and Sindia and the consequent preparations of the last mentioned Chief for returning to Hindostan, he is entirely relieved from apprehensions of Sindia's animosity, and although no cordial union can probably take place between this Court and Dowlut Rao, yet the Rajah of Berar has been induced to enter into the Peshwa's present views of securing him from the immediate resentment of the British Government and of His Highness the Nizam, perhaps for the sake of preserving a supposed counterpoise to the British power. It is probable that these sentiments were not entertained by him much earlier than the commencement of the present month, and that had he not intelligence above three weeks sooner that a reconciliation had taken place between the Peshwa and Dowlut Rao, was he likely to do so. In the interim he wavered and it is impossible to

acquit him wholly of insincerity in his conduct during that interval. The professions then made were so consonant to the former disposition of this Court that I did not sufficiently distrust them. But it may be doubted whether the promises at that time tendered were even intended to be kept.

7. It seems now evident that the Rajah will not accede to the treaty recently concluded at Hyderabad, and that his object in wishing to negotiate on a different basis in concert with the Peshwa, is to avoid on his own part and on that of the Peshwa, concessions by which the power of the Mahrattas in general might be lessened. At the same time he possibly looks to his own exaltation as a mediator between the greatest Power of India and even hopes to ingratiate himself in that capacity with both parties. Conceiving this to be really the present disposition of the Court of Nagpur, I apprehend that by making any further difficulty of reporting to Your Lordship the Rajah's offer of interposition, I should accelerate rather than retard his progressing towards a close union with the Court of Peshwa. To avoid this consequence and for the purpose of reminding him that Your Lordship has evinced a zealously amicable disposition towards the Peshwa, and that no differences exist between the British Government and the Court of Poona, I sent the message stated in the fourth paragraph of this address.

8. While the Rajah's proposal is thus kept in suspense, there is room for the probable recurrence of circumstances to estrange him from a combination with other Marhatta Powers, before this seemingly discordant union can be consolidated. Meanwhile an influence at this Court is preserved which may be exerted to prevent the adoption of obnoxious measures. Such is the actual mission of the ministers to Poona, the Rajah's proceeding to meet Bajy Rao and Sindia on the Godavary, and especially his assembling troops on his southern frontier.

9. Unless impelled by motives of necessity the Rajah of Berar cannot be long cordially united with the Court of Poona, because he is ever secretly impatient of feudal subordination to the Peshwa. So lately as this morning in his message which the Rajah desired should be delivered verbatim to me by my Moonshee, he said, "whether I be considered as the kinsman, the servant or the slave of the Rajah of Sittarah, it is on account of the relation in which I stand to Sao* Rajah, whatever that be, that I am interested for the Peshwa. He writes to me that he commits himself to my guidance as to that of a father. Now my objects are the same with those of the British Government, namely that general tranquillity be preserved while no injustice is committed. If then the Peshwa should aggress, my army will be at your disposal."

* Shahu II.

10. Considering the mutual jealousy that subsists among all the Marhatta Powers, it is not even now impossible that if Your Lordship should think it expedient to encourage the Rajah's offer of interposition, he may side with the British Government rather than with the Peshwa in the progress of negotiation, and that for the same reason which rendered it credible that the Rajah's ministers, had they gone to Poona, would have taken part with the British Government in negotiations there. The reason here alluded to is the wish which the Rajah of Berar probably entertains of ingratiating himself with the British Government that he may revert more safely to his ancient policy of maintaining relations of amity with all, while he forms no permanent strict alliance with any power.

No. 52—The Raja asks the Resident to rely on his solemn promise of assistance to the Company in the place of a definitive treaty, which the Resident objects to. The Raja is informed of the Peshwa's unwillingness to accede to a treaty in which the Bhonsle Raja figured as principal.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 20th December 1800.

The information I received through various channels is so contradictory that I cannot state it to Your Lordship with any confidence as a ground for judging of the present disposition of this Court. Intelligence, on the authenticity of which I can place most reliance, only proves that the counsels of the Rajah of Berar fluctuate, and that measures of the most opposite tendency become alternately the subjects of deliberation. In a late despatch (dated 5th instant) I had the honour to mention to Your Lordship that the Rajah was supposed to entertain thoughts of resuming the design of an alliance with the British Government. Four days ago Sridher Pundit sent a message by my Moonshee which seems to demonstrate that this information was not groundless.

2. He mentioned a rumour that I was holding myself in readiness to return to Hindoostan. He conjured me not to think of doing so. If I expected my recall the Rajah would immediately write to Your Lordship to solicit my continuance at his Court; perhaps the delays that have occurred, may have occasioned dissatisfaction; but the Rajah is, he said, resolved (though further delay may yet intervene) that I should not take

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my leave without having succeeded in my mission. I have not thought it necessary to contradict the rumour mentioned by Sridher otherwise than by saying, that I do not know of any sufficient foundation for it. My Moonshee had already observed to him, when receiving his message, that excessive delay was doubtless unsatisfactory.

3. I have stated this message to Your Lordship, simply because it conveys a seeming confirmation of the notion that the Rajah has it still in contemplation to enter into engagements with Your Lordship. On the other hand, I have credible information that he has very lately deliberated on the measure of proceeding in person to Poona in consequence of reiterated summons from the Peshwa. A few days before he was said to be much disgusted by an intimation from Bajee Rao that pecuniary contributions are expected from him, and no less so by a declaration from the same quarter, that he is distrusted and suspected of duplicity in his conduct.

4. Unwilling that the Peshwa's refusal of admitting him as a principal in any treaty of alliance in which His Highness may be contracting party, should remain longer unknown to the Rajah of Berar, I obtained an audience on the 16th instant. I began by requesting the communication of the Rajah's sentiments on the clause of the recent treaty of Hyderabad, which concerns him. He replied that his message (of the 20th ultimo) the purport of which he saw repeated as a solemn engagement, amounted on his part to the obligations of a treaty; his whole army would be at Your Lordship's disposal in case of aggressions. This promise, which he would strictly fulfill, was, he said, equivalent to a treaty.

5. As it was not my immediate object to press for a definitive answer, I considered this as evasive only and reserving to myself to remark on it the next day, I replied that written engagements the terms of which shall have been deliberately weighed by both parties, and which shall specify all reciprocal objections, are indispensable. Else the extent of a promise and the complete or imperfect fulfilment of it must become the occasion of future controversy.

6. In reply, the Rajah acknowledged that written documents obviate disputes. But previously to the further consideration of this subject, he requested a copy of the treaty of Salbye, to which he is by implication a party. I readily agreed to furnish the copy requested by him.

7. I then proceeded to remark that the Rajah perhaps postponed according to the treaty of Hyderabad, wishing to learn previously what the Peshwa, who is named in the same clause of it, finally determines in regard to the option given to him. That I knew beforehand what His Highness the Peshwa's determination would be, and that I found it necessary to acquaint the Rajah with the circumstance from which I anticipated the

Peshwa's answer. It was a matter of almost equal delicacy to communicate or suppress it; but it was no longer possible to let him remain ignorant of what it was absolutely necessary he should know. I then informed him that in consequence of his declared willingness to enter into an alliance such as had been offered to him, Colonel Palmer had proposed in his negotiations with the Peshwa a clause similar to that which the Rajah had perused in the recent treaty of Hyderabad. But Bajy Rao declared he would not accede to a treaty in which the Rajah of Berar was to be admitted as a principal, because the Rajah is subordinate to him and stands in the relation of a subject.

8. The Rajah replied that he is not subject to the Peshwa, (but) a servant like him of the Rajah of Sittarah. He thanked me for making known this circumstance to him and added compliments, to which I returned suitable answer.

9. The next day, I gave written instructions to my Moonshee to deliver a message in my name to Sridher Pundit for the Rajah. The following is a literal translation of it.

"From the time of my arrival here, it has been the intention of both parties and both have recognised it as expedient that a treaty should be adjusted, for this is considered as the means of strengthening the relation of friendship, the bonds of union and participation in joy and sorrow. Accordingly the Rajah himself more than once declared in express terms that it must take place. When the design was formed of adjusting a new treaty at Hyderabad for the purpose of establishing a firm foundation of tranquillity, peace and safety, this was mentioned, and from the mode in which the proposition was received, it was certain that the Rajah declared his accession to the plan. Afterwards when a rumour prevailed that the treaty was concluded, being asked the purport of it, I committed to writing and sent an abstract of the terms of the new treaty; this too seemed satisfactory, and the Rajah subsequently used to declare he would accede to it. Now the Rajah says a verbal declaration should be received as equivalent to a treaty, and that is his answer. I have not received it as a definitive answer, and for this reason, lest the Rajah, notwithstanding the firm friendship that subsists, should be charged with want of sincerity and be liable to reproaches. It is necessary to tread the path of consistency and it is advisable to contemplate the benefits and good consequences of concert and strict union. This merits deliberation. A week hence I shall trouble him for his sentiments on the subject of the proposed treaty of alliance."

10. Trivial circumstances prevented this message being delivered until yesterday morning and the Rajah, having proceeded to a place of worship twenty coss distant, has deferred answering it until his return from that excursion.

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No. 53—Colebrooke informs the Governor General that the Raja was only procrastinating and was not very eager for a subsidiary alliance with the Company.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 16th January 1801.

After returning from the excursion mentioned in my address to Your Lordship dated 20th ultimo, Rajah Raghojee Bhonsla immediately proceeded on a similar excursion towards a different quarter, making an apology to me for this further delay in replying to the message which I had sent to him, as reported to Your Lordship in my address above quoted. He returned from his second excursion in a few days and yesterday after a further postponement on account of the intervening festivals, he gave my Moonshee a private audience at which he noticed my message in the mode stated in the following report.

2. He asked, what failure has there been on his part in discharging the duties of ancient friendship? deficiency never shall occur. On this he is firmly resolved and no doubt need be entertained. These general assurances were frequently repeated and he renewed his declaration that all his forces are at Your Lordship's disposal. He said, he has always spoken to me his sincere sentiments without concealment; what he has said he is resolved to make good; it may be considered as engraved on stone. Equity is the object he, as well as the British Government, contemplates. The task of adjusting matters of friendship between both parties must be mine, and I must so contrive that both shall preserve their equal scales weighed in friendship's balance. He said he would add but one remark, for to say more would be superfluous, that all good policy now belongs exclusively to the British Government.

3. Your Lordship will perceive that the Rajah studiously avoids giving a direct refusal to the proposal of according to the treaty of Hyderabad, though evidently resolved not to avail himself of the option given to him by that treaty. He is unwilling by a direct refusal to break off negotiation entirely and preclude himself from resuming them, should circumstances soon render it, in his opinion, expedient again to seek the alliance of the British Government. However urged, he will for these reasons continue to elude returning a positive answer. Mean time his deliberations, so far as I obtain any information of them, have hitherto indicated irresoluteness on every point except that of procrastinating, and of preserving, if possible, the relation of amity with the great Powers of the Deccan, at the same time cultivating friendly disposition of the British Government in particular.

4. With powers of less note he observes less delicacy. Since the close of the rainy season, a part of the troops stationed in the province of Gurrah have advanced into the contiguous districts of Bundelkhand under pretention of chastising the borderers, who had made incursions into Gurrah. They have succeeded in reducing several strong places and are continuing to advance towards Panna. No answer has been returned to letters received from Ali Bahadur, who expostulates on the ground of all Bundelkhand having been abandoned to him and therefore belonging to his dominions, and the latest accounts received from that quarter state that troops sent by Ali Bahadur were approaching and an action was expected to take place in the course of a few days. It is probable that Raghojee Bhonsla wishes to take advantage of present circumstances to subjugate that part of Bundelkhand which borders on his own dominions, and has not been already completely reduced by Ali Bahadur. The studied silence observed at this Court in regard to those recent transactions, indicates that the Rajah is in the present instance prosecuting ambitious designs.

No. 54—Colebrooke suggests his recall and the abolition of the residency of Nagpur, as it gave an appearance of an actual alliance between the Raja and the Company. He asks the Governor General's permission to declare to the Raja that the negotiations for an alliance were finally broken off.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY, GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Nagpur, 21st January 1801.

A few days ago I received information that the design of sending confidential Ministers to Poona is certainly resumed by this Court, and that a day for their departure will be appointed in the course of next week. I have not learnt the precise objects of their mission nor the colour, which will be put on this measure, when it is formally announced a few days hence. But I cannot doubt, that Raghojee Bhonsla's whole aim is to effect the complete accommodation of all his differences with other Marhatta Powers, that he should in more security pursue his ancient policy without need of placing himself under the immediate protection of any one state.

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2. This opinion of the present views of the Court of Nagpur I was before led to entertain, as I have had the honour to state in former addresses to Your Lordship. It is confirmed by private intelligence that the Ministers are instructed to enforce the Bhonsla's claim for a remission of all pecuniary contributions, and to repel the demand of arrears and the claim for a present contingent in money or troops by holding out a menace that the Rajah may be induced to follow the example of the Nizam, and conclude a strict alliance with the Company.

3. This information is so consonant to probability that I do not hesitate in giving credit to the intelligence. It is obvious that such a menace is likely to have weight at the Court of Poona in the present posture of affairs, and when the Rajah of Berar shall have effected by such means the objects to carry there, he will be entirely relieved from any necessity of seeking the protection of the British Government.

4. I hope Your Lordship will not think me presumptuous if I beg leave to suggest the expediency of recalling me from this Court. The Rajah of Berar derives from the presence of a British Resident at his Court the benefits of an actual alliance with the British Government without making any return for those benefits, and without being bound by any engagements to the Company. The withdrawing of the Residency would deprive him of those advantages. It would diminish the efficacy of the menace which his ministers are instructed to hold out to the Court of Poona, and it must consequently accelerate those events, which may compel him to take refuge in an alliance with the Company.

5. The negotiations which were opened with him seem to be now virtually closed. Should Your Lordship deem it expedient to recall me on this ground, either for the reasons which I have had the honour to suggest or upon any other considerations, the Rajah of Berar will find it necessary immediately, or else after the lapse of a few months, to make new overtures to Your Lordship, which may lead to the speedy arrangement of a treaty of alliance with him. I have the probability of such necessity be felt by him less early than I am led to suppose, still a contrary result need not be apprehended whatever turn affairs may take between the British Government and Dowlut Rao Sindia or His Highness the Peshwa; for the Rajah of Berar will either observe real neutrality, or at least take no active part against the Company or its allies.

6. The weight which he obtained among other Mahratta States through the presence of a British Resident at the Court, and through the consequent appearance of connection with Your Lordship's Government, is so valuable to him that in all events he will doubtless solicit the reappointment of a Resident, and thus afford Your Lordship an

opportunity of granting his request at a time when he has it less in his power than at present, to employ the favourable disposition manifested by Your Lordship towards him for the purpose, which tends to the obstruction of Your Lordship's views.

7. These considerations indicate the expediency of the measure, which I have now had the honour to suggest. But if other circumstances render it ineligible, I beg leave to propose that I should be authorized to declare formally that the negotiation founded on the basis of the recent treaty of Hyderabad is at an end. By thus weakening the Raja's confidence that he will at any time be admitted by Your Lordship to the benefits of an alliance with the British Government, even after failing in his negotiations with the Court of Poona, he may be forced to the immediate adoption of a less subtle* policy.

8. Should Your Lordship approve either of these suggestions I beg leave to solicit your early commands; because the mission of the Ministers to Poona with instructions such as are stated in the second paragraph of this address, is likely to take place early in the next month.

No. 55—Colebrooke informs the Governor General that a mission would soon visit the Poona Court from the Bhonsle, but that in no way indicated the Raja's complicity in the dangerous schemes of Sindhia and the Peshwa.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR.

TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY, GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Nagpur, 26th January 1801.

Rajah Raghojee Bhonsla yesterday at noon sent for my Moonshee and desired him to deliver a message acquainting me, that Tuesday which is to-morrow, had been the moment fixed upon for the departure of the ministers deputed to the Court of Poona; when their mission was before in contemplation, I was made acquainted with everything relating to it; by my advice it was then postponed, but it had been now resolved upon for the transaction of indispensable affairs. This information was, he said, communicated to me conformably with the exigency of friendship, and he desired my Moonshee to convey to Sridher in the evening the answer he might give.

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2. I directed the Moonshee to reply that I was much pleased when he repeated to me the mention of friendship, and that I waited to be informed of the present motives for now sending the Ministers to Poona. The delivery of my message to Sridher yesterday evening was however prevented by the circumstance of the Rajah's palace being besieged by a body of Sikhs, who have mutinied for their pay. As the mutiny is not yet quelled, I shall not probably receive any further communication respecting this mission and the motive of it before it takes place.

3. To the information, which is already before Your Lordship, imperfect as it is, I can yet add no further intelligence but the arrival of an agent from Poona with an answer so far satisfactory to the Rajah as to have accelerated his sending the ministers thither. Your Lordship will remark the careless manner in which the measure has been notified, and the Rajah's seeming indifference as to the opinion that may be entertained of a step, which he has not yet explained.

4. The Rajah of Berar has in this instance evidently taken a resolution, which is not to be shaken by argument, perhaps not even by the strongest remonstrances I could take upon myself to make without Your Lordship's special instructions. Nor would any useful purpose be attained by a strenuous opposition to this measure; since the Bhonsla could be at no loss for other channels of concerting with the Court of Poona, agreements such as he may have in view.

5. Although the present behaviour of the Rajah of Berar does not seem conformable with his supposed disposition to cultivate a good understanding with the British Government, and to rely on the protection of the Company in case of need, yet it is not wholly inconsistent with that disposition, as connected with the other views, I have been also led to ascribe to this Court. It chiefly proves that the Rajah of Berar presumes too much on the alacrity with which he thinks he would be at any time welcomed as an ally by the British Government. I do not find any reason for believing that the Rajah of Berar is willing to enter into views of the Peshwa and Sindhia inimical to the Company or its allies, and the expediency of the measure, which I ventured to propose for Your Lordship's consideration in the fourth paragraph of despatch dated 21st instant, appears to be still further confirmed.

6. Since the foregoing part of this address was written, the mutiny having been quelled, Sridher has received the answer to the Rajah's message above mentioned. He observed that an urgent requisition having been received from the Peshwa brought by the agent recently arrived from Poona, the mission of himself and his colleague is now become unavoidable. He made professions of the Rajah's unalterable friendship for the Company and asserted his own reluctance to proceed to Poona, could it by any means be avoided. He added, that the Rajah will this evening appoint an hour for an interview to-morrow.

No. 56—The Resident is asked to bring about an amicable settlement of the boundary dispute in the Midnapore quarter with the Bhonsle Raja; on the Raja's declining a fair settlement, severe measures are threatened.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,

TO—H. T. COLEBROOKE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR.

Fort William, 11th April 1801.

I am directed by His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General in Council, to transmit to you, for your information, the enclosed copies of letters received from the acting Magistrate at Ramgarh, together with an extract from the Military Department on the same subject, and to desire that you will make the necessary representations to the Rajah of Berar, in order that measures may be adopted to prevent the apprehended renewal of the disturbances so lately quelled in the Palamou district.

2. I am further directed to transmit to you copies of letters received from the Magistrate of Midnapore, and to desire that you will also state the circumstances therein mentioned, to the Rajah of Berar, and at the same time that you will suggest to the Rajah the expediency of adopting the measure proposed by the Magistrate, for the purpose of establishing a definite and connected line of demarkation between the territories of the Company and of the Marhattas, as being the only means of preventing the perpetual recurrence of acts of depredation on the part of the Marhattas, upon the inhabitants of the Company's possessions. Should the Rajah be disposed to accede to an equitable exchange of territory, or to any species of commutation by which the object above described may be attained, you will suggest to the Rajah the necessity of appointing a proper person with sufficient powers to adjust the terms of the proposed measure, in concert with such officer as may be nominated under the order of His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General, to enter into a negotiation for that purpose. Should the Rajah be disinclined to accede to this proposition, you will state to him, that with a view to protect the lives and property of the Company's subjects from those acts of depredations and violence which the officers of the Marhatta State are either unwilling, or unable to restrain, His Lordship will consider it his duty to deviate from the unavailing delicacy hitherto observed by the British Government towards the Marhatta State and to authorize the Company's troops to pursue the perpetrators of such acts of violence as are now complained of, into the Marhatta territory.

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3. With a view to aid the effect of your representations upon the foregoing subjects, His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General has thought proper to address a letter to Raghojee Bhonsla, which will be transmitted to you by this despatch, from the Persian Translator's office.

No. 57—Recall of Colebrooke and abolition of the Residency at Nagpur; appreciation of Colebrooke's services by the Governor General.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,

TO—H. T. COLEBROOKE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR.

Fort William, 15th April 1801.

The conduct of the Rajah of Berar during the whole of the negotiations appears to me to have been insincere and illusory. He seems at no period of time to have been really desirous of becoming party to the general defensive alliance concluded with His Highness the Nizam. It appears to have been the Rajah's policy to render his negotiation with the British Government subservient to his particular views at the Court of Poona. But whatever may be the Rajah's real disposition and designs, the importance of his becoming a party to the alliance is greatly diminished by the altered state of circumstances. Your mission has already produced as much benefit to the interest of the Company as could reasonably be expected by your longer continuance. It has revived and improved the political relations between the British Government and the State of Berar, and has laid the foundation of a closer alliance, if circumstances should hereafter render such a connection desirable.

I have therefore resolved to withdraw the Residency from Nagpur. You will receive from the Persian Department a letter from me to the Rajah's address announcing your recall. You will accordingly quit Nagpur for your return to the Presidency as soon after your delivery of that letter as you may find convenient.

I have great pleasure in communicating to you my entire approbation of your conduct and my sense of your zeal, diligence and ability during the whole of your Residence at the Court of Berar.

I shall direct the Resident at Poona to make such provision as may be necessary for the conduct of the political relations of the British Government with the Court of Nagpur, and for obtaining intelligence of its views.

No. 58—Mutiny of Raja's brigade in Berar, the Pindari trouble in Sagar, Raja's brother Venkoji offers certain confidential intelligence. Raja summoned to Poona.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,
TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 30th April 1801.

A dangerous mutiny of the troops stationed in Berar proper, has engaged the whole attention of this Court during the past week. The entire brigade of sepoys stationed in that province mutinied for their arrears of pay. They confined their principal officers and marched with the cannon attached to their brigade towards this capital. On their approaching within fifteen miles, it was thought necessary to draw out a large body of troops towards the quarter from which they were advancing, but the mutineers after committing some violence on their march, have become more moderate, and have now agreed to return to their duty on receiving a certain proportion of the arrears due to them.

2. While this transaction keeps the Court in alarm, its attention is distracted from other important objects. The garrison of Sumbalpoore continues mutinous and so far from yielding the fort as was expected in consequence of an adjustment which had been made, these mutineers have plundered the neighbouring country. At the same time intelligence has been received that an action has been fought with doubtful success between Holcar's marauders and the troops sent by this Government to expel them from Sagar. They still continue their devastations in that province, notwithstanding a pecuniary contribution which the chieftain of Sagar agreed to pay to the marauders by way of ransom for his city and district.

3. Within the last week Vincajee Bhonsla has renewed the subject of his proffered communication. The confidential persons employed by him brought me several messages, contained a direct hint that he looks to be seconded in his designs, and as I have reason to believe that his views are such as were explained in my address to Your Lordship dated 25th ultimo, I judged it necessary to notice that hint in a manner adapted to discourage his expectations, if these be founded on any other grounds but the fact of sinister conduct on the part of his brother towards the British Government or its allies. It was also my wish to provoke the communication of such a fact, if it be real. I therefore replied, that if the designs in which Vincajee desires to be seconded are adverse to his brother's interests, it is necessary to reflect whether the British Government consistently with its invariable and rigid observance of equity and good faith, can be expected to assist designs injurious to one with whom it maintains the relations of amity, and who has not forfeited its friendship by any known act.

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4. No reply was made to this observation. In the evening of the next day Vincajee unexpectedly sent to request my Moonshee's immediate attendance on him at his garden three miles distant from the town. As the Moonshee had a previous appointment to wait on Rajah Raghojee Bhonsla at the very same hour upon a trivial business, he was under the disagreeable necessity of excusing himself and Vincajee seems to have taken it in good part, although the compliance with his summon at the time would have been followed by the certain consequence of awakening his brother's suspicions. He has not yet appointed another time, nor sent any later message.

5. The circumstances which so long delay Vincajee's proposed communication, are unfortunate. It might perhaps resolve the doubts, which there is too much reason to entertain, respecting the intention of the Peshwa and Dowlut Rao Sindhia. To their designs whatever these are, the Rajah of Berar must doubtless be privy, though it still seems improbable that he should be induced to take part in them. At the same time it must be acknowledged that the Rajah's conduct is not clear from suspicion, and both Vincajee's confidential messengers who are persons of rank and highly trusted by him, have thrown out obscure hints which tend to increase the distrust of the Rajah of Berar's good faith. I still hope to avail myself of the advances made by Vincajee to elicit from him a full disclosure of the designs entertained by the Marhatta Powers.

6. I have this moment, while preparing the present despatch, received intelligence that an express arrived last night from Poona with a summon from the Peshwa to the Rajah of Berar requiring his immediate attendance at Poona, and notifying to him that Dowlut Rao Sindhia, Ali Behadur and other Marhatta chiefs have been also summoned. The express has been brought by two confidential servants of the Peshwa. Whether the Rajah of Berar will comply, is yet uncertain.

No. 59—Colebrooke conveys to the Governor General secret intelligence about the Peshwa's plans to form a confederacy of the Maratha chieftains against the Company, in which the Nizam also may be invited, as also the Bhonsle Raja. British hostility to Sindhia's employment of French officers is resented by the Nagpur Court.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,
TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY, GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

Nagpur, 4th May 1801.

It seems indubitable that the purpose for which a convention of Marhatta Chieftains has been summoned, is to arrange a confederacy against the British Power. Persons from whom I have been accustomed to receive intelligence in which I put trust, because their confidential

situations give them access to accurate information, now speak of the Peshwa's designs as completely manifested by the call of a convention, and the Rajah of Berar's privity to them as no longer susceptible of concealment after the receipt of a summon to attend that meeting. One of the persons here alluded to is in the confidential employ of Vincajee Bhonsla, the other attached to the same prince, but derives further means of information from the employments which he holds in the service of the Rajah of Berar.

2. They acknowledge that the object of the convention is to concert measures against the British Government, that the Peshwa has long harboured the same designs and he dates it so far back as the fall of Tippoo Sultan. He says the project is now matured and the troops lately levied at Poona are intended for this very service. The other avers that the scheme includes a plan of inviting aid from the French and from Zamaun Shah. Both assert that its object is to extort from the British Government the cession of a part of the conquests made in Mysore, and to screen Dowlut Row Sindhia from the effects of the resentment supposed to be excited solely by his entertaining French officers in his service. They confirm what has been mentioned by other persons also, that the Marhatta Courts hope to detach the Nizam from his alliance with the Company; both hint that the Rajah of Berar listens cheerfully to the Peshwa's overtures, but in answer to the direct question suggested by this hint, they employ only general terms, one saying that the Marhattas are all of one mind, the other launching out into regrets at the infatuation of the Marhatta Chieftains. To the question whether the Rajah of Berar will comply with the summons, the reply was "not immediately, but he will probably meet the rest of the Marhatta Chieftains on the banks of the Godavary under pretence of religion, at a fair which will be held on the last day of August next".

3. The information of which the heads are here submitted to Your Lordship, is corroborated in some circumstances by intelligence received through other channels. An intelligence who receives wages from me, has of late frequently brought accounts of conversations overheard, regarding proposals made by the Marhattas to the Nizam for a confederacy to wrest from the Company its acquisitions in Mysore. I have also received intelligence but which is not yet confirmed, that an agent sent by the Nizam with a secret commission unknown to Azim-ul-Omrah arrived here last week, has had a private audience of the Rajah of Berar and still remains here in disguise.

4. As to the supposed cause of resentment on the part of the British Government against Dowlut Row Sindhia, that notion has certainly been entertained even by this Court. An expression dropt by one of the Rajah of Berar's ministers was long ago reported to me, which conveyed that it was unjust to dictate to any one what servants he should employ, or to

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require him to dismiss from his service men of a particular tribe or nation that may be displeasing to another power. This was spoken on the subject of the supposed misunderstanding between the British Government and Dowlut Row Sindhia.

5. But in regard to the Rajah of Berar's alleged disposition to listen to the Peshwa's overtures, it must be remarked that the same persons who now hint it, have, like others who speak of the views of the Court, invariably affirmed it to be the Rajah of Berar's policy to maintain appearances with all Powers but unity with none, and certainly there is no indication from any military preparations that the Rajah has hitherto meditated taking part in an arduous war.

6. Doubtless the Rajah of Berar would view with no regret events that should re-establish a counterpoise against the British Power in the East Indies. With hopes of this consequence he may be disposed not to discourage the Peshwa's projects, but he himself probably intends to adopt the same conduct which this Court observed during the last war between the Company and the Marhattas, preserving neutrality for which he would claim merit with both parties and by which he would hope to find himself after the close of the war, better secured in his own independence.

No. 60—Colebrooke points to Venkojee, the Raja's brother, as the source of his information of a general Maratha confederacy against British interests. Venkojee offers to supply more information of an incriminating nature.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 8th May 1801.

On reviewing my address to Your Lordship bearing date of yesterday, I am apprehensive that I have not sufficiently restricted the credit attached by me to the information stated in the second paragraph of that address. The persons, who furnished it, must be considered as deriving their knowledge chiefly, though not solely, from Vincajee Bhonsla, but neither of them have alleged his authority in support of the genuineness of their information. Without this authentication and without a detail of facts, their assertions, however confidently made, can be received only as surmises, though probably they possess better knowledge of what they affirm.

2. Vincajee's confidential messenger has brought an answer to the observations which I made on the suggestion, that he expects to be seconded in his views. In this answer he insinuates that he has it in his power to disclose not one, but many instances of insidiousness in his brother's conduct towards the British Government, and that he will do so, and even point out simple and very gentle means of reclaiming Raghojee Bhonsla, provided I promise to trust myself to his guidance. Without making the unconditional promise asked by him I have returned an answer which will, I hope, induce him at length after so much hesitation and so many mysterious messages, to make his proffered disclosure.

No. 61—Colebrooke learns from Venkoji Bhonsle's agent of attempts by the Marathas to dissolve the alliance between the Company and the Nizam.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY.

Nagpur, 8th May 1801.

In a long conversation between Vincajee Bhonsla's confidential agent and my Moonshee which followed the communication of my answer to Vincajee's last message, that Moonshee by my orders enforced the purport of it, by saying that regard is equally entertained for both sons of Moodajee Bhonsla, but the demonstrations of it are, by the natural course of affairs, confined to the head of the family. To entertain propositions from Vincajee Bhonsla would be a deviation from this usual course and must be founded on sufficient reasons. He took several occasions of insinuating that he believed no such reason exists, else it would have been made known before this time.

2. On the other hand Vincajee's agent explained his hesitation as arising from sensations of resentment against his brother and revived affection for him. One moment he is desirous of consulting his own safety, the next he is reluctant to become the means of endangering his brother ; however, the disclosure will be made. Mean time he assured, said the agent, that Raghojee Bhonsla is privy to the counsels of the other Marhatta chiefs.

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3. In addition to his former intimations of the nature of these designs he then hinted that the dissolution of the alliance between the Nizam and the Company is an object which the Marhattas have much at heart, and to effect which every artifice will be used. He repeated his former information (for it was from him the intelligence was received) relative to the arrival of a secret agent from Hyderabad; he did not, however, furnish any light which could enable me to ascertain the truth of the intelligence, but he added as Vincajee's as well as his own opinion, that the mission, if real, is a stratagem of the Court of Hyderabad. I must, however, remark that more probably the intelligence itself is wholly erroneous.

No. 62—The Resident sends to the Governor General a copy of a secret letter from the Peshwa to the Raja.

FROM—THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 8th May 1801.

Since I closed my despatch of this date, the treachery of a Muttsuddy* has given me possession of an important document; it is a copy of the Peshwa's last letter to the Rajah of Berar, and I have the honour to enclose a translation of it.

2. I shall hereafter solicit permission to recommend to Your Lordship's notice the person, by whose address this document has been procured with a comparatively small expenditure of money on secret service.

No. 63—Translation of the secret letter from the Peshwa to the Raja asking him to come personally to Poona to concert measures against the English in co-operation with other Maratha chieftains and the Nizam.

FROM—THE PESHWA,

TO—RAGHUJI BHONSLE.

Poona.

When confusion manifold and various prevailed here all that was written to require your attendance had no effect on you. In regard to several matters which you have represented by means of Narain Row† and subsequently, the case is, that on the subject of reconciling enmity and cementing union between Sindhia and you, a written message has been

* Clerk.

† Narayan Baburao Vaidya, Peshwa's Vakil at Nagpur.

sent and one will be again sent. It is therefore written to you that by no measure and on no account, you should treat with the English for an alliance with them. For in a short time my object and Musheer's* will become the same. It is incumbent that having settled your country, you repair to this place. For on your arrival and after consulting we will, with all our chieftains and with Musheer aforesaid, fetch the ornament of the throne from Delhi, and making him our leader, face them† and will take from them the share of the territory lately embezzled by them. But all these matters will be concerted at a meeting. What more?

No. 64—The Resident proposes an exchange of territory to settle the boundary question. (See letters dated 17th June 1799, 17th March 1800 and 18th April 1801). He prepares to leave Nagpur before the rains.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR.

TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 12th May 1801.

I have had the honour to receive Your Lordship's commands bearing date of 15th ultimo, and beg leave to make my heartfelt acknowledgments for the distinguished honour conferred on me by Your Lordship's approbation of my conduct at this Residency.

2. As no more than three weeks remain before the rainy season which here commences earlier than in Bengal, I lost no time in delivering Your Lordship's letter to Rajah Raghojee Bhonsla and requested an early audience of leave. Though it be extremely difficult to prepare for so long a journey and to complete it before the roads become impassable, and although the consequences of being stopped by the season in the forest that intervenes upon every route would be fatal, I thought it my duty to make every exertion to quit this place immediately, because I must else be detained until the month of October next. The necessity of unfortunately urging my immediate dismissal has prevented my distinguishing whether the difficulties made by the Rajah, are merely demonstrations of civility, or proceed from disappointment in his favourite projects. His Minister Sridher Pundit has now promised that I shall have an audience of leave after one private interview, which is appointed for tomorrow.

* Meaning Azeem-Ul-Omrah.

† Probably meaning the English.

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3. At the last interview which was on the 9th instant, previously to announcing my recall I delivered to the Rajah Your Lordship's letter to him relative to the conduct of the zamindar of Sirguja; Vincajee Bhonsla, who was present, promised that effectual measures should be taken to restrain that zamindar.*

4. I next opened the subject of a proposed exchange of lands for the purpose of adjusting the line of demarkation between the provinces of Midnapore and Cuttack. To elucidate the representations made by me on this point, I furnished the Rajah with a map hastily sketched in Persian from Major Rennel's atlas and exhibiting the insulated situation of Purgunnahs Patarpore etc., when the Rajah reserved for a future interview his answer to the proposal thus opened to him. I added that in the case of his acceding to it, (which I did not doubt he would do) an officer must be appointed on his part to meet one appointed on the British Government for the purposes of adjusting on the spot, the interchange of territory and the consequent line of demarcation.

5. So far I can judge of the disposition of this Court, it does not appear any way disinclined to the proposed adjustment of the boundary between Midnapore and Cuttack. However a difficulty may, I apprehend, hereafter arise from the greater value of Purgunnah Patarpore, Cauwerda etc., the revenue of which amounts, I believe, to more than treble that of the lands which the British Government can offer in exchange on the western side of the Sabeenreeka.†

No. 65—The Resident informs the Governor General how very anxious the Raja's brother was for cultivating a friendly understanding with the British. He also reports the Raja's having made a conciliatory reply to the Peshwa's summons.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 14th May 1801.

Through the same channel through which a copy of the Peshwa's summons to the Rajah of Berar was obtained, a copy of the draft of the Rajah's answer has been since received. It is not, however, sufficiently authenticated as a copy of an answer actually despatched. I shall therefore

* See letter No. 30 dated 17th March 1800. (Ed.)

† Subarna-rekha river.

only state its purport consisting of excuses for immediately complying with the summons and in a general promise of taking no step without the Peshwa's knowledge and consent.

2. Two days ago, by Vincajee Bhonsla's desire my Moonshee met him as if by accident at a place of worship. In a very short conversation Vincajee hinted the insincerity of his brother in terms which could not be misunderstood, though he still withheld the communication of any positive fact, or particular detail. After some pertinent observations, he proposed as an effectual remedy the admission of himself to the honour of a direct and frequent correspondence with Your Lordship.

3. The whole tendency of this proposal will be readily perceived. Vincajee wishes to cultivate an understanding with the British Government. He will early solicit the countenance of Your Lordship while he fixes his separate Court at Ratanpur, the capital of the provinces of which he has full possession. The real and still more the seeming tendency of this to weaken the Rajah of Berar would probably force Raghojee Bhonsla into a change of measures advantageous to the British Government. If it should not produce that effect and the Rajah of Berar should actually take part against the Company, Vincajee will then hope by siding with the Company against the Rajah to obtain, through the aid of the English, Cuttack and other districts which he thinks himself entitled to claim in right of his deceased mother. Though such be the remote scope of the proposal, yet the admission of him to the honour to Your Lordship's correspondence which is not unprecedented, would not necessarily involve the acknowledgment of him as an independent chief; I have therefore thought it advisable neither to reject nor accept the limited proposition stated in the preceding paragraph, but again to press for the communication of facts and details, as requisite to justify the proposal of a departure from present usage; and Vincajee's confidential agent at the close of a very long conversation from which he just parted, again promised to me a full disclosure.

4. In the course of this conversation he confirmed, but still without stating particulars, the information before received from him, as reported in former despatches addressed to Your Lordship. He added the remark that the Rajah of Berar may be easily awed, but the Peshwa's and Sindhia's inveterate enmity will finally compel the British Government to chastise them. Other observations of a similar importance would be uselessly reported in detail to Your Lordship, as his promised communication, if made by him, will be more pertinent, and the document, which has been procured through a different channel, furnishes more direct evidence than can be expected from him.

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No. 66—Colebrooke's final leave taking. Raja intends deputing Bagaji Pandit as his confidential agent to Calcutta.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,
TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 20th May 1801.

I paid my last visit to the Rajah of Berar at his palace on the 17th instant ; and he returned it the next evening at my own tents. At the moment of finally taking leave, the Rajah earnestly desired me to deliver a message to Your Lordship containing assurances of unalterable friendship and regard for Your Lordship, and professions of faithful attachment towards the British Government and the Honourable East India Company. I replied to this with similar but appropriate compliments.

2. The Rajah still intends to depute Bagajee Pundit as a confidential agent on his part and to expedite the despatch of that agent in a few days after my departure, but the intimations given, since the audience on the 14th have not afforded a fit occasion for adding anything to what I then said on this subject.

No. 67—Vyankoji's confidential agent met Colebrooke in his tents one stage from Nagpur and cautioned him that the designs of the Raja and the other Maratha chieftains were by no means friendly to the British. Vyankoji offers his services to the British when exigency would require them.

FROM—H. T. COLEBROOKE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,
TO—MARQUIS WELLESLEY, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

One March from Nagpur, 22nd May 1801.

Vincajee's confidential agent made his last visit to me at my tents after I had marched one stage from Nagpur. In a long conversation he added little to his former communications. However, he affirmed in direct terms that Rajah Raghojee Bhonsla does intend to meet the Peshwa at the general convention of Marhatta chiefs on the banks of the Godavery. It is not possible, he said, to foretell the precise result of deliberations among chieftains whose views are in some respects incompatible, in others tending towards the same objects. All harbour designs which are injurious to the Company, but which are so in various degrees. Whether they will adopt a consistent plan seems doubtful ; but the British Government should be on its guard ; and Vincajee is solicitous to merit its favour by rendering important services to the Company at this juncture.

2. I again endeavoured to elicit a communication of facts and details, and at length said that however readily I might give credit to his opinions and assertions, and confidently draw inferences from the hints delivered in metaphor and parable, yet my conviction would avail nothing; it was necessary that I should be furnished with evidence and means of proof to convince my superiors.

3. He replied that proof would appear within a few months and evidence would arise of its own accord; it is only when the exigency should be apparent, that Vincajee can expect his services to be accepted or his wishes to be complied with. In the mean time, and to pave the ways for concert when necessary, he is desirous of opening a friendly correspondence with Your Lordship, in which nothing will be for the present introduced, but customary phrases of compliment.

4. It is probable that Vincajee's agent and perhaps himself also, are unable to furnish more positive and detailed information than that which has been received from them. Finding it impossible to extort more explicit intelligence, I ceased to urge it; but gave encouragement to the agent to hope that a mere complimentary letter from Vincajee to Your Lordship, will be honoured with a complimentary answer.

5. Though I have not succeeded in obtaining, through this channel, a full information as with reasons might be expected, yet I hope to be honoured with Your Lordship's probation of my conduct in the delicate situation, in which I have been placed by these private messages sent by Vincajee. At the close of this I leave him disposed to avail himself of the encouragement which Your Lordship may find it expedient to give. Yet I have neither flattered his hopes, nor excited his expectations; on the contrary sufficient demonstrations have been given him of an aversion from intrigue.

No. 68—Raghuji Bhonsle communicates to the Nizam's Minister Bajirao's flight from Poona and seeks his advice for bringing about a settlement of the distracted Maratha affairs, evidently to secure the Nizam's sympathies for the project of raising Vinayakrao to the Peshwaship.

Translation of a Khureetah from Rajah Ragoojee Bhoonslah to the Nabob Azim-Ool-Omrah.

Communicated to the Resident, December 4th 1802.

To the Nabob Sahib, the kind, the ornament of bounty to his humble friend's safety.

Although a friendly letter expressive of kindness, requesting a communication of the state of your health, and of the inmost circumstances and desires of your mind, has already been written, (this the obvious sense of the passage which is obscure however in the original, and may

almost equally apply to a former letter transmitted from either party to the other), still my heart, the seat of affection, is anxiously expecting and awaiting its answer. Advertising therefore to the firmness and strength of the ties of harmony and union, to render me happy and elated according to the creed of friendship and affection is most proper and laudable. As my ministers, Sreedur Pundit and Kishen Rao Chitnaveese, will have already written subsequently to their arrival at Poona in regular order all the particulars of their interviews and discussions, both private and public, with Rao Pundit Purdhaun, now also the particulars of the arrival of Jeswunt Rao Holkar at Poonah, the defeat of the army of Sindhia and the departure of Rao Pundit Purdhaun towards Mhar will certainly in the way of occurrence and news have attained the honour of communication.

Subsequently then to these events the aforesaid ministers to wit, Sreedhur Pundit and Khishen Rao Chitnaveese, at the earnest request and invitation of Rao Holkar entered into a discussion of the policy, counsel, intentions and deliberations for the arrangement of the state and government of Rao Pundit Purdhaun. The purport and result of these consultations with Rao Holkar were that I was a party (meaning however obscurely it may be expressed, a party with Holkar), that in the government of His Highness the Nizam from the existing intimacy and friendship the most unlimited confidence was reposed; that if Rao Pundit Purdhaun therefore should entirely reject the idea of returning to Poona, what he, Holkar, wished to know was, what in such case was to be done for the due arrangement of the government of the aforesaid Rao. The detail of these matters has, accordingly, been fully and particularly written to the respectable Madhaorao and Keyshoo Rao, the Vakeels of the Bhoonslah at Hyderabad, who will report the same.

As in consequence of the sincerity of friendship and affection to the exclusion of all manner of difference and distinction between me and His Highness the Nizam and that founder of the * * *, all affairs and transactions are dependent on mutual consultation and advice, a suitable answer to these circumstances requiring counsel comprizing a communication of the secrets and the opinions of the exalted mind and the desires and real views of the heart of noble conception, will be a source of improvement and exaltation to the affairs of kind friendship and connection.

In the month of Rejjub (November) also Amrut Rao, Moro Punt Furnaveese and Baba Furkia arrived at Poona, and by the intervention of Rao Holkar they had an interview with my Ministers. Whatever deliberation or counsel may hereafter appear shall be communicated.

For the rest may the days of your happiness and delight be perpetuated.

No. 69.

*Translation of an Enayetnamah from His Highness the Nizam
to Jeswunt Rao Holkar.*

Communicated to the Resident, December 6th 1802.

Your letter having been received, its contents were fully represented.

From a remote period, the rites of unity and friendship and the ties of harmony and connection have been established from generation to generation between us and the ancestors of Rao Pundit Purdhaun and those of that valiant person.

The ease and prosperity of the inhabitants of Hind and the Deccan, and the maintenance of mutual friendship between renowned Chieftains, are among the things we have most at heart. In compliance therefore, with your request, letters to Rao Pundit Purdhaun concerning the sincerity and devotion of that valiant person shall most readily adorn the plain of composition.

Regarding us from the subsisting union as attentive to your situation, rejoice us with written accounts of your welfare.

What more ?

N.B.—A Nawazishnamah to Jeswunt Rao Holkar of the same tenor and date from Azim ul Omrah.

SECTION 2

Treaty of Deogaon and after *1804-1805*

After peace was concluded between the Raja of Nagpur and the British by the treaty of Deogaon (1803), the Resident watched the movements of the Raja very minutely. The agents of Sindhia and Holkar used to frequent Nagpur and those from Bhonsle visited the Courts of Sindhia and Holkar. Sindhia and Holkar were by no means friendly to the British. Every small circumstance, therefore, aroused the suspicions of the Resident. The Raja made large additions to his forces and made improvements in the army. (See letter dated 17th November 1804). The Raja of Khoorda in Orissa was trying to throw off the allegiance of the British Government and sought the assistance of the Nagpur Raja, (letter dated 13th November 1804). The Nagpur Raja's brother Nanasaheb collected some troops, which ravaged Manikgad, Ralegaon and Venikotha in Berar. The Resident protested against all these acts, and gave an ultimatum to the Raja that if the troops collected by the Raja were not disbanded and the troops ravaging Berar were not recalled, he would leave Nagpur and war would be declared against Nagpur. (Letter dated 28th January 1805).

The Raja's wakil, Yashwantrao, tried to convince the Resident that the recent military activities were only intended to provide against Pindari inroads, and the depredations into Berar were the irresponsible acts of Nanasaheb, who was not amenable to the Raja's control. The Raja eventually disbanded his troops and recalled those from Berar.

Sindhia and Holkar were trying to wean the Bhonsle from the side of the British and invited him to join them openly, but the Bhonsle was too cautious to plunge himself into open warfare, and the Resident (Elphinstone) was ultimately convinced that whatever were the Raja's original intentions, he had given them up (letter 20th May 1805).

Elphinstone was instructed by the Governor General to convey from him strong remonstrances to the Raja for his apparently evil designs if he saw that the Raja continued his military preparations. Elphinstone minutely watched the Raja's movements and thought that there was no need for such a step. He had to suffer a rebuke from the Governor General for putting off these remonstrances, which attitude really proved proper. (17th November 1804).

In order to further induce the Raja to remain firm to the British cause, he was promised that the British would give him aid against the aggressions of Sindhia and Holkar, of whom the Raja was afraid. A promise was also held out that certain districts lost by him in the late war would be restored to him to compensate him for his loss. (18th November 1804).

The successes of the British army at Dig and other places confirmed the Bhonsle to the British cause, and in spite of jealous and calumnious accusations from certain quarters (9th November 1805), Elphinstone cleared all doubts about the Raja's intentions from the mind of the Governor General and all British officers. (19th November 1805).

No. 70—The Resident forwards the substance of a secret letter from Antaji Naik to Raghuji Bhonsle regarding the Raja of Khoorda's offer to hire Bhonsle's troops.

FROM—MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,

TO—THE COMMISSIONERS OF CUTTACK.

Nagpur, 10th Nov. 1804.

I have the honour to enclose a paper said to be the substance of a letter from Antajee Naic*. It contains no information of consequence, but as it is very circumstantial it may afford you the means of ascertaining

* of Khoorda, in Cuttack.

the truth or falsehood of the intelligence I have received respecting Antajee Naic, which appear to me very desirable. I have not been able to learn the date of the letter, but I understand the harcaras who brought it were not less than a month on their journey.

Letter from Antajee Naic to Raja Ragojee Bosla, received November 8th, 1804, written near 6 weeks ago.

I have come to Khoorda from Rypore, have seen the Raja, he desires me to hire 1,000 men, horse and foot of which he will defray the expense, and to write to Your Highness requesting you to give Ragonaut Bukhshee a dress of honour and send him hither with some troops and guns. I enclose a letter from the Rajah containing the above requests. The Raja and I have found out a lucky hour, and now in tent we have circulated a report that Ragonaut Bukhshee has marched from Nagpore, which has inclined the Moorkee zamindars to join us. One Raja desiring me to hire troops and I have moved out for his satisfaction, but I shall wait your orders and do as they direct. The news of the garrison of Cuttack is this; the fort was empty before, there were but few troops in it; now they have put the garrison in a state of greater arrangement; they remain in the day-time at their separate places, but at night they join, arrange the fort, collect the guns, send out a patrol, remain on their guard; up to this time there was little preparation, the Raja has 5,000 or 6,000 men."

Note: I do not know whether this term Moorkee zamindars merely means the zamindars of the country or whether it is used in Cuttack in some more limited sense.

- No. 71**—The Governor-General intends to punish the Raja of Khoorda for his hostile intentions; he requests the Resident to remove any misunderstanding which might possibly be caused thereby in the mind of Raghuji Bhonsle.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,

TO—THE RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

Fort William, 13th Nov. 1804.

At an early period of time after the establishment of the British authority in the province of Cuttack, the conduct of the Rajah of Khoorda (one of the principal tributary Rajahs whose territory is comprized within the limits of that province) excited considerable doubts of the sincerity of his proposed allegiance to the British Government. The subsequent proceedings of the Rajah of Khoorda have been of a nature not only to confirm those doubts, but to constitute acts of positive hostility against

the British Government, and to render indispensably necessary the adoption of measures of severity against the Rajah of Khoordah.

2. At an early period of time after the conquest of Cuttack, the Rajah of Khoorda demanded the restoration of four pergunnahs, in one of which was included the Pagoda and city of Juggernaut, on the grounds of their having once belonged to some of his ancestors; intimating at the same time to the Commissioners for the affairs of Cuttack, his determination never to recede from this demand. With the hope of intimidating the British authorities in the province of Cuttack, the Rajah of Khoorda considerably augmented his establishment of troops and published his intention of seizing those pergunnahs at a convenient period of time.

3. In the month of June, the Commissioners at Cuttack received authentic intelligence that the Rajah of Khoordah had been employing every endeavour to induce the remaining tributary Rajahs in the province of Cuttack to unite in a common effort against the British authority, and this information was corroborated by the intelligence which the Commissioners of Cuttack subsequently received from you. Numerous reports conveyed to the Commissioners through various and distinct channels, concurred in stating that the Rajah of Khoordah continued diligently to increase his military establishment; at the same time the exertions of the Rajah of Khoordah were actively employed in repairing and improving the internal defences of his country.

4. In consequence of the instructions of His Excellency the Governor General to Lieutenant Colonel Harcourt under date the 4th of October, of which a copy is enclosed in my letter to you of the same date, that officer resolved to despatch Captain Blunt to the Rajah of Khoordah for the purpose of conveying to him the representations prescribed by the Governor General's instructions, and of effecting such an arrangement as may afford sufficient security against the prosecution of the Rajah's inimical design. Lieutenant Colonel Harcourt however, deemed expedient previously to despatch a native agent to the Rajah of Khoordah to apprise the Rajah of Lieutenant Colonel Harcourt's intention to despatch Captain Blunt for the purpose of communicating with him on subjects of considerable importance to the Rajah's welfare and interest.

5. Lieutenant Colonel Harcourt's agent having proceeded to Khoordah, with difficulty obtained one interview with the Rajah. He was surrounded night and day by armed men, and after the expiration of fourteen days from the day of his arrival, he was informed that his longer continuance would be attended with personal danger, and was accordingly advised to depart.

6. The Rajah of Khoordah has also precluded the freedom of intercourse with the authority to which he is immediately subject, by closing the entrances into his territory, and the messengers whom Lieutenant Colonel Harcourt has had occasion to despatch to Khoordah,

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or who have been sent by his agent with letters to that officer, have been arrested and confined.

7. Various other indications of a spirit of hostility have been manifested by the Rajah of Khoordah, of a nature to preclude all doubt of his intention to revolt, and of the exertion of his utmost endeavours to excite the same disposition in the minds of the other tributaries of the British Government dependent upon the province of Cuttack.

8. Under these circumstances it has become indispensably necessary to acquire the means of imposing a due degree of restraint upon the hostile proceedings of the Rajah of Khoordah by measures of coercion.

9. His Excellency the Governor General has accordingly approved Lieutenant Colonel Harcourt's intention of employing the force under his command in active operations against the power and resources of the Rajah of Khoordah. It is not however the intention of the Governor General to authorize the prosecution of measures of severity towards the Rajah of Khoordah, beyond the extent necessary for the purpose of depriving him of the means of prosecuting designs, of the nature of those which now require the active interposition of the British power.

10. His Excellency the Governor General deems it proper to communicate to you the preceding detail for the purpose of enabling you eventually to explain to the Ministers of the Rajah of Berar, the circumstances which have produced the necessity of hostile preparations against the territory of the Rajah of Khoordah.

11. The expediency of this measure originates in the probability of a misrepresentation of the motives of that proceeding. Any disputes between the British Government and the petty states or tributaries lately subject to the Rajah of Berar, are calculated in a certain degree to excite apprehensions to encourage intrigues in the Court of the Rajah of Berar.

12. The Governor General has received information that Holkar's embassies and agents have attempted to issue an alarm amongst the petty chieftains dependent upon the British Government (with a view to induce them to revolt and for Holkar's standard), by encouraging an opinion that it is the secret design of the British Government ultimately to deprive them of all power and independence, and to reduce them gradually to the condition of zamindars and subjects of the Company, and the object of the intended operations against the Rajah of Khoordah may be misrepresented with a view to give a colour of probability of such unfounded calumnies.

13. Adverting however to the information communicated by you in your letter to my address of the 3rd of September, relative to the actual existence of a correspondence between the Rajah of Berar and the Rajah of Khoordah of a nature hostile to the British Government, as well as to the terms of the remonstrance which you were directed to address to

the Rajah of Berar by the instructions of His Excellency the Governor General contained in my letter of the 4th of October, the prosecution of hostile operations at this time against the Rajah of Khoordah might possibly be supposed by the Rajah of Berar to originate in our discovery of that Chieftain's correspondence, and to be connected with a design of ultimately turning our arms against the Rajah of Berar. Such an impression would obviously tend to hostile measures between the British Government and the Rajah of Berar. It is necessary therefore that you should be prepared to prevent or remove any such impression on the mind of the Rajah or of his ministers by being enabled to state to them the actual circumstances of the case.

14. His Excellency however leaves to your discretion the time and mode of explaining these circumstances to the Rajah of Berar or his ministers, and His Excellency will approve your abstaining from any explanation whatever on the subject of the Rajah of Khoordah, if in your judgment it should be inexpedient or unnecessary.

15. If you should make any such communication, it will be necessary to guard against establishing any precedent, by which the Rajah of Berar might infer a right of interference between the British Government and any of its tributaries, or any right to question or even to be made acquainted with our conduct towards any of our tributaries or subjects.

No. 72—The Governor General censures Elphinstone for not remonstrating with the Raja against his hostile designs as manifested by his military preparations. He threatens the Raja with punishment in case he joins Holkar.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,
TO—THE RESIDENT, NAGPUR (ELPHINSTONE).

Fort William, 17th Nov. 1804.

I am directed by His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 29th ultimo. His Excellency is inclined to believe that the military preparations and the arrangements described in that dispatch, have been adopted by the Rajah of Berar exclusively with a design to renew the war with the British Power, if the absurd reports of Jeswunt Row Holkar's successes should continue to prevail in such a degree as to obtain full credit in the Rajah's mind. Such also appears to have been your positive conviction on the date of the dispatch above acknowledged. His Excellency the Governor General therefore is surprised that under that impression you should have withheld the remonstrance, which you were directed to address to the Rajah by His Excellency's instruction of the 4th ultimo.

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In suggesting that you should suspend the prescribed remonstrances to the Rajah until you should have received intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief's first operations against Holkar, "*unless you should deem it useful or necessary to urge them,*" it was not the intention of His Excellency that you should tacitly permit the progress of preparations and arrangements, such as your dispatch describes. In leaving to your judgment the expediency of urging that remonstrance without awaiting the intelligence of the Commander-in-Chief's operations, His Excellency manifestly contemplated a case of more progress than that which was described in the dispatches to which His Excellency's instructions refer. On the occurrence of such a case therefore it ought to have appeared to you from the express terms of His Excellency's instructions, as well as from the dictates of your own judgment, to have been both useful and necessary to press the prescribed remonstrance upon the Rajah without a moment's delay.

2. I am further directed to observe to you that at your conference with Jeswunt Row and Jykishan Row on the 28th ultimo you do not appear to His Excellency to have opposed with sufficient confidence the credit of the absurd reports communicated to you by Jeswunt Row on the subject of Holkar's successes, and of the progress of his army within the British territories. Within a few days after the despatch of your letter of the 29th ultimo, you must have received authentic intelligence precisely the reverse in every respect of that which has formed the subject of the late fabricated reports.

3. The force of Jeswunt Row Holkar, both cavalry and infantry, is now flying before the British army in every direction; and the sole embarrassment experienced by the Commander-in-Chief consists in the difficulty of overtaking their flight. The regular official accounts will serve to satisfy the Rajah of Berar that Holkar has never ventured to meet any part of the British force in the field; that in every attempt to plunder he has been repulsed with severe loss and disgrace; and that he has in no degree injured any part of the British resources or power.

4. His Excellency is anxious to learn that you have fulfilled your intention of addressing the prescribed remonstrance to the Rajah on his return to the City, and that you have required him to afford some satisfactory indication of his intention not only to abstain from war but from preparations evidently destined against the British Power. The Hon'ble Major General Wellesley embarked for Fort St. George on the 13th instant for the purpose of proceeding to take the command of the army of the Dekkan. You will be pleased to transmit regularly to the Hon'ble the Major General Wellesley copies of all your dispatches to His Excellency the Governor General.

5. It is proper that you should be informed that the necessary arrangements are in progress for punishing shameless treachery of the Rajah.

of Berar, if he should actually proceed to the extremity of co-operating with Jeswunt Row Holkar or Meer Khan, and that orders will be immediately despatched to the Resident at Poona and to the officer commanding in the Dekkan to march directly toward the Rajah's army for the purpose of frustrating his designs, and ultimately of reducing his further means of mischief.

6. It is extremely desirable that you should endeavour to obtain full and satisfactory proof of the Rajah's treachery. If such proof can be obtained it is the Governor General's intention at a proper season to punish the Rajah of Berar with due justice, even if he should now be deterred from actually making war upon the Company.

No. 73—Elphinstone reports the Raja's suspicious attitude in the Company's war with Holkar.

FROM—M. S. ELPHINSTONE, NAGPUR,

TO—GENERAL WELLESLEY.

Dated 18th Nov. 1804.

I have had the honor to receive your letter of the 30th, in which you mention the success of your recommendation of Lt. Close, and I lose no time in offering my acknowledgments for this new mark of your kindness and of the Governor General's condescensions. As you were in Calcutta so lately as the 31st, the letters which I sent for you to Hyderabad will not have reached you, and it will not signify if they never do, as they were mostly written under a false impression that General Lake had met with some serious check; an occurrence of such a nature was confidently reported to have taken place, and many circumstances were added agreeing so well with my accounts of his operations that I had little doubt of some calamity having befallen the army. I have since heard of General Lake's army up to the 15th and as all his operations were so successful, I am very desirous carrying my instructions of October 4th into effect, but the Raja is still at Ramtege. You will be informed of the state of the armies by a public letter which will accompany this. I am unwilling to offer any conjectures in my letters to the Governor General except on the Raja of Berar's proceedings, but from general appearances I cannot help believing that Sindia and the Boslah had some plan concerted for assisting Holkar, and that their view in assembling near Hoshangabad was to hold themselves in readiness to act against us, that on the reverse of Holkar's fortune it appeared to this man, who is the least desperate and the prudentest of the two, that his best plan was to draw himself out of the affair and that he now wishes to stay quiet, but that both Meer Khan and Sindia are endeavouring to

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intimidate him into a confederacy, which direction they will take if they succeed, I cannot ascertain. My intelligence says they intend an attack on the Nizam's country, but their movements look as if they had views on Bundelcund or Berar. Whatever may be true state of the Raja's affairs I think my last orders will apply, but if I find that he is really pressed and threatened. I may perhaps hold out to him that the Governor General will probably grant him assistance if he solicited it and agrees to reasonable condition, and add that such a solicitation would most likely be considered as a proof that his intentions are good now, whatever they may have been at first. This might prevent his joining the enemy through fear and also give the Governor General an opportunity of having a force, which appears to be his wish.

No. 74—Elphinstone threatens to leave Nagpur if the Raja did not disband the troops collected by him.

FROM—MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE,

TO—COLONEL HALIBURTON.

Nagpur, 11th December 1804.

The Raja continues his pacific declarations and is actually disbanding troops. But tomorrow is fixed for my departure, if I do not in the meantime hear that his army is actually separated and his troops on the frontier called into interior to be dismissed.

(Rest of the letter is in cypher).

No. 75—In this lengthy and important document the Resident analyses the Bhonsle Raja's attitude towards the Anglo-Holkar struggle. The Raja, he says, no doubt favoured an alliance with Holkar when the latter had obtained advantages over British arms. But since Holkar's discomfiture at Dig the Raja appears to have laid aside his hostile designs and disbanded his new levies.

FROM—MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE,

TO—COLONEL CLOSE.

Nagpur, 28th January 1805.

I have now the honour to communicate to you the account of the Bosla's proceedings to which I referred in a former dispatch.

The Raja gave me no reason to suspect his fidelity to his engagement till the month of August when the account of the retreat of our detachments in Malwa became public; from that time the Raja's hopes of being able

to maintain a contest with the British seem to have revived; he held frequent consultations with his confidential ministers and appeared to have some important measure in contemplation; at the same time reports of his hostile intentions began to prevail and he visibly gave more attention to his army than he had done since the peace of Deogaum.

Towards the middle of September I received distinct information of the nature of the consultations which occupied the Raja's time. They referred to a projected confederacy with Holkar and to an invasion of Cuttack, with a view to which intrigues were entered on with the Khoorda Raja under the directions of Ragojee Bosla; when the preparations became more public they were ascribed to an intended expedition against Hoshangabad. Sindia's march to that place was also professed for the purpose of restoring it to the Raja, but as the confederates did not execute this project when fully prepared and when the success of Sindia's first operations gave them every reason to expect the easy accomplishment of their design, it must be thought very doubtful whether the capture of Hoshangabad in reality was the ultimate object of their preparations.

About the beginning of October a Vakeel named Hybut Row arrived here from Meer Khan; he was well received and lodged with the Raja's Chitnavees where he still continues. My secret intelligence represented this person as being charged with three demands, the Raja's compliance with some one of them was to be compelled by threats of invasion from Meer Khan; the first was that the Raja send an army to co-operate with Holkar, the 2nd, that he should furnish him with a sum of money, and the 3rd, that if he would not go to war with the British, he should embarrass them by demanding the restoration of Berar. Hybut Row, I believe, was vakeel for Meer Khan only; the communications with Holkar being carried on through Vencut Row his minister at this court and Eswant Omajee, the Bosla's vakeel in his camp. On the arrival of Hybut Row, I thought it necessary to warn the Raja against the false statements and deceitful acts which Holkar's agents would make use of for the purpose of inducing him to join their master's desperate cause, and of the certain harm he would draw on himself if he allowed himself to be influenced by their suggestions. About the middle of October Balajee Eswant, Sindia's vakeel at Nagpore, returned from visit to his own court. Immediately after his interview with the Raja, Saccaram Bukhshee marched with a reinforcement of 3,000 men and guns to take the command of the Raja's army then encamped near Chouragur. At the same time the Raja's military preparations in other points assumed an appearance of increased activity.

The Raja endeavoured to account for these appearances by saying that his country near Sagur was threatened by Meer Khan and that he was about to send troops for its defence. This message was accompanied by an intimation that the Raja had great fears of his nephew Goojabba's

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quitting his court and going into some foreign service. Having before received intelligence that it was in contemplation to send Goojabba to Holkar under pretence of a quarrel between him and the Raja, this circumstance made me doubt the truth of the whole message, which I was inclined from other reasons to disbelieve. I therefore suspected that Meer Khan's attack on the Raja's possession was a misrepresentation made with a view of enabling the Raja to assemble his troops near the army of that partizan and of Dowlut Row Sindia. I had before abstained from remonstrating with the Raja in the idea that he wished to wait the issue of the contest between the British and Holkar without declaring himself on either side, and that as the event would certainly be favourable to us, it was desirable to encourage this spirit and to avoid bringing the business to an issue while Holkar's power was undiminished. But the message above mentioned induced me to think that there was no time to be lost and I accordingly waited on the Raja, stated my doubts on the subject of Meer Khan's attack, and pointed out the danger and impropriety of his sending his army to a position near the army of Meer Khan, and not far from the British frontier. The Raja assured me in reply of Meer Khan's hostile intentions, and promised to shew me letters from that Chief threatening the Bosla Government if an immediate payment of money was not made by it to him. He also said that he should not send his army near Sagur unless his country was actually invaded; if no such event took place, it was to remain at Hoshangabad; on examining the letters I found them to contain expressions calculated to excite the Raja's hopes and revive his ambition and an invitation in plain terms to *** and chastize the enemy, with a threat or warning that neglecting to do so would occasion the ruin of the state; conceiving the style and matter of this letter to be at variance with the Raja's account of Meer Khan's message and having other reasons for suspecting his intentions, I continued remonstrating on the increase of his army and threatening him with the consequences of any infringement of the peace till the end of November, although his preparations appeared to slacken during that period.

On the 24th of November I received intelligence of an incursion of Pindaris then said to be Meer Khan's, who certainly did most serious damage to the Raja's country; soon after I learned that Nagoo Jewajee had attacked Gurry Mundela and had been repulsed by the Raja's officer there with great loss; I found also that a degree of misunderstanding subsisted between the Raja and Sindia on account of Ragojee's not paying some money, which Dowlut Row was said to have stipulated for before he moved to Hoshangabad. In consequence of those circumstances I began to think that if the Raja had been engaged in any confederacy he had now drawn back from it, and that Meer Khan was about to compel him to assist Holkar. This impression was strengthened by Jeswunt Row's informing me about the beginning of December that the Raja had

broken his army into three divisions, that all the roads by which the Pindaris could come might be stopped.

All communications with the northern parts of the Raja's country being at this time cut off, and the extreme alarm and confusion which prevailed at Nagpore rendering it impossible to obtain correct intelligence, I gave credit to Jeswunt Row's account which I thought a decisive proof that the Bosla harboured no plans of aggression, but I began to apprehend that the Raja might be led by his fears to join the enemy contrary to his inclination. I therefore threw out hints that His Highness might hope for the assistance of the British Government if he made reasonable stand against Holkar, and I was on the point of giving a proof of the Governor General's goodwill by entering on a negotiation for affording the Raja a compensation for Sumbalpoore, when on December 4th I was visited by Jeswunt Row, who informed that Nana Saheb had long been collecting troops without the Raja's knowledge, and had now surprised the fortress of Maunicgur¹ on the right bank of the Warda. About the same time I received a letter from the aumil of Rallygong² stating that his district had been invaded by troops belonging to Sena Saheb Sooba (Ragojee Bosla). I went immediately to the Raja, remonstrated with him in the severest tenor on his ungrateful and perfidious conduct, and pointed out the destruction and misery which he would draw on himself by his disregard of faith and justice. The Raja endeavoured to persuade me that the outrage of which I complained, had been committed by some troops who were in no service and had no view but plunder. He said he found the story of his brother's being concerned, of his having surprised Maunicgur, to be a mistake. The real offenders were about 1,200 men of the description he had mentioned, and they had only plundered Vaineecota² and a few open villages, and he also offered to send troops into the Nizam's country to chastize them; on my rejecting this proposal and pointing out the impossibility of so large corps collecting within the Raja's dominions unobserved by the Government, the Raja repeated his professions of fidelity to his engagements and enquired what he should do to satisfy His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General. To this I replied that I doubted whether it was possible to satisfy His Excellency at all, but that I would consent to wait the result of an enquiry into the circumstances of the attack on Vaineecota, provided His Highness would agree to disband his new levies, to disperse his old army into remote positions, and to hold himself responsible for the pacific conduct of his brother and all his subjects during the interval, or if he was unable to control their violence that he should call in the British army for that purpose. The Raja made difficulties about this last article and put off giving his answer on it till the following day. In course of this conversation it

¹ On the western Bank of the Wardha, opposite Chanda. ² In the Yeotmal district of Berar.

appeared that the Raja's army, instead of being divided in the manner described by Jeswunt Row, had been collected (in consequence of orders sent by the Raja fifteen days before) at a place called Lodicare¹ situated, I believe, to the south of Paunar and within no great distance of the Nizam's country of Amner; on the 5th the Raja was sick and requested me to put off my visit till the 6th to which I consented, but warned the Raja that I expected when we did meet that he would either agree to all my proposals or give me passports to enable me to quit his country.

Next morning I went to him and he confessed that he had now discovered the attack on Berar to have originated in Nana Saheb (Vencojee Bosla). I replied to this that the Raja must answer for his brother's conduct. I brought forward agreements to shew that Nana Saheb could make no attack without the Raja's knowledge, and remarked that if the Raja had not ordered his brother to invade Berar, he had approved the measure, as its author continued still at large and unpunished; I now required the Raja to confiscate Nana Saheb's share of the country, to engage that he should not leave Nagpoor or continue his intrigues here, and that he should procure the recall of the troops who were plundering in Berar; the Raja refusing to consent to these terms I requested that he would allow me to withdraw from his dominions. After a long interval the Raja desired to be allowed to retire for some time; when he came back he agreed to all my demands, and orders were written to Saccaram Bukhshee to send half his army to Chapara and half to Sindora, east of Betul. I reminded the Raja that I did not promise that His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General should not punish his breach of treaty with immediate hostilities, and clearly explained to him that the British army should immediately advance towards his dominions, after which I withdrew. In course of the next two or three days I obtained such information as put it out of all doubt that the incursion into Berar was planned or abetted by Ragojee Bosla. The principal grounds of this were the Raja's preparations and suspicious conduct for some time preceding this crisis. The position of his army which though well suited to a plan of invading Berar, was neither calculated to repel the Pindaris, nor to oppose Meer Khan; the intelligence which I began to receive of bodies of troops at Kailode, Tannygong and Sailo Gooran, which places together with the station of Saccaram Bukhshee's army and that from which the party marched which attacked Vaineecotta, extend along the whole of the Raja's and Nizam's common frontier and are all situated within the country under the Raja's immediate management. Also that the infantry then plundering in Berar had been raised in Nagpore, that the cavalry belonged to Andlekar and Aherrow, old Sirdars of the Raja's, and that the troops at Tannygong belonged to Chittur Sing, a Chief in the Raja's immediate service; it was besides impossible to suppose that Vencojee Bosla could hope to cope with the British or even the Nizam's Government, and that

¹ Wardha district.

he could expect to carry on the war without his brother's knowledge. To these may be added intelligence which I received about the middle of November, though it made no great impression on me at the time and did not occur to my recollection till some time after the inroad into Berar. About the time I mention I was informed that the Raja had desired his brother to entertain troops and had made over some of his own to him, the reason alleged for this arrangement was that the Raja wished to throw part of the burden of the state on Nana Saheb and his mother who willingly expends her treasure in the service of her younger son. I was informed from another quarter that there was some plan of a feigned quarrel between the brothers, the object of which was to enable the Government to keep on good terms both with Holkar and the British; at the same time I heard also that a real difference existed between Boslas. The course of events is most favourable to the former account, but it is difficult even now to believe that the Raja would trust the existence of his state to the success of so contemptible a stratagem. Another proof of the Raja's hostile intentions may be drawn from a fact which had not at that time come to my knowledge. His Highness's vakeel at Hyderabad presented a remonstrance to the Nizam about the time of the incursion into Berar which was so expressed that the British Resident at that court declared, that considering the Raja's late conduct he could view it in no light but that as manifested. The above circumstances with the exception of that last mentioned, convinced me that the attack on the Nizam's country originated with the Raja, and as no change of circumstances had taken place since it had been made, I could not but entertain strong suspicions of the sincerity of the Raja's pacific declarations, and accordingly on the 7th of December perceiving clearly that the Raja was desirous of evading the fulfilment of the conditions I had proposed, I sent to inform him that his late conduct authorized every suspicion of him, and that if his intentions were now good it was his business to shew it; that on the contrary he had failed even in complying with the letter of his engagements, and that if he did not take such steps as should convince me of his sincerity I would on the next morning quit his court. In consequence of this message Jeswunt Row and Jykishan Row came to me on the night of the 7th and gave me such strong assurances of the Raja's sincerity that I was induced to agree to stay some days, so as to give His Highness time to shew his pacific disposition. At this visit Jeswunt Row asked me as from himself if His Excellency the Governor General would grant the Raja a British force, and said that plan would be very advantageous to the Raja, and would satisfy His Excellency of his sincere desire to cultivate the Company's friendship. I objected to talking on public business in the manner proposed and said that after the Raja's conduct, it was very doubtful whether His Excellency the Governor General would grant him a force, but I added that when the Raja should have disarmed I would listen to any official proposal on the subject.

Next day Jeswunt Row brought me information that the Raja had discharged some of his troops.

In the evening I received letters from the Nizam's officers in Berar representing that there was a considerable body of Pindaris at Mahisdee¹, a place near one of the defiles which lead from the Jujadry² hills into Berar, and that they were said to intend an invasion of that province. I immediately warned the Raja that if the passes were not defended, he must answer for the damage which the Pindaris might do in Berar. On the 9th I received that the corps at Tannygong had advanced to the Warda and that it was still increasing; as there was ample time for the Raja's orders to have reached this corps, I could not but consider this movement as strong ground for suspecting that the Raja did not really wish it to return, and that he was guilty of similar acts of treachery at more remote stations from which I could not so soon receive intelligence. I therefore announced to Jeswunt Row that if the corps in question was not recalled, or if I was not satisfied of the Raja's wish to recall it before the third day, I should return to my former resolution of withdrawing from this country. On hearing the contents of this note the Raja sent to apprise me of his intention to come to my house and came immediately after this. He made very strong professions of his earnest wish to recall all the troops from the frontier, but observed that it would require some time to effect that object. His conduct was so humble and submissive on this occasion that I am induced to think that he must have heard that day of the victories over Holkar, of which I received intelligence two or three days after.

On the 10th I received information of the arrival of Amrut Row in Berar; though I had no reason to suspect Amrut Row of disaffection to our cause, and though it was clearly his real interest to adhere to the English, yet considering the passion for intrigue which so often infatuates the natives and the discontent which Amrut Row might be supposed to feel at the Peshwa's treatment of him, I thought it prudent to endeavour to keep him out of all situations where he might be tempted to engage in plots and political speculations, particularly, as I did not know that there was any reason to wish for his speedy arrival at Benares. I therefore wrote to him to beg he would stop his journey, and I continued this request after I was satisfied that the Raja had no intention to attack Berar, because I was uncertain that the orders of His Excellency the Governor General on the Raja's conduct might not involve a fresh misunderstanding with his court.

On the 10th I was informed by a letter from Bisnoor that the troops from Tannygong had crossed the Warda and plundered a merchant at Tewsa, ten miles to the west of the Nizam's boundary; on this I revived remonstrances and repeated my determination of leaving Nagpore at the time fixed.

¹ Mhaisdehee near Multai.

² Melghat (Vindhyadri).

On the 12th I communicated to the Raja the official account of the battle of Dig, on which he fired a royal salute and sent a person to congratulate me. I also received such intelligence as induced me to believe that the troops on the Warda were not under the Raja's control, and I learned that his army had broken up and quitted its menacing position. I therefore agreed to put off my journey, and from that time to this I have had no serious reason to doubt the Raja's intention of continuing at peace with the British Government, although the Nizam's country on the Warda suffered considerable alarms from the passage of the Raja's refractory troops along that river to the Nerbudda, which I believe they have now crossed. The Raja's army has not been divided as was stipulated, but I believe the reason assigned by the Raja to be true one. It is that the troops are ill paid and refuse to move without advances. It is however at the Turra Ghaut near Devgar and not in a menacing position. I believe the Raja's principal force is at present at Nagpore. I believe his troops here to consist of 1,500 horse and 3,000 foot, chiefly Arabs and Rohillas; in Saccaram Bukhshee's camp he may have 4,000 horse and 3,000 foot; in Gurry Mundela, there are about 5,000 men. There are 6 guns with Saccaram Bukhshee. I believe the number of troops disbanded by the Raja including those who threatened and invaded Berar, may amount 4,000 or 5,000 men. The seizure of Nana Saheb's country has really taken place, although I never mentioned it after the 6th of December.

From the above circumstances, joined to general appearances and reports, I believe the Raja to have laid aside the intentions which I am convinced, he entertained of profiting by the first opportunity to attack us and our allies. Nothing can be a stronger proof of his wish to remain at peace than his anxiety respecting His Excellency the Governor General's resolution on his conduct and his joy when he found the decision so favourable. I am sorry I cannot furnish you with a particular account of the negotiations between this Court and Sindia's. The following are the principal facts which have come to my knowledge. When Sindia moved towards Hoshangabad the Raja of Berar certainly engaged to assist him with his troops and to pay him a sum of money, and I believe, a portion of the money was paid off; this part remained in the hands of Ballajee Eswant on whom Sindia gave bills to people whom he employed to raise men at Nagpore. There was at first every appearance that the Raja intended to send his troops to join Sindia, and when he failed in doing so, Sindia became very impatient, wrote to the Raja's chief at Chouragur and Gurry Mundela to join him without waiting for orders from Nagpore. The reason given by the Raja's ministers to me for his not permitting his troops to join Sindia is that he was averse to acting in concert with a court under Gatsby's* influence. I believe that the Raja at the same time that he delayed the advance of his troops, declined paying

* Sarje Rao Ghatge, Sindhia's father-in-law.

the rest of the money he had promised Sindia, and that he made no further payments till after the incursion of the Pindaris, when he is said to have given 5 lakhs of rupees through Ballajee Eswant to Sindia. I am the more inclined to believe that the Bosla has advanced money at different times to Sindia on account of the great distress which Ragojee appears to suffer from want of money, notwithstanding his extortions from the bankers and the small payments which he made to his army.

A person named Boojing Roy resided here some time on Sindia's part for the purpose of raising men, and marched in November with a considerable number of troops that he had levied, amounting according to the accounts of the Raja's Ministers, to near 4,000 men.

A Mahomedan Sirdar of some consequence in Sindia's service whose name is Himmat Bahadur, has resided here for some weeks; he is treated with great attention by the Raja and his avowed reason for coming here is some domestic concern. There are different accounts of his real object, the most probable of which is that he was sent with a bill on Balajee Eswant for the remainder of the sum due by the Raja, and that he has orders to raise men with the money and march with them to Sindia's camp.

There is also a person named Atma* Ram here at present who holds or has held some important station in Sindia's service. I heard at one time that he had been deputed hither by Sirjee Row, but I now understand that he has come from the southward on his way to Sindia's camp.

No. 76—The Resident reports how the Bhonsle Raja's troops were distributed throughout his kingdom.

FROM—MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,
TO—COLONEL HALIBURTON, IN BERAR.

Nagpur, 28th January 1805.

I have just had the honour to receive your letter of the 3rd instant. From the conduct of the Raja of Berar and the disposition of his troops at this juncture I am led to believe that he will make such satisfaction for his late infraction of the treaty of Deogaum, as will preclude the necessity of a war, but after his recent treachery no certain dependence can be placed on him.

I believe the following to be the distribution of the Raja's force at present.

At Nagpur 3,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry; at the Turra Ghat north of Bannua from 4,000 to 5,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry; on Gurry Mundela there is, I believe, from four to five thousand men of all

* Atmaram Shivram Tamboli. See Proceedings of the Indian Historical Records Commission. Vol. XI, pages 85-88.

discriptions; besides the above there is no considerable number of troops in any one place. I have not lately heard of any of the Raja's people being on the frontier except at a place near Amner, where there are some straggling horse. Sindia is reported to be near Sagur. He certainly is some marches north of the Nerbudda. Meer Khan is said to be at some distance from Bilsa to the north of that place. From this statement you will be able to form an opinion what position it will be best for you to occupy. I should think there was no objection to your advancing towards the Warda, but perhaps, if you were to take up a position immediately on that river, it might be difficult to prevent the Nizam's cavalry from foraging within the Bosla's frontier—an occurrence which it is very desirable to avoid. I expect soon to hear His Excellency the Governor General's determination on the Raja's violation of the treaty and his subsequent submission. It will probably be accompanied by some instructions for your guidance. I do not imagine that any junction can take place in the interior between the Raja of Berar's troops and those of any other Chief, and I shall endeavour to prevent the Raja's assembling his own army without coming to an issue with the British. I have the honour to enclose a copy of a letter to you from Colonel Close which may not perhaps have reached you by the regular channel.

No. 77—Elphinstone reports his interview with the Bhonsle Raja in which they discussed the meeting that took place between Daulatrao Sindhia and Yashwantrao Holkar. The Bhonsle Raja's intentions towards the British were found by the Resident to be perfectly pacific.

FROM—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 20th May 1805.

The Rajah having come into Nagpore for some days I waited on His Highness on the 15th instant.

There was no conversation on business at this visit. The Rajah enquired what was the latest news I had received from Hindostan, and mentioned that he had heard of the meeting between Sindia and Holkar. I said the last authentic intelligence I had received from Hindostan was the account of the submission of Runjeet Sing and the flight of Holkar, but that I had heard of the meeting His Highness alluded to through such channels as induced me to believe it had taken place. Sreedar Pundit then enquired in what light Sindia's conduct was viewed by the British Government; to this I replied that I had not yet received accounts of his junction with Holkar through the medium of any British authority, nor had I heard of the motions of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief subsequent to that event. A short conversation then took place between the Rajah and his ministers in which they remarked on the want

of discretion which appeared in Sindia's conduct, on the little judgment with which he had chosen his time to break with the British and on the implicit reliance which he placed on his minister, to which they ascribed all his misconduct.

The ministers also enquired about the position and intended movements of the army under Colonel Close, and seemed anxious to know whether it would cross the Nerbudda and assist in surrounding the enemy. I said I had not sufficient information to satisfy them on those heads, but that I did not imagine the army would go out of the Deccan, because the great force which was assembled in Hindostan rendered it very improbable that its services could be required.

The Rajah during the whole of this interview spoke very cordially of his friendship for the Company and the interest he took in its success.

Yesterday His Highness returned to the place where the muster of his troops is carried on. I understand the force there assembled to amount to 8,000 horse and 3,000 foot at least.

There are many reports of the destination of the army. It is said that a considerable part of it will be sent towards the Rajah's northern frontier, and that would be a very natural position for His Highness's troops to take up while there is a war in Hindostan, but Jeswunt Row has more than once informed me that when the muster is over, the troops will move in to Nagpore. It is generally said in the army that it is intended to be sent towards Sambalpore in which direction it is said, part of the troops that were at Chanda, have already been dispatched. A report is also in circulation that it is meant to act against Berar, and I have had letters from some of the Nizam's officers on the frontier expressive of considerable alarm on that account.

I understand from Jeswunt Row that an incursion was lately made into the Rajah's country by a considerable party belonging to the Nabob of Bopaul, who were defeated and repulsed with much loss. A battalion of Colonel Baptiste Filoses with 4 guns and a party of horse arrived about the beginning of this month at Hoshangabad. It is said they have come to deliver over Sewny to the Nabob of Bopaul on payment of a sum of money.

No. 78—Col. Close informs the Governor General of his march towards Sindhia's camp and the dispositions of the British and the Bhonsle troops in that part of the country.

FROM—COL. CLOSE, IN COMMAND OF THE DECCAN ARMY.

TO—GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Camp Hurrunkaire, 25th May 1805.

Since I had the honor to address Your Lordship on the 12th instant, the treasure which Lieutenant-Colonel Kirkpatrick had dispatched from

Hyderabad for the use of this division has arrived, and detachments of His Highness the Nizam's contingent continue to come in daily. The principal quotas still to join are Salabut Khan's and Ufsin-ood-Dowlah's.

The former is on its march from Balapore and the latter from Ellichpore. The heavy guns left Ahmednugur on the 9th instant, and by this time must be near Adjunta. Colonel Wallace was to march on the 23rd instant.

On my arrival at Mulkapore, I learned that about 200 horses had been ordered to be drafted from the 5th and 7th regiments of cavalry for the 3rd and 6th. As these horses however would have subjected the two latter corps to great inconvenience owing to their being short of their complement of men, I gave directions that the drafting should be deferred, and as Colonel Wallace's division has been weakened by the march of one of his battalions to Poona to remain at that station, the 5th and 7th regiments of cavalry will now accompany him to the field.

Sindia's frontier in this neighbourhood continues quiet. There are about 16 or 1,800 men in Asseerghur, of whom 500 are Arabs. They appear to be ill paid. The Killadar subsists them chiefly by occasional exactions from Burhaunpore, which is in great part deserted. By accounts from Nagpore, some of his parties have disturbed some of the Rajah's villages in the Gawilghur hills. A few bullock loads of ammunition have been lately received into Asseerghur, a supply which seems to have arrived from the northward.

His Highness the Paishwa has ordered the Vinchoor Jaghiredar to join this force, and I hope to hear soon of his having commenced his march from Khandesh. By the latest accounts from the Kistnah, Chintaman Row's levies and movements appear to have been intended solely against the Polligar of Kittoore, with whom he has come to an accommodation.

Your Lordship will observe from the correspondence of the Resident at Nagpore that the Rajah of Berar has about 7,000 horse and 3,000 infantry assembled near his Capital.

The Manager of Ellichpore has lately written to this camp that by information from the northward, His Excellency Lord Lake was in pursuit of Holkar on the Chumbul.

No. 79—Col. Close moves northward to thwart any hostile move of Sindhia, and a detailed account of the dispositions of British troops in Berar and Khandesh.

FROM—COL. CLOSE,

TO—LORD LAKE, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

Hurrunkaire, 26th May 1805.

His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General having directed that the troops under Colonel Wallace and Haliburton should take up

positions favourable to the eventual commencement of operations against the possessions of Dowlut Row Sindia, the division under Colonel Haliburton moved from the vicinity of Jalna on the 27th ultimo, and reached Mulkapore on the 11th instant where I joined and took the command of it. A present state of this force is forwarded to the Adjutant General for Your Lordship's notice. A part of His Highness the Nizam's contingent is present with this force and detachments of it are on the march to join from different quarters.

The division under Colonel Wallace was to march from Ahmednugur on the 23rd instant, and may be expected to arrive in this vicinity by the 7th or 8th of next month. He leaves 2 battalions at Ahmednugur to be employed eventually in seizing Sindia's districts near that post, and will be accompanied by the 1st, 5th and 7th Regiments of Native Cavalry, a detachment of artillery, His Majesty's 74th Regiment, two Battalions of Native Infantry, and a detail of Native pioneers. The 5th and 7th Regiments of Cavalry are very weak and His Majesty's 74th Regiment seldom parades more than 120 rank and file for duty. The two divisions united will consist of 5 Regiments of cavalry, a detachment of artillery, His Majesty's 84th and 74th Regiments, 6 Battalions of Native Infantry, and a detachment of Native Pioneers. This force will be well supplied with provisions and stores and equipped with a battering train, and in the event of hostilities, will be joined by at least one battalion of Native Infantry from Ahmednugur after Sindia's districts in that quarter shall have been seized. Depots of grainage established at Ahmednugur, Aurungabad and Jalna. Besides the force detailed above including the latter battalion, there will be in the Deccan, two battalions at Hyderabad, two at Poona, one divided between Ahmednugur, Chandore and Jalna, and one employed to keep in check the banditti who infest the line of communication between Ahmednugur and Aurungabad. Total troops in the Deccan 5 Regiments of Native Cavalry, a detachment of artillery, His Majesty's 84th and 74th Regiments, 13 battalions of Native Infantry and a detail of Native pioneers. The battalions at Hyderabad and Poona are meant for the protection of Their Highnesses the Soubahdar of the Deccan and the Paishwa. Sindia's frontier in this neighbourhood is quiet. There was a contest lately between the native holding the chief authority in Burhanpore and the Killadar of Asseerghur, in which the latter prevailed. The garrison of Asseerghur consists of 16 or 1,800 men of whom 500 are Arabs; a supply of ammunition has been thrown into the fort lately; but the garrison is ill paid, depending upon the exactions made by the Killadar from Burhanpore for subsistence.

The Rajah of Berar professes to entertain the most friendly sentiments towards the British Government. He has about 7,000 horse and 3,000 infantry in the vicinity of Nagpore.

Nothing material has happened of late at the courts of Hyderabad and Poona, and the Marratta Jaghiredars on the Kistna seem to be engaged only in intestine quarrels, the direct communication between Poona and Mysore being open as usual.

No. 80—Col. Close discusses the best method of overcoming the possible combination of Sindhia, Holkar and the Bhonsle Raja. The last he considers was averse to undertaking hostilities against the British, although he was not disposed to entertain a British subsidiary force for his protection.

FROM—COL. CLOSE,

TO—THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR.

Hurrankaire, 30th May 1805.

I have received the copy of Mr. Jenkins' private letter to your address of the 22nd April, which you enclosed to me, and which intimates that he had received intelligence that it was amongst the schemes of Ghautky* and Meer Khan to proceed to the eastward with a part of their forces in order to ravage the territories of the Rajah of Berar.

I cannot but believe the information that towards the end of April His Excellency the Right Honourable the Commander-in-Chief arrived with the army on the Chumbul, and that on his approach Sindia, Holkar and Meer Khan retired towards Kotah. Impressed by the truth of this intelligence, I think it probable that whatever schemes Ghautky and Meer Khan may have had in contemplation at the date of Mr. Jenkins' letter, they may have since found it necessary to alter them, and that considering the advanced period of the season it is likely that His Excellency's operations on the Chumbul will furnish sufficient employment to these chieftains to detain them to the northward of the Nurbuddah till after the rains.

But if Ghautky and Meer Khan approach the territory of the Rajah of Berar, I would have you apply to such a state of things the instructions contained in the 9th paragraph of Mr. Secretary Edmonstone's dispatch to your address dated 22nd December 1804, warning the Rajah eventually that a combination of his forces with those of Ghautky or Meer Khan will be considered as an act of positive hostility on the part of the Rajah. If the invasion take place as above supposed, which is certainly very improbable, and the Rajah proceed decidedly to oppose the invaders and solicit the aid of our Government, it will certainly be my aim to afford him such support from the army of the Deccan as circumstances may permit; at the same time, I do not conceive that any combination of circumstances can make it expedient for the troops in this quarter to cross the Wurdah before or during the rains.

* Sarjerao Ghatge.

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In the event of the invasion alluded to taking place, and of the Rajah of Berar proceeding to join the invaders for purposes hostile to the British interests or of those of our allies, the combination must be opposed by such a system of operations as the circumstances of the crisis may suggest.

The Rajah of Berar has shewn a decided disinclination to accept a subsidiary force from the British Government, and at the same time had hitherto avoided the most pressing invitations from Sindia's Government to co-operate in its views. It is apparent therefore that the Rajah's policy is to preserve the independence of his Government by pursuing a middle line, calculated to save him from the necessity of uniting with either side. This insecure system of policy the Rajah might possibly be induced to abandon for a union with Sindia and the adverse chieftains, did their fortunes improve to such a degree as to open a prospect to the Rajah that by espousing their cause, he might recover the territories which he lost by the treaty of peace. On the other hand, the spirit of the Rajah's Government, as well as his habits of life, would naturally render him reluctant to throw himself into the hands of a band who can maintain themselves only by indiscriminate plunder, and who are regulated only by principles of falsehood and treachery.

It is impossible to discover the plan on which the Rajah has lately assembled so large a force at his capital, but it will appear desirable not to manifest suspicions against the sincerity of his professions except on obvious grounds, and especially as he would meet any such disclosure on our part, by arguments in support of his sincerity, which it would be difficult to subvert.

From such considerations I do not conceive that remonstrating at this juncture against his keeping so strong a force assembled would be advisable or productive of any effect, unless it should be pushed to a critical extreme.

No. 81—The Resident reports news gathered by him regarding the activities of the Bhonsle Raja, the disposition of his forces and the movements of other minor individuals likely to create trouble for the British.

FROM—MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL,

Nagpur, 2nd June 1805.

The situation of affairs at this court is almost the same as it was when I last had the honour of addressing Your Excellency.

The Rajah continues with his army but comes occasionally to a place about four miles on this side of the camp, where his mother and family at

present reside for the purpose of performing some religious ceremonies at the river Canhaun. He is still occupied in arranging and settling the pay of his troops. A detachment is said to be forming to march towards Jubbulpore and a considerable force has been put under Ballajee Conare* the Soobehdar of Cuttack. Beeca Bhow, who was sent to sequester Chanda, lately returned from that place to the army attended by 1,000 or 1,500 horse. It is reported that he is about to be sent to the Pergunnahs under Gyalgurt† to relieve Natto‡ Pundit, the person at present in charge of them.

I have this day received a letter from my news-writer at Chanda in which he confirms the report mentioned in my letter, of the march of a body of troops from Chanda towards Chuteesgur and Ruttunpore. It states them to consist of 2,000 gosaiens and 3,000 horse belonging to the Rajah and commanded by Hybut Row.

I have also received information from another channel that 1,000 foot and 2,000 horse assembled at Ranjgur, a place on the Waingunga 50 or 60 miles east of Chanda. The professed object of collecting them was to repress the depredation of some robbers in that neighbourhood; it does not however appear that any disturbances have really been created there by robbers. The numbers stated above are probably exaggerated, but it appears that some troops are collecting at Chanda and to the eastward of it, and are marching towards Chuteesgur.

It is to be remarked that a person in the name of Hybut Row commanded one of the parties destined for Berar in last December, though he did not enter that country. He was at that time represented by the Rajah's ministers as one of Nana Saheb's desperate adherents. Of the other Chiefs concerned in that inroad Natto Ram and the Gosaien Naingeer are still in the service of this government in Gurry Mundela, as was Rajah Chittersing,|| (half-brother to the Rajah of Sittarra) till lately, when after offering his services to the Sagur man he marched to join Sindia but was plundered on the way by some Pindaris or other free-booters connected, I believe, with Dowlut Row's Government.

The battalion which was at Hoshangabad has returned to Bhilsa (where Baptiste has a garrison) without restoring Seony to the Nabob of Bhopaul. Kareem Pindari, one of the principal of the free-booters connected with Sindia, is at Seeore near Bhopaul employed in occupying a jageer, which Dowlut Row has lately assigned to him. Atma Ram, Sindia's agent, continues to recruit for his master. At this place he has now four or five hundred men at Nagpore; but I understand he has more in different parts of the city. I have reason to believe that the troops formerly raised by him were sent to Ougeein.

Ballajee Govind, Sindia's vakeel, has been in camp with the Rajah for four days and returns tomorrow. As Sindia has not yet committed

* Balaji Konher.

† Gawilgad.

‡ Nathu (?)

|| Chatur Singh Bhonsle.

any overt act of hostility against the British nation, I continue to communicate with his vakeel and have lately given him a safe conduct for his family who reside at Aurungabad, which I received some time since through Colonel Kirkpatrick from the government of Hyderabad.

No. 82—Col. Wallace reports what the Nawab of Elichpur, Salabat Khan, told him, which was to the effect that the Raja of Nagpur intended to join Holkar against the British and persuaded the Nawab to do the same.

FROM—COL. WALLACE, COMMANDING BRITISH TROOPS IN BERAR,

TO—COL. CLOSE.

Camp near Balapur, 9th November 1805.

Yesterday a confidential person came to me from Nabob Salabut Khan, who having something, he said, of a secret nature to communicate, I withdrew with him for the purpose of learning what this was, when he informed me as follows.

That the Rajah of Nagpore had lately sent a vakeel named Balwunt Row Shunkur to Salabut Khan at Ellichpore, who opened his mission by recalling to Salabut Khan's memory the intimacy and friendship which formerly subsisted between him and the Rajah, and inviting him to renew that, and to give proofs of his having sincerely done so by performing such services as might be required of him by the Rajah. That in reply Salabut Khan said that he would be happy to be on friendly terms with the Rajah whenever circumstances would permit, and that he conceived himself to be so now, but that as he was at present placed by his Circar under the authority of the British Officers here, he could not agree to perform any service for him which they might disapprove of. That the Vakeel then answered that he would procure him an order from his own Government to attend to the desires of the Rajah, to which Salabut Khan replied that on receiving such an order, he should communicate it to the British Officers, and act as they might recommend. That Salabut Khan desirous of ascertaining the object of this communication asked the Vakeel what was the nature of the services the Rajah wished him to execute, who gave him to understand, that his acting in a concealed manner against the interest of the British was what the Rajah solicited him to do; and added that his sending 4 or 5,000 troops under his, or Futy Jung's son to join Goojabah, the Bonsla's nephew, and accompany him to Holkar, would be a very acceptable measure. That Salabut Khan perceiving the extent of the treachery proposed, expressed with heat his abhorrence of such transactions, when the Vakeel seeing that he could not be gained, demanded of him payment of a debt due to the Rajah, which Salabut

Khan said he would pay whenever ordered to do so by his government, and insisted on the Vakeel's immediately leaving Ellichpore.

This is nearly word for word what this messenger of Salabut Khan communicated to me, and which I have thought it proper to acquaint you with. To Mr. Elphinstone I shall also send a copy of this letter. You will perceive that this transaction is connected with that mentioned in Mr. Elphinstone's dispatch to the Governor General dated 22nd September last, wherein it is stated that the Bonsla had complained of the treatment his Vakeel had met with from Salabut Khawn on being sent to him to demand payment of an old debt.

Salabut Khan states as the reason for his not sooner having made known this circumstance, that he expected shortly to join me when he could personally inform me of it, and that he was afraid to write on the subject, as through the means of Moonshees employed by European gentlemen, communications made in writing generally became known, and that his zeal for the British interests had already done him injury. That however being lately desired by me to remain at Ellichpore he had sent a confidential person to relate the occurrence to me.*

No. 83—Elphinstone informs Wallace not to credit the report of Salabatkhan respecting the treacherous conduct of the Bhonsle Raja.

FROM—MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,

TO—COL. WALLACE.

Nagpur, 19th November 1805.

I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of the 9th instant. I am very sorry indeed to reflect on the veracity of so respectable and attached a Sirdar as Salabut Khan, but the following considerations induce me to give little credit to his statement respecting the Rajah's attempt to lead him into intrigues against the interests of the British nation. You will have observed from my official correspondence that the Rajah at first endeavoured to prevail on me to apply directly to the Government of Hyderabad for an order to Salabut Khan to pay the money, and it was not without some discussion that I convinced him of the impropriety of such a request and the necessity of demanding payment before he complained of Salabut Khan's withholding it. I do not think that a man of the Rajah's character would expose his designs to a premature discovery by an unguarded communication of them to a Sirdar

* This was an attempt on the part of Salabat Khan to poison the ears of the British officers against the Nagpur Raja. See Elphinstone's letter dated 19th November 1805 in reply.

of Salabut Khan's known attachment to the British Government; nor do I imagine that he would accompany such propositions with the demand of a debt which would make it Salabut Khan's interest to divulge them that he might have a pretext for refusing payment. If the Rajah had wished to enter into an intrigue such as is described, he might easily have conducted it in the most secret and guarded manner by means of some of his ministers whose families reside at Ellichpore, or of the officers in charge of his districts in Berar who, I believe, frequently visit that city. There is also something so very unreasonable in the request made to Salabut Khan, that I cannot persuade myself of its having come from the Bonsla. If Salabut Khan sent his son with 500 men, which I believe is all he has, to Holkar, it is evident that you would immediately seize his person, a risk which the Rajah could not imagine Salabut Khan would consent to incur. I understand it to be Goojaba's intention to join Sirjee Row. If he does so, it will tend to shew that the account of his intended journey to Holkar is unfounded, and will greatly tend to clear the Rajah from all knowledge of his flight, as there is no ground for suspecting His Highness of any connection with that traitor. For these reasons I entirely concur in the opinion stated in your letter that the story is invented to excuse Salabut Khan's behaviour to the vakeel. There are only two circumstances that give the least appearance of probability to the transaction, the intriguing turn of this Court, and the promise of procuring orders from the Nizam's Government. From a passage in Colonel Close's letter to Lord Cornwallis dated October 6th there is reason to think that the enemy had hopes of drawing the Nizam into their views by means of Ragotim Row, and it certainly was believed here (before Maheput Ram's journey to Hyderabad) that Ragotim Row was about to acquire an ascendancy in the councils of the Souba. This might lead to such a message, as is said to have been sent to Salabut Khan, but this circumstance is of little weight compared to those I first pointed out. It may be worth while to mention that I have had information given me, more than once, of intrigues between the Bonsla and Salabut Khan, originating in the latter Chief particularly at the time when Salabut Khan's nephew arrived here, but I never paid the smallest attention to them, from an idea of Salabut Khan's knowledge of his own interest and of his fidelity to the British Government, which was so apparent in the late war with the Bonsla.

P.S.—This is rather an important subject in regard to this Government, I shall send copies of our correspondence to the Governor General and Mr. Russell, you may perhaps think it worth while to forward this or a copy of it to Colonel Close.

No. 84—This is an important communication received by the Resident and communicated by him to the Governor General disclosing the restless circumstances in which the Maratha Chiefs were placed, and the astute move of the British administrators in meeting the various dangers that threatened them.

FROM—MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,

TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 10th September 1806.

On the 8th instant I was visited by Jeswunt Row, who said the Raja had sent him to consult me on the subject of intelligence received the night before from Sindia's Vakeel. He proceeded to say that Sindia had arrived within four marches of Ougein* and was about to move on Bhopaul; that Holkar was to join him there within a fortnight or at most a month. And that it was their declared intention to attack the Rajah†, unless he would either pay them a large sum of money or consent to meet them and unite with them in all their enterprises. He said that the Raja had never yet been accustomed to buy off the enmity of other chiefs and that if he were disposed to do so now, he had not the means, as his revenue is much inferior to his expenditure, and his troops very much in arrears. That he was convinced that to join with Sindia and Holkar was to put himself into their hands, and on the other hand, he was entirely unable to oppose them with success in the field. His Highness was therefore in the greatest perplexity, and requested that I would advise him how to act in the critical situation in which he was likely to be placed.

When Jeswunt Row had concluded, I at first said that the question he had proposed to me was one on which I could give no opinion as I had not sufficient information, and besides, I had no instructions to converse on any subject that was likely to create disagreement between chiefs with whom the Company was on terms of friendship, but on being pressed to give my private opinion I observed that a union with Holkar for the purpose of oppressing the Bonsla was so obviously contrary to Sindia's interests, that I could scarce believe he could be led to adopt such a measure. I said there were many points of dispute between Sindia and Holkar which could not be easily adjusted; that there must still remain some traces of their former enmity, that Holkar's restless ambition was of itself sufficient to excite the apprehension of his neighbours, and his power was already sufficient to be very formidable to Sindia, and would be much more so if he was suffered to increase it by plundering the Bonsla and thus weakening the only ally on whom Sindia could depend, if attacked by Holkar. I put Jeswunt Row in mind of the degraded station in which Sindia appeared in his own army when Holkar took refuge there from the pursuit of Lord Lake, and asked him if Sindia could even so far forget his feelings on that occasion as to expose himself to similar humiliation

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† Raghuji Bhonsle.

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again. Jeswunt Row replied that Sindia had not sufficient knowledge of his own affairs to perceive the destructive effects of his uniting with Holkar. That he was under the influence of the meanest and most contemptible advisers, and would easily be persuaded that Holkar would behave with more moderation now than he had done formerly. I enquired whether the Raja had no vakeel with Sindia, and whether that chief's more respectable ministers did not point out to him the consequence of any increase of Holkar's power, and the benefits to be derived from uniting with the Bonsla to resist any attack his ambition might urge him to. Jeswunt Row replied that Sindia had no respect for the opinions of any person except one of his menial attendants, (whose name I think is Chundoo Hozra), and that he employed his influence in persuading Sindia to fall into Holkar's views, to which end he generally wrought on Dowlut Row's fears by representing the greatness of Holkar's power and the impolicy of offending him. He added that he believed Sindia to be at heart inclined to Holkar and that there was no reality in their apparent disputes. I expressed my doubt of the real cordiality between Sindia and Holkar. I remarked that they had separated after their confederacy at Subbulgur and might be separated again. Jeswunt Row said that was entirely owing to Ambajee Ingle, and that the very circumstances of that separation were now used by Holkar's advocates with Sindia as the foundation of an argument in his favour, for that they represented Sindia's acquisition of Gohud and Gwalior as entirely owing to Holkar's exertions. Jeswunt Row further added that while Ambajee was minister Sindia adopted all his ideas, as he no doubt would those of any minister to whom he gave his confidence. He further observed that Holkar had in all probability views very far beyond merely levying money on this country. He had promised the Raja advantages in case he would join him, and he was known to talk among his intimate friends of renewing the war with the British as soon as he was able to do so with effect. He did not speak so openly to his troops, but he did not entirely conceal his views from them, as he gave out that he had dreams and visions warning him never to desist from his undertakings and promising him entire success in the end. On this I said that I agreed with him that Holkar would renew the war with the British if he thought he could derive any advantage from doing so, but he had no inducement to do it at present. As for his dreams they were natural fictions to encourage his defeated troops. His promises to the Raja of confidence and future advantages were not unlikely to be pretences to entice the Raja to join him, in which event, it would be in Holkar's power to compel the Raja to furnish him with whatever money he thought proper to demand. With respect to the advantages which Sindia had derived from his connexion with Holkar, I thought the fallacy of the statements Jeswunt Row referred to very palpable. Sindia had in connecting himself with Holkar irreparably injured his reputation for good faith; he exchanged the friendship of the British for a hollow alliance with a Power that would

one day swallow him up. At the same time he had sunk himself from being one of the first powers in India to a state of inferiority to Holkar, whose ascendancy in the confederacy and even the affairs of Sindia's own Government was evident to all India, nor would he ever have obtained Gohud by adhering to Holkar. On the contrary, it is probable that Holkar would soon have left him to make what arrangement he could, as he had formerly done in the beginning of the war in 1803. Such, I said, would have been his conduct in the event of ill success. But if he was victorious the consequences would have been worse. In that case, he would either have retained the control which he had obtained in Sindia's Government, or he would have insisted on such adjustment of his differences with Sindia as would have left that prince in no condition to oppose his further incroachments. I then said that the share which Holkar had taken of the booty, which he and Sindia collected from the chiefs whose countries they plundered, would show how much he would allow Sindia of that which might be obtained from the Bosla. Sindia, I observed, must be aware of this and consequently would be well disposed to arrange with the Raja separately; if the interests of the latter should require such a measure. Jeswunt Row said the Raja would of course adopt all the measures of precaution that were in his power, but he had little hope of succeeding, and if he failed he had no means of defending his dominions, nor any security for the safety of his capital or even of his family. He then asked me what the Raja ought to do if he really was attacked by both chiefs, either together or separately, insinuating that it was the attachment His Highness had shown to the British in the late war that drew the enmity of the other chiefs upon him. As Jeswunt Row did not make this assertion in direct terms, I only replied to it by saying that it would show the deepest ingratitude in Holkar to attack the Raja who had spared him during his misfortunes, notwithstanding that he had great provocation to go to war and could have found no difficulty in seizing many of Holkar's southern possessions, while that chief was seeking an asylum in the Punjaub. I said that if the combination the Raja apprehended really took place it was not likely that any part of his dominions except Gurry* Mundela would suffer, for his northern frontier was strong, and the late arrangements between Holkar and the Raja of Jypore plainly showed that the former was not desirous of exposing his army to risk in enforcing his exactions. Jeswunt Row answered that the Raja of Jypore had been saved by the timely interposition of Raja Maunsing, that the appearance of co-operation among the Rajpoots still secured them, but it increased the Raja's danger, for the Rajpoots never acted but on the defensive and consequently their union only served to narrow the field of Holkar's pillage, and in fact to leave no power except the Bosla from whom he could hope to be supplied. He said the Raja had no allies to look to and he could not expect to intimidate Holkar, as the success of the Pindaris had already displayed his weakness

* Gadha Mandla.

to all India. Jeswunt Row enlarged on the hardship of the Raja's situation who, far from harbouring plans of aggrandizement, is content to submit to the losses he has sustained and wishes for nothing but quiet, and yet is disturbed in the possession of the little that remained, and compelled either to assimilate to the turbulence of his neighbours or to suffer from their rapacity. I expressed my concern for the disquiet to which the Raja was exposed, but observed that dangers often seemed greater than they were, and said that at the worst His Highness might be able at once to remove the present evil and to secure his future quiet if he would shew Sindia his true interest, which is the same as the Bosla, in as much as they both possessed regular Governments and dominions either already well inhabited or capable of improvement, and had not like Holkar by reducing their own territories to a desert, laid themselves under the necessity of subsisting by plunder. I then concluded the conversation by desiring Jeswunt Row to observe that I was not speaking the sentiments of my Government, as we had been agitating matters on which I had no instructions, but that I was merely giving my own opinion, which my wishes for the Raja's welfare prevented my withholding when it was desired. Jeswunt Row asked if I would write to Calcutta respecting the danger with which the Raja was threatened and inform the Raja of your ideas on the subject, and I told him that it was my duty to report all political events that seemed of sufficient importance to deserve your attention, but that there did not seem to be anything in what we had been discussing, on which you were likely to give your opinion.

I omitted to mention that Jeswunt Row stated the Pindaris as having come to an accommodation with Sindia and as having begun to threaten in consequence. He represented Seetoo as connected with Sindia and Kareem with Holkar. It is difficult to say whether the junction between Sindia and Holkar is really intended, or whether it is an invention of the former chiefs designed to alarm the Raja and induce him to come to a speedy composition with Sindia's pecuniary demands. It is a circumstance in favour of the latter opinion, that I was informed by a person from Sindia's vakeel of an intended meeting between Dowlut Row and Holkar which was soon to take place on the north of the Nerbudda as early as the 2nd of July, at which time it appears by Mr. Mercer's dispatches that no such plan of co-operation could have been designed. There is however every reason to suppose that Sindia intends to extort money from the Raja. His Vakeel is sending off his family and valuables to Burhanpore, either because he apprehends that the country will be disturbed or on purpose to impress the Raja with that idea.

P.S.—Since I wrote the above I have received another communication from the Raja through Jeswunt Row on the subject of the dangers with which he is threatened. Jeswunt Row began with referring to our last conversation, then said that the Raja would take every measure he could, to

prevent the invasion of his country, and he was anxious to know whether the British Government would so far interfere in his favour as to attempt to dissuade Sindia and Holkar from attacking him. To this I answered that I did not think you could possibly consent to do so. I said it was your wish to meddle as little as possible with the affairs of other states, and besides, it was agreed in the treaty with Holkar that the British Government should not interfere between him and other Powers not immediately connected with us. Jeswunt Row said the Raja only wished for a friendly mediation, to which I replied that such interpositions could not be used with dignity unless a much more intimate connexion subsisted between the states than we had with Holkar. Jeswunt Row continuing to urge the Raja's request I said that I had given my opinion of the probable success of such an application, but that I would submit it to you and inform the Raja of your answer. I added that although you might find it impossible to interpose, I was confident you would be concerned to see Sindia and Holkar join for the purpose of disturbing the peace of India, and that you would much regret any injury befall the Raja's state, as his system of attending to the welfare of his country and preserving its tranquillity was much more conformable to our ideas of good Government, and more conducive to the general happiness of mankind than the scheme which was attributed to the other chiefs of maintaining armies by rapine and extortion for the disturbance of their neighbours. I said I had long since pointed out to the Raja the probability of such events taking place as appeared now to threaten him, and had offered the alliance and cooperation of the British ; but that our situation was now altered. We were at peace with Sindia and Holkar and there did not appear the least probability of any disagreement with those chiefs, and consequently we were bound to observe the strictest neutrality in all the quarrels they might have with other states not included in the general defensive alliance.

No. 85—The Resident reports to the G. G. the proposal of the Bhonsle Raja to send his agent Yashwantrao Ramchandra to meet Holkar and reconcile him to the British.

FROM—M. S. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 20th September 1806.

I had the honour to report in my last despatch that the Raja was under considerable alarm from the designs of Sindia and Holkar. His anxiety concerning the intentions of the latter chief has now determined him to send a vakeel to his camp, and Jeswunt Row Ramchander has been selected for that purpose.

I was informed of this by Jeswunt Row himself who came yesterday to acquaint me with the Raja's resolution. He began by saying that Venkat Row, Holkar's Vakeel, had received letters from his master informing him that Holkar would soon be in this neighbourhood, and desiring him to quit Nagpore and repair to his own camp without delay. The departure of the Vakeel, Jeswunt Row observed, left the Raja without any channel of communication with Holkar, the inconvenience of which was particularly felt when that chieftain's plans were so doubtful; His Highness had therefore resolved to send a vakeel to his camp and had pitched on Jeswunt Row as being acquainted with Holkar, and more likely at once to conciliate him and penetrate his designs than any person who had not before resided with him. Jeswunt Row also mentioned it as one of the Raja's motives for selecting him that his known attachment to the British interests would secure His Highness from all suspicion of intending to unite with Holkar in any confederacy against the Company.

In reply to Jeswunt Row's communication I expressed my obligation to the Raja for communicating his intentions, which I said you would consider as a proof of his friendship and confidence. I assured Jeswunt Row that I had too much experience of the Raja's wisdom and good faith to entertain any doubts of the motive of his sending a vakeel to Holkar, even if his choice had not fallen on one so well disposed towards our Government, and I concluded by expressing my wishes that his journey might be safe and his mission successful. Jeswunt Row replied that he should certainly be exposed to risk on his journey, but that he should be indifferent to that if he could be sure of a favorable issue to his negotiations. He observed that Holkar had long talked of invading the Raja, and all accounts represented him as being now fully determined to carry his plan into effect, and in particular, the Raja had received notice of Holkar's having desired one of his friends to collect troops and be prepared to assist him in an expedition which he projected against this country. As I have been informed that Holkar has written to the above effect to Nana Saheb*, I took occasion to enquire to whom those instructions had been given and at last was told by Jeswunt Row that they were sent to Jagannat Row, the Vakeel who came from Holkar during the war with us.

I then enquired whether Jeswunt Row went by Sindia's camp or whether any other person was to be sent thither; to both which questions he replied in the negative.

The Raja continues to hasten the progress of the city wall. It is intended to be a thick rampart, and might be of considerable service against a Maratta enemy, but it will require in all probability several years to complete it. His Highness has lately given orders for increasing his infantry, and I understand, has issued 25,000 rupees to one of his chiefs to enable him to raise men in Gurry Mundela.

* Vyankoji, the Raja's brother.

The younger brother of Ambajee Inglia has lately arrived in the neighbourhood of Jubbulpore with a strong escort and some treasure. He is represented as having made that movement with a view to secure a retreat, in case he cannot procure sufficient security for the safety of his person from Sindia.

No. 86—Jenkins writes to G. G. of his having been informed by the Raja's vakeel that an emissary from Holkar had waited on the Raja with proposals of an alliance which were politely declined. He also reports the success of the Raja's arms at Heshangabad against Bhopal and the Pindaris.

FROM—R. JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,

TO—LORD MINTO, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 28th November 1807.

On the 11th instant the Rajah and all the members of his family went to Ramteg to perform some religious ceremonies incident to the late feast of the Dewalee.

On the day after His Highness's departure Jeswunt Rao came to visit me and to inform me of the Rajah's wish that I should remain at the city during the short period of his intended absence. In the course of conversation Jeswunt Rao mentioned reports which he said were prevalent, that the Seiks were assembled at Patiala for the purpose of invading the Doab.

Having received Mr. Secretary Edmonstone's dispatch with its enclosures under date the 1st September, I was apprized of the expectations which were entertained of the approach of Runjeetsing of Lahore for the purpose of settling the differences at Patiala. In the first instance however I told Jeswunt Rao that we had no reason whatever to apprehend any hostile attempts from the Seiks,* either in regard to the terms upon which we were with them, or to the state of our military arrangements in that quarter; which although adopted to a state of peace, were yet calculated to repel any aggressions. I said that I had no positive intelligence relative to the late movements of the Seiks, but that there had long existed a disagreement between the Rajah and Ranee of Patiala, both of whom were reported to have requested the mediation of Runjeetsing; and that if the Seiks were assembled at Patiala, we need look no further for the object of their movements. Nothing further of consequence passed at this visit.

On the 21st the Rajah returned from Ramteg and on the 23rd I had another interview with Jeswunt Rao, who came with a polite message from the Rajah on the occasion of his return. After we had conversed for a short

* Sikhs.

time on indifferent topics, Jeswunt Rao mentioned Holkar, and asked whether I had received any late intelligence respecting his movements. I mentioned in reply what I had heard viz., that Holkar was still at Rampoorah Bhanpoorah, and that he had lately dismissed many of his mossulman troops. Jeswunt Rao then alluded to the communication, which he had before made to me, of the arrival of a vakeel from Holkar at Nagpur. He said that the Rajah had been prevented for some time from hearing the communications with which the Vakeel was charged, but that His Highness had at length granted him an audience, that the Vakeel represented the services which Holkar had rendered to the Marhatta cause and the efforts which he had made to support the Marhatta name, whilst the Rajah had remained quiet at his capital, that of those services and these efforts his present poverty was the consequence, and that he looked up to the Rajah who was a descendant of the ancient princes, as his patron and superior. To him therefore he applied for assistance; he wanted money and troops to enable him to prosecute the views which he entertained for the common good, and he trusted the Rajah would furnish him with both, and unite in his enterprizes. To these and other representations of a like nature, the Rajah had replied in friendly terms, that he had neither money nor troops to spare, and was as much in want as Holkar could be, of funds to keep up an army; that the friendship between the two families was of long standing, and His Highness wished it to remain on its present footing without alteration or diminution; but that with respect to the views and enterprizes to which Holkar alluded the Rajah advised him to think before he acted, and to act with caution and circumspection, that the Rajah's state was once flourishing, and that all his endeavours would henceforth be directed to preserve his present dominions in peace and tranquillity. I said that the Rajah's reply was a proof of that wisdom which His Highness discovered in all his transactions, and that I had no doubt Holkar would be inclined to profit by such good advice.

Jeswunt Rao then mentioned the capitulation of Ratgurla to Sindia and the probability of that Chief moving towards Bhopal. He also informed me that the Rajah's army under Sudeek Ally Khan had taken Chynpore Baree, and that Hoshangabad would soon fall. Jeswunt Rao then took his leave.

Some days ago intelligence was received that the Raja's army under Gunput Rao, which had been reinforced by some of Sindia's troops under Bhoojung Rao and Dhondoo Mories, said to amount to 3,000 men, has obtained possession of Hoshangabad. This event has afforded great satisfaction to the Rajah. Gunput Rao's army has since crossed the Nerbudda to pursue the plans which have been formed between the Rajah and Sindia for the partition of Bhopal.

The views and intentions of Nana Saheb appear to have undergone a considerable change since I last had the honour of addressing Your

Lordship. I before mentioned the movements of his troops towards Chanda for the purpose of chastising the Rajah of Bustar. The principal part of these troops is now ordered to return for the purpose of uniting with a force of about 2,000 horse and foot with 2 guns under Keshoo Govind and Ramchunder Waugh, who have arrived at Ramteg. Six additional guns from Chanda are also on the road to join them. These movements are said to be connected with the negotiations alluded to in a former dispatch which have been carrying by Vencojee Pedree with Sindia, on the part of Nana Saheb. Three or four lacks of rupees have been already paid to Sindia through that agent; in acknowledgment of which Sindia is to allot to Nana Saheb a certain portion of territory, either in Bhopal or in its neighbourhood; and Nana Saheb is to maintain a force in the territory so allotted.

I have now the honour to state the substance of the demands which, concurring accounts lead me to believe, have been made by Holkar's Vakeel from this Durbar. These appear to be, 1st, that the Rajah should unite with Holkar in a common cause.

That the Rajah should repair in person with an army to meet Holkar at any place His Highness may determine, to consult on the objects to which their combined operations should be directed.

That if the Rajah could not in person repair to the place of meeting, one of his family or some chief of reputation should be sent with a respectable force for that purpose, and to act in conjunction with Holkar.

That in the event of the 2nd and 3rd proposals being disagreeable, the Rajah should furnish Holkar with funds to enable him to increase his forces, and to prosecute his plans for the common good.

That if the Rajah will not make a common cause with Holkar or assist him in any of the modes above mentioned, His Highness should restore the jewels and property or the value of them, which Holkar alleges were confiscated by the Rajah when he was confined at Nagpore. On this latter article Holkar is said to found a very exorbitant demand of money, and he is further mentioned to threaten the Rajah with a visit if it be not complied with.

The Rajah, as far as I can learn, has given no decisive answer to any of these demands further than to mention his own poverty, the low state of his Government, and his unwillingness to enter into engagements, of which he does not know the scope and tendency. These replies have given no satisfaction to the Vakeel who is urgent for a categorical answer to his master's propositions, particularly the last, which is the most embarrassing to the Durbar, but during the vicinity of Sindia, the Vakeel's representations will probably have little effect. Another person from Holkar, named Raj Mahomed, arrived at Nagpore three days ago, and a third is said to be expected.

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Amongst various reports prevalent at Nagpore, which scarcely merit attention, it may be proper to mention that of a general confederacy against the British Government ; such a report has commonly prevailed at this season, and is at present joined with a reputed design of emancipating the Peshwa from our control. Propositions to this effect are also attributed to Holkar's Vakeel, and similar views are said to be concealed under the negotiations between this Durbar and Dowlut Rao Sindia respecting the partition of Bhopal, which affords a pretence for uniting their forces. I need hardly say that there appear to be no grounds for attributing any such views at present to the Rajah.

Having since I commenced this address, received a copy of Mr. Mercer's despatch No. 5 to Your Lordship, the nature of the proposals therein mentioned to have been made by Holkar to Sindia, seems to give countenance to the reports that some stipulations respecting the Peshwa have been brought forward by Holkar's Vakeel at Nagpore. It is indeed so obviously the character of Holkar to wish to appear the promoter of plans, although merely nominal, for confederacies and enterprizes, and probably so much his interest to appear so to his troops, that it is not unlikely such stipulations may have been proposed also to the Rajah. I conceive however that in any event the concurrence of this Durbar in such proposals would be very doubtful ; and no considerations which can at present be contemplated, would in my judgment induce the Rajah to be the first to unite with Holkar in any plans of mutual operation. Even supposing in the first instance Sindia to enter into engagements with Holkar, as the consequence would probably be the return of Ghautka to power, the aversion of this Durbar to that profligate and unprincipled character would probably render it still less disposed to agree in measures, of which he might in any degree have the control and guidance, and this without reference to any idea of a war with the British Government. But as this reasoning is perhaps carried further than the actual or prospective state of things may appear to render necessary, I must solicit Your Lordship's pardon for intruding it in this dispatch.

Since the army of Gunput Rao has crossed the Nerbudda, the Durrah or party of Seetoo's Pindaris under his son Doast Mahomed, united as is reported, with some of the troops of Wuzeer Mahomed Khan, amounting to about 4,000, has taken the opportunity of invading the Rajah's country. These Pindaris first appeared in the neighbourhood of Maltoy*, at which place they are said to have divided into two bodies. One party consisting of 1,500 horse moved towards Nagpore, and carried its devastations to within 7 or 8 miles of the city from which the conflagrations which marked its tracts, were distinctly seen. This party proceeded towards Natchengong on the Wurda, but the latest accounts mention that it is on its return. The Rajah finds so much difficulty in assembling his troops, which are scattered in every direction through the city, that no effect

* Multai.

measures are ever taken in time to arrest the progress of the plunderers, and it is likely that they will be able to retire unmolested with their spoil. Of the other body of Pindaris no certain intelligence has yet been received, but it is said to have moved through the hills towards Chateesgurh.

I beg to take this opportunity of acknowledging receipt of Mr. Secretary Edmonstone's dispatch under date the 28th September. With the desire of obtaining information regarding the result of Mr. Richardson's enquiries with respect to the Rajah of Berar's asserted supremacy over the zemindar of Shownuggur, and on other points with which it may be useful for me to be acquainted when that subject may be discussed, I have addressed a letter to Mr. Richardson, a copy of which is transmitted in my dispatch of this date to the Secretary in the Political Department.

P.S.—Since writing this despatch, I have received a message from the person named Raj Mahomed who calls himself a Vakeel from Holkar, intimating his wish to pay me a visit. As I understand he is not yet acknowledged by the Rajah, having, as it is said, no credentials from Holkar, I thought proper for the present to decline his offer, adding at the same time that I should be happy to see him after his introduction to the Rajah. There are various reports respecting this person with which I need not trouble Your Lordship, as the Rajah's conduct towards him must soon indicate his real character.

No. 87—Bhonsle's communication that the British required him (B.) to cede Hoshangabad to the Nabob of Bhopal, and its reception in Holkar's Court are reported by Metcalfe to Govt.

FROM—C. T. METCALFE, RESIDENT AT DELHI,
TO—THE SECRETARY TO GOVT.

Delhi, 1st February 1815.

By intelligence from Holkar's camp it appears that the Raja of Nagpore has made a communication to that court on the subject of Bhopal.

This communication and its reception are reported in the following terms.

1st. This day, the 22nd of January, a letter was received from Nagoojee, Holkar's agent at the court of Nagpore, accompanied by letters from Raja Rugoojee Bhonsla. The letters of the Raja stated, that the British Government had demanded from him the cession of Hoshangabad in favour of the Nuwab of Bhopal, as that district formerly belonged to Bhopal; that the Raja had pleaded the authority of the Peshwah, that Mr. Jenkins had answered that the Peshwah was master of his own house, that if the Raja would cede that purgunnah, well, if not, that the British army would advance and put the Chief of Bhopal in possession; that the

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Raja had engaged to give an answer in a month, and had written on the subject to the Peshwa and Sindia. The ministers after reading the letters consulted in the presence of the Bae and sent copies of the letters to Nuwab Meer Khan.

2nd. This day, the 23rd January, Meena Bae and the ministers consulted on the communication received yesterday from the Raja of Nagpore respecting the requisition made by the British Government for the cession of Hoshangabad. It seems that one of the ministers observed to the Bae, "If such is the intention of the British Government, no doubt it will demand from this Government the restitution of the purgunnahs of the Powar Chief of Dhar, taken possession of by the late Muharaja Jeswunt Rao Holkar after his return from Lahore. What excuse will you then make?" The Bae replied, "The British Government is the ruler of the country, if it made the demand who possesses the power to object to it?"

I have stated the intelligence exactly as it has reached me, though it is evident from the misrepresentation which it contains regarding the discussions at Nagpore on the subject of Bhopal, either that the Raja of Nagpore must have given a false account of those discussions, or that an erroneous report regarding them has been circulated in Holkar's camp.

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1871-1872

SECTION 3

Restoration of Sambalpur and Patna to Nagpur

1806-1808

According to the treaty of Deogaon (1803) the Raja of Nagpur ceded Cuttack to the British. The British had already taken possession of Cuttack and had entered into agreements* with the numerous zamindars of Cuttack and Chhattisgarh, who thereby had transferred their allegiance from the Marathas to the British. The 10th article of the treaty of Deogaon provided that such treaties should be confirmed, and a list† of these zamindars should be submitted to the Bhonsle. Outside the province of Cuttack, these zamindars were those of Sambalpur, Sonapur, Ramgad and Boad, their zamindari being situated in Chhattisgarh, which was not ceded to the British. These zamindars were unwilling to retransfer their allegiance to the Bhonsle and it was found difficult to induce them to yield. The British officers who had entered into agreements with these zamindars also reported to the Governor General the impropriety of such a measure. The Governor General therefore proposed to the Bhonsle Raja that he should accept a reasonable compensation for the loss of these territories from his dominion. After

*See letter dated 13th December 1803.

†See letter dated 19th January 1804.

some hesitation the Raja yielded to this proposal*. The question and measure of such compensation, however, remained in suspense till September 1805.

In September 1805 Lord Cornwallis after his return to India, decided to restore the districts of Sambalpur and Patna to the Raja of Nagpur†, in spite of the difficulty of inducing the zamindars to remain in their possessions under the suzerainty of the Bhonsle or to quit them and accept other territory in the Company's provinces in lieu of their old tenures. Captain Roughsedge who had considerable local experience and influence in Chhattisgarh was entrusted with this difficult task and he tried his best to faithfully carry it out. (See letters dated 12th September 1805 and 10th March 1806.)

The Raja of Sambalpur and his son were already in confinement at Chanda, which was under the direct control of Nanasaheb (Vyankoji) the Raja of Nagpur's brother, and the Raja of Sonepur and his son were in confinement at Nagpur. Ratankuwar, the chief Ranees of Sambalpur, who had the possession of the fort, would not leave it unless her husband and son were released. The Governor General and the Resident of Nagpur suggested to Raghuji the release of these Chieftains as it would facilitate the occupation of Sambalpur, but the refractory nature of Nanasaheb would not allow him to yield to his brother's persuasions and these captive chiefs were not released. (17th July 1806.)

Many of the zamindars of the Bhonsle either consented to accept the suzerainty of the Bhonsle and to continue in their possessions; others accepted other possessions in the Company's territory. Mukta Dhi, the other Ranees of Sambalpur, even quitted the fort much against the wish of the chief Ranees, Ratankuwar. (4th October 1806). Ranees Ratankuwar of Sambalpur and Jujarsing‡ of Raigarh however remained adamant. As Ranees Ratankuwar had once consented and then retracted, she was given to understand that she would remain at her risk (17th July 1806) and an exception was made in the case of Jujarsing, whose territory was to be excluded from the cession.

Raghuji Bhonsle was formally informed of the decision of the Governor General to restore Sambalpur and Patna to his authority. The Governor General also induced the Nizam, through the Resident at Hyderabad, to cede to the Raja of Nagpur some of the former's possessions, east of the Wardha, which formerly formed part of Berar and were under the dual control of the Nizam and Bhonsle, like the rest of Berar (25th March 1806). Raghuji however refused to accept them (12th May 1806). Evidently he was not satisfied with the restoration of Sambalpur and

*See letter dated 3rd September 1804. †See letter dated 18th September 1805.

‡ See letter dated 10th March 1805.

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RESTORATION OF SAMBALPUR AND PATNA TO NAGPUR

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Patna which were not important from the point of revenue. He pressed for Berar or Cuttack and pleaded that his friendship with the British, unlike that of Sindhia and Holkar, placed him in a worse position than the two Chiefs who fought with the British. The Governor General however expressed his inability to fulfill the Raja's desire, though the Raja latterly assumed a supplicating attitude. (Letters dated 23rd March 1808 and 11th July 1808.)

A formal treaty for the restoration of Sambalpur and Patna was drawn up by the Resident on 24th August 1806 and ratified by the Governor General on 2nd October 1806.

The Nagpur army took possession of Sambalpur and Patna after some resistance from those zamindars who did not accept the terms of the Governor General and had remained in Sambalpur at their own risk. The Ranee of Sambalpur resisted to the end and eventually fled (29th November 1808 and 4th June 1809) to the Company's territories where she was given an asylum on condition of stopping all her activities against the Nagpur Government. (26th December 1808). The Nagpur Government demanded that the British officers should give them peaceful possession of Chhattisgarh, but they were asked to resort to their own strength. Bastar had also to be subdued by force. (20th March 1809). Nanasaheb, the Raja's brother, had to exert himself personally in Chhattisgarh.

Jujarsing of Raigarh was accused by the Nagpur Government of fomenting sedition amongst the zamindars of Chhattisgarh, but these charges were held by the Governor General to be groundless and Jujarsing remained safe under the protection of the British Government. (5th February 1809).

No. 88—The Governor-General ratifies the treaty of Deogaon with Bhonsle; Cuttack affairs; approval of Elphinstone's appointment as Acting Resident at Nagpur till the arrival of Webbe.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

TO—THE HONOURABLE MAJOR-GENERAL WELLESLEY.

Fort William, 9th January 1804.

Your despatch dated the 17th of December 1803 enclosing the copy of a treaty of peace concluded by you on that date on the part of the Honourable Company with the Rajah of Berar, has been received and submitted to the Governor General in Council.

2. The Governor General in Council has great satisfaction in communicating to you his high approbation of the terms of peace concluded with the Rajah of Berar, which His Excellency in Council considers to be in the highest degree advantageous, honourable and glorious to the British Government.

3. The Governor General in Council discharges a satisfactory part of his duty in expressing to you the high sense which he entertains of the judgment and ability manifested by you on this occasion. The Governor General in Council considers you to have rendered an essential service to the interests of the honourable Company and to have augmented the reputation of the British name at the conclusion of this advantageous and honourable treaty.

4. The Governor General in Council has this day ratified the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Berar, and the ratified copy will be immediately despatched to the Resident at Hyderabad for the purpose of being transmitted to the Rajah of Berar through Mr. Elphinstone, whom you have appointed to act in the capacity of Resident at that Chieftain's Court.

5. The Governor General in Council now proceeds to state such observations as appear to be necessary on the several parts of your letter of the 17th of December 1803 and on the articles of the treaty.

6. The Governor General in Council entirely approves the arrangement which provides for the exclusive ratification of the treaty by the Governor General in Council. Instructions will be immediately issued to the Residents at Hyderabad and Poona directing them to communicate the treaty respectively to Their Highnesses the Soubahdar of the Dekkan and the Peshwa, and to obtain their assent to the terms of it.

7. The designation of its cessions under the treaty, jointly to the British Government and its allies, was extremely judicious, and the temporary transfer of the whole of the ceded territory situated to the westward of the Rajah of Berar's dominions to the authority of the Soubadar of the Dekkan under * * * which you propose to His Highness is entirely approved by the Governor General in Council for the reasons stated in the 4th paragraph of your dispatch.

8. The motives which induced you to confine the demand of territorial cessions on the eastern side of the Rajah of Berar's dominions to the Province of Cuttack, under a distinct provision for the confirmation of all treaties which may have been concluded with the tributaries or feudatories of the Rajah of Berar's Government, claim the entire approbation of the Governor General in Council.

The object of establishing a barrier to the frontier of Cuttack was not to be placed in competition with the inferior advantage of securing the

cession of the whole of the territory west of the river Munda, nor of sufficient importance to hazard the conclusion of the treaty on the terms to which the Rajah of Berar was disposed to accede, and you judged very properly in taking into consideration the probability of the actual conclusion of engagements between the British Government and the chieftains occupying the territory contiguous to the northern and western frontiers of Cuttack, by which that barrier would be established under the provisions of the 10th article of the treaty.

The records of the Government do not afford materials sufficient to enable the Governor General in Council to specify the exact limits of the province of Cuttack proper, nor has the Governor General received from the Commissioners for the affairs of Cuttack, the details of their negotiations with the tributary Chieftains on the frontier of that province. The Commissioners have therefore been directed to communicate to you an accurate statement of the limits of the province, to transmit to you copies of the engagements which may have been concluded with any of those tributary chieftains, and to apprise you of the progress of any depending negotiations with Chieftains of that description.

9. It is not the wish of the Governor General in Council to take advantage of the provisions of that article for the purpose of reducing the extent of the Rajah of Berar's dominion, beyond the degree necessary to maintain the obligation of our public faith with those Chieftains who have solicited the protection of the British Government; on the other hand, it is incumbent on the British Government to provide for the security of those Chieftains who have manifested a disposition to connect their interests with those of the Honourable Company against the effects of the Rajah of Berar's resentment.

10. In cases in which the progress of the negotiation at the period of time when the Commissioners for the affairs of Cuttack received official intelligence of the conclusion of peace with the Rajah of Berar, may have extended to the acceptance of proposals, on the part of any of those chieftains, for the transfer of their allegiance to the British Government without the actual conclusion of reciprocal engagements, the Governor General in Council is decidedly of opinion that the operation of the 10th article of the treaty should be admitted.

11. The Governor General in Council accordingly directs that in specifying the names of those chieftains who are to be admitted to the benefits of the provisions of the 10th article of the treaty, you will be regulated by the application of the principles above stated to the communications which you will receive from the Commissioners for the affairs of Cuttack, with respect to the state of their negotiations with the tributary chieftains on the frontier of that province.

12. Several pergunnahs situated within the province of Midnapore were subject to the authority of the Rajah of Berar, and since the occupation

of the province of Cuttack by the British Power engagements have been concluded with the zamindars of those pergunnahs.

13. As dependancies of Balasore at which place the revenues of them were paid, those pergunnahs might justly be considered to be ceded under the spirit of the stipulations of the 2nd article of the treaty—but although this constructions of the 2nd article of the treaty should be disputed, those pergunnahs will necessarily be placed under the authority of the British Government by the letter and spirit of the 10th article.

14. The District of Morebunje with its dependent zamindaries was also subject to the authority of the Fouzdar of Balasore to whom the revenue of that district was paid; proposals of submission to the British authority were made by the zamindar of Morebunje at an early period of time, and engagements have since been concluded with that zamindari.

That district together with its dependencies and generally all districts either included within the area of Cuttack or dependent on Balasore, must also be considered to be ceded to the British Government under the preceding construction of the 2nd and 10th articles of the Treaty.

15. The district of the....., the revenue or tribute at Balasore are enumerated in the margin* to the letter of which the records of the case afford information and the names of some of those districts may however have been omitted. The Governor General in Council therefore deems it more advisable to depend on the general description than on the detailed enumeration of them.

16. The Rajahs of Sonapore and Boad sometime since dispatched vakeels to the Commissioners for the affairs of Cuttack with proposals to become tributary to the British Government, and preliminary engagements on the basis of those proposals were actually adjusted between the Commissioners and the vakeels of those chieftains. The detail of the progress of those negotiations which you will receive from the Commissioners, will enable you to judge whether under the general principles stated in the (9th and 10th) paragraphs of the letter, those engagements should be confirmed by the provisions of the 10th article of the treaty of peace. The same observations are applicable to several of the hill Rajahs on the north-western frontier of the province of Cuttack.

17. Previously to the occupation of the province of Cuttack by the British Power the Governor General addressed a letter to Obhirsingh, the Rajah of Singboom (a territory situated on the south-western bank of the Soobanreka and contiguous to Morebunje) who has long since withdrawn himself from the authority of the Marhattah Government

*Pergannahs on the n. en. side of the Soobanreka, Petaspore Bhogran Comarda Shahbunder Kya Chund Dist. S. W. of the Soobanreka, Morebunje and its dependant zamindaries.

to which he was nominally subject, offering to him the protection of the British Government. The Rajah of Singboom having accepted the offer, by a letter which he addressed to the Acting Magistrate of Midnapore, must be considered to be entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the 10th article of the treaty.

18. The Governor General in Council understands that there are a few inconsiderable districts or pergunnahs interspersed within the limits of the zamindaries of Morebunje and Keunjur and their dependencies, the proprietors of which have in a similar manner established their independence; although these districts or pergunnahs may not be considered to be dependent on any of the territories ceded to the Hon'ble Company by the treaty with the Rajah of Berar, the admission of a claim on the part of the Rajah of Berar to exercise authority over any of the districts or pergunnahs so situated would be manifestly inconsistent with the spirit and intent of the 2nd article of the treaty; such a claim would perhaps be most effectually precluded by defining the western boundary of the territory to be ceded between the province of Sambalpur and the Soobanreka.

19. You are apprized of the instructions which were issued to Lieutenant Colonel Broughton (the officer to whom the arrangements for the defence of the western frontier of Bengal were entrusted) for the conclusion of engagements of alliance with the Chiefs of Rattanpore, Ryelin and Sambalpur and other Maratha chieftains occupying the territory contiguous to that frontier. The state of the negotiations with those chieftains at the date of our latest advices from that officer is described in the annexed copy of his dispatch of the 26th ultimo.

20. Lieut.-Colonel Broughton has been directed to cease the prosecution of any further measures of hostility against the dominions of the Rajah of Berar, but at the same time to continue in the position which he may occupy at the period of his receipt of these orders until furnished with the further instructions of Government subsequently to the ratification of the treaty by the Rajah of Berar, unless the state of the troops under his command should render it necessary to withdraw them. Lieut.-Colonel Broughton has also been directed not to enter into any new engagements of a nature hostile to the rights and interests of the Rajah of Berar, and to endeavour to communicate to you and to Mr. Elphinstone by a direct route any such engagements as he may have contracted with any of the dependants of the Marhatta Power together with the names and description of such dependants, transmitting to the Residency a copy of his despatch which will be immediately forwarded to you and to Mr. Elphinstone by the route of Hyderabad.

21. If Lieut.-Colonel Broughton's negotiations should not have proceeded beyond the extent described in the annexed copy of his dispatch of the 26th of December 1803, the Governor General in Council will

consider the case of those chieftains to whom that dispatch refers to be subject to the operation of the 10th article of the treaty. In that event however the Governor General in Council deems it to be a duty incumbent on the British Government to require, that the Rajah of Berar shall engage to refrain from molesting any of those chieftains on account of the disposition which they have manifested to support our cause, and it should be distinctly understood by the Rajah of Berar, that his disregard of that engagement at any future period of time will be considered to justify the British Government in affording its protection to those chieftains against the effects of his resentment and in placing them in the condition of tributaries to the Honourable Company. The same course should be observed in all cases of a similar nature.

22. The Governor General in Council entirely approves the arrangement which leaves the fort of Nurnalla and Gawilgarh with a contiguous territory in the possession of the Rajah of Berar, for the reason stated in 11th and 12th paragraphs of your despatch.

23. The 7th Article of the treaty which provides for the general mediation and arbitration of the British Government between the Rajah of Berar and our allies, is extremely judicious, highly advantageous to our interests and those of our allies, and honourable to the character of the British Government.

24. A doubt has been suggested to the Governor General in Council with regard to the construction of the Persian and Marhatta transcripts of the 8th article of the treaty, which may be interpreted to limit the exclusion of subjects of France as well as those of other European states from the service of the Rajah of Berar, to the case of the existence of war between the British Government and any of the states. By the term of the English transcript of that article the exclusion of French subjects from the service of the Rajah of Berar appears to be absolute. The object of this article would perhaps have been more completely attained by the absolute exclusion of all Europeans from the service of the Rajah. The result of the war however greatly diminishes the importance of this object, and the Governor General in Council deems it too inconsiderable to hazard the inconvenience which might result from requiring a modification of the terms of that article previously to the ratification and exchange of the treaty. It may however be admissible to ascertain the Rajah of Berar's construction of that article of the treaty, but without impeding the delivery of the ratified copy. If it should be thought necessary a modification of the 8th article may be hereafter proposed to the Rajah, whose ready acquiescence may be reasonably expected.

25. The Governor General in Council is decidedly of opinion that the concessions which have been obtained from the Rajah of Berar are amply sufficient for every purpose of security and retributive justice to the British Government and its allies, and to be entirely conformable

to the general spirit and principles of the Governor General's instructions with regard to the terms of pacification with that Chieftain.

26. The Governor General in Council entirely approves of your intention to dispatch the Honourable Mr. Elphinstone* to the Rajah of Berar to act in the capacity of Resident at that Chieftain's Court until the arrival of Mr. Webb.†

27. The Governor General in Council has great satisfaction in expressing upon this occasion the high sense which he entertains of the zeal, abilities and services of Mr. Elphinstone during his attendance upon you in the field. The Governor General will readily avail himself of any opportunity of rewarding the merits of Mr. Elphinstone by appointing him to a situation which may enable that gentleman to acquire additional honour in the employment of his distinguished zeal and talents in the promotion of the public service.

28. You will be pleased to communicate to Mr. Elphinstone this recorded approbation of his public conduct.

No. 89—Invitation to the feudatories of the Bhonsle, (Rajas of Sambalpur, Sonapur and Bana) to come under British protection and throw off their allegiance to the Marathas.

FROM—LIEUT.-COL. GEORGE HARCOURT, COMMANDING THE BRITISH TROOPS IN THE SUBAH OF AUDEIN AND COMMISSIONER FOR THE AFFAIRS OF THE SAID SUBAH AND MR. JOHN MELVILLE, COMMISSIONERS FOR THE AFFAIRS OF AUDEIN.
TO—JAYT SING, RAJAH OF THE TRACT OF SAMBALPUR AND PURTY SING, RAJAH OF THE TRACT OF SOHENPUR AND JAGAT ISHWAR, RAJAH OF THE FORT OF BANA.

13th December 1803.

(After Compliments.)

You will have no doubt heard that His Excellency the Governor General in Council has been pleased to appoint us, Lieut.-Colonel George Harcourt commanding the British Troops in the Subah of Audain and Mr. John Melville, Commissioners for the affairs of the said Subah. As the boundary of this Subah and your country are near each other, and as you are the principal Rajah of those provinces, we are desirous of establishing such a friendship with you as will prohibit the idea of our

*Elphinstone's permanent post was that of Secretary to the Residency of Nagpore. His salary was Rs. 1,500 per mensem—(Ed.)
Webbe was afterwards deputed as Resident at Sindia's Court. Jenkins who was Webbe's assistant reports Webbe's death on 9th November 1804, Jenkins assuming his charge—(Ed.)

Jan. refers to be in that event fully incumbent on us shall engage account of the and it should regard of that need to justify those chieftains the condition we should be approves the with for the the general in the Rajah analogous to character of

being on any other footing. Such an alliance will be a great advantage to you while this is an assistance to us. The strict adherence of the Honourable Company to the alliances they form, and their fulfilment of engagement once entered into, is known to all the world and no doubt you are acquainted with it. If therefore you will establish a friendship with them you may expect to derive substantial advantages therefrom. It would not be proper in us to receive any nuzzarana or other present from you more than customary from friends, as what may be necessary to draw your esteem for the Company, but if you will send five gold Mohurs annually it will be received. In order that the friendship which we have thus laid a foundation for, should be permanently and firmly established between both parties, we enclose you two contracts. One in the name of the Company to you which we have signed, and another from you to the Company. Should you keep possession of the one signed by us and return the other with your signature, our friendship is firmly established, and from the moment you sign the enclosed contract you may consider yourself as an ally of the Honourable Company and desist from paying the tribute which you formerly paid to the Marhattas, and on no account pay them that due for the last and present years.

The Honourable Company will not require any other consideration for their friendship or protection.

If you send a vakil here he shall receive a dress with which we beg leave to present you.

No. 90—The Commissioners for the affairs of Cuttack send a list of the tributaries of Cuttack and the limits of that province.

FROM—COMMISSIONERS, CUTTACK,

TO—MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,

19th January 1804.

We have had the honour to acquaint you that His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General has been pleased to communicate to us a copy of the treaty of peace, concluded by you on the part of the Honourable East India Company and its allies with the Rajah of Berar on the 17th December 1803.

2. His Excellency has been pleased to direct our particular attention to the second article of that treaty by which the province of Cuttack and the part and district of Balasore are ceded in perpetual sovereignty to

the Honourable Company, and for the purpose of specifying the territories ceded in perpetuity by that article, His Excellency has commanded us to afford you all the information we are possessed of respecting the limits of Cuttack proper and of Balasore with its dependencies.

3. With the view to the execution of the 10th article of the treaty wherein it is stipulated by the Honourable Major-General Wellesley that a list of the names of such dependants and tributaries to the Rajah of Berar, who may have concluded engagements with the British authorities during the late contest, shall be delivered to the Rajah of Berar after the treaty shall have been ratified by His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General in Council, His Excellency has been further pleased to command us to forward to you a list of those tributary chieftains whose possessions are not within the limits of Cuttack proper, with whom we have either begun or concluded engagements, for the transfer of their allegiance to the British Government; and to communicate to you the state of our negotiations with any such persons at the period of time when we received the intelligence of the treaty of the peace with the Rajah of Berar.

4. In obedience to the commands of His Excellency contained in the 2nd paragraph of this letter, we feel happy at being able to state that the boundaries of few countries are better known or more distinctly marked than those of the province of Cuttack, nor has the conquest of any country or the obedience of its subjects been more completely or unequivocally established.

5. The province of Cuttack includes the part and districts of Balasore—Balasore being a sub-division of the province.

6. The country called by the Maharrattas the subah of Cuttack comprises two kinds of possessions, one of which is distinguished by the name of *Mogulbandi*, the second by that of *Gurjat**; the first was considered actually in the possession of the Government as a royal domain, as lands held direct from Government, without any intermediate superior; the second held by tributary chieftains paying a stipulated revenue to Government, and who are the intermediate superiors between the Government and the tenant of the soil.

7. The boundaries of these united possessions are—to the eastward the sea, to the westward the Maharratta province of Chhattisgarh, to the southward the Chilka lake and the Ganjam district; and to the northward the districts of Jellasore and Midnapore and the province of (Bengal).

8. Within the undoubted limits and actually under the acknowledged authority of Cuttack, beginning at Gumsoor (an ancient possession of the British Government in the Northern sircar) and proceeding towards the British province of (Bengal), in the Gurjat possessions of (1st) Khorda,

* Gurjat means estates in the hilly country of Orissa (Wilson).

(2nd) Daspalla; (3rd) Angul; (4th) Hindol; (5th) Dhenkanal, which last joins the independent territories (6th) Baany, Banswa, and (7th) Koonpur. 9. We do not conceive it necessary to submit to you any observations regarding the * * * territory and its dependancies, as they have been so correctly detailed in His Excellency's despatch to your address of the 9th instant.

10. The tributary landholders whose lands are situated within the undoubted limits of the subah of Cuttack, as detailed in the 8th paragraph of this letter, have long since done homage to our Government; and with almost all of them particular engagements have been formally executed; those which remain unsettled, being only delayed by necessary investigation and explanation; we beg to notice in passing that it was not because it appeared to us that particular engagements were necessary to ensure their allegiance or obedience, but that we considered the measure as a guard against future misunderstandings on both sides.

11. The independent Rajah of Koonpur is a ruler of part of the Mogulbandi territory in Cuttack, and should undoubtedly be included under the provisions of the 2nd and 10th articles of the treaty of Deogaon, as we are hardly effecting his agreement to become a tributary for the whole of his possessions in consequence of the arrangements we have proposed to him.

12. We now beg leave to proceed to the consideration of the subject contained in the 3rd paragraph of this letter, regarding the arrangements we have begun or concluded with chieftains tributary to the Rajah of Berar whose possessions, though not included within the subah of Cuttack proper, yet appear to come within the provisions of the 10th article of the treaty; these consist of the Rajahs of Boad, Ramgurn, Sonapur and Sambalpore, and their territories are within the Chhattisgarh province immediately on the western frontier as boundary of Cuttack, towards the Maratha dominions.

13. The grounds upon which we conceive them as coming within the provisions of the 10th article of that treaty are as follows.

14. On the 14th November Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt received information from Major Forbes, then commanding a detachment stationed at the * * * , that Vakeels had arrived in his camp from Boad and Ramgurn requesting to be made acquainted with, and promising on the part of the chiefs whom they represented, to obey all such orders as he might please to give them.

15. On the 17th November Vakeels reached Major Forbes from Sonapur with a similar application on the part of the Rane * * * the Rajah Prithising being in confinement at Nagpur.

16. To each of the Vakeels Major Forbes delivered a proclamation founded on the instructions of His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor

General to the officer commanding the troops in the province of Cuttack, copy of which is enclosed (No. 1), and the Vakeels were told by Major Forbes that he would acquaint the chief authority in Cuttack with the offers of obedience and solicitations for protection tendered by those Vakeels from Sonopore, Boad and Ramgur, and that when he received answers to those communications, he would acquaint them with it.

17. The Vakeels sent by Lieut.-Colonel Harcourt to Boad are at present residing at that place where the Rajah treats them with every kindness, a copy of a letter received from that Chief, is also enclosed (No. 5) by which his desire to be taken under the protection of the British Government is sufficiently proved.

19. No answers or reports have been received either from Sonopore or Ramgur, but the application of the chief authorities in those districts, addressed to Major Forbes by vakeels sent for the express purpose of soliciting the protection of the British Government, and on the receipt of which the papers referred to in the 17th paragraph of this letter were immediately despatched by special messengers or vakeels from Cuttack, entitles the Sonopore and the Ramgur chiefs to the protection they solicited if it should be considered desirable to extend it to them.

20. The official intelligence of the conclusion of peace with the Rajah of Berar was received in Cuttack the 14th January, subsequent to the receipt of despatches from Major Broughton dated the 3rd January announcing the conquest of Sambalpur, and the submission of the district of Sonopore to the British detachment under the command of that officer. 21. It appears to us expedient to observe to you that the district of Singbhum which has been long in our possession, is not included in the subah of Cuttack, and would therefore require being particularly specified. 22. Although it may not be particularly required by you, we have nevertheless thought it advisable to enclose to you (No. 6) a complete list of all the tributaries within the undoubted limits of the province of Cuttack.

No. 91—Notes from the Governor General for Mr. Elphinstone on the subject of compensation to the Raja of Nagpur for losses incurred by him in the last war.

FROM—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL,
TO—THE RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

3rd September 1804.

The Rajah of Berar having now formally renounced all claim whatever to the restoration of Sambalpur and to his dominion, and having admitted

the justice of the principles which have regulated the conduct of the British Government with regard to that question, the Governor-General in Council authorises Mr. Elphinstone to know the discussion on the subject of compensation to the Rajah of Berar for the loss both of revenue and of dominion by the separation of Sambalpur from his territory. The only practicable compensation is the grant of an annual sum of money together with certain privileges, distinctions or immunities at the principal Hindoo places of worship within the British dominions. The pecuniary compensation to be annual, to be regulated in some degree by the amount of revenue which the Rajah of Berar usually derived from the Provinces and tributaries separated from his dominion by the operation of the treaty of Deogaon, but to exceed that amount considerably. The pecuniary compensation may exceed the total amount of that revenue to the extent of one lack of rupees.

The payment to be made annually to the Rajah of Berar at fixed period by the British Resident. The information furnished by Colonel Broughton relative to the revenue of Sambalpur and Patna, etc., to be communicated to Mr. Elphinstone, and the Commissioners at Cuttack to be required to furnish this Government and Mr. Elphinstone with all the information they possess or can acquire, relative to the tribute formerly paid to the Maratha Government by the tributary chiefs not included in the province of Cuttack with whom they contracted engagements. Mr. Elphinstone to ascertain with the utmost practicable accuracy from the records of the Rajah of Berar or from other sources of information, the amount of revenue derived from the provinces above described. To communicate the result of his enquiries to Government with a view to enable Government to determine the amount of pecuniary compensation to be made to the Rajah. Mr. Elphinstone at the same time to state the amount which he has reason to believe, will be considered by the Rajah of Berar to be a satisfactory compensation, combined with the proposed privileges at the places of Hindoo worship. The payment

be advisable to consider a mode of compensating the Rajah's ministers in the same manner as pursued by Major Malcolm at the Durbar of Sindia; Mr. Elphinstone at liberty to enter also (into negotiations) on this subject, and to promise pensions to the ministers not exceeding on the whole the total amount of (). The privilege proposed to be granted to the Rajah of Berar at the principal places of Hindoo worship within the Company's dominions is that of granting exemptions from the payment of duties upon pilgrims to these places of devotion to a certain number of persons

The places of Hindoo worship at which it is proposed to grant the exemption, are Jagannat, Gya and Illahabad and to these may be added Muttra, if duties are usually levied there. At Benares no duties upon

pilgrims are levied, but any reasonable privilege which the Rajah may desire may be granted at that place.

If the Rajah accept the privilege of granting exemption in the manner described, it will be necessary to impose some restraint on the abuse of that privilege. For that purpose, the Resident should grant passes (according to a form which will be transmitted) for the number of persons to be exempted at one and the same time, and the production of these passes to the collector of the duties at the several places of Hindoo worship shall constitute an authority for the exemption of those persons from the payment of duties.

No papers to be granted to more than () persons at one time. These restrictions to be communicated to the Rajah of Berar at the time of offering the proposed privilege, as they may probably affect his sense of the value of that privilege.

Mr. Elphinstone to repeat to the Rajah of Berar that the British Government would readily restore the provinces of Sambalpur and Patna to the dominion of the Rajah of Berar, and the tributaries, with whom we have contracted engagements which are confirmed by the treaty of Deogoon, to their former connection with the Rajah of Berar's Government, if that measure were not absolutely precluded by the obligation of our public faith. But that under the necessity of maintaining the engagements by which these provinces, etc., have been separated from the Rajah's dominion, the British Government is anxious to afford to the Rajah of Berar every reasonable and practicable compensation.

It is the intention of the British Government to declare the provinces and tributaries above described as now placed under the protection and authority of the British Government in conformity to the tenor of the engagements, concluded with the persons exercising the authority in those provinces and with those tributaries, and the British Government will consequently consider itself at liberty to adopt all such measures with respect to those provinces and tributaries as may be consistent with the relation in which they are placed towards the British Government by the tenor of their engagements.

The Rajah of Berar should be distinctly apprized that any attempt on his part to disturb those provinces and tributaries will be followed by the immediate loss of the proposed compensation in all its branches, including the proposed privileges and distinctions.

In such an event the annual payment will be suspended and the proposed privileges will be revoked.

In addition to which circumstances a great risk will be incurred of an interruption of the peace and amity now subsisting between the two States.

Mr. Elphinstone to apprise the Rajah immediately on the receipt of these notes, of the determination of the British Government to grant him compensation and of the proposed nature of that compensation, and to enter into the discussion of that subject for the purpose of adjusting the preliminary points upon which its ultimate adjustment depends.

And Mr. Elphinstone is at liberty actually to conclude (subject to the notification of the Governor-General in Council) such of the articles of the proposed arrangement as may appear to him to admit of an early conclusion, always conforming to the principles stated in these notes.

On the other hand, if the present temper of the Rajah or of his Durbār as connected with the state of affairs relating to Holkar or Sindia, should appear to Mr. Elphinstone to render this communication liable to misconstruction, Mr. Elphinstone will exercise his discretion in suspending it to a more seasonable opportunity.

No. 92—The Governor General asks the Resident to secure the enlargement of the Rajas of Sambalpur and Sonpur from their confinement at Nagpur.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,
TO—THE RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

Fort William, 20th February 1805.

In the 21st paragraph of the paper of notes under date the 2nd November which was transmitted to you by the command of His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor-General, you were instructed to endeavour to frame some arrangement to procure the enlargement of the Rajahs of Sambalpur and Sonpur, who are understood to be retained in confinement at Nagpur.

2. It appears from the communications of Lieutenant-Colonel Broughton that the enlargement of those persons is an object of much anxiety to their respective subjects, and it is Lieutenant-Colonel Broughton's opinion that that measure would be attended with beneficial effects. The Governor-General in Council is therefore pleased to desire you will endeavour to carry the instructions above referred to into effect with the least practicable delay.

3. Maharage Sahy, the son of the Rajah of Sonpur, is also said to be in confinement at Nagpur. His Excellency desires that you will consider the above order to be applicable to the case of Maharage Sahy also.

4. You will probably have been informed by Lieutenant Colonel Broughton of the appearance in Sambalpur of a young man who assumes the name and character of Maharage Sahy, but whom Lieutenant-Colonel Broughton suspects to be an impostor.

No. 93—The Governor General asks Capt. Roughsedge to open negotiations with the zamindars of Sambalpur and Patna in order to be able to restore these districts to the Raja of Nagpur.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,

TO—CAPT. ROUGHSEDGE.

Bankipore, 12th September 1805.

The share which you had in the proceedings of Colonel Broughton on our western frontier, your personal acquaintance and communication with the principals or agents of those chieftains and zamindars formerly under the dominion of the Raja of Berar, with whom Colonel Broughton concluded engagements on the part of the British Government, and your general knowledge, experience and abilities have induced the Governor-General to direct me to consult with you on the practicability of accomplishing an arrangement with those chieftains and zamindars, which will admit of our restoring eventually to the Raja of Berar the districts of Sambalpur and Patna without compromising our public faith.

2. It is unnecessary to explain to you the considerations which render the Governor-General extremely anxious to have it in his power to restore these possessions. It is sufficient for the purposes of this letter to state that His Lordship is so, and that under present circumstances he would consider that object to be chiefly attained by the sacrifice of a considerable annual sum of money or by grants of land, applied to the purpose of compensating the chiefs and zamindars with whom we have contracted engagements for the loss of their respective tenures, if they should be unwilling to maintain them under the Maharratta Government, or for the deterioration of their condition by the transfer of the provinces of Sambalpur and Patna to the authority of the Raja of Berar, if they should be disposed to remain in the occupation of their respective territories.

3. The engagements having been contracted with the chiefs and zamindars personally, and extending no further on our part than to preclude us from placing them again under the dominion of the Maharrattas without their consent, it may perhaps be a question whether we are not at liberty to restore the territory which they occupy to the Maharratta Government

even without the consent of those chiefs and zamindars, provided we offer them a reasonable compensation as above described and afford them in their own persons the stipulated protection. But whatever may be the merits of this question it is not the wish of the Governor-General to proceed at present upon that principle. His Lordship wishes that the suggested arrangement should be the result of a negotiation between the British Government and the other parties to the existing engagements. It remains therefore to state some general remarks relative to the detail of the proposed arrangement and to the mode of conducting such a negotiation.

4. The Governor-General is well aware of the decided aversion of all these chiefs and zamindars to the Government of the Maharrattas, and His Lordship concludes that no degree of pecuniary compensation, no promises of security against the vengeance of the Maharratta Government, although guaranteed by the British Government, would induce the chiefs and zamindars voluntarily to return under the dominion of the Maharrattas, and that rather than submit to the Maharratta authority they would abandon their tenures and retire within the limits of the Company's territory. That asylum the Governor-General would readily consent to afford them, granting them a reasonable compensation either in land or money as might be found most practicable and convenient. The amount of compensation must be regulated principally by the estimated extent of the profits which these chiefs and zamindars derive from their respective tenures, but it ought not to be limited to that extent, unless they should be content to accept it as an equivalent for what they may resign. The Governor-General trusts that it would not be difficult to fix the amount of compensation if the chiefs and zamindars should consent to the general principle of the arrangement.

5. His Lordship now wishes that you should, without delay, proceed to open a negotiation with these persons upon the principles which have been stated, unless any insuperable or very material obstacles and objections to the measure should occur to you, in which event you will state them for the consideration of His Lordship and await his final orders.

6. Perhaps the most expeditious and convenient mode of commencing such a negotiation would be by employing the services of Ferzund Ali, Colonel Broughton's agent now at Sambalpoore. This point however His Lordship leaves to your judgment and discretion, and you may consider yourself authorized immediately on the receipt of this letter to proceed upon the execution of this duty without further reference, unless you should deem such a reference to be necessary. But you will of course communicate to me without delay for the information of the Governor-General, the mode in which you propose to prosecute this negotiation, together with your sentiments upon the subject of the proposed arrangement. The Governor-General will be glad to be enabled to

communicate to the Rajah of Berar at the earliest practicable period of time, his intentions with regard to Sambalpur and Patna, if there should be any probability of success in the accomplishment of the proposed arrangement. In the meantime a copy of this letter will be despatched to the Resident at Nagpur for his information with regard to the Governor-General's wishes and intentions in favour of the Rajah of Berar.

No. 94—Cornwallis, the new Governor General, explains his policy of non-interference and expresses his intention of compensating the Bhonsle for the loss of his possessions. (See Lord Minto's letter dated 11th July 1808).

FROM—LORD CORNWALLIS, GOVERNOR GENERAL,

TO—RAJA RAGHUVI BHONSLE.

Fort William, 18th September 1805.

I reflect with great degree of gratification and pleasure upon the perfect harmony and cordial attachment, which I had the happiness to establish and maintain during my former administration of the Company's affairs in this country between the British Government and the State of Berar.

This reflection excites in my mind a sincere solicitude for your welfare and prosperity and a proportionate degree of regret at the occurrence of those events which have unavoidably occasioned the alienation of a portion of your ancient dominions.

You cannot be ignorant of the general principles which governed my conduct towards all the states of Hindustan and the Deccan during the period of my former administration. It was the uniform maxim of my Government to cultivate the friendship and confidence of, surrounding states by abstaining from any encroachments upon their rights, privileges and independence, and from all interference whatever in their internal concerns and in their transactions with each other, and by promoting the adjustment of all depending questions upon principles of justice, equity and moderation, to refrain from the prosecution of any views of conquest or extension of dominion, and to limit my attention to the internal prosperity of the Company's subjects. I have returned to this country with a resolution to regulate every act of my administration by the same just and moderate principles. The States which are disposed to remain upon terms of amity with the British Government and to abstain from the prosecution of designs injurious to its interests, will have no cause

to apprehend any design on our part, to establish over them any degree of control, or to interfere in any manner in their internal concerns.

Confiding in your disposition to maintain the amicable relations with the British Government, my attention has been directed to the means of compensating to the utmost practicable extent for the losses you have sustained, although the consequence of your joining in an hostile confederacy against the British * * * and you will be apprised by the Resident that I have actually adopted measures with a view to enable me to make that compensation to the utmost extent practicable, consistently with equity and with the indispensable obligations of public faith.

It will be evident to you however that these favourable intentions must be completely frustrated by any indication on your part, of a design to favour or assist the cause of the enemies of the British Government. I have lately received intelligence of some circumstances which justify a doubt of your intention in this respect. These circumstances will be stated to you by the Resident. It is sufficient for me to intimate that the British Government must consider you to be responsible for the conduct of all your relations, subjects and servants so far as it respects the British Government or its allies, and that every ground of doubt and suspicion must be completely removed before the favourable intentions which I have announced to you, can be carried into effect.

I trust however that the sentiments and intentions stated in this despatch together with your knowledge of the principles which have uniformly regulated my conduct in the administration of the Company's affairs, will convince you of my sincere disposition to establish and maintain the relations of harmony and friendship upon the foundations of mutual confidence, justice, equity and public faith.

For further communication I refer you to the representations of the Resident.

No. 95—Capt. Roughsedg reports the progress of negotiations for the evacuation of Sambalpur and Patna.

FROM—CAPT. E. ROUGHSEDEGE,

TO—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT.

Sambalpur, 10th March 1806.

1. I have delayed for some days to report to you for the information of the Honourable the Governor General in Council the state of affairs

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at this place, in the hope of being honoured with the commands of Government on the subject of my several despatches.

2. It is with regret however I now find myself compelled to submit the failure of all my attempts to prevail on several of the dependent zemindars of Sambalpur to consent to the arrangement desired by Government, and I am sorry to be obliged to include in this number Rajah Jujar Sing, zemindar of Ryghur, a person whose attachment to the British interests and services with Colonel Broughton, have been repeatedly brought within the notice of Government.

3. His aversion to quit his native country is not more insurmountable than his reluctance voluntarily to return under the Maharatta authority, and the combination of these two sentiments has apparently driven him to the wild and desperate resolution of attempting to defend his country in conjunction with all who may be similarly disposed, against any attempts of the troops of the Raja of Berar to regain possession.

4. It is difficult to say to what lengths this determination may carry the Rajah and his confederates, and although I have no positive grounds of suspicion, it would not, I confess, surprize me to witness an attempt on their part to gain possession of the fort of Sambalpur and the person of the Rane who continues, I am happy to say, steadfast to her original engagements with me.

5. As I consider it absolutely necessary to guard as much as possible against such an event, I have deemed it inexpedient to discharge for the present the body of irregulars, and should any further ground of suspicion arise, it is also my intention to detain here as long as may be indispensably necessary, the detachment of Sipahs under Lt. Lloyd whose arrival may be looked for on the 20th instant.

6. I trust when the importance of preventing the scene of uproar and confusion which must follow their occupation of the fort and possession of the person of the Rane is considered, that these measures may meet with the approbation of Government.

7. I had for many days strong hopes of ultimately gaining the consent of Rajah Jujar Sing to the arrangement desired by Government, and it was not without sincere concern that I found myself obliged, after urging every argument that might convince, and trying every channel that could influence him, to relinquish this expectation.

8. In announcing to me his final determination not to quit Ryghur, he added, that the short experience he had of the system and principles of the British Government, whilst it increased his regret for the approaching loss of its protection, had not failed to create in his mind a thorough confidence in my assurance of a liberal and permanent provision for himself and dependants, and the consent required from him, but that no advantage, however great and flattering, could compensate in his opinion

and that of his family for the unhappiness and indeed disgrace which could not fail to be the result of their quitting Ryghur; he concluded by saying that as he was inflexibly determined no more to return under the authority of the Maharrattas, he looked forward solely to the strength of his country and his own exertions for protection, and if disappointed in these hopes, that it was his determination to destroy himself and family.

9. How far the approach of a Maharratta force and the formal cession of this country on the part of the British Government would tend to alter these resolutions, I cannot pretend to say, but a thorough knowledge of the disposition and views of Rajah Jujar Singh authorizes me to assure you that no temptation in the present state of things would be strong enough to induce him to quit Ryghur.

10. Under this conviction I deemed it advisable after expressing my regret at his unwise determinations to point out his inability to resist a Maharratta force and the necessity of his eventual submission to the authority of the Rajah of Berar, adding that I was persuaded the British Government, holding in remembrance his past services, would not fail to recommend him forcibly to the forgiveness and favour of that Court, if he should be desirous of its interposition.

11. To this offer he appeared to pay but little attention and disclaiming confidence in the promises of the Maharrattah Government or submission to its authority, he shortly after retired.

12. The great influence of Rajah Jujar Singh in Sambalpoore has rendered his refusal, I am sorry to say, materially detrimental to the success of my mission with other zemindars, one of whom Diwan Subsing of Suctee has also given a decided negative, and I much fear that the ultimate answer of the proprietors of Sonopore and Seracole which I expect to-morrow, will be of a similar nature; of the remaining zemindars of Saranghur and Binjur have assented to the wishes of Government, and I have great hopes that the Rajahs of Ganjpoore, Bombra and Bonei will follow their examples.

13. I had delayed transmitting to you for the approbation of the Honorable the Governor General in Council, a calculation of the several provisions in land or money which will be sufficient for the comfortable subsistence of the Chieftains of these districts and their immediate dependants, in the daily expectation of being furnished with the information from Khoorda, but the lateness of the season and the difficulty of effecting the removal of so many families in time for their settlement in that district or elsewhere before the commencement of the rainy season, oblige me no longer to postpone this statement. I have therefore the honour herewith to transmit an account for the general correctness of which I can safely vouch, of the income at present enjoyed by the several

zemin্দars, and a calculation of the several provisions to which their former services, the nature of the sacrifice required from them, the number of their dependants, and the reasonable exigencies of their rank and situation, in my humble opinion, justly entitle them to.

14. As it is possible that some of the persons who at present refuse to relinquish their tenures, may hereafter alter their inclination, I have included the whole, and I trust it may be permitted me to add that the several sums mentioned have been the result of a very minute and careful investigation from various quarters.

15. The average of the proposed provision is considerably within the amount of the present incomes of the zemin্দars, and the only material excess is in the instance of the Rajah of Patna; I trust however when the respectability of his family, which formerly possessed the whole country from Ruttanpore to Cuttack, and the fidelity of his attachment to the British Government are considered, that this will not be deemed too liberal a compensation for his relinquishment of possessions which under the protection of the British Government would doubtless have ere long been superior in value to the provision proposed for him.

16. I deem it my duty also to say a few words on the subject of the Rajah of Saranghur whose character, in the original account transmitted by Colonel Broughton to Government of the zemin্দars of Sambalpur, was painted in no favourable colours.

17. Colonel Broughton long since found reason entirely to alter his opinion of this person, with whose conduct he was thoroughly satisfied, and on the present trying occasion I have found in no other individual so firm an attachment to the British Government, and so ready an acquiescence in its wishes.

18. There are three Ranees at present in the fort of Sambalpur, one of whom as will appear from statement No. 1, has an establishment and income entirely independent of the lady at the head of affairs; she is equally attached to the British Government and on the relinquishment of her tenure, has equal claim to a compensation. I trust therefore the separate provision proposed for her may be honoured with the approbation of Government.

19. I take the liberty further to state that I have calculated the amount of the several compensations on the supposition of their being principally to consist of land, and I beg leave to assure you that to the best of my judgment if wholly of a pecuniary nature, they will not be sufficient to afford either just indemnification for the sacrifices of the zemin্দars, or to provide for that comfortable subsistence and state of respectability which, I am persuaded, it is the intention of Government to secure to them.

20. I have this instant received a letter from the Ranees of Sonopore which, I am happy to say, is expressive of her acquiescence in the wishes

of Government, but the unsteady disposition of the natives of this country, the clashing of individual interests in the families of the several Chieftains and the general fluctuation of hopes and fears at this trying juncture, render it impossible for me to become responsible for their ultimate fidelity to their engagements.

21. My present opinion is that with the exception of the zemindars of Ryghur, Suete, and Seracole, the arrangement desired by Government may be carried into effect, the conduct and services of the two latter persons, have not been such as to give them in effect any strong claims on the British Government, but with respect to Jujar Sing the case is different, and I hope to be excused in respectfully suggesting (in the event of the completion of the arrangement) the propriety of securing him by a private condition in the treaty of cession of these districts, from the resentment and oppression of the Rajah of Berar.

22. I beg leave respectfully to solicit the instructions of Government for my guidance in the event of any attempt on the part of the dissenting Chieftains to take possession of the fort and person of the Rane, as also the early decision of the Honourable the Governor General in Council on the subject of the several provisions for those who acquiesce.

23. I have given no specific assurances to any one on this head, but I have reason to believe that the parties concerned would be satisfied with, and grateful for, the amount now submitted.

24. It is to-day reported on good grounds that a considerable body of Pindaris has made its appearance in Chateesghur, and after carrying off a very valuable caravan of silks, etc., proceeding from Benares to Nagpore, and plundering two or three pergunnahs it has encamped in the neighbourhood of Ruttunpore with an intention of attacking that place; this party is supposed to have penetrated by the route of Omercuntuc from Sohagpore.

No. 96—The Governor General authorises the Resident to inform the Raja that steps have been taken to secure for him the districts east of the Wardha from the Nizam.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,

TO—THE RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

Fort William, 25th March 1806.

Your letter to my address of the 8th ultimo, intended to give cover to complimentary letters from the Rajah of Berar and his ministers to the address of the Honourable the Governor-General enclosed only a letter

from the Rajah to the address of the late Governor General Marquis Cornwallis in reply to His Lordship's of the 18th of September 1805. As you may not be in possession of a copy of that reply, I am directed to transmit one together with a translation for your information.

2. You will observe that in this letter the Rajah has distinctly declared the same expectation which his ministers have intimated to you, of obtaining the restoration of all the territory alienated from the Rajah's dominion by the result of the war, founding that expectation on an erroneous construction of the late Governor General's letter of the 18th of September.

3. The Honourable the Governor General deeming it to be of importance to resist such unreasonable expectations in the most decided manner, has addressed the enclosed letter to the Rajah, which is accompanied with copies in English and Persian for your information.

4. You will observe that the Governor General has deemed it expedient to combine with a refutation of the Rajah's unauthorised construction of the late Governor General's letter, a distinct explanation of the extent in which it is proposed to compensate for his losses, and of the measures adopted for the purpose of fulfilling that intention.

5. You will have received from Captain Roughsedge a report of the degree of success which has attended his negotiations with the zemindars of Patna, Sambapore, etc., for the surrender of their rights. When the final result of those negotiations shall be known to the Governor General in Council, instructions will be communicated to you on the subject of the transfer to the Rajah of Berar of those districts of which the zemindars shall have consented to relinquish their respective tenures. Until your receipt of such instructions, it will not be expedient that you should communicate to the Rajah any detail of Captain Roughsedge's proceedings. It will be sufficient to state generally that Captain Roughsedge has succeeded in persuading the principal zemindars to relinquish their tenures and to accept a provision within the Company's territories, and that Captain Roughsedge is continuing to prosecute his endeavours to persuade the remainder either to consent to a similar arrangement or to hold their zemindaries under the authority of the Rajah.

6. The Governor General concludes that you will have received from the Resident at Hyderabad a report of the degree of success which has attended his efforts to induce the Subadar of the Dekkan to cede his territorial rights on the east of the Warda to the Rajah of Nagpore. To provide however against the possible event of your not having received such communication, I am directed to transmit to you the enclosed extract from the Resident's report of his proceedings upon that subject under the instructions issued to him by the Governor General's authority, and a copy of the Resident's letter to my address of the 27th ultimo.

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7. The negotiation being terminated, it will be proper that you should now communicate to the Rajah the result of it. The Governor General trusts that the form of the grant to the Rajah of the districts east of the Warda, will not in his opinion detract from the value of the concession. You will receive from the Resident at Hyderabad the sundd for those districts and you will communicate with the Resident on the subject of giving possession of them to the Rajah.

8. In delivering the Governor General's letter to the Rajah, you will regulate your verbal representations to him by the spirit of its contents. The British Government has a right to expect that the Rajah of Nagpore will not only withdraw all claims and pretensions of the nature expressed in his letter to the late Governor General, but that he will receive with due sentiments of gratitude and acknowledgment the liberality which Government is disposed to extend towards him, that he will appreciate the solicitude of the British Government to improve the condition of his affairs by a just estimate of the exertions which it has employed and the sacrifices which it is disposed to submit to, for that exclusive purpose. If the Rajah should be so unreasonable as to contemplate with any other sentiments, the liberality of the British Government, it is evident that the object of that liberality will be frustrated, and the loss of dominion and revenue which the proposed arrangements will occasion, will not be compensated by any adequate advantage. If therefore the intimation of the actual and proposed concessions in the Rajah's favour should be received by him with unbecoming sentiments, you will report the circumstances of the case for the information of Government, and suspend the prosecution of any measures for the transfer of the districts which the Subadar of the Dekkan has consented to cede to the Rajah, until furnished with further instructions from the Governor General in Council.

No. 97—The Governor General asks the Resident to explain to the Rajah that the late G. G. (Cornwallis) never intended to cede to the Rajah more than Sambalpur and Patna. G. G.'s endeavour to secure for him the territory to the east of the Wardha, was only voluntary.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVT.
TO—THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR.

Fort William, 3rd May 1806.

In my letter to your address under date the 22nd ultimo acknowledging the receipt of your dispatches Nos. 12 and 13, I signified to you by direction of the Honourable the Governor General in Council that the

communication of the sentiments and final resolution of Government with respect to the subject of those dispatches, should be postponed until the receipt of an answer to the Honourable the Governor General's letter to Rajah Raggojee Bhonsla transmitted in my dispatch of the 25th March. I have however subsequently received the directions of Government to desire that you will avail yourself of an immediate opportunity, of explaining to the Rajah (what the Governor General in Council observes it would have been advisable to explain at the commencement of the discussion) that the late Governor General Marquis Cornwallis never entertained the design of ceding to the Rajah more than the provinces of Sambalpur and Patna, and that the project of obtaining for the Rajah the cession of the districts east of the Warda was voluntarily adopted by the present Governor General, and was intended to denote to the Rajah the disposition of Government to promote his prosperity in the utmost practicable degree, that the Governor General projected the attainment of this cession in addition to the districts proposed by the late Marquis Cornwallis to be ceded, under the supposition that the Rajah attached a peculiar degree of importance to the acquisition both of Sambalpur and Patna and the districts east of the Warda from their local situation as well as from considerations of extended sovereignty, not that he would estimate their value merely by their revenue. In this proposed arrangement also the Governor General had in view the discussions which took place with regard to all these districts subsequently to the conclusion of the Treaty of Deogaum, in the course of which discussions the Rajah manifested an extreme degree of anxiety for the restitution of those districts, justifying a conclusion that the Rajah would have received with gratitude the intimation of those exertions which the British Government has made and those pecuniary sacrifices to which this Government has manifested its intimation to submit, for the sole purpose of gratifying the Rajah's wishes.

No. 98—The Governor General expresses satisfaction at the Raja's acceptance of the cession of the Sambalpur and Patna. The Raja, however, declined accepting the districts east of the Wardha.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVT.
TO—THE RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

Fort William, 12th May 1806.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch, No. 15, dated the 16th ultimo.

2. The Governor General in Council has received with much satisfaction the information which your dispatch conveys, of the Rajah's acceptance of the intended cession of Sambalpur and Patna, and his concurrence in the assignment of pensions to his ministers, in a manner more consistent with the sense he should entertain of the liberality of the British Government than that in which he received the communication of the extent of the proposed cessions. In however limited a degree the Rajah may be impressed with the sentiments of gratitude on this occasion; his acceptance of the cession of Sambalpur and Patna, and his concurrence in the grant of the pensions, may be considered to constitute a certain pledge of his sincere desire to maintain the relations of amity and concord with the British Government, and a certain degree of sincerity for the continuance of that disposition and the completion of the arrangement may be expected to produce a beneficial effect upon all our political relations.

3. The Rajah's proper acceptance of our proffered liberality, therefore, is considered by the Governor General in Council to be an event of some importance, and the charge of these concessions, however considerable, appears to the Governor General in Council to be more than compensated by the advantages which they involve, not only in the point of view above described, but also in the relief which the cession of Sambalpur and Patna will afford to the British Government from the inconvenient obligation of extending its protection to those distant and unprofitable territories.

4. The tenor of your discourse to Sreedhur Pandit as described in your dispatch, is entirely approved by the Governor General in Council. 5. You will of course receive from Captain Roushdsedge regular reports of his proceedings in his negotiations with the zemindars of the districts to be ceded. Every exertion will now be employed to accelerate the departure of the zemindars who have assented to the proposed arrangement, and to expedite the actual transfer of the provinces in question to the Rajah's authority.

6. The Rajah having declined acceptance of the districts east of the Warda proposed to be ceded to him by His Highness the Soubadar of the Dekkan, the Resident at Hyderabad will be instructed to make the necessary communication to His Highness, and to drop all further proceedings upon the subject.*

7. I am directed to add that on the occasion of the cession of Sambalpur to the Rajah, Government is entitled to expect that the Rajah will release the husband and son of the Rane of Sambalpur, who are at present in confinement, the British Government engaging that they shall never return into that province, or excite disturbance in the Rajah's country, and you are accordingly desired to take an opportunity of preferring this application in the name of the Governor-General.

*These districts were later transferred to Nagpur.

No. 99—The Governor General asks the Resident to inform the Raja that he might send his officers to take charge of Sambalpur and Patna.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVT.
TO—THE RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

Fort William, 15th May 1806.

The Governor General in Council concludes that Captain Roughsedge has transmitted to you a copy of his dispatch to my address under date the 1st instant.

2. I am now directed to transmit to you for your information and guidance, a copy of the instructions which have been issued to Captain Roughsedge in reply.

3. In conformity to the intimation contained in the (7th) paragraph of those instructions, you will be pleased to request the Rajah of Berar to dispatch the officers appointed to receive charge of the provinces of Sambalpur and Patna, to the neighbourhood of Ruttunpore, with the most positive injunctions prohibiting them from entering the province of Sambalpur until they shall receive an intimation from Captain Roughsedge, that the country is in readiness to be given up. It will be proper at the same time to communicate to the Rajah the extent of the intended cession, and to settle the conditions of it. The enclosed extract from the Governor General in Council's instructions to Captain Roughsedge of the 25th of March, and copy of instructions to that officer of the 13th instant, will apprise you of the resolutions of Government with regard to Rajah Jujar Sing, the Rajah of Ryghur, whose country must be excepted from the transfer unless he should ultimately consent to accept a provision within the Company's territories, of which however at present, there is little prospect. With reference to the remarks contained in Captain Roughsedge's dispatch of the 26th ultimo, relative to the probable consequences of a premature disclosure of the resolution of Government to continue its protection to Jujar Sing, I am directed to state the opinion of the Governor General in Council that the intelligence of that resolution when communicated to the Rajah of Berar under these instructions, will not reach Sambalpur before the zemindars who are about to proceed into Cuttack, have made such progress in arrangements for their departure, as will preclude all apprehension of their retracting or of any bad consequences arising from Jujar Sing's example. You will therefore be pleased to state distinctly to the Rajah that all the zemindars with whom engagements were contracted, excepting Rajah Jujar Sing, have consented to relinquish their tenures and to accept a provision within

the Company's territories. That Jujar Sing, notwithstanding the advantageous offers made to him by the British Government, has refused to release us from our engagements. That under these circumstances, the Rajah of Berar must be sensible that we are bound to consider the territory of Rajah Jujar Sing to be subject to the British authority until his consent to accept a provision within the Company's dominion can be obtained, for which purpose the efforts of the British Government will still be continued. An engagement therefore on the part of the Rajah that no molestation shall be offered to Jujar Sing, must be rendered a condition of the transfer, and as suggested in the 10th paragraph of Captain Roughsedge's letter of the 1st instant the most positive injunctions must be issued to the Marhattah officer who may be appointed to the control of the ceded districts, to consider the territory of Rygurn in the light of a portion of the British dominions, and to refrain from interfering in any manner in the concerns of Rajah Jujar Sing.

4. The Governor General in Council is further of opinion that it will be proper to interchange written articles of engagement with the Rajah of Berar according to the following form:—

1st. Declaring that with a view to compensate in some degree to the Rajah for the losses which he has sustained in the war, the British Government has employed its endeavours to persuade all the zemindars of Sambalpoore, and Patna, and their dependancies with whom engagements were contracted, to accept a provision within the Company's territories, for the express purpose of transferring those provinces to the dominion of the Rajah of Berar without a violation of public faith, and that by this arrangement the British Government has acquired a right to transfer, and does accordingly transfer, to the Rajah of Berar, the districts communicated in a separate schedule. You will obtain the materials for the preparation of this schedule from Captain Roughsedge, who as you will observe by his instructions of this date, is directed to transmit to you a copy of the statement ordered to be prepared by the 9th paragraph of my letter to Captain Roughsedge's address of the 13th instant.

2nd. That the undermentioned districts,* the zemindari of Rajah Jujar Sing being excepted from the transfer, the Rajah engages that Rajah Jujar Sing shall on no account be molested in the possession of his territory by the Rajah's officers, and that they shall not in any manner interfere with his possession or in his concern, that they shall exact no tribute or revenue from his territory, nor exercise any authority over him and that this territory shall be considered as the territory of the Honourable Company.

*Captain Roughsedge will furnish a list of these districts if it should be necessary to designate the limits of the zemindari.

- 3rd. That the husband and son of the Rannee of Sambalpur, be released from confinement, and permitted to join their wife and mother; the British Government engaging that they shall never return into the province of Sambalpur or excite disturbances in the Rajah's territory.
5. An engagement to the above effect, should be interchanged between you and the Rajah, and be transmitted for the ratification of Government in the usual manner.
6. If the Rajah shall assent to these terms, his officers may immediately be put in possession of the districts to be ceded according to the plan proposed by Captain Roughsedge, with whom you will of course communicate without reserve upon the whole subject.
7. You will transmit to Captain Roughsedge copies of your dispatches to Government upon the subject of these instructions.

No. 100—The Governor General informs the Resident of the demurs of the zamindars of Sambalpur and Patna and of the Rannee to abandon their tenures and that therefore they have lost any claim to protection; he approves of sanads of pensions to ministers.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVT.
TO—THE RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

Fort William, 17th July 1806.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatches of the numbers and dates noted in the margin and to communicate to you the orders of the Honourable the Governor General in Council on the subjects of them.

2. The Governor General in Council entirely approves your proceedings relative to the release of the husband and son of the Rannee of Sambalpur and of the Rajah of Sonopore. You will be pleased to intimate to the Rajah that the Governor General in Council acquits him of any participation in the capricious conduct of his brother. You will further signify to him that after the earnest and long continued endeavours of the British Government and the expense which it has actually incurred and agrees permanently to incur, in persuading and inducing the zemindars of Sambalpur and Patna to relinquish their tenures for the sole purpose of transferring those possessions to the dominion of the Rajah of Berar, the release of those unfortunate captives whose continued confinement could be productive of no one benefit to Nana Sahab, is a trifling concession which Government was entitled to expect. That the cession of those provinces however being intended as a benefit to the Rajah, the British Government will not on account of the conduct

of his brother revoke its intentions. I am directed at the same time to desire that you will make another effort to obtain the release of the captives, urging the liberality of Government on this occasion as an example of justice on the part of the Rajah's brother.

3. You have been apprized by Captain Roughsedge of a renewal of the demur on the part of the Ranees of Sambalpoore and others of the zemindars to abandon their tenures. Enclosed I have the honour to transmit for your information a copy of the reply which has been addressed to Captain Roughsedge's dispatch of the 3rd instant, from which you will observe, that Government does not consider itself bound to continue its protection to the zemindars who shall depart from the obligation of their voluntary and positive engagements, and consequently that under any circumstances the provinces of Sambalpoore and Patna will be transferred to the Rajah's authority, with the exception of the territory of Rajah Jujjar Sing.

4. The Governor General in Council entirely approves your reply to Jeswant Row's report of the absurd language used by the Holkar's vakeel as described in your dispatch of the 20th ultimo.

5. The Governor General in Council approves your having granted temporary sunnuds to the ministers of the Rajah and the tenor of those sunnuds.

6. You will have received sunnuds under the seal and signature of the Governor General in Council corresponding in substance with the tenor of those which you have delivered to the ministers.

No. 101—The Resident urges upon the Rajah the desirability of releasing the Raja of Sambalpoore and his son.

FROM—MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

TO—THE SECRETARY TO GOVT.

Nagpur, 17th July 1806.

Since my last letter I had the honour to receive despatches from Captain Roughsedge containing accounts of the reluctance shown by the Rani of Sambalpoore to quit her country before her husband shall have been released. Conceiving this a fit occasion for renewing the negotiations respecting Sambalpoore, I.....sent for Yeshwant Rao, and after explaining to him my conviction that you retained your original desire to relieve the Rajah's losses without being offended at the conduct of his brother, I proceeded to acquaint him with what had passed at Sambalpoore, and to point out the little probability there was of that province being restored unless the Rajas were released, and the reason there was to think that the restoration of it on any terms would be attended with great difficulty.

unless advantage were taken of the resolution of the zamindars to quit it before they had time to alter their intentions. I also dwell on the impolicy of losing so valuable a possession for the sake of detaining three helpless men in confinement, and concluded by requesting that the Rajah might be apprised of the situation of affairs to the end that he might not impute the consequences of any longer delay to me. Yeshwant Rao repeated what he had often before said and what I think most probable, that the Rajah was as anxious as I could be for the release of the zamindars, but that Nana Sahab's resolutions could not be altered, particularly in a case when he could hope to diminish the friendship which subsisted between his brother and the English. He promised that the Rajah should exert himself to bring about the arrangement I desired.

Next morning I received a note saying that the Rajah was desirous of being assured that one Govinda (who I believe was Dewan of Sonapore) would not be claimed; that His Highness was anxious for a speedy answer and would let me know the result in the evening. I immediately stated that I had no orders regarding Govinda or any person except the 3 Rajahs whom I named, and as the Rajah appeared to entertain sanguine hopes I expected soon to have heard of his success. I however heard nothing more till the 14th, when having occasion to go to the Durbar I took the opportunity to ask Shreedhar Pandit whether anything was determined about Sambalpur, to which he only answered that the Rajah's endeavours to prevail on his brother were unremitting, though hitherto unsuccessful. Since that day I have heard nothing more on the subject and fear that His Highness has failed in prevailing on his brother to act as his interest so evidently requires.

I have had the honour of receiving Mr. Edmonstone's letter dated 5th June enclosing those from you to the Raja and Shreedhar Pandit. I informed Yeshwant Rao that you were satisfied with the Raja's explanations and presented the Khareetas on the occasion above referred to.

No. 102—The Governor General approves of the terms of the treaty for the restoration of Sambalpur and Patna to the Raja of Nagpur, as drafted by the Resident.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVT.,
TO—THE RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

Fort William, 25th September 1806.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch No. 23 dated the 3rd instant, and to communicate to you the Governor General

in Council's entire approbation of your negotiation, respecting the terms of the treaty to be concluded with the Rajah of Berar, for the cession to him, of the provinces of Sambalpur and Patna. The Governor General in Council concludes that within a few days after the date of your dispatch, you will have been enabled to transmit the treaty for ratification.

2. The Governor General in Council also entirely approves the tenor of your replies to Jeswant Row on the subject of his questions and remarks, regarding views and projects of Holkar. I am directed to observe for your information that reports of Holkar's designs have for a long time prevailed of the most vague and contradictory nature. The most prevalent report appears to be that he meditates an incursion into the country of the Sics, but all accounts concur in representing him to be in the greatest distress for money to pay his troops. Government has no just ground for supposing that Holkar entertains the desperate design of renewing a contest with the British Power.

3. The accounts from the Resident with Dowlat Row Sindia warrant a confidence that Sindia will never be induced to connect his interest with those of Holkar.

4. You have already been furnished with copies of the instructions of Government to the Resident with Dowlat Row Sindia and to the Resident at Delhi, respecting Surjee Row Chautka, from which you will have found that the prohibitory articles of treaty, relative to that person, have been abrogated.

5. I am further directed to add with reference to that part of your conversation with Jeswant Row which relates to the late discontent among the troops at Nellore and Hyderabad, that by the latest advices all symptoms of discontent have completely subsided, and that the Mysore Princes have arrived at Bengal, where they will permanently reside.

No. 103—The Governor General ratifies the treaty with the Raja of Nagpur regarding the restoration of Sambalpur and Patna.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVT.,

TO—THE RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

2nd October 1806.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter under date the 7th ultimo enclosing a treaty under the seal and signature of the Rajah

of Berar on the subject of the res oration of the provinces of Sambalpur and Patna to the Rajah's possession.

2. The Honourable the Governor General in Council entirely approving the terms of that instrument, a copy of it duly ratified by the Governor General in Council, is now transmitted for the purpose of being delivered to the Rajah.

No. 104—The Sambalpur zamindars, receding from their engagements, take the risk of protecting themselves in their tenures against the Raja of Nagpur.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVT.,

TO—CAPT. ROUGHSEDEGE.

Fort William, 4th October 1806.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch under date the 13th ultimo.

2. It is sufficiently evident from the communications contained in that despatch that the zamindars of Sambalpur and Patna have determined to depart from their engagements and to remain at all hazards on their respective tenures, and the Governor General in Council concludes that you will in consequence have quitted Sambalpur.

3. The Governor General in Council highly approves your zealous endeavours to induce the zamindars to adhere to their engagements, and is satisfied that you have carried those endeavours to the utmost practicable and requisite extent.

4. The Governor General in Council is perfectly convinced of the accuracy of your reports relative to your negotiations with the Rani of Sambalpur, and is satisfied that her assertions relative to an unqualified promise on your part respecting the liberation of her husband and her son, is merely a pretext for evading the obligation of her engagements.

5. The Governor General in Council approves your proceedings with respect to Mahesa Bedar. It appears probable that the zamindars will unite to resist the Mahratta troops unless the number of the latter should be such as to overawe them. It appears however from the tenor of the despatches from the Resident at Nagpur that the Rajah of Berar is aware of the probability of resistance, and will have appointed a

proportionate force to prevent or overcome it. But it will be a great satisfaction to Government to learn that the occupation of the provinces of Sambalpur and Patna has been peaceably effected.

6. With respect to Rajah Jujarsing I am directed to inform you that his perseverance in the conduct described in your despatch, will of course constitute a renunciation of all the stipulations in his favour to which indeed he will possess no title, unless he shall have signified in writing his formal and specific acceptance of the conditions properly detailed by you in your letter to his address of the 2nd ultimo.

7. The Governor General in Council concludes that you will have received from the Resident at Nagpur, a copy of the engagement finally adjusted with the Rajah of Berar for the transfer to his authority of the provinces of Sambalpur and Patna. I am directed to inform you that the engagement has been formally ratified by the Governor General in Council who now considers the whole transaction to have finally closed.

8. For the reasons stated in the 13th paragraph of your despatch the Governor General in Council will be disposed to grant a subsistence to Monnear Singh on the receipt of your recommendation with regard to its nature and amount.

9. A copy of this letter will be transmitted to the Resident at Nagpur.

No. 105—Capt. Roughsedg reports his arrival at Khoorda with Ranees Mukta Dhi of Sambalpur, Ranees Ratan Kuwar having refused to quit Sambalpur.

FROM—CAPT. ROUGHSEDE,

TO—THE SECRETARY TO GOVT.

Sonepore, 4th October 1806.

1. Two days after the despatch of my letter of the 16th ultimo I received a communication from the Honourable Mr. Elphinstone dated the 3rd ultimo conveying a copy of his letter to the Honourable the Governor General of that date.

2. For the reasons contained in my former letter and those which are stated in the accompanying copy of my reply to the Resident's letter,

strengthened by circumstances which have since occurred, I have deemed it my duty to persevere in the resolution of returning to the British territory and I trust my determination may be honoured with the approbation of Government.

3. When my intentions of quitting Sambalpur without delay were generally known and credited, the Dewan Sadashiv Rae to whom the internal administration of the whole province had been exclusively confided, and whose good conduct I have more than once in the course of my mission had occasion to notice to Government, claimed my attention to his situation and after lamenting the ill success of his zealous endeavours to keep the Ranees steadfast to her engagements with the British Government, represented that the consequence had been to him the entire loss of her favour, nay her bitterest displeasure, and that as he could not remain in Sambalpur after my departure, being as was known to me equally obnoxious to the Ranees and the Maharrattas without inevitable destruction, unless he consented to join the unprincipled faction whose bad advice had so unfortunately biased the Ranees, he trusted to the just liberality of the Honourable the Governor General in Council for a compensation for the sacrifice he had made which might be sufficient for the reasonable maintenance of his family, and further that animated by this hope he earnestly requested to be permitted to accompany me to Cuttack with his children and domestics.

4. Although from my own knowledge of the truth of the Dewan's statement and the consequent fairness of his claims, I considered it my duty ultimately to have acquiesced in his request, I was desirous in the first instance of endeavouring to extend the benefits of his resolution, and it having occurred to me that in consequence of the fallacious but continued assents of Ranees Ratanikuar which had always been understood to include Ranees Mooceta Dhy, I had been prevented by a knowledge that it would be highly offensive to the former from making any direct or separate proposition to the latter, and that she had thereby, although in fact the elder Ranees and wholly independent of the other, been excluded from the advantages of a free election, I took the opportunity afforded by the Dewan's request to reply that I would willingly charge myself with the protection of his family and the representation of his claims to Government on the condition of a successful exertion of his influence with Ranees Mooceta Dhy, on the subject of a proposition which I had deemed it necessary to make to her.

5. The Dewan cheerfully acquiesced and I lost no time in transmitting to the Ranees, through him, an explanation of the reasons which had before prevented and now rendered necessary a direct communication to her, adding an offer on the part of the British Government of a suitable provision

in Khoorda for her maintenance, couched in the terms used in other instances and limiting the period of her determination to three days from the date of my letter.

6. After some discussions which it is not necessary to trouble you with, I received from the Ranee Moocta Dhy before the expiration of the time granted her, a voluntary and full acquiescence in my proposal and the next day (the 30th of September) was fixed upon for her quitting the fort; the Ranee Ratanankuar was highly incensed at the intelligence and with the intention no doubt of preventing her departure by force, assembled a very considerable body of armed men. I therefore deemed it absolutely necessary as sickness had very much weakened the small party with me, and the Ranee from motives of personal delicacy had also shown a strong reluctance to be escorted by Sepahis, to collect together again the irregulars whom I had some days before discharged, but who fortunately had not yet quitted Sambalpore.

7. My arrangements being completed, the Irregulars were sent in small parties to prevent unnecessary alarm and under particular instructions, into the fort on the morning of the 30th ultimo, and my own men held in readiness to support them in the event of any forcible opposition being offered to the voluntary departure of the Ranee Moocta Dhy. I am happy in having it in my power to state however that from the prudent conduct of the men and the excellent precautions observed by their Subadar Richpalsingh, notwithstanding the occurrence of some very critical circumstances, the Ranee was enabled without violence or commotion to leave the fort at a late hour in the evening. The preparations for her journey were completed the next day and on the 2nd instant, attended by the Dewan and a majority of the respectable servants of the Rajah she commenced her march with me to Cuttack.

8. It will be obvious, I persuade myself, to the Honourable the Governor General in Council that the sum formerly recommended by me for the maintenance of Ranee Moocta Dhy under very different circumstances when the Dewan and the other servants now attending her would have been supported from the provision to be granted to Ranee Ratanankuar, and a variety of expenses which will now press upon her would not have existed, will no longer be adequate to the reasonable exigencies of her rank and situation, but I do not feel myself warranted to intimate my ideas on this subject until after a more minute enquiry than the hurry of our march has yet permitted. I trust however a couple of days will be sufficient for this purpose and begging leave to acquaint you that in compliance with the earnest request of the Ranee added to my own opinion of its expediency, I have directed the Irregulars to attend her as far as Khoorda.

No. 106—Elphinstone reports to the Governor General the resistance offered by the zamindars of Sambalpur to the authority of the Raja and other items of news. The Raja claims help from the British in reducing Sambalpur.

FROM—THE RESIDENT, NAGPUR,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 25th November 1806.

1. By accounts which Nana Sahab* has received from Rattanpore, it appears that the Sambalpur zemindars are disposed to resist the officers who have been sent to take possession of that province. This information was communicated to me by Jeswant Row who revisited me for the purpose. After stating the fact he endeavoured to prove that it was incumbent on the British Government to put the Raja in possession of Sambalpur. I observed in reply that the Government had from the first declared its resolution not to assist the Raja in taking possession of Sambalpur by force of arms, and that no reason now existed for its altering its determination. Jeswant Row remarked that when that declaration was made there appeared to be (no) necessity for employing force, the British Government having promised to remove the zemindars who had agreed to accept of a provision within the Company's dominions, that it was incumbent on us to keep them to their engagements and to put the Raja in quiet possession of the territory, which we professed to bestow on him. In answer I first reminded Jeswant Row that the British Government had not only not promised to assist the Raja in taking possession of Sambalpur but had clearly announced its determination not to assist him. That the gift of Sambalpur was perfectly voluntary and might be made under any limitations you thought proper. That you had never promised the Raja to give the zemindars compensations but had merely mentioned your intention of doing so, that His Highness might perceive that it was not your intention to break faith with the zemindars. That the Raja had no concern with the engagements entered into with the zemindars, and that it was particularly unreasonable in this Court to require that those engagements should be executed, as it was a measure of its own which formed the only obstacle to their fulfilment. I said I alluded to the refusal to release the Rajas of Sambalpur and Sonpore, which I remarked you had both recommended as a measure of policy and requested as an act of friendship; that as neither of those inducements could prevail on the Court of Nagpur to liberate the Rajas, it surely could only blame itself for any inconvenience that arose from their detention. I said I did not mean to impute that impolitic step to the Raja, but merely to shew where the present opposition of the zemindars originated. I went on to say that notwithstanding the little regard that was shewn to the wishes of the British

* Vyankoji, the Raja's brother.

Government, it still retained its anxiety that the Raja should obtain quiet possession of Sambalpur, and with that view Captain Roughsedge had done every thing in his power to prevent resistance on the part of the zemindars and had suggested that the force sent to take possession should be 2,000, strong, in which case he said no opposition would be made; that this advice had not been attended to or there would have been no difficulty in taking possession. Jeswant Row replied that there was nothing in the treaty of cession regarding the release of the zemindars, and that sending troops to Sambalpur was expensive. I agreed that the treaty gave us no right to demand the release of the Rajas, and added that the treaty gave the Raja no right to demand our assistance in taking possession. Jeswant Row said that it implied such a right, for it was from the Company, not from the zemindars, that N. S. was to receive Sambalpur. If he was to conquer it, there was no gift. The British might as well give him any other country if he could take it. I said that nothing of the sort was implied, the Company gave him the province but did not exempt him from the inconvenience attending such a possession. If His Highness thought the inconvenience gave him the province but did not exempt him from the inconvenience attending such a possession. If His Highness thought the inconvenience exceeded the advantages, he need not occupy the province, but that was what nobody would pretend. With respect to the value of the gift I first made Jeswant Row admit that the release of the Rajas or the dispatch of 2,000 men would secure the possession of Sambalpur to the Raja, and then asked him whether those means or any others that could be devised would have obtained it for him without the consent of the British Government. Jeswant Row admitted that they would not and added that the knowledge of our power to protect them, if we chose, encouraged the zemindars to resistance, and that Kaishoo Govind even pretended (though the Raja and his ministers gave no credit to it) that the zemindars were secretly instigated by us to hold out. He therefore suggested that the troops at Hazarry Baugh should be ordered to make only one march towards Sambalpur, to shew that we were disposed to check resistance and that, he said, would be sufficient to secure the quiet occupation of the country. I said I made no doubt of the Raja's disbelief of Keshoo Row's assertions. I remarked that they did not deserve to be repeated, for setting aside the inconsistency of the intrigues with the English character, it was absurd to suppose that the Government would voluntarily cede country for the purpose of recovering it by treachery. Jeswant Row then explained that he and Sireedur Pundit and (I believe) the Raja thought as we did, but that it was difficult to satisfy Nana Sahab. He then had recourse to our treaties that we would assist in the occupation of Sambalpur, stating that all the expense would fall on the Raja and that Nana Sahab would reap the benefit, that he had even persuaded the Raja to promise to make up to him for the revenue he lost during the time Sambalpur remained in our possession. I said that I should of course mention everything he said to you, that I had not the least reason to believe that you would assist

the Raja in occupying Sambalpur. In course of a short conversation that took place on my first announcing to Jeswant Row that the zemindars had receded from their engagements, he remarked that as the country out of which a provision was to have been made for the zemindars would now remain to the Company, and as the Raja would be encumbered with the expense of maintaining them besides the inconvenience he would suffer from their influence, it would be worthy of the generosity of the British Government to grant to him the territory which was designed for the Rajas. This proposal for introducing the Raja of Berar into the part of Cuttack was not seriously urged and was soon dropped.

2. Since I had the honour to write to you Goojaba Dada has returned from Holkar's camp. He was coldly received and I do not find that his arrival has had any effect on Jeswant Row's journey to Holkar's camp. Sindia's Vakeel Balajee Eswant has set off for his master's camp accompanied by Bapoo Goojary* (a dependant of Narrain Row Wided the Reshwa's Vakeel) who proceeds to Sindia on the Raja's part. Ragonaut Row the son of Kundoojee Ingilia has arrived at this place with his father's family.

3. The Pindaris are still quiet, though the season at which they generally commence their devastations has long past. Kareem is said to be still with Sindia. 4,000 of his party have crossed the Nerbudda and are expected soon to make an irruption either into this country or Berar. The armies at Ambarra and Chouragur have quitted their cantonments and prepared to repel the Pindaris, should they enter the Raja's territories.

No. 107—The Resident informs the Bhonsle Raja that the Company declined any direct interference in the rebellion of the zamindars of Sambalpur, and advises the Raja to adopt a conciliatory policy towards them.

FROM—MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 8th December 1806.

I yesterday received a visit from Jeswant Row Ramchunder at which the following conversation took place on the subject of Sambalpur. Jeswant Row began by producing a letter from Kaishoo Govind, the amil of Rattanpore, to Nana Sahab, in which he stated that he had set out with the troops he could spare from Rattanpore to take possession of Sambalpur, that such of the zemindars as he had communicated with, pretended to be ready to admit the Raja's officers, but while they were

* Charpure.

† Vaidya.

making these professions they had formed a league of which Jujar Sing of Rygur* was the real head and had assembled troops to defend Sambalpur, while the zemindars of Patna among which he particularly specified Bugut Surega, the Raja of Bora Samber, had made an incursion into some districts of the Bosla's country, plundered some villages and attempted to surprise an aumildar who was encamped in the neighbourhood with a small body of troops. At the same time Kaisahoo Govind received intimation that it was the intention of the zemindars to attack him and in consequence he determined to fall back on his own province. After reading the letter Jeswunt Row said that Nana Sahab, on receiving it, had carried it to the Raja who had sent him (Jeswunt Row) to acquaint me with these transactions by which the gift of Sambalpur, though intended and still acknowledged as a kindness, was likely to be converted into a source of detriment to His Highness's affairs, and to request that I would favour him with advice on the steps most proper for him to take. In reply to this I said that when Sambalpur was occupied by the British the Raja had shewn the utmost anxiety about its being evacuated, though he knew that he would have the zemindars to contend with as he had now, that after the adjustment of that question the British had withdrawn their troops from the province of which they transferred the Government to the zemindars, that in consequence of your anxiety to gratify His Highness you had sent Captain Roughsedge not with a force to secure the country for the Bosla, but as an ambassador to persuade the zemindars to release us from our engagements. He having succeeded in that object, you had directed me to inform the Raja that the British Government transferred its sovereignty over Sambalpur to His Highness, at the same time apprising him that he would receive no assistance in taking possession of it, that His Highness had accepted the province on these terms, a treaty had been concluded and the affair ought to be at an end. His Highness had nevertheless advanced a claim to be put in possession of the territory. I could admit nothing of the sort and consequently I must beg him to excuse my interfering any more with his transactions in Sambalpur than I did with those of his other dominions.

Jeswunt Row observed that he had omitted to mention that after my last conversation with him he had reported all I had said to the Raja, who admitted in the fullest manner that he had no claim on the British Government for aid in taking possession of Sambalpur: He said His Highness's only view at present was to inform you of the difficulties he laboured under, in the hope that you would shew your friendship by relieving him from them. Jeswunt Row went on to state that from the original cession of Sambalpur, Nana Sahab had never ceased to reproach the Raja with the loss he had suffered and to importune him for a compensation which the Raja had granted him, that he (Nana Sahab) was extremely dissatisfied with the manner in which Sambalpur was

* Raigad.

restored to him, and complained of it to the Raja saying that he had never desired the restoration of Sambalpoore, that he had a right to a certain annual revenue and while he received it he was indifferent from what source it was derived, but he had just ground of complaint, if in lieu of part of it he was assigned a country which not only afforded nothing but occasioned damage to other possessions. Jeswant Row said it was in vain to argue with Nana Sahab, for he never considered his own misconduct in detaining the Rajas of Sonopore and Sambalpoore and in neglecting to send an adequate force to the latter country, but threw all the blame on the Raja's minister whom he accused of deceiving him with regard to the terms on which Sambalpoore was to be given up. The Raja's mother with her usual partiality for her younger son, took the same view of the question and their constant remonstrances rendered the Raja very unhappy; that His Highness therefore entreated that you would adopt any measure that was agreeable to you to relieve him and to give full effect to the very friendly arrangement you had made in his favour. Jeswant Row proceeded to propose that Mr. Jenkins should be directed to halt at Sambalpoore and to endeavour to effect an adjustment by threatening the zemindars with the severe displeasure of the British Government, if they continued to oppose the Raja's authority. I said I could take upon me to say with confidence that there was nothing consistent with propriety and with the dignity of the British Government which you would not do to secure the peaceable occupation of Sambalpoore by the Raja, but I was certain you would never consent to threaten the zemindars with punishments that you did not intend to inflict. Jeswant Row said that the troops at Hazary Baugh were at hand and that it would require nothing but their appearance to reduce the zemindars. I replied that I knew you would not consent to employ British troops against Sambalpoore, as that measure would be inconsistent with your former declarations, with your general policy, and indeed, with the relation in which the zemindars stood towards the British Government. I added that though you would be unwilling to interfere in the affair of Sambalpoore, I had no doubt your good-will towards the Raja would induce you to make another attempt by letter to convince the zemindars of the bad consequences of their resistance, but I said I could not promise that you would take that step which indeed afforded but little prospect of success, as every thing that could be done by argument had been tried during Captain Roughsedge's stay at Sambalpoore. I said that in all events it was absolutely indispensable that the Raja should send a strong body of troops to the frontier, that such a step would be necessary to enable him to retain Sambalpoore, even if he were once in possession of it, and if I might assume it as a thing certain that he would prepare such a force, there were three plans which I could suggest to him and which I would submit to you, Honourable Sir, without engaging that you would consent to any of them. The first was that the Rajas

of Sambalpur and Sonpore should be released and an establishment in the Company's provinces again offered to the zemindars. 2nd, that in case Nana Sahab distrusted the fidelity of the confined Rajas, the Ranees and other zemindars should be left in possession under the Bosla. The Honourable Company should engage to grant the imprisoned Rajas a provision within the British dominions and they should not be delivered over until the Bosla's troops were in possession of Sambalpur. 3rdly, that in case Nana Sahab should persevere in his resolution to keep the Rajas imprisoned, the offer of an establishment in the British dominions should be renewed to the Ranees and the other zemindars while under the impression, which would be made on their minds by the approach of a strong body of the Raja's troops to their frontier. I said each of those plans (particularly the 1st and 2nd) was even at this time attended with some probability of success. But I would recommend to the Raja not to rely on your answer but make immediate arrangements for marching a force to Sambalpur, as every day strengthened the means of resistance in the hands of the zemindars and increased their confidence in their ability to withstand the Raja's attempts to subject them. Jeswant Row replied that he would acquaint the Raja with the substance of my discourse, but that he had too low an opinion of the talents and moderation of the younger brother to be sanguine in his hopes of the release of the zemindars. With respect to sending a force he observed that the Raja's troops were all employed in defending the frontier from the Pindaris, nor could they be prevailed on to march for Sambalpur unless their arrears were paid, and that Nana Sahab had spent so much money in the many foolish enterprises he had engaged in that he really had not the means of raising a respectable body of troops. I observed that money might be raised on the credit of the revenue of Sambalpur, that it was but a small sum that was required and that without an army it would be impossible for the Raja to get possession of Sambalpur, even if you were to consent to any of the plans I suggested, for which I would by no means engage. I added that, if Nana Sahab was so unreasonable as to refuse to take such measures as were necessary to forward his own views, however you might regret the inconvenience which the Raja suffered from the complaints of his family, you would be under the necessity of abstaining from all interference in an affair which was abandoned by those whom it most nearly concerned. I hope, Honourable Sir, that the offers I have made to the Raja will meet with your approbation. I was led to make them from conviction that they were entirely in the spirit of your instructions to me at all the different stages of the negotiation. If Nana Sahab acts on any of them, I conceive from Captain Roushledge's statements that it would be successful with the zemindars and your original plan would be effected, which appears to me to be still desirable, both with a view to conciliating the Bosla and to the welfare of the zemindars in whom, I think it probable that you may still take an interest,

notwithstanding the levity and inconsistency of their late conduct. If all the plan should be rejected by Nana Sahab, neither he nor the Raja can pretend to have the slightest ground for discontent, and they will be prevented from renewing the solicitations which they have of late brought forward, and which it may be thought unfriendly absolutely to reject. Notwithstanding the above arguments, I have been very careful to prepare the Raja for the event of your refusal to interfere in the affairs of Sambalpur; you will observe that His Highness has expressly renounced all claim to such interference and that I have pointed out to him the necessity of his proceeding in all his arrangements regarding that province without waiting your answer.

No. 108—Jenkins reports to the Governor General his meeting with the Rhonsle's Valai at which the Sambalpur situation was discussed.

FROM—RICHARD JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,
TO—SIR C. E. BARLOW, BART., GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 29th January 1807.

Nothing of material import has occurred at this Court since the departure of Mr. Elphinstone until this evening when I received a visit from Jeswant Row Ramchander accompanied by Jykishen Rao.* The object of their visit was to deliver to me for the purpose of being transmitted to Fort William a Khureetah from the Rajah to your address, in answer to the letter presented by me to His Highness at my first visit, and I have transmitted the Khureetah according to the usual form under cover to the Persian Secretary to Government. I took the opportunity afforded by the question of Jeswant Row whether I had lately heard from Calcutta, to inform him of your having with great satisfaction complied with the late applications made through Mr. Elphinstone in favour of pilgrims proceeding to Benares etc. I said that you had been particularly pleased with the occasion offered by Tumma Bae's visit to the Provinces, of manifesting your friendship and respect of Balla Sahab, and that you had accordingly instructed the principal civil officers at Benares, Gaya and Allahabad to show every mark of attention to Tumma Bae, suitable to her rank and near connection with that prince. Jeswant Rao made suitable acknowledgments for the first of the communication, but he appeared more particularly gratified with the latter intimation. He remarked that application of Balla Sahab was intended to be secret as being made without the minister's knowledge; and that he was assured that the prince would be exceedingly pleased with your very kind attention to his wishes.

* Brother of Yeshawant Rao.

After some further conversation upon different subjects, I introduced the mention of Sambalpur, with the view of entering upon the disclosure of your instructions relative to Mr. Elphinstone's propositions, which I received some days ago. Having called to Jeswant Rao's recollection Mr. Elphinstone's last conference I said that I had been honoured with your commands relative to the propositions which he then made, and I requested to know whether His Highness had yet resolved to appoint an adequate force to take possession of Sambalpur. Jeswant Rao did not answer my question but desired I would repeat the substance of the propositions. I accordingly recapitulated them as stated in Mr. Elphinstone's dispatch No. 28. Jeswant Rao proceeded to say that he had communicated them to the Rajah, but that there were no hopes of prevailing upon Nana Sahab to release the confined Rajas; that every effort had been tried in vain, for Nana Sahab's character and temper were such as to render all attempts to change his resolution ineffectual, and that the Raja had placed his only hope in the friendly assistance of the British Government.

I replied that you had already done as much as could reasonably be expected, to secure to the Rajah the peaceable occupation of Sambalpur, especially as so little had been performed on the part of this Government to forward the success of your friendly offices. I said that Sambalpur and the other districts were now the Rajah's property, and that no kind of interference would be exercised by you on the subject without His Highness's determination to adopt the measure of appointing a force of the strength recommended by Captain Roughsedge, which Jeswant Rao had admitted would be a force not to be resisted by the zemindars, but without which any attempt at negotiation would be nugatory. I was authorised by you to concert with the Rajah an arrangement founded upon either of the three propositions above mentioned, and that His Highness might discover in so friendly a determination on your part the full extent of your regard for his welfare and satisfaction. Jeswant Rao admitted that you had already conferred the greatest obligations upon the Rajah. He said that he had fully stated to Mr. Elphinstone the impracticability of prevailing upon Nana Sahab to release the confined Rajas, as well as the extreme pecuniary distress of this Government, and that no forces would move to Sambalpur without receiving their arrears of pay; which the Rajah had not resources to liquidate. He then proceeded to touch upon the arguments formerly used to Mr. Elphinstone respecting the right which the Rajah had to expect that the British Government should put him in full possession of the territories it had bestowed. To these arguments I was enabled fully to reply; and as the conversation on both sides was nearly the same as had formerly passed with Mr. Elphinstone, I need not take up your time with a recapitulation of it. I recalled however to the recollection of Jeswant Rao the full disavowal from the Raja, which he had been the channel of conveying to Mr. Elphinstone, of any right to our aid

against the zemindars, and when Jeswant Rao had admitted the truth of what I said and had repeated that the Rajah had no right to our assistance but only asked it as a matter of friendship, I said that Mr. Elphinstone had already stated, and indeed had from the first declared that no aid would be given against the zemindars, and that I repeated it as a point expressly laid down in your late instructions. I then proceeded to remark upon the first part of his discourse. I said that I had no intention to press the Rajah to act upon either of the propositions I had mentioned, and that as all the difficulties lay on his part, he could not expect that the British Government would be more anxious than himself on the subject; that you had only assented to Mr. Elphinstone's propositions and that Mr. Elphinstone had only made them in consequence of the repeated solicitations of the Rajah for advice and assistance, that two of the propositions only related to the release of the Rajas of Sambalpur and Sonopore, but that in all three it was assumed that a strong force was in readiness to second any negotiation which might be entered into with the zemindars, that whichever of the propositions might be adopted, the burthen would be the Honourable Company's and the advantage the Rajah's. I concluded by saying, that as it appeared the Rajah was not in fact anxious on the subject, it was sufficient that I had stated your friendly desire to promote the welfare and interests of his Government.

The subject was then changed by Jeswant Rao who enquired whether I had any late intelligence respecting the Pindaris. I said that my last accounts mentioned their being at Mukray,* and that there was a report of their shortly intending to enter Berar. Jeswant Rao observed that the information received by this Government was of the same nature; that Gunput Rao who was now encamped near Woottappe, had agreeably to orders quitted his cantonments and separated the heavy baggage from his army, and that he had been ordered to communicate with the officers of His Highness the Nizam commanding troops on the frontier, with the view of keeping each other informed of and prepared to repel any hostile movements of the Pindaris. I said that the measure was perfectly proper and that everything with the Pindaris depended upon their finding the quarter which they attacked unprepared to resist them. Jeswant Rao assented to the remark. He then spoke of Sindia. He observed that he had a large army on foot and that it did not appear how it could be subsisted in his own country. He asked whether we had any connection with the Rajpoot States and whether we took any part in the transactions amongst them. I said that we exercised no interference where it was not authorised by treaty and that we had no engagements with the Rajpoot States. He enquired whether we had any treaty with the Raja of Bhurtpoor,† to which I answered in the affirmative and he then asked whether if Holkar, or Sindia should attack him, we should oppose them.

*Makrai.

†Bharatpur.

I said that neither Sindia or Holkar would attack any state whom they knew we were bound to protect. He then asked whom we were bound to protect and when I named the states with whom we have treaties of alliance, Jeswant Rao said that we had a treaty with the Rajah, and that in case he should be attacked by Holkar or Sindia we would of course support him. I replied that you would in every respect conform to the stipulations of the treaty subsisting between the two states, but that it was also incumbent upon you to keep faith with Sindia and Holkar with whom we had similar treaties, and that as long as those Chiefs did not attack our territories or those of the states I had mentioned, we were bound to observe a strict neutrality towards them.

Jeswant Rao next alluded to the late changes at Hyderabad. He said that scarcely any chiefs of rank or character would now remain at that city, since Rao Rumba and Noor-ool-Umra had quitted it. He asked why Rao Rumba had been obliged to retire to his Jaghire. I answered that he had been detected in intrigues, inconsistent with the interests of his Sovereign, and that it was His Highness's pleasure to banish him from the capital where he had too many means of prosecuting his improper designs. I said that I believed no person of rank or respectability has quitted Hyderabad, whom His Highness wished to retain. Jeswant Rao then began to speak in praise of Noor-ool-Umra's abilities and military reputation, and he asked whether any opposition would be made to his entering the service of any other state, as he had lost all hopes of promotion or success under his own Government. He mentioned that Soobah Khan and Sulabut Khan had been formerly in the service of this Government, and he said it was a common thing for military chiefs to change one service for another. In reply I admitted the truth of the latter remark, but added that I really could not say what was the constitution of the Nizam's Government in that respect, but that I did not see any reason for supposing Noor-ool-Umra to be desirous of service under any other state while he had so ample a provision under his own Sovereign. Upon Jeswant Rao rising to take leave, I reverted to the subject of Sambalpoore and pointed out the necessity of a speedy determination on the part of His Highness to adopt some decided course respecting the occupation of it, if he wished you to take any further part in the question. Jeswant Rao said that Captain Roughsedg was not now in Sambalpoore, and he requested to know how the negotiation could be arranged. I said that Captain Roughsedg was still in Cuttack from whence he could easily communicate with the zemindars, should either of the propositions be accepted, but that I must first be made acquainted with His Highness's sentiments upon what I had communicated; and that in all cases the preparation of a strong force under a proper officer was an indispensable preliminary to any communication being made by me to Captain Roughsedg on the subject.

main sends to the Governor General an account of the preparations for the marriage of the Raja's daughter and of the irruption of the Pindaris in Nagpur. He also discusses the situation at Sambalpur.

FROM-RICHARD JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,

TO—SIR GEORGE BARLOW, G. G.

Nagpur, 21st February 1807.

In my last dispatch I had the honour to acquaint you of the Rajah's expedition to Ramteeg. His Highness returned from thence on the 9th instant.

It was my original intention to have taken an early opportunity of

renewing the subject of Sambaripore, in order either to induce His Highness to adopt some decisive measure for the occupation of that province upon some one of Mr. Elphinstone's propositions, or to promote an entire relinquishment of the question. Since his return however the Raja has been so much employed in dispatching the arrangements of his internal administration, with the view of securing a total remission from business during the approaching marriage of his daughter and indeed in adjusting the preparations for the marriage, that I have not had it in my power to execute my intentions. In the midst of his other avocations the Raja is at present much pressed with regard to the Pindaris who have recommenced their depredations on his north-western frontier, the conduct of some of the Raja's troops having given them a good pretence for their inroads, in attacking and killing an adopted son of Settoo at Singpoor, a place formerly given by the Raja to that chief. A skirmish has since taken place between a party of these plunderers and of the Raja's troops on the Wurdah, in which the latter have lost several horses, elephants and camels. The Raja is consequently too much taken up with providing for the defence of his own country to carry into execution any plan for sending troops to another quarter.

It appears on the other hand that Nana Sahab is very jealous of any interference on the part of the Rajah in the measures he wishes to adopt for the occupation of the ceded provinces. Keshoo Govind has accordingly been again sent with about 400 infantry and 4 guns and I hear has arrived at Ryepoor, where a negotiation has been opened with the Rane of Sambalpoore. This circumstance seems to indicate that Nana Sahab is willing, if possible, to obtain possession of the districts without being obliged either to his brother or to the British Government, and at all events I am convinced that the Rajah has scarcely a voice in approving or rejecting the propositions which have been made to him on the subject. If Nana Sahab should still fail in obtaining Sambalpoore by his own plans, (and I understand the zemindars entertain a great horror of his treachery and cruelty) he will probably again hope for the Rajah's assistance; and in

that case, the Rajah may hereafter wish to profit by the mediation which has been offered under your authority.

It is not likely in any event that the subject will be renewed by the Durbar for at least a month or six weeks from the present period, not certainly with an intention of immediately dispatching a force to the frontier. Under the decided indifference which has been evinced to our proffered mediation, I do not think that any revival of the question should proceed from me, especially after so long an interval. I have given the Rajah no reason to expect that it would, and I particularly recommend a speedy determination if he wished you to interest yourself any more on the subject. In the course of so long an interval as will have elapsed before the subject, according to my present view of it, will be again agitated, I cannot be certain that the state of affairs, or Captain Roughsedge's situation may continue to be such as to render my acquiescence in the measures which may be proposed by this Court either proper, or convenient to Government. It is therefore a question which I beg leave to submit to your decision, whether in the event of a disposition in the Rajah at a future period to act upon either of Mr. Elphinstone's propositions, I am to consider myself authorised to enter on the execution of your late instructions.

I have the honour to inform you that on the 19th I was visited by Jeswunt Rao and Amrut Rao Bukhshie accompanied by Jykishan Rao. They were deputed to invite me for the following days to an entertainment which the Rajah proposed to give me in congratulation of my arrival and to apologise for the delay which had taken place in that ceremony. This delay they attributed to the great press of business in which the Rajah had been engaged. I accordingly waited upon the Rajah at his palace yesterday accompanied by the gentlemen of the Residency, and after the entertainment I received the usual presents. Nothing of course relating to business was introduced on this occasion.

No. 110—The paper contains a report stating that the Rane of Sambalpur declined surrendering the place to the Bhonsle Raja's officer unless her husband and son were released.

Translation of a Marhatta report received by Mr. Jenkins from the Karcoon Khundoo Pundit, who returned to Nagpoor in the month of August 1807.

I set out in company with Janoo Raghonaut from Nagpoor (in September 1806) and arrived at Ruttunpoor in twenty days. Keshoo Govind (Nana Sahab's manager) was there employed in raising troops for which he detained us about 15 days. He then desired us to go to Succaram Copaul who was encamped with a force on the Maha Nudde at a village named Sewree Narayan, and told us that he would send the

troops after us. I remained about two months and a half at Sewree when Keshoo Govind ordered Succaram Gopal to return to Ruttunpur. About 300 infantry and the same number of horse at length arrived from Ruttunpur, and we marched to Saringhur.

In the interim Keshoo Govind had sent Succaram Wissoonauth with 25 men to be stationed as a Thana at Sambalpur. These the Ranees received with proper attention, and kept them three months, during which time nothing was heard of them in camp. Keshoo Govind then sent a pair of Hircarras to Succaram Wissoonauth with a present of cloths for the Ranees, and the Hircarras returned in the course of a month with intelligence that all the zemindars of Atharagurh were united; that they had stopped up the passes and ghauts, and were ready for battle; and that the Ranees said she would give up the fort upon the terms only of her husband and son being released from confinement.

This account Keshoo Govind wrote to Sreemunt (Nana Sahab).

After this Pudmunath Bukshhee Kayut and Chalee Gooroo of Gungapoor were sent from Sambalpur to negotiate. They proposed that the tribute of Atharagurh should be fixed and that the money should be paid in any way which might be thought proper. That if they wished to have a Thana at Sambalpur, 50 or 100 men might be stationed without the fort, and that the Ranees would obey all orders, only let her have the internal management of the country. Two months were wasted in this kind of wrangling. At length Janjee Bunsor Naik, and Nurhuree of Sambalpur arrived from Nagpur with presents, etc., from Sreemunt to the Ranees. It was debated whether the Ryghur man should be taken with them to Sambalpur. Nurhuree opposed going through Ryghur and said that he would engage to get the Thana delivered over. Beetees and another respectable person from Ryghur were at Saringhur during two months. When asked whether Joujar Sing was engaged in treachery, they said they took no part, but that whoever obtained the musnud, he would be indifferent to them. Janjee Bunsor, Antjee Naik Gudur, and Nurhuree went to Sambalpur, and Pudmunath Bukshhee, etc. went to mediate; two months elapsed during which we heard nothing more. Four men who accompanied them from Saringhur returned. These reported that the Ranees proposed to give up the fort, only upon the release of her husband and son. Otherwise that the amount of tribute should be settled. If they meant to attack her, she said that she would oppose them as long as she was able and then fly to the hills and destroy the country, that they had better therefore not sent troops against her.

In the manner above described nine months elapsed. Although Beetees of Ryghur declared solemnly that they had no kind of connection with either party, it was said every where in the Bhosla's camp that the Ryghur man was concerned in the business.

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No. 111—In this elaborate and important despatch Elphinstone communicates to the Governor General his interviews with the Rhonsle Raja himself and his agents, when earnest representations were made by them to the British Government for restoring the whole or part of the territories lost by the Raja in the late war. The Raja's humiliating position and a pathetic appeal for relief were an outstanding feature of the Raja's solicitations.

FROM—ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,

TO—LORD MINTO, G. C.

Nagpur, 23rd March 1808.

When I was last at this place I frequently had occasion to report to Government the hopes expressed by the Raja that the whole or part of the territories which he lost in the war in 1803, might be restored to him as a reward for his fidelity since that period. I always discouraged communications of this sort, but the Raja continued to make them, from time to time; and when I was about to set off for Calcutta he renewed his application with additional earnestness, observing that he relied on my exertions while at the seat of Government, for the restoration of his State to something like its former prosperity. On that occasion, I was careful to explain to him that his wishes were such as were not likely to be gratified by any means, and that my journey to Calcutta, so far from putting it in my power to contribute to their success, would prevent my doing so, even if I were inclined, as after I quitted Nagpur I should cease to have any official communication with the Governor General. I returned a similar answer to a letter which I received from the Raja while I was in Calcutta.

Since my return the Raja and his ministers have earnestly enquired at every interview I had with them, what Your Lordship's sentiments are with respect to this Government and whether you have not charged me with any message for the Raja. I have always replied by assuring them of Your Lordship's friendship and regard for His Highness, adding that there is nothing at present on foot between the Governments which required a more particular message.

At last at a visit which I received a few days ago from Jeswant Row Ramchunder that minister entered on the subject openly and fully. He represented the heavy losses which the Raja had sustained, the confusion which followed in his finances, the difficulty he found in paying his army, and his consequent inability to defend his country from any power that might attack it, or even from the ravages of the Pindaris. He pointed out the difference in this respect between the Raja and the other Marattas. He said that they could always keep an army together by the prospect of war and plunder, but that in a state that was at peace the army had no inducement to serve but the hopes of being regularly paid. He dwelt on the progressive decay and ruin of the Government which was the result

of the present state of things, and concluded by describing the effect of these calamities on the Raja himself and by declaring that His Highness's situation was such as would reduce a person of less firmness to despair. He said the Raja had but one hope and that rested on the magnanimity and bounty of the British. He enlarged on the Raja's devotion to our interests, on the fidelity which His Highness displayed during the contest with Holkar and the renewed war with Sindia, and he alluded indirectly to the great advantages which these Chiefs had derived, from a line of conduct equally opposite to justice and good faith, and to the course which the Raja had adopted. He then endeavoured to show that the British might easily bestow such a portion of territory on the Raja as should save and restore his Government, without being felt by a Power like the Company, and concluded by informing me that the Raja wished to write a letter or to send a person in his confidence to Your Lordship to endeavour to procure some relief from the misfortunes with which he was surrounded. In reply to Jeswant Row, I assured him that it would give Your Lordship the highest pleasure to see the Raja's Government in a flourishing condition, but I said it appeared to me almost impossible for Your Lordship to do anything at this time to assist him. During extensive wars I observed that it was often in the power of a nation to enrich a friend or ally at the enemy's expense, but during a general peace, as at present, there were no means by which the Company could add to the Raja's dominions, unless by sacrificing some of its own which the Raja could scarcely expect, particularly when he reflected that the Company had to clear off the expense of the late wars and to maintain many establishments, including a great army which had not been diminished since the peace. On these grounds, I said, I did not expect that the Raja's solicitation would be successful in any shape, and that I would therefore earnestly advise His Highness not to expose himself to a refusal, which it would be disagreeable to Your Lordship to give, and which it probably would be mortifying to him to receive. I will not take up Your Lordship's time by detailing all the discussion that past between Jeswant Row and me, at this visit and at another which he made for the purpose of inviting me to the Durbār. I shall only observe that Jeswant Row brought forward no claim except what was founded on the Raja's distressed situation; and that he urged it in the most respectful language.

I yesterday went to the Durbār alone, as I had been requested to do, and found the Raja in company with Siveedar Pundit, Jeswant Row and two or three of his principal ministers. The conversation that took place was in substance the same as that with Jeswant Row, except that no allusion was made to the success of Holkar and Sindia. The Raja urged his request with more earnestness and in terms more friendly and submissive than had been employed by Jeswant Row. His Highness took pains to show that by giving him the support necessary to preserve

his power we should secure to ourselves a grateful and zealous ally in all future wars, and in the meantime the resources we conferred would remain in the hands of a friend, whose firmness and fidelity had been shown by near five years experience.

On my endeavouring to show the impracticability of the British Government's taking any steps to increase his resources, the Raja said he did not think of the means, that his only wish was to excite in Your Lordship's mind an interest in his situation and to leave the means of relieving him entirely to Your Lordship's wisdom. On mentioning his intention of writing a letter or sending a vakeel to Your Lordship, the Raja reminded me of what he had several times before said, that he did not consider my interview with him on that occasion as official, and that he requested my advice on the manner in which he ought to proceed, not as from a minister of the English Government, but as from a friend and well-wisher of his own. He then begged me to tell what course I thought he ought to adopt so as to give him the best prospect of success. I told him in reply that I would by all means recommend to him not to take the step he proposed at all. I said there was no hope that it would succeed; and to make a request in such circumstances could have no good effect, and might lead to distrust on Your Lordship's side and dissatisfaction on his. The Raja asked me if I thought you would be displeased with a request put in so friendly a manner and left entirely to Your Lordship's decision. I said from the manner in which it was submitted and from the entire tranquillity of the time, Your Lordship would not view His Highness's request with suspicion, but you would probably think it very unreasonable. This produced some little conversation between the Raja and his ministers about the probable nature of Your Lordship's answer; after which, Sireedar Pundit told me that the Raja had before written on this subject to Sir George Barlow and had received an answer; that he had no doubt Your Lordship's answer would be such as would please the Raja, but whatever it might be His Highness would not be dissatisfied with it. In explaining the subject of the Raja's letter to Sir George Barlow (which related to Lord Cornwallis' first letter to His Highness) Sireedar Pundit took occasion to go over most of the arguments in favour of the Raja's expectations drawn from Lord Cornwallis' promises. I stopped him to remind him that when I delivered the letter from Lord Cornwallis, I had taken it upon me to explain His Excellency's promises in such a manner as could have left no doubt in the Raja's mind as to the expectations he ought to form. The Raja then renewed his questions concerning the measures he ought at present to pursue, and asked me whether I thought he ought to write or send a vakeel. I said if he was determined to do one of the two, I thought he had better send a vakeel. As he had no minister at Calcutta there would be nothing extraordinary in his sending one, and his vakeel might ascertain Your Lordship's wishes, without the necessity of a formal application from the Raja himself. Sireedar Pundit

said that the Raja had in fact resolved to send a vakeel. He said the person to fill that office was not yet fixed on; but hinted that it would probably be Jeswunt Row. At the conclusion of the conversation I asked the Raja whether I was to consider it as entirely confidential or whether I was to communicate it to Your Lordship. The Raja said I might act in that respect as I thought best for his interests; but he begged me to communicate it in such a manner, that it should not call for an answer, as he was anxious Your Lordship should not decide on his request till you had heard what his vakeel had to urge. The subject was then dropt and some time after I withdrew. In order to shew the grounds of the Raja's present expectations, it may be proper to acquaint Your Lordship with the manner in which they first arose. By the treaty of Deogaum, the Raja, besides ceding Berar and Cuttack (on the 2nd and 3rd articles) agreed (in the 10th article) to confirm all treaties made, during the war between the British and his feudatories. When accounts were received from Bengal, it appeared that the provinces of Sambalpur and its dependencies had been guaranteed to certain zemindars of the country who had joined the British against the Marattas; and the benefit of the 10th article of the treaty was accordingly claimed for them. The Raja contended that the circumstances of the treaty with the Sambalpur zemindars were such as to exclude that transaction from the operation of the treaty of Deogaum. The Marquis Wellesley, though he maintained that the treaties with the zemindars were precisely of the species which the Raja had agreed to, yet in consideration of His Highness's heavy losses, offered the Raja a compensation equal to thrice the value of the province so ceded. The Raja did not accept this offer but admitted the application of the treaty to Sambalpur and has not since advanced any claim to that province. His Highness frequently complained of the great reduction of his power; represented his losses to be greater than those of Sindia in proportion to his territories, and expressed his hopes that the Company would one day restore some part of the country he had ceded; his ministers used also to talk of the ruined state of Berar in consequence of the very bad administration of the Nizam's Government in that province, and to point out how little His Highness the Soubeddar gained by the possession of a tract of country which, in the Raja's hands was worth all the rest of his dominions, but no claim was ever advanced to any country, except Sambalpur till the middle of 1805. About that time, the Marquis Cornwallis, in a letter to me, delivered his opinion that the Raja of Berar had suffered by the war in a far greater degree than Sindia, though his conduct was less culpable, from which consideration and from a desire to conciliate the Raja, His Excellency was determined to restore the province of Sambalpur, if he could prevail on the zemindars to give up their claim to our protection. His Excellency about the same time communicated his intentions in general terms to the Raja; but from motives of delicacy His Lordship refrained from mentioning the

particular country he meant to restore, as he had not at that time obtained the consent of the possessors to such an arrangement. This circumstance afforded room for the Raja to construe Lord Cornwallis's letter into a promise to restore the whole of the country he had lost by the war; and though from the explanations I took upon myself to give him, I am convinced that he could not really have entertained such an expectation, His Highness professed to expect nothing less than the restoration of Berar and Cuttack; he even insinuated that he could not attach much weight to my explanations as they were at variance with the Governor General's letter.

When the extent of the proposed cession was made known to the Raja, he expressed the greatest dissatisfaction. He quoted a part of Lord Cornwallis's letter, in which that nobleman assured the Raja of his intention of compensating his losses to the utmost practicable extent consistent with equity and public faith; and insisted that it was as consistent with equity and public faith to restore either Berar or Cuttack or Sambalpoore. Having been before this time informed of the treaties with Holkar and Sindia, the Raja dwelt on the different fortune of those Sirsars from his own. Sindia, he said, had lost less than he did at the first peace; He had since broke his engagements with every circumstance of aggravation, yet the British Government had restored Cohud and Gwalior to him, and Holkar after a long and severe contest with the British had, by their free choice, been put in possession of all the estates of his family. While His Highness, who had adhered to us through the whole struggle, received nothing but Sambalpoore, which produced only a third of the revenue he had refused to accept from Lord Wellesley. His Highness said that his disappointment was a subject of ridicule to the other Maratha Chiefs whom he had refused to join, and who now exulted in the superior success of their plans over those adopted by the Raja.

The Raja and his ministers continued on all occasions to allude to Lord Cornwallis's letter and to the treaties with Sindia, till I left Nagpore. Since my return they have used much more moderate language than before, they have not entered any direct comparisons between their situation and that of Sindia or Holkar. They no longer bring forward their unreasonable claims to Berar and Cuttack; nor are they in any respect so violent in their complaints as formerly; though the Raja has not yet obtained possession of any part of the province of Sambalpoore. The zemindars of that country after consenting to give up their treaties with the Company, were led by their abhorrence of the Maratta Government to determine to oppose the Raja without our assistance, and His Highness after a feeble attempt to reconquer the country, has given up his plan, till he shall be more able to undertake such an enterprise.

I shall do myself the honour of acquainting Your Lordship as soon as a person shall be fixed on to go as vakeel to Calcutta.

No. 112—Elphinstone in forwarding the Raja's letters to the Governor General mentions that the Raja was sending his Chief Minister Shridhar Pandit to Calcutta to meet the Governor General and lay before him his mission for the restoration of the lost territory.

FROM—ELPHINSTONE.
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 20th April 1808.

I have this day transmitted to the Persian Secretary letters from the Rajah of Berar and his Ministers to Your Lordship's address.

By those letters Your Lordship will perceive that the Raja has fixed on Sireedur Pandit, his principal Minister, for the embassy to Calcutta.

I received this information at a visit which Sireedur Pandit paid me some days ago. He said that the Raja had determined to send him as being the best means of shewing his respect for Your Lordship and the great importance he attached to the success of the request he was about to prefer. The Raja, he said, had instructed him to state that his going might be considered as His Highness's going in person, and that in the event of his ill success the Rajah was determined actually to proceed to Calcutta in person. On my treating this as an hyperbolical expression Sireedur Pandit assured me that the Raja was in earnest, that if his Minister failed he would go himself unattended to Calcutta, and if he did not succeed in exciting Your Lordship's compassion he would retire to Benares. Sireedur Pandit went on to say that in his mission to Calcutta he hoped to be accompanied by Your Lordship's representative at this Court, that such a custom had been usual with the Courts of Hyderabad and Poona, in two or three embassies that he had made to those capitals the Vakeel of the Power to which he was sent had accompanied him, and an arrangement of the sort was particularly desirable at present on account of his inexperience of the practice of a European Government. In reply to this discourse I told Sireedur Pandit that as I had dissuaded the Raja from the embassy when first proposed, he must expect that I would be more averse to its being committed to him. I observed that it was impossible he could leave this without much inconvenience being felt from his absence. That this was not an occasion that required the mission of so considerable a person. If as I expected the Raja's request was refused, it would be unsuitable to the Raja's dignity to have sent his principal Minister in vain, and even if it were successful there was nothing to arrange that required any particular abilities, that if he went I should be very happy to accompany him, but that I did not imagine I should be permitted. I afterwards took an opportunity of saying that my particular duty was to attend the Raja, and that it would be quite foreign to the nature of my office to accompany him to Calcutta. The conversation being for some time continued it was at last agreed, I believe, on Sireedur Pandit's proposal that the Raja should write and learn Your Lordship's view of the subject before the Minister should march.

At the same visit Jeswant Row mentioned Holkar's having sent a letter in very menacing terms to the Raja saying that he was coming to Mahaisur, and would then be able to bring the disputes which had long existed between the Raja and him, to a settlement. Sireedur Pundit asked me if Your Lordship would assist the Raja against Holkar's aggression. I said Your Lordship would be sorry to see two Powers at peace with us at war with each other and that you would particularly regret the Raja's being involved in the calamities of war, but that as the Company's Government was on friendly terms with Holkar and bound by treaty to maintain those relations, Your Lordship could not interfere in the quarrel. Jeswant Row asked whether in case Holkar made war with Sindia and the Raja, the British would interfere, I said they would not. Jeswant Row then said and if they all three united would your Government interfere. I said of course not. Nothing further passed worth reporting to Your Excellency. Jeswant Row has since that meeting been very careful to impress me with the idea that the Raja is in earnest in his professions of a design to go to Calcutta as a suppliant, if Sireedur Pundit's mission fails. I have always treated that sort of language as if it were not meant that I should believe it literally.

I was last night honoured with Your Lordship's commands for me to proceed to Sindia's camp. I propose if the Raja's arrangements for my audience of leave permit it, to set off on the day after to-morrow, and hope to reach Sindia's camp (supposing it to be halted) by the middle of next month.

No. 113—The Raja's solicitations for the restoration of Berar or Cuttack or both cannot be considered. The Resident is asked to dissuade the Raja from sending his Minister to Calcutta for this purpose.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,

TO—(THE ACTING) RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

11th July 1808.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of the Resident's despatch No. 3, dated the 20th of April reporting the substance of his conferences with the Raja and his minister, on the subject of His Highness's renewed solicitation respecting the grants of a compensation for his losses during the war, and of his desire to despatch his minister Shreedhar Pandit to the Presidency accompanied by the Resident for the express purpose of urging that solicitation in person.

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2. The arguments by which the Resident endeavoured to dissuade the Rajah from the prosecution of this arrangement, are considered by the Governor General in Council to be extremely proper and judicious.

3. I am now directed to transmit to you the enclosed copies of the Governor General's reply to His Highness's letter referred to in the Resident's despatch of the 20th of April, in which His Lordship has entered into a full discussion of the question which forms the subject of the Resident's despatch, together with copies of letters to Shreedhar Pandit and Jeswant Rao Ramchandarra.

4. The originals of these letters will be transmitted to you from the Persian Department.

5. As your complete knowledge of the subject will enable you to afford whatever explanation may be desired by the Rajah on points adverted to in the Governor General's letter, it is unnecessary to furnish you with any particular instructions on this occasion, and it is sufficient to desire that you will accompany the delivery of the letter with a representation in the spirit of its contents, and endeavour to support by mild and conciliatory arguments the object of the Governor General's address, that of soothing the feelings of the Rajah under the unavoidable disappointment of his hopes of obtaining in the present situation of affairs, a compensation for the losses which he sustained by the war.

6. I am directed to take this opportunity of acknowledging the receipt of the Resident's despatch of the 29th of April, reporting the substance of various conferences held by you and the Resident with His Highness's ministers Shreedhar Pandit and Jeswant Rao Ramchandarra, on the subject of the apprehension which they entertained of being removed from His Highness's counsels, and to signify to you the Governor General in Council's entire approbation of the replies returned to their representations and their questions by you and the Resident.

7. The Governor General in Council would receive with extreme regret the intelligence of their removal and would not hesitate to interpose the influence of the British Government to prevent it, if circumstances should warrant an expectation of success. His Lordship in Council however trusts that the apprehensions of the ministers are premature. You are authorised at the same time to assure them of the respect which the Governor General entertains for their characters, and to apprise them that as far as may be consistent with the general principle of abstaining from all interference in the internal concerns of other states, the Governor General in Council will be happy to afford them all the support that can be derived from the influence of the British Government.

8. With a view to this object you will observe that the Governor General in his letters to Shreedhar Pandit and Jeswant Rao Ramchandarra, has taken occasion to express the high sense which His Lordship entertains of their merits and to intimate the solicitude for their continuance in the

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exercise of their ministerial functions. As it is to be supposed that these letters will be submitted to the Rajah's perusal, they will afford to the ministers all the advantage that can be derived from the Rajah's knowledge of His Lordship's sentiments in their favour.

9. I am further directed to transmit to you the enclosed copy of the Governor General's reply to the letters lately received from the Rajah on the subject of Mr. Elphinstone's departure.

10. The originals of that reply and of a corresponding letter to Shreedhar Pandit and Jeswunt Rao Ramchandra will be transmitted to you from the Persian Department.

No. 114—The Governor General explains why the Rajah's request for compensating him by the restoration of Berar or Cuttack cannot be considered.

FROM—(LORD MINTO) GOVERNOR GENERAL,
TO—RAJA RAGHUPJI BHONSLE.

Fort William, 11th July 1808.

*Extract from a letter dated the 11th July 1808 from the Secretary
to Government to Rajah Raghujji Bhonsla.*

In your letter to which that of Sir George Barlow above mentioned is a reply, Your Highness expressly stated your expectation of the extension of your dominions to their original limits—that is to say the restoration of the provinces of Berar and Cuttack, and the tenor of the conferences which Mr. Elphinstone after his return from the Presidency to Nagpur had occasion to hold with Your Highness and your ministers, warrants the supposition that Your Highness still entertains a hope that one or both of those provinces may be restored to you. I know too that Your Highness adverting to the assurance* which you have received from this Government of a desire to compensate your losses to the utmost extent practicable, consistently with equity and public faith, has declared your opinion that it was as consistent with equity and public faith to restore either Berar or Cuttack, as Sambalpoore and Patna.

But a little reflection must, I am satisfied, convince Your Highness that such an expectation is unreasonable, and that this opinion is founded in error.

The province of Berar by being annexed to the dominion of His Highness the Nizam, ceased to be at the disposal of the British Government. That Government is bound by treaty to secure to His Highness the integrity of his dominions. It is evident therefore that consistently with public faith no measures can be adopted with a view to the restoration of that province.

* See Lord Cornwallis's letter dated 18th September 1805 ante.

With respect to Cuttack, the obligations both of equity and public faith render it impossible to transfer the possession of it to another state. For, in the first place the British Government cannot in justice be expected to resign the possession of a territory valuable, not merely on account of its produce but still in a greater degree on account of its position and acquired not by the efforts of irregular ambition and aggressive violence, but by the result of a war in which that Government was compelled to engage for the defence of its rights and those of its allies, and secondly, the restoration of the province of Cuttack would not be consistent with the obligations of public faith, because the protection of the British Government is pledged to the chiefs and landholders of the province, and it would be a violation of that principle to compel them to place themselves under another dominion after having acquired valuable rights and privileges solemnly declared to be indefeasible.

Your Highness will thus perceive the absolute impossibility of complying with the wishes which you have intimated, or of obeying under present circumstances the dictates of my own solicitude to improve the condition of Your Highness's affairs. Your Highness will equally perceive the inutility of despatching a confidential agent with a view to the accomplishment of this object.

No. 115—Jenkins reports having delivered the letters of the Governor General to the Raja, advising him not to entertain hopes of the lost territory being restored to him. The Resident mentions what relations subsisted between Sindhia and Holkar and how the Bhonsle Raja's forces suffered a defeat before Bhopal.

FROM—R. JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,
TO—LORD MINTO, G. C.

Nagpur, 11th August 1808.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Secretary Edmonstone's despatch under date the 11th ultimo and of Your Lordship's letters to the Rajah and his Ministers referred to in that despatch.

Immediately on the arrival of the letters I requested an interview with His Highness's Minister Jeswant Rao Ramchunder, but as he was confined by a severe indisposition, and could not come to the Residency, I paid him a visit at his own house. The contents of Your Lordship's letters to the ministers made me desirous to converse with Jeswant Rao before I requested an audience of the Rajah, as although Jeswant Rao had on a former occasion expressed a wish for such a mark of Your Lordship's favour, he had afterwards desired that a simple statement of circumstances should be submitted to your notice, and Sreedur Pundit appeared to be rather apprehensive that the Rajah would suspect him of having made

complaints, if such letters were written. I also had not before an opportunity of explaining the delay which had taken place in the arrival of the answers, owing to the long indisposition of Jeswunt Rao.

After the usual compliments had passed, I entered on the subject of the letters, and told Jeswunt Rao that from the delay which had occurred, and the cause of which I explained in a few words, I had been anxious not to protract a moment the intimation of their arrival. I read and explained to him their general contents from the copies with which I had been furnished, and waited to hear his remarks on them; particularly on those addressed to him, and Sreedhur Pundit. With regard to Your Lordship's letter on the subject of compensation, Jeswunt Rao remarked that nothing remained unanswered, and that there could be no ground for any future discussion on the subject. I said I hoped and trusted that the Rajah was fully prepared for the nature of Your Lordship's reply, and that he would be sensible at the same time of the justice of Your Lordship's arguments and of your particular regard for the welfare of His Highness's Government. Jeswunt Rao said that everything had been fully explained by Mr. Elphinstone in his personal conference with His Highness, and that although he was not then induced to abandon all hope of receiving some assistance from the British Government, that he would now be convinced of the impracticability of Your Lordship affording it under present circumstances. I requested Jeswunt Rao to obtain an audience for me as soon as it might be convenient for His Highness to grant one.

Jeswunt Rao then asked whether Your Lordship was acquainted with the circumstances which he had formerly mentioned to Mr. Elphinstone and me. I replied that Your Lordship was fully apprised of those circumstances, and that a knowledge of them had induced you to address letters to him and Sreedhur Pundit in the terms which he had perused, as a spontaneous mark of your respect and esteem for their characters. Jeswunt Rao said that for himself and Sreedhur Pundit, they could not be too grateful for such a proof of Your Lordship's favour. He appeared desirous to ascertain what further communication I had received on the subject from Your Lordship. As I had some time before understood from him that the Rajah had entirely thrown off the reserve, which he had for a short period maintained towards his Ministers, and had entirely restored his confidence to them, I did not think it expedient to be very particular in my reply to his questions. I only said that Your Lordship had anticipated from the Rajah's wisdom and discernment the favourable turn which had actually occurred in His Highness's disposition towards such faithful ministers, and that your letters would demonstrate your readiness to do anything in their favour, which was consistent with justice and propriety. Jeswunt Rao expressed his entire satisfaction with what Your Lordship had written, and repeated what he has before frequently mentioned, respecting the Rajah's temper and judgment. He said that when his Ministers gave their sentiments on subjects which His Highness submitted to them, it had

frequently happened that His Highness had previously formed opinions from the representations of others; and that on those occasions the contrary advice of his ministers was generally received by the Rajah with apparent aversion and displeasure; that this however was but momentary, and that His Highness never failed to adopt in practice the really wise and judicious advice; that in fact the Rajah shut his ears to no counsels; but that he easily distinguished between the counsels which were bad however specious, and those which his true interests required him to make. The confidence of the British Government in the Rajah was founded upon its confidence in his wisdom to discern, and his steadiness to pursue his true interests, which were in many respects the same with those of that Government and particularly in the policy of maintaining the most perfect friendship and union between the two States. Nothing further of consequence passed at this visit yesterday. According to invitation I waited upon the Rajah at the palace, and went alone at his particular desire. I found His Highness attended by the principal ministers and persons of the Court. He appeared particularly cheerful and received me with great cordiality. After the usual interchange of civilities, I intimated the arrival of Your Lordship's letters, which I requested permission to present; and in apologizing for the delay which had occurred in the arrival of an answer on the subject of His Highness's affairs, I took occasion to say that it had arisen from Your Lordship's anxiety to manifest your respect and regard for His Highness, and the degree in which the affairs of his Government had interested Your Lordship's mind; that in the midst of weighty concerns, you had given the most particular attention to the subjects which His Highness had brought under your consideration, and had only delayed your reply to His Highness's letter in order to enable you to enter on them in the full and ample manner, which your sense of His Highness's attachment and fidelity to the British Government, and your personal respect and friendship for His Highness, seemed to demand. His Highness received the letters with respect, and whilst the minister read and explained that on the subject of compensation for his losses, His Highness made remarks on particular parts of it, and paid great attention to understand fully its contents. His Highness's remarks were generally expressive of his recollection of the past negotiations and correspondence referred to in the course of Your Lordship's letter; but when the minister came to that part of it which alludes to His Highness's expressions in a letter to Marquis Cornwallis, of his expectation of the extension of his dominions to their original limits by the restoration of Berar and Cuttack, His Highness shook his head and said that can never be. His Highness appeared to be fully prepared for the tenor of Your Lordship's reply, and it did not make the smallest alteration in the good humor

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which he manifested on my entrance, and during the whole of the audience. Finding that His Highness appeared satisfied with Your Lordship's reply, and conceiving it to be unnecessary for me to enter into any particular discussion in illustration of a subject so fully treated in your letter, unless His Highness showed a disposition to be discontented with it, I confined myself to addressing a few words to His Highness in the general spirit of its contents. I said that Your Lordship's letter was so full on every point, that it was superfluous for me to say anything in addition to the arguments it contained, the justice of which I was convinced, was acknowledged by His Highness; that with respect to Your Lordship's friendship and respect for His Highness, and the interest which you took in the welfare and prosperity of his Government, the contents of the letter would also be satisfactory to His Highness; His Highness, I said, might rely upon it that nothing would be more grateful to Your Lordship than an opportunity of affording more substantial proofs of the sentiments with which you were impressed, and that your concern at the impossibility of it at the present time was proportionate, that His Highness's wisdom, and the good faith with which he had adhered to his engagements with the Company, were the grounds of Your Lordship's confidence in the permanence of the present happy relations which subsisted between the two Governments, and that I recommended His Highness to confide in the effects of your attachment and regard when the state of circumstances may enable you to make a suitable return for his continued adherence to the obligations of friendship and good faith. His Highness replied by general expressions of his friendship and attachment to the British Government, and of his confidence in Your Lordship's assurances.

After the other letters had been read, some conversation took place on general subjects in which His Highness bore a part with his ministers. His Highness asked whether I had received any late accounts from Sindia's camp. I said that by my last accounts it was near Shahabad, but that Sindia was expected to move to Soopour, with the view of following up his success against the Jypoor Rajah. The Minister said it was reported that Holkar had written a threatening letter to Sindia to prevent him from interfering with Jypoor, but that Sindia had returned one in similar terms. He asked whether I thought they were likely to meet. I said that as friends I did not think it likely that they ever would meet, and I scarcely thought that either party would be inclined to meet as enemies. Holkar would probably avoid an action from policy and Sindia from the natural irresolution of his character. The Rajah asked what I thought would be the result if either of them were to attack the other. I said I thought the advantage was at present on the side of Sindia. The Minister then asked whether I had received any late accounts of Mahceput

Ram and whether he was still with Holkar. I said, I believed he was. He enquired whether the entertainment of Mahesput Ram by Holkar was not a breach of his treaty with the Company. I said that the mere circumstance of his having received Mahesput Ram was no breach of treaty, and the wish of getting hold of his treasure might probably have induced Holkar not to discourage him; but that I did not think Holkar would be at all inclined to violate his faith with the Company, particularly in the present state of his affairs. No other conversation took place of sufficient importance to be submitted to Your Lordship, and I took my leave of His Highness after an interview of considerable length.

I have omitted to mention that in my visit to Jeswant Rao described in the former part of this despatch, he mentioned in confidence a renewal of the demands formerly made upon the Rajah by Holkar, accompanied by more particular threats of his resolution to take more decisive measures, if they were not complied with.

The measures of this Government appear to be still almost entirely directed towards Bhopaul. The fort and town of that name lately fell into the hands of the Rajah's troops in conjunction with those of Sindia, and the speedy conquest of the whole province was anticipated. From a false security however in those to whom the defence of the place was entrusted, Vizier Mahommed Khan with the assistance of the Pindaris was enabled to surprise and recapture it after the slaughter of the greater part of the Rajah's garrison. This reverse has induced considerable exertions on the part of His Highness to pay the arrears of his troops, and the most oppressive measures have been resorted to for the purpose of raising the necessary supplies of cash. In the mean time since the movement of Sindia to the northward, the Rajah's troops find it difficult to maintain themselves in their other conquests in Bhopaul.

Since Vincojee Pidree left Sindia's camp, Nana Sahab's army under Ramchunder* Waug, which had advanced beyond Jubbulpore for purposes connected with that person's negotiations, has returned to Chateessgurh. Two months ago he proceeded against the country of Sohagpore, and after a bloody contest, has succeeded in putting Nana Sahab in complete possession of that country, the Rajah or zemindar of which is now in confinement with most of his family at Ruttunpore. It has long been the object of Nana Sahab to seize Sohagpore from which, it is said, he will derive a revenue of nearly a lack of rupees. Ramchunder Waug is now encamped at Seori Narain near the frontier of the Sambalpore province. Nana Sahab continues deaf to every overture for the release of the Rajahs of Sambalpore and Patna, and it is probable that after the rains, Ramchunder Waug will be ordered to commence operations in that quarter.

* Afterwards one of the chief adherents of Appa Sahab.

No. 116—The Resident reports that Bhonsle's army has taken Sambalpur, the Ranees having fled. The Bhonsle Raja requires that she may not be given refuge in the Company's territory.

FROM—(JENKINS) RESIDENT, NAGPUR,

TO—CAPT. ROUGHSEDEGE, HAZARIBAG.

Nagpur, 29th November 1808.

I have just been informed by the minister of the Rajah of Berar that the troops of Nana Sahab under Ramchander Waugh have taken the fort of Sambalpur and are in pursuit of the Ranees* who has fled, and may attempt to take refuge within the Company's frontier.

By the 8th article of the treaty of Deogaum you will be aware that the Company engage that they will not give aid or assistance to any disaffected relations, Rajahs, zemindars or other subjects who may fly from or rebel against the Rajah's authority, and the Rajah accordingly requires that the Ranees may not receive protection in the Company's dominions, should she take refuge in them from the pursuit of his brother's troops, who will not of course pass their own frontier. Applicable to such a case you will probably receive the orders of Government to whose decision I have referred the above circumstances, together with the Rajah's requisition. In the mean time I have been desired to inform you that I have done so, and to request that if the Ranees should take refuge from the pursuit of the Rajah's troops, within the districts under your authority, she may either be ordered immediately to quit them, or be detained under your jurisdiction until you may receive the instructions of the Government on the subject.

No. 117—The Governor General decides that Ranees Ratankuwar, who has fled from Sambalpur, shall be detained in the Company's territories, and will not be surrendered to Nanasahab. She is not to be allowed to take any hostile measures against the Bhonsle Raja.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,

TO—THE RESIDENT, NAGPUR (JENKINS).

Fort William, 26th December 1808.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th November reporting the substance of your conference with the minister Jeswant Rao on the subject of Nana Sahab's late proceedings in Sambalpur, the consequent flight of the Ranees, and the applications on the part of Nana Sahab to the British Government to withhold its protection from the Ranees.

*Ratankuwar.

2. Your reply to Jeswant Rao was perfectly proper and Government also approves of your having given him a letter to Captain Roughsedge, although as you will learn from the sequel of this despatch, Government will be pleased to know that Captain Roughsedge has adopted the alternative of detaining the Ranees, rather than ordering her to quit the Company's territories. It appears necessary however to furnish you with instructions for your further guidance in the event of the Ranees actually taking refuge within the British territories and claiming the protection of our Government.

3. The obligation of the 18th Article of the Treaty of Deogoon as well as the ordinary duties of friendship, preclude Government even if any such disposition existed, from affording the Ranees any aid against the troops of the Nagpur State, or from encouraging or permitting her while under its protection or control, to give any disturbance to the Rajah's Government, but the Governor General in Council does not conceive that the terms of that article either require or would justify the unconditional surrender of the Ranees to her implacable enemy.

4. Under this view of the subject instructions have been addressed to Captain Roughsedge for his guidance in the event of the Ranees entering the Company's dominions, a copy of which is enclosed.

5. You will observe that Captain Roughsedge is instructed to acquaint the Ranees that refuge will be afforded to her for the present in the British territories, and that the British Government will interest itself with the Court of Nagpur to effect such a settlement of her affairs as may provide for her personal security and support, but that he is strictly to enjoin her to abstain from any act hostile to the Rajah's Government or in any respects to give offence to His Highness.

6. Nana Sahab having declared his intention of assigning a provision for the Ranees in Sambalpur, it will be desirable to ascertain with precision the nature and amount of such provision in order that it may be offered to the Ranees through the medium of the British Government. His Lordship in Council will not deem it necessary to require her to accept the offers of Nana Sahab; indeed, it is highly improbable that they will be such or attended with such a degree of sincerity as to induce her to think them a compensation for the loss of an asylum within the British territories, and it may be apprehended that the proffered provision is probably only held out as a means of obtaining possession of the Ranees's person.

7. Captain Roughsedge, you will observe, has further been desired to remonstrate against any attempt on the part of the officers commanding the Nagpur forces, to commit hostility against the territories of the Company, and if necessary, to repel any such attempts by force. You will of course express to the Rajah the Governor General in Council's sense of the propriety of the positive orders to that purport, which are stated to have been issued by Nana Sahab.

8. It does not appear to be practicable to give you any further instructions for your guidance at the present moment, the general principle on which Government has determined to proceed in the expected event, is sufficiently pointed out and will enable you to act under any circumstances which may occur and for which the orders of Government do not expressly provide—such further instructions will be issued as future events may render necessary.

9. I am directed to annex a copy of Captain Roughsedge's letter referred to in the enclosed instructions. My letter of the 12th instant will apprise you of the sentiments of Government with respect to the supposed design of Nana Sahab against Rajah Juyar Sing.

No. 118—Jenkins reports to the Governor General the capture of Sambalpur by Ramchandra Wagh on behalf of Nana Sahab, and the meek submission of the Bhonsle Raja to the British refusal of his request for the restoration of his territory and for the recognition of his sovereignty over Shahmagar.

FROM—RICHARD JENKINS,
TO—LORD MINTO, C. G.

Nagpur, 8th January 1809.

A considerable time has elapsed since I last did myself the honour of addressing Your Lordship, but few events have occurred at this Court in the interval, with a relation of which it was necessary to trouble Your Lordship. I have waited upon the Rajah on five or six occasions, accompanied by the gentlemen of the Residency, to partake of His Highness's amusements. On those occasions the very great good humor and affability of His Highness seemed to evince some change to have taken place in his ideas on the subjects which I had the honour to describe in my separate dispatch of the 25th October, and to such a change in fact I have been assured by Jeswant Rao, were in a great measure to be attributed an unusual degree of favour of late manifested by His Highness towards his ministers, as well as the particular marks of attention with which he has honoured the British Residency. Indeed it was natural to expect that the injudicious and absurd reports of his low favourites would of themselves ultimately defeat the objects with which they were insinuated to His Highness.

My despatch to the Secretary in the Political Department of the 29th November will have made Your Lordship acquainted with the capture of Sambalpur by Ramchunder Wagh, and the communication which I had with the Durbar on that subject. I have heard nothing further regarding the operations of Nana Sahab's troops in that quarter. My Moonshiee who has lately arrived from Calcutta by the route of Ruttunpore, was invited to pay his respects to Nana Sahab and his mother,

and on his departure he was instructed with a letter to my address from Nana Sahab, which communicated his safe arrival at Ruttunpore with his mother; his intention of shortly proceeding to Omercuntuc, after which he should return to Nagpore and the success which had attended his arms in the reduction of Sambalpur. To this letter I returned a suitable congratulatory reply. The only subject upon which Nana Sahab spoke to my Moonshah, besides the general expressions of his friendship towards the Company and personal regard for myself, related to the reports of the expected invasion of India by the French. To his questions the Moonshah very properly replied by stating that it was out of his sphere to talk on political subjects; that such subjects were calculated for the conversation of persons of high station, but that it would be presumption in him to give an opinion on them before a prince of Nana Sahab's rank and wisdom. Nana Sahab mentioned other reports of military preparations at Benares and other places; which the Moonshah represented to him, had not at all come under his observation, although he had so lately left Benares. By the latest intelligence from Ruttunpore, Nana Sahab had marched from that place with his mother to Omercuntuc. A great part of his suite and of the troops which accompanied him from Nagpore had fallen sick which delayed him so long at Ruttunpore. His force at that place is said to amount to upwards of three thousand horse and foot, and that of Ramchunder Waugh in Sambalpur to about 4,000.

The apprehensions entertained by the Rajah, respecting the operations of a British detachment with Rajah Kishoreesing on the southern frontier of Bundelcund, and the grounds of those apprehensions were stated in my letter to Mr. Richardson of the 1st instant, a copy of which I have done myself the honour of transmitting to the Secretary in the Political Department. I deemed it my duty on this occasion to renew the assurances which I formerly gave to the Ministers, that no measures would be pursued tending to dispossess His Highness of any places of which he had actually possession, at least without a direct communication between the two Governments. Shawnugur, Muhesur and Joudpore, I before informed His Highness, agreeably to the information which I had received from Mr. Richardson, were the districts under our protection bordering on His Highness's dominions, and forming the southern frontier of Bundelcund; beyond which we had no claim whatever to my knowledge. By Mr. Richardson's dispatch of the 5th of February 1808 however, I learnt that Rajah Kishoreesing had preferred a claim to the fort of Dhamoonnee and the possessions attached thereto, occupied by this Government since the Sumbut year 1859; but I have of course avoided giving any hint of such a claim without Your Lordship's orders, since it would doubtless have given colour to those apprehensions in His Highness's mind, relative to our views of encroachment, and to the insecurity of his actual possessions, which, with less reason he affected to entertain when the affair of Shawnugur was discussed.

Although I was never called upon to give a formal communication of the failure of His Highness's request to Your Lordship for the possession of Shawnuggur, the casual introduction of the subject had enabled me to state to Jeswant Rao the circumstances which rendered that arrangement impossible. The comparative insignificance of that object probably caused it to be forgotten in the more important matter of the Rajah's letter to Your Lordship after Mr. Elphinstone's return. The conciliating tenor of Your Lordship's reply, and the gratifying prospect of future advantages from a continued adherence to friendship and good faith which it seems to have afforded to His Highness, prevented that chagrin and irritation which the disappointment of his immediate hopes might otherwise have excited by keeping alive his expectations of some substantial, though future benefit, from the bounty of the British Government, and same expectations probably caused his subsequent indifference on the ill success of his application regarding Shawnuggur, which had appeared of so much interest in the former discussions.

In my last conference with Jeswant Rao on the occasion of his communicating to me the accounts of Rajah Kishore's proceedings, mentioned in my letter to Mr. Richardson, Jeswant Rao again brought forward the subject of the Rajah's expectations from Your Lordship's assurances. He said that although His Highness was firmly persuaded of the intention of Your Lordship to take the first opportunity of conferring some substantial favour on his Government, he trusted Your Lordship would not be displeased if he took upon him now and then to remind you of his hopes; which His Highness meant, he said, was not to shew any impatience or improper urgency, since the time and season of promoting the accomplishment of his hopes, whether in one, two, or three years or more rested with the British Government; but he wished to shew that he always kept his mind fixed upon the pleasing expectations of the future, held out to him by Your Lordship's letter. Jeswant Rao proceeded to say that the Rajah had desired him to ascertain from me whether I had received any reply relating to the message, which I had conveyed from His Highness.

I replied that although the Rajah's message was not of a nature to require any reply, I was happy to inform His Highness that Your Lordship had expressed your great satisfaction at the manner in which your letter had been received. What afforded Your Lordship the chief pleasure I said, was the sense with which His Highness appeared now to be so fully impressed of the unreasonable nature of his expectations regarding Berar and Cuttack, and of the impossibility of their being realized. The confidence which the Rajah expressed in Your Lordship's assurances, tempered as Jeswant Rao had represented it to be with a determination to wait with patience until the vicissitude of events should afford an opportunity for your Lordship to make the return due to his fidelity and attachment, I said, I should have great pleasure in repeating to Your

Lordship, as often as His Highness might think proper and that I felt myself at the same time fully authorized to repeat to His Highness in your Lordship's name every assurance which your letter contained. Jeswant Rao then dwelt upon the Rajah's sense of the value of your Lordship's friendship, to which I replied with corresponding expressions of cordiality, and of confidence in the Rajah's possessions; which concluded the conversation.

Although I have had other interviews with Jeswant Rao, no other discussions of any importance have taken place, and in my visits to the palace, of course no business was brought forward. Some questions indeed were asked by the Rajah relating to European politics and his ministers on those occasions, but as neither these nor any replies led to anything beyond mere expressions of curiosity on one part and the gratification of it on the other, I need not intrude them upon Your Lordship.

No. 119—Jenkins writes to the Governor General informing him of the loss of Sambalpur by Nana Sahib's forces, his return to Nagpur and the capture of the fort of Bastar by Ramchandarra Wagh through the treachery of the local Diwan.

FROM—THE RESIDENT, NAGPUR,
TO—LORD MINTO, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 20th March 1809.

I have the honour to acquaint Your Lordship that Nana Sahib with his mother and son returned to Nagpur from Omercutuc* a few days ago. The Rajah went two or three marches on the road to receive them and sent me a polite message by Jeswant Rao on the occasion.

A few days before intelligence had been received that the zemindars of Sambalpur had retaken the fort from Nana Sahib's people, a small garrison only having been left, in order that the whole force which could be mustered might be employed against Bastar. I have received no particular accounts regarding the Ranee, nor has Jeswant Rao lately mentioned the subject. Your Lordship's instructions under date the 26th December which reached me some time ago, I concluded to be only applicable to the case of the Ranee's having actually taken refuge in the Company's territories, and under this impression I have of course refrained from entering on their contents in the first instance with Jeswant Rao. On learning the reverse of fortune at Sambalpur, Nana Sahib who had then arrived at Rypore, dispatched a force of about 500 infantry and 400 horse with 4 guns to that province. Ramchunder Wagh had taken the fort of

* Amarkantak.

[June 1809]

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Bustar through the treachery of the Dewan of the Rajah, but the last accounts state that all supplies were cut off and his army harassed to such a degree by the inhabitants of that wild country, that he had requested either reinforcements to be sent or leave to withdraw his army. The Dewan who delivered up the fort had made his escape and was amongst the most active opponents to the further progress of the invaders.

I have had no particular official communication with the Durbar since the date of my last dispatch. Mr. Secretary Edmonstone's despatch of the 27th of January has enabled me to reply in the most satisfactory manner, to the enquiries of Jeswant Rao on the subject of our military preparations to the northward, which had long since excited the attention of this Court. In explaining the cause of these preparations, I conceived a plain statement of the facts and circumstances described in the five first paragraphs of that dispatch to constitute a sufficiently firm ground for demonstrating the justice of the principles and objects of the late proceedings.

No. 120—Ranee Ratankuwar of Sambalpur's arrival in British territory.

FROM—CAPT. ROUGHSEDE,
TO—JENKINS, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR.

Dated 4th June 1809.

From the accompanying copy of my letter to the Chief Secretary you will perceive that the Ranee Ruttun Kuwar of Sambalpur is safely arrived in this district.

2. At her request I do myself the honour to solicit your interference, if it can with propriety be exerted, in favor of the son of a very old servant of the Ranee's, named Deen Bundoo Pahar; he is at present confined in the fort though I believe without any serious cause, and it is much desired that he should be permitted to quit Sambalpur and join his father who has followed the fortunes of his mistress.

3. If without inconvenience any account could be obtained of the present situation of Rajah Jeyti Sing* and Maharaaj Sing† who have been so many years confined in the fort of Chandah, the Ranee would derive much consolation, in her misfortunes, from a knowledge of their welfare.

* Ratankuwar's husband, Raja of Sambalpur.

† Son of the Raja of Sambalpur.

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SECTION 4

Joint campaign against Meer Khan

1809-10

The weakness of the Bhonsle's army exposed his dominions to the inroads of the Pindaris, who were under some sort of protection of Sindhia and Holkar. These chiefs made use of the Pindaris in times of war and, when unemployed, the free-booters made depredations into other territories. Amir Khan, or Meer Khan as he was more commonly known, was an adventurer, a soldier of fortune and claimed to be a sardar of Yashwantrao Holkar, but was in fact a Pindari chief. The cautiousness of Raghuji Bhonsle and his refusal to join either the Sindhia or Holkar in their wars against the British had made him unpopular with both these chiefs. This encouraged the Pindaris to indulge in their ravages in the Nagpur territory. (25th November 1804.)

Meer Khan ravaged the Bhonsle's territory on both the banks of the Narbada and as a pretext put forth a claim on behalf of his nominal master Yashwantrao Holkar, for a restoration of his valuable property, left by him at Nagpur, where he was confined for some time by the Bhonsle. Meer Khan claimed 50 lakhs of rupees as compensation, which was naturally refused. (9th August 1809.)

The Governor General saw the dangers which would arise from this situation and the possibility of different combinations between Sindhia, Holkar, Bhonsle and Ameer Khan as against each other or against the British (12th December 1804.) In any case, the Governor General thought it prudent not to allow the Bhonsle to enter into combination with any of these chieftains. He therefore wrote to the Resident at Nagpur to promise British help to the Bhonsle, in case any of the above chiefs attacked his country. On 16th October 1809 the Governor General communicated

to the Resident his resolution to oppose the progress of Meer Khan, in the interests of the British, and expel the free-booter from the Bhonsle's territory. The Resident was asked to inform the Raja that the British Government were not going to claim any return for this gratuitous help to him. The Raja was asked to co-operate with the British army. (18th October 1809.)

Colonel Close, the Resident at Poona, was placed in military and diplomatic charge of this campaign and an ultimatum was sent to Meer Khan, that in the event of his not receding from his present position he would be expelled by force from the Raja's dominions. (16th October 1809.)

Colonel Close immediately started from Hyderabad where he then was, and proceeded to Jalna where the troops from Surr (near Poona) joined him. The Poona forces also were subsequently ordered to join him. (21st October 1809 and 23rd December 1809.)

Sadik Ali Khan, the Bhonsle general had promised Meer Khan a sum of money to purchase his retreat, but on learning of the British aid he refused to pay the amount to Meer Khan. The British officers in Bundelkhand were also asked to co-operate with Col. Close in case of need. (18th November 1809.)

Close proceeded to Hoshangabad, via Pandhurna. At Hoshangabad he learnt that Meer Khan had retreated to Bhilsa and was proceeding towards either Sironj or westward. Meer Khan was assisted by Vazir Muhammad Khan, the Nabob of Bhopal who was the common enemy of the Bhonsle. He was also supported by other Pindari chiefs.

Meer Khan, however, did not attempt to re-enter Nagpur territory and retreated towards Bhilsa. (19th January 1810). Under the orders of the Governor General Colonel Close had to confine his campaign to the immediate purpose of expelling Meer Khan from the Bhonsle's territory, and he therefore did not feel authorised to pursue Meer Khan beyond the Narbada. (19th January 1810.)

Close subsequently took up the question of Vazir Muhammad Khan, the Nabob of Bhopal, in his hands under instructions from the Governor General, which is dealt with in another section.

Ultimately Meer Khan made terms with the British. The Governor General induced him to settle at Tonk under certain terms and Meer Khan was converted from a soldier of fortune to a respectable and peaceful chieftain. His descendants are the present ruling chiefs of Tonk.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT;
TO—ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR.

I am directed by His Excellency the Most Noble the Governor General to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatches of the dates noted in the margin.

2. The reports contained in your dispatches combined with those which have been received from the late Resident and the Acting Resident at the Court of Dowlat Row Sindia and from other quarters, have appeared to justify at different times, different and even opposite conclusions with regard to the designs of those chieftains. The desultory and precarious principles of action which regulate the conduct and proceedings of the Marhatta chieftains, preclude the practicability of forming a confident opinion of their views upon the apparent tendency of their measures or the obvious bias of their interests. It is probable indeed that the views of these chieftains vary according to the temporary aspect or supposed condition of affairs. Without entering therefore into any speculative discussions of the nature of the actual designs of the Rajah of Berar and of Dowlat Row Sindia, His Excellency the Governor General deems it proper to contemplate and provide for every case which under the state of our information, with regard to the proceedings of the Rajah of Berar, Dowlat Row Sindia, and Ameer Khan, can reasonably be supposed to arise, and to furnish you with instructions for the regulation of your conduct under the occurrence of any of those cases in which the Court of Nagpore may be concerned. The cases which it appears necessary to contemplate are :—

3rdly.—The combination of the forces of Dowlat Row Sindia and Ameer Khan for the purpose of acting against the British power or the State of Hyderabad.

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4thly.—The combination of the forces of those chieftains for the purpose of attacking the Rajah of Berar's dominions.

5thly.—The prosecution of hostilities against the Rajah of Berar's dominions by Ameer Khan independently of Sindia's co-operation.

6thly.—The combination of the Rajah of Berar with Ameer Khan independently of Dowlat Row Sindia.

3. The tenor of your late reports has disposed the Governor General to disbelieve the existence of any combination between the Rajah of Berar and Dowlat Row Sindia, for purposes hostile to the British Government or its ally, notwithstanding the apparent hostile tendency of Dowlat Row Sindia's counsels under the direction of Serjee Row Chautka, and other circumstances which have an apparent tendency to support the credit of such a combination.

4. Under this impression the Governor General deems it probable that a junction of the forces of those chieftains may be connected for the purposes of opposing Ameer Khan, whose Pindaries (it appears by your late dispatches) have actually ravaged part of the Rajah of Berar's territory. In that event, the project will of course be avowed by the Rajah of Berar. The reality of any such project however must be determined by collateral facts and circumstances; for such an avowed might obviously be made with a view to cover designs of an hostile nature. Under any other circumstances therefore than a firm and well founded persuasion that the object of a proposed junction of the forces of Dowlat Row Sindia with those of the Rajah of Berar is to oppose the troops of Ameer Khan, you will remonstrate in the strongest terms against such a combination of their forces.

5. You will observe by the enclosed copy of the Governor General's instructions of this date to the acting Resident at the Court of Dowlat Row Sindia, the terms in which that officer has been directed to remonstrate with Dowlat Row Sindia, in the event of a proposed or actual junction of the forces of those chieftains. In the case supposed, your representations to the Rajah of Berar will be regulated by the spirit of those instructions, as far as it may be applicable to the conduct and circumstances of the Rajah of Berar and to the position of his forces. You will be careful to observe the same directions as are conveyed in the 7th and 8th paragraphs of His Excellency's instructions to the acting Resident at the Court of Dowlat Row Sindia, with respect to a regular communication of your proceedings to the Honourable Major General Wellesley and to Colonel Close, and to the regulation of your conduct, according to the instructions which you may receive from either of those officers.

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observed that Holkar had certainly made very great and respectable efforts, that he had penetrated into the country lately conquered from Sindia and had gone through such unexpected exertions as must surprise all India.

14. His Excellency the Governor General observes that such a representation of the supposed exertions of Jeswant Row Holkar was not consistent with the judgment and discretion which you have manifested in the general tenor of your conduct at the Court of Nagpur. The information which you have since received of the real course and nature of events, will have demonstrated the error of ascribing to Holkar any extraordinary exertion or any degree of military skill, gallantry or enterprise, and His Excellency trusts that your habitual prudence will have induced you to take an opportunity of explaining to the Rajah of Berar's ministers the error of your former statement.

15. It may be proper that you should caution the Rajah of Berar against the danger of giving credit to rumours which are industriously diffused throughout all quarters of Hindostan, of a nature injurious to the interests of the British Government and to the reputation of the British arms, and favourable to the cause of Holkar, and to impress upon the Court of Nagpur a due sense of the peril of founding any course of policy on such idle fabrications. Your own good sense will induce you in future to act with great caution in the event of any such rumours reaching you, before you may have received authentic intelligence from Government or its officers.

16. With the exception of the occasion to which the preceding paragraph refers, I am directed by his Excellency the Governor General to signify to you His Excellency's entire approbation of your proceedings.

17. Copies of these instructions will be transmitted to the Honourable Major General Wellesley, the Resident at Poona and the Acting Resident at the Court of Dowlat Row Sindia, and to the Resident at Hyderabad.

No. 122—Elphinstone reports to the Governor General an attack upon the Bhonsle Raja's territories by Meer Khan's Pindaris which the Raja ascribed to his friendship with the British. The Resident warned the Bhonsle Raja against holding any intercourse with Holkar.

FROM—MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT,

TO—GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 25th November 1804.

I yesterday received a visit from Jykishen Row who came to inform me that the Rajah had intended to have halted at Ramtes a sacred place near Nagpur, till his wife was in some measure recovered, but that intelligence had been received of the plunder of Chaparra by Meer Khan's Pindaries, of their having burnt Mangong a village

*Babai near Hoshangabad .

No. 123—General Wellesley advises Col. Close that the British Regiments stationed in Khandesh may be ordered to help the Bhonsle Raja against Meer Khan.

FROM—GENERAL WELLESLEY,

TO—COL. CLOSE.

Seringapatam, 19th December 1804.

I conclude that if circumstances in Khandesh should have permitted, you will have decided that the British detachments in that province should march into rear, according to the suggestions contained in my private letter of the 11th instant. If you should have complied with my suggestion in that instant, I beg leave now to recommend that in case the Rajah of Berar should call for assistance to repel the attack of Meer Khan or any of the other chiefs attached to the cause of Jeswant Row Holkar, you will authorise the officer commanding the British troops to move to his assistance without loss of time, provided that he is of opinion that he can do so without risk to the territories of the Souba of Berar, and provided his equipments of provisions, etc., are so ample as to place him beyond risk of want in the territories of the Rajah of Berar and to make him independent of any supplies which he might expect there, and provided that he has reasonable ground for hope that by entering the Rajah's country he will be able to bring Meer Khan's corps to an action. It is my opinion that the British detachment cannot be moved far to the northward of Nagpore in aid of the Rajah, without entering the Nizam's territories, but there may be cases in which to move it even to that city might greatly endanger the safety of those territories. Of all the cases of course the officer commanding on the spot must be the best judge. I propose to send Mr. Elphinstone a copy of this dispatch.

P.S.—I enclose a copy of the letter which I have written to Mr. Elphinstone.

No. 124—General Wellesley advises the Resident at Nagpur that the Commanding officer in Khandesh may be asked to move against Meer Khan, if the Bhonsle Raja was in real distress on the Khan's account.

FROM—GENERAL ARTHUR WELLESLEY;

TO—THE RESIDENT AT NAGPUR.

Seringapatam, 19th December 1804.

I have had the honour to receive your several public and private dispatches to the 3rd November and I am happy to inform you that I am perfectly satisfied that the intentions of the Rajah of Berar are pacific. It is very possible that he may have opened a negotiation with Holkar

The attention of this Government has for some time past been occupied by the reported designs of Meer Khan to prosecute the claims of Jeswunt Rao Holkar upon the Rajah, and either to assist Wuzeer Mahommed Khan or at least, to interfere in such a manner in the transactions of Bhopaul,

Nagpur, 12th June 1809.

TO—LORD MINTO, G. C.

FROM—R. JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,

No. 125—Jenkins informs the Governor General that Nagpur was threatened with an invasion of Meer Khan demanding satisfaction of old scores due to Yashwantrao Holkar, and that the Raja's forces were unable to resist Meer Khan. He requests orders, in case the Raja sought British protection, as to the line of conduct he should adopt.

menaces the Rajah's state, is great and immediate.

In case the Rajah should require the Company's assistance, I beg you to examine very minutely the grounds which he may have for calling for it; and I beg you to decline to write to the officer commanding the detachment in Berar unless you should have reason to think that the danger which

I beg you to take an opportunity of mentioning this circumstance to Jeswunt Row Ramchunder; and point out to him the extent of the service which may thereby be rendered to the Rajah's state.

I have therefore written a letter to Colonel Close this day, of which I enclose a copy, in which I have requested him to authorise the officer commanding the British detachment which will shortly be in Berar to move to the assistance of the Rajah, if he should be required so to do, on certain provisions therein stated.

assistance can be given without risk to the Company's allies.

It does not appear to me that the Rajah of Berar possesses the means of paying for any assistance which may be afforded to him; much less those of subsidizing permanently a body of British troops. At the same time it would be very desirable to afford him assistance against Meer Khan, particularly if that free-booter should be too strong for him, and if the

Nagpur.

It is not improbable that as soon as the Rajah of Berar will hear of the late successes of the troops under the command of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, he will ask for the assistance of the Hon'ble Company against Meer Khan, particularly if the operations of that free-booter should press upon him, and if his troops should approach to

has been attacked by Meer Khan for this reason. certainly been relinquished by the Rajah; and it is most probable that he or Meer Khan, the object of which may have been hostility towards the British Government; but the design to attack us if it ever existed, has

as to draw from one party or other, or from both, some pecuniary advantage. The claims of Holkar I have formerly had the honor of describing to be founded on the alleged seizure of his jewels and property during his confinement at Nagpur by the Rajah, and on this head he was said to have advanced an exorbitant demand of nearly a crore of rupees.

The mission of Omaljee Puttel in the end of 1807, as described in my dispatches of that period had no specific result. Under the existing circumstances of the vicinity of Dowlut Rao Sindia and the distance of Holkar's encampments, the Vakeel's representations and threats were only met by evasive replies and friendly professions, and he finally returned to his master without accomplishing any object of his mission. Since that period the correspondence between the two Governments has consisted, on the part of Holkar, in reproaches and threats of revenge if his just demands should still be evaded, and has been conducted, on the part of the Rajah, in that spirit of evasive and procrastinating policy which has always been characteristic and the boast of this Durbar.

From the period however of the arrival of Meer Khan in the camp of Holkar, these demands have been reiterated in a tone, and followed up by indication, which have aroused the Rajah to the necessity of adopting some more direct steps either to satisfy or to resist them. It was accordingly in contemplation some time ago to depute a Vakeel to Holkar's camp for the purpose of conducting a negotiation on the subject. Still, however, nothing was determined and the departure of the Vakeel was deferred from day to day. In the meantime Meer Khan actually marched in the direction of Bhopal with the avowed purpose of enforcing the demands of Holkar so long evaded by the Rajah of Berar, and of advancing, if necessary, to Nagpur. Meer Khan at the same time invited the chiefs of the Pindaris and the Nabob of Bhopal to meet him, and gave it out as his intention to commence his operations by assisting Wuzzeer Mahommed Khan to drive the Rajah's troops across the Nerbuda.

It was then determined to send the Vakeel to the camp of Meer Khan and he accordingly marched on the 6th instant in the direction of Bhopal, at which place or in the neighbourhood Meer Khan or his nephew is said to have arrived, about 10 days ago. The person deputed is named Bappoo Ghurpooreh,* a man of no great rank and he is accompanied by Keshoo Rao, the son of Yankut Rao, Holkar's Vakeel at Nagpur, who died a few months since on a pilgrimage to Tripatty. The principal chiefs of the Pindaris are said to have visited Meer Khan, but no immediate operations in conjunction with them appear to have been determined. Indeed the lateness of the season may be considered a sufficient obstacle to the prosecution of any offensive measures on this side of the Nerbuda, for the present. It is besides likely, and

*Charpure.

correspondent with the general report, that Meer Khan has more immediate plans to pursue to the northward of that river, in conformity to the measures of alternate exaction, which have hitherto been practised by the Governments of Sindia and Holkar on the petty chiefs in that and every other quarter, not immediately subject to the undivided authority of either.

Contributions from Sagur, Curry Cotta and other places, from which they were lately levied by Sindia, are said to have been demanded by Meer Khan in Holkar's name, and in levying these, it is probable that he will have sufficient employment for the rains. In the meantime his negotiations with this Government and the Nabob of Bhopaul may be expected to be brought to a result, which will prove decisive of his future movements.

It appears that in the prosecution of the measures of exaction to which I have alluded, Meer Khan has committed the most shameful depredations upon the territories of Sindia lying in the route of his march, and upon which the Government of Holkar has no kind of claim. These proceedings are described by Lieutenant Close's dispatch No. 15 to have drawn some remonstrances from Dowlut Rao Sindia, and I have reason to believe that some expectations are entertained by this Government of more vigorous measures being adopted by that chief to back these remonstrances. I do not know, however, whether this Government would not esteem the movement of Sindia, or of any considerable body of his troops to the southward, whilst his counsels are directed by Serjee Rao Chautka, a subject of nearly as great apprehension as the actual presence of Meer Khan, whose intriguing spirit and self interested views at the worst afford a likelihood that he may be induced to compromise part of the demands of his principal for some substantive personal consideration.

Yet the conduct proper to be pursued by the Rajah in this crisis seems rather difficult to decide. Whilst, on the one hand, a compliance with the demands of Meer Khan would establish a precedent which would be productive of future bad consequences by encouraging similar demands on the part, both of Sindia and Holkar, on the other hand, the disorganised state of the Rajah's Government, the discontent and disheartened consideration of his troops which have hitherto left his dominions a prey to the lowest of free-booters, afford little prospect of successful resistance to an army led by so enterprising a chief as Meer Khan accustomed to warfare, and flushed with the hopes of a rich harvest of plunder from a wealthy and populous capital.

The Rajah himself is said to incline to the former alternative; his mother and Nana Sahab to the latter. They recommend His Highness to apply the money, which Meer Khan would extort, to the payment of his troops; to reform his military establishments; and to

prepare for a vigorous resistance to exactions, which if once granted, would be a perpetual tribute upon his Government. Such vigorous proceedings however, are but ill suited to the disposition of the Rajah, and of the two plans it is more likely that he will pursue the former, in that spirit of temporizing policy which sacrifices to present ease the most substantial future interests.

Discouraging as the prospect certainly is with regard to the Rajah's ability successfully to resist Meer Khan and the Pindaries, it is yet perhaps doubtful whether that chief would be inclined to come to extremities if he could obtain his demands by any other means. Whatever he might apprehend from the jealousy of Sindia, or whatever other motives might be supposed to weigh with him, he might imagine that the British Government would not be an inactive spectator of the dismemberment of the Rajah's territories, or of operations, the result of which might endanger the dominions of the Nizam, by the establishment of a predatory power on his most vulnerable frontier. The Rajah would doubtless endeavour to encourage this idea and even to impress Meer Khan with notions of the existence of actual engagements to the support between himself and the British Government. At all events, Meer Khan might fear, and the Rajah might threaten that if he were pressed, he would throw himself entirely on the protection of the British Government, of whose acceptance of the trust it is not likely that Meer Khan would entertain a doubt.

It may be also supposed that the fear of being reduced to such an extremity would have its effect upon the Rajah in determining the plan of policy to be pursued in the present crisis. To be obliged to become a party to the general defensive alliance, has ever been considered by the Rajah as the last humiliation which circumstances can impose upon him, although I believe he still conceives his accession to the alliance, to be a point to which the views of the British Government are particularly directed.

If these considerations therefore may be allowed any weight, both parties will perhaps be inclined to a compromise. At the same time should negotiation fail, and Meer Khan cross the Nerbudda with an intention of prosecuting hostile operations against the Rajah, His Highness would doubtless be desirous, on some terms or other, to obtain our assistance. I could of course give His Highness no encouragement to expect it on any terms; but as the case, if it does occur, would involve considerations of great political moment to our interests, I deem it proper at this early period, to submit the possibility of its occurrence to your Lordship's notice.

There are various accounts of the force which Meer Khan has with him. The lowest estimation which I have heard, makes it about 11,000, of which 8,000 are said to be horse, and 3,000 infantry, with 20 guns. The arrival however of Jeswant Rao Holkar at Indore, is reported to be

connected with the object of supporting Meer Khan in the exactions which he makes in the Maharajah's name.

On the subjects above discussed I have had little communication with His Highness's ministers beyond casual and very general conversations on the movements and designs of Holkar and Meer Khan. It was not my part to bring forward such discussions, and the ministers have not been very communicative with regard to the views which the Durbar is inclined to take of the state of things. The fact of Meer Khan's demands and threats, they have not appeared to wish to conceal, but excepting a semblance of anxiety with which they have made enquiries regarding my intelligence of Meer Khan's movements and designs, and his disposition with respect to the depredations of that chief on his territories, I have not been able to collect from their discourse much of their actual feeling on the subject.

Within these few days the Rajah has been endeavouring (**) his troops by promises of pay, and by some trifling distributions of money as an earnest of his intention, shortly to liquidate their arrears, and has issued orders to his chiefs to keep up their establishments to their present strength during the rains, which is contrary to the usual practice; also a body of 600 Arabs who had been discharged, has been again taken into the service. On the other hand, the Rajah and other bodies of horse stationed at Nagpur have been ordered to disperse themselves into their usual cantonments for the convenience of forage. The army at Chynpore Baree, which is the principal station in the Rajah's conquests in Bhopaul to the northward of the Nerbudda, was by my last accounts preparing to recross that river, leaving only a strong garrison in the place, whilst the fort of Hoshangabad on the southern bank is entrusted to a small garrison of four hundred men.

The approach of Meer Khan is said to have prevented an attack which was meditated by the officer in command of the Rajah's troops at Chynpore Baree upon Wuzeer Mahomed Khan, preparatory to which the heavy baggage had been sent across the Nerbudda. The subsequent resolution to retreat is attributed to the same cause, of Meer Khan's approach. Sudeek Allee Khan the Commander-in-Chief of that force still continues at Nagpur, but is stated to be shortly proceeding to join it with treasure to satisfy the arrears of the troops. The time of his departure however appears very uncertain.

From these indications, I should be led to form the conclusion that the Rajah has considerable fears with regard to the termination of the present discussions, but that he entertains no immediate apprehensions of the invasion by Meer Khan of his territories on this side the Nerbudda; and that he is inclined to trust for the present, the preservation of his conquests in Bhopaul rather to the result of his negotiations with that chief, than to the doubtful issue of a contest which, if unsuccessful, would lay open the whole of his dominions to the enemy.

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No. 126—Meer Khan and the Nawab of Bhopal combined their forces and invaded the territories of Sindhia and the Bhonsle Raja north of the river Narbada. These and other occurrences together with the heavy demands made by Meer Khan upon the Bhonsle Raja are reported to the Governor General by the Resident.

FROM—R. JENKINS,

TO—LORD MINTO, G. C.

Nagpur, 6th July 1809.

Since the date of my dispatch No. 11 accounts have confirmed the reported arrival of Meer Khan in the neighbourhood of Bhopal. That chief was subsequently met by Wuzer Mahomed Khan and both together moved upon Chynpore Baree, the principal station in Bhopal, occupied by this Government to the northward of the Nerbudda.

Meer Khan however being destitute both of the force in infantry and of the equipments necessary for undertaking a siege, this movement appears to have been adopted rather as a bravado, than anything else. He summoned the Rajah's killahdar to deliver up Baree, Choukeegurh, and any other places which the Rajah had in Bhopal, and his summons was of course treated with the contempt it merited. A small party of horse which he had sent to reconnoitre was put to flight by the fire from the fort, and Meer Khan moved his camp to a position on the north bank of the Nerbudda about 11 coss east of Baree, where it continued by the last accounts.

From this position parties of horse cross the Nerbudda which from the scarcity of rain is still fordable in every direction, and forage and plunder in the Rajah's territories as far as Seonee Chappara. To the northward of the river his parties ravage Gurry Mundela, the Deoree, and Sagur countries, from the zemindars of which latter places Meer Khan has demanded large contributions. He threatens to lay regular siege to Baree and Choukeegurh as soon as his battalions and guns arrive, and in the meantime it is said to be his intention to canton with his horse in the neighbourhood of Jubbulpore during the rains.

Baree is a place of considerable extent, but no great strength as a fort. Its principal defence consists in a river which encompasses a great part of it, and which is not fordable during any season of the year. It was however taken by Sudeek Allee Khan in about 3 days.

Choukeegurh is a hill fort about 2 coss from Baree and is said to be of some strength. Against Sudeek Allee Khan it held out about 16 days and then capitulated. It was supposed however to have been capable of standing a long siege.

I had the honor to mention in my last despatch that the force at Chynpore Baree commanded in chief by Sudeek Allee Khan, had re-crossed the Nerbudda. It has since taken post at Sohaugpore. Sudeek Allee

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Khan has at length left Nagpur with a small reinforcement and treasure to join it. The Rajah has accompanied him to Puttunsanee, a place about 7000 from the city, and is expected to return tomorrow after giving him his final instructions and dismissal. He will probably be entrusted with any negotiations, into which it may be found necessary to enter with Meer Khan, and although the Rajah seems to have adopted the advice of his mother in preparing to resist the demands of that chief, the ravages to which his territories are exposed, are said to have again inclined him to attempt some peaceable accommodation.

Meer Khan appears to be continually addressing letters to the Rajah and his ministers couched in those mingled terms of affected submission and real insolence, which are peculiar to native correspondence. I received from Jeswant Rao at a visit which he paid me a few days ago, the following communication.

He said that the Rajah had just received a letter from Meer Khan. Its contents were general expressions of his obedience to the Rajah whom Meer Khan professed to consider in the same light as the Maharajah Holkar, and from whom therefore he expected some pecuniary aid to enable him to pay his troops, which would then be entirely at the Rajah's service in whatever he might be pleased to command. For particulars he referred His Highness to the letter which he had written to Sreedhur Pundit.

This letter, as Jeswant Rao described it, stated that Meer Khan had now arrived on the Rajah's frontier, which he had hitherto used all his endeavours to prevent his troops from violating. That he looked up to the Rajah as his superior, and himself and his troops were at His Highness's disposal, but that it was incumbent upon the Rajah to pay them, and that he would thereby secure their forbearance from plunder and their future services. The consequences would be upon the Rajah if his troops were kept hungry; and he (Meer Khan) could not be responsible for any thing that might happen. He was appointed to settle with the Rajah's Government about Holkar's demands, and he wished that could be also done in a pacific manner. If the Rajah would not see his own interests and submit, his country would be plundered and laid waste. His Highness perhaps expected assistance from the English or from Sindia; in either case, his dominions would be ravaged and perhaps his capital plundered. Meer Khan's letter after dwelling on the abilities and wisdom of the minister, Jeswant Rao said, concluded, that it would be consistent with that wisdom and those abilities that Sreedhur Pundit should advise the Rajah to avoid a contest, and satisfy his (Meer Khan's) hopes and expectations without coming to those extremities, which must be so very injurious to his Government and subjects.

The further demands of Meer Khan, Jeswant Rao said, were that Wazeer Mahommed Khan should be reinstated in the dominions he had lost, including the forts of Hoshangabad, Sheonee, Chynpore Baree, and

Choukeegurh. Those and all his other demands, according to Jeswant Rao's statement, were refused in moderate terms, and Meer Khan was told to act as he might think proper.

Although I do not place perfect confidence in the correctness of this statement, as conveying the exact tenor of Meer Khan's letters, I deem it proper to submit it to your Lordship's notice. I received it from Jeswant Rao as I in general do receive such accounts, without making any particular comment or shewing more interest in them than is requisite not to discourage communications of a similar nature.

No. 127—Jenkins sends an elaborate report of the activities of Meer Khan in the Nagpur territory and of the failure of negotiations conducted with him by the Raja. The latter offered 14 lacs, but the former demanded fifty. The Raja was unable to liquidate the arrears due to his army.

FROM—R. JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,

TO—LORD MINTO, G. C.

Nagpur, 9th August 1809.

By the last intelligence which I had the honour to submit to Your Lordship, Meer Khan was encamped near the banks of the Nerbudda, whence his parties of horse were ravaging the Rajah's territories on this side of that river as far as Sheonee Chappara. The rise of the river which took place subsequently to that period, put a stop to these depredations, and Meer Khan marched from the situation he occupied, to Deoree in order to enforce his demands of tribute from the zemindar of that place. Meer Khan having erected batteries which played against the fort with some effect for two or three days, the zemindar visited him in his camp and the demands were compromised by the payment of 25,000 rupees for the subsistence of Meer Khan's troops.

From Deoree Meer Khan made a march of four coss in the direction of Jubbulpore, and wrote to the Rajah's manager of Gurry Mundela and the different commandants of forts in that province desiring them to retire across the Nerbudda. A slight skirmish took place between a party of Meer Khan's horse and of the Rajah's infantry posted to defend a fort, in which the latter gained a trifling advantage, but owing to the heavy rains Meer Khan was obliged to halt several days, and in the meantime the answers which he received from the Rajah's officers, referred him to their Government to obtain orders for the evacuation of the province and intimated their resolution of defending to the last extremity the posts entrusted to their charge.

On the 19th of July which is the date of my last accounts, Meer Khan made another march in the direction of Jubbulpore to a position about 14 coss from that place. He was then distant about 5 miles from the Ghauts

which form the entrance into Curry Mundela from that side, and to defend which a considerable force has been raised by the zemindars of the province who are said to be determined to resist him by every means in their power. By making a circuit of about 30 miles to the northward, Meer Khan might avoid all the difficulties which he is likely to encounter in attempting to penetrate by those Ghats, and should he meet with any great resistance it is likely he will adopt a route more favourable for the action of cavalry, of which his force principally consists. Jejabba Chautka, who commands at Jubulpore, has a force of only 2,000 horse and 1,000 infantry with 8 guns for the defence of the province, and it does not seem probable that he can make any effectual resistance against an army, which by every accounts is now not less than 16,000 horse and foot with 16 guns. Of this number 3,000 are Pindaries under their chiefs Dost Mahomed and

Commed Koowur.

On Meer Khan's arrival at Patna, the place of his present encampment, he was met by Mardansing, Rajah of Curry Kotta, from whom as well as from the Sagur man he had demanded tribute. The former is said to offer a considerable sum as the price of his being put in possession of Teigurh, a fort at present belonging to the Rajah of Berar, to which he asserts some claim, and the latter to promise his co-operation and a larger sum than the tribute demanded by Meer Khan, if that chief will place Jubulpore in his hands. These proposals Meer Khan finds it his interest to encourage, and the Sagur man is expected to follow the example of the Rajah of Curry Kotta in visiting Meer Khan in his camp.

Whilst Meer Khan was occupied at Deoree, the Nabob of Bhopal made an attempt to surprize the Rajah's army which had moved from Sohanpore to Gadarwara, under the immediate command of Ghous Sahib, Sudderk Allee Khan's brother. The Nabob's troops were beat back with considerable loss, but Ghous Sahib was unfortunately killed by a party of Seik horse who came upon him from an ambuscade, whilst he was separated from the main body of his army in the pursuit. When this news arrived the Rajah had just returned from Patansangee to which place he had accompanied Sudderk Allee Khan, and His Highness now set out again to visit that chief, who on his part on receiving the melancholy news of his brother's fate, had made a march of about 14 coss beyond Patansangee. The Rajah went as far as Udassa, and had there a meeting with Sudderk Allee Khan, who afterwards proceeded to Mooltee on his march to join his army.

The Rajah's Vakeel arrived in Meer Khan's camp about the beginning of last month, but it soon became evident that the mission would be of no avail in inducing Meer Khan to moderate his demands. The negotiations were short but conclusive. Meer Khan is said to have defined his demand on the part of Holkar, to be 40 lacs of rupees and 12 or 14 lacs on his own account for the expenses incurred in his expedition. The

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Vakeel offered 14 lacs in lieu of all demands, but Meer Khan refused to abate the least portion of his demands, and repeated his determination to march to Nagpur. The Vakeel is now on his return to Nagpur, and is I believe, accompanied by one from Meer Khan to the Rajah. All His Highness's proposals to the Government of Jeswant Rao Holkar have been referred to Meer Khan, nor would Holkar consent to receive the Rajah's Vakeel, who had been ordered eventually to proceed to Indore from Meer Khan's camp.

From the communications of Jeswant Rao and from other sources of intelligence I learn that the Rajah has hitherto positively refused to discuss any personal demands of Meer Khan, which he conceives to be most injurious and insulting from a chief who is not acknowledged as anything but the servant of Holkar. Jeswant Rao's expressions were that His Highness would not think it degrading to be compelled to pay money to an independent power, such as the Nizam's or Sindia's or the British Government, but that he could never submit to become tributary to Meer Khan, whatever might be the consequence.

In this state of things the conduct of the Rajah, at the same time that it proves his fears from Meer Khan, appears to indicate little confidence in the sufficiency of his own resources to meet the approaching danger. He has drained his capital of troops to increase the force of Sudeek Allee Khan at Mooltaee, which now amounts to about 3,000 horse and 2,000 infantry with 6 guns, and he has ordered 40 pieces of artillery to be equipped for immediate service at Nagpur, but he has adopted no effectual means to conciliate his troops or to render them effective in the hour of danger, and he reserves to the last moment the liquidation of their arrears whether from distrust of their fidelity, or from the fluctuation of his counsels between resistance and submission, or from his expectation of the interposition of some foreign power before the occurrence of the extreme case, in which he may require the service of his troops for the preservation of his person and capital.

Perhaps each of these considerations may have a share in preventing the Rajah from adopting the measures which if he depends on his own exertions, the crisis seems imperiously to require, but the expectation of the succours for which His Highness is in negotiation with Sindia and by the help of which he hopes to baffle the designs of Meer Khan, before the season will permit of that chief's crossing the Nerbudda, has probably the greatest weight. I have not yet heard of any express engagement being concluded with the Government of Dowlat Rao Sindia, respecting the troops which are to march against Meer Khan. To draw closer the relations between the two Governments, I understand that the Rajah is prepared to give his sanction to the marriage of Appah Sahab, the son of Nana Sahab, to Sindia's daughter on which subject a secret negotiation was said to subsist between Nana Sahab and that chief's Government, sometime

ago, but which the Rajah did not approve. This however is at present merely a report.

I received about three weeks ago, a secret communication that it was in agitation to make an offer to the British Government of a sum of money for the aid of a few battalions in the present contest with Meer Khan, from the source through which this intelligence was conveyed to me. I was led to expect an early intimation on the subject from the Durbar, especially as it was said, although I believe erroneously, to have been much pressed upon the Rajah by his mother. Through the same channel however, I was subsequently informed that the hopes which the Rajah entertained of Sindia's cooperation and which letters recently received had increased, were the cause of the project being for the present laid aside, to be brought forward however again, in case those hopes should fail. It has been indeed for some time a general report in Nagpoor that the Rajah was to be assisted by the British Government, but this may arise either from the obvious necessity under which the Rajah lies of obtaining foreign assistance which none could grant so effectually as the British Government, or from a designed propagation of the report, to answer the purposes of intimidating Meer Khan, and of giving confidence in the stability of his Government to all ranks of his subjects, particularly to the monied men, upon the Rajah's credit with whom the facility of raising the necessary supplies must much depend. There is however no mode of extortion which is not exercised at this moment to meet the demands both present and prospective, which press upon this Government, and which whether the Rajah pays money to Sindia or to Meer Khan, must be eventually very great.

No. 128—R. Close, acting Resident with Sindhia, writes to the Governor General that Sindhia and Bhonsle Raja were seeking the mediation of Zaim Singh of Kotah for settling their dispute with Meer Khan.

Camp at Roopalee, 13th September 1809.

I have had the honour to acquaint your Lordship with the arrival of Dowlat Rao Sindia's Vakeels in Meer Khan's camp. They proceeded from Kota where their first object was to secure the mediation of Rana Zalimsing. They were thence accompanied by a Vakeel from that chief for the purpose of assisting in the negotiations. The only information which I have yet obtained regarding them, states that the presumption and arrogance of Meer Khan had proved a bar to their effecting any accommodation; and Meer Khan has been called upon from hence to give an explanation of his intention.

The mediation of Zalim Singh appears also to have been solicited by the Rajah of Berar in his present contest with Meer Khan; a Vakeel named Narain Sing is stated to have arrived at Kota from Nagpore, whose endeavours are directed towards engaging the Rana to interest himself in the restoration of peace. As a further inducement my accounts add that Narain Sing had acquainted the Rana that the subject had been referred to the British Government, in conjunction with whom he could not fail to succeed. The Rajah of Berar's Vakeel in this camp has ex postulated with Dowlut Rao Sindia on the desertion of his master's cause, he has alleged the Rajah's determination to resist Meer Khan's demands and that he will depend upon his own exertions unassisted from hence.

No. 129—This extract contains the report of a discussion between Jenkins and the Bhonsle Raja on the subject of the movements of Meer Khan and the Pindaris within the northern boundary of the Nagpur territory and the negotiations between them for settling their disputes.

FROM—R. JENKINS, RESIDENT,

TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

22nd September 1809.

Jeswunt Rao then spoke of Meer Khan, and mentioned that negotiations had been going on with his Vakeel, but that the object of them was merely to gain a little time, and if possible to defer the period of actual hostilities until the Dusserah, when the arrangements entrusted to Sudeek Ale Khan, and the preparations in this quarter, would be completed. On Sudeek Ale Khan the Rajah, Jeswunt Rao said, placed great reliance. To him were entrusted negotiation with the Pindaries, and all the military arrangements against Meer Khan. He had sent reinforcement to Chautuka at Jubbulpore of 3,000 infantry, 1,800 horse and 6 guns which would soon cross the Nerbudda, and he would himself take up a position to be ready to afford further support.

Jeswunt Rao then asked me whether I had any late accounts from Meer Khan's camp. I mentioned my accounts from Meer Khan's camp, which were that Meer Khan had been joined by about 4,000 horse and infantry under Jumshed Khan and Shahamut Khan, that he had separated all his heavy baggage, and was prepared to take immediate advantage of the falling of the nullah between his camp and Tejgurrh to penetrate into Gurry Mundela.

Jeswunt Rao said that these accounts were correct; and that Meer Khan's Sirdars and troops in general were very impatient of their long inactivity, having exhausted the resources of plunder in the Sagur territories. Many of the Sirdars, he said, had insisted upon either getting their dismissal or being ordered to attack Jubbulpore; and Meer Khan had written to the

Rajah, mentioning his long forbearance and distinctly apprising His Highness that any hostility which might now be committed would not be imputable to himself.

Jeswunt Rao next hinted at certain reports which he said prevailed about Meer Khan's ultimate intentions, and asked what I thought of them. I requested him to be more explicit. He said that the reports were that Meer Khan was invited by the Nizam to invade Berar, and that the Nizam had promised him sums of money which he might require for the support of a large army in such an expedition.

I said that the reports which Jeswunt Rao had mentioned on other subjects, were sufficient to show the idle and unfounded rumors which were frequently afloat, and that they were seldom worth notice. Jeswunt Rao went on to say that what he had now mentioned did not rest entirely on common report, that Meer Khan's Vakeel asserted that his master's object was not confined to that of realizing the demands which had been made on the Rajah; indeed that he said expressly, that his ultimate object was the invasion of Berar agreeably to invitation from the Nizam, and the Vakeel had urged this, as a reason, why his master was desirous of an early settlement of the discussions with the Rajah, in order that he might be at liberty, when the season would admit, of his moving to the southward.

Meer Khan, Jeswunt Rao added, had formed high notions of the destiny which awaited him, and even his Sirdars affected to pay him part of that homage which, some late predictions had put it into his head, he should shortly be entitled to receive, as King of Delhi. His force, Jeswunt Rao said, was daily increasing, and that he would not want for numbers to follow him anywhere in the hope of plunder.

I remarked that if Meer Khan had such intentions he was not acting very prudently in raising to himself so many enemies, as his licentious proceedings could not fail to do. Jeswunt Rao said that he had no other way of collecting an army than by such proceedings. He then asked what would be done, if Meer Khan invaded Berar. I replied that the British Government and the Nizam would be ready to repel attack from any quarter. Nothing further of consequence passed, excepting that Jeswunt Rao mentioned in some part of the conversation that it was said, Meer Khan had sent persons to explore the roads into Berar from the Handia ghaut, by which it was supposed he would cross the Nerbudda.

Since the date of my last dispatch Meer Khan's Vakeel has obtained more attentions to his demands than the Rajah paid to them at that time. As he was peremptory in insisting upon being dismissed, the Rajah was induced to make an offer of 4 lacks of rupees to Meer Khan to induce him to withdraw. The terms of the offer, however, were said to be that 20,000 only should be paid immediately, the principal sum not to be liquidated until Meer Khan should be ten marches from the frontier of Curry Mundela. This offer induced the Vakeel to delay his departure until

[Sept. selected by the Vakeel named Napore, whose interest himself Jeswunt Rao had been told that he was to be more explicit. He said that the reports were that Meer Khan was invited by the Nizam to invade Berar, and that the Nizam had promised him sums of money which he might require for the support of a large army in such an expedition. I said that the reports which Jeswunt Rao had mentioned on other subjects, were sufficient to show the idle and unfounded rumors which were frequently afloat, and that they were seldom worth notice. Jeswunt Rao went on to say that what he had now mentioned did not rest entirely on common report, that Meer Khan's Vakeel asserted that his master's object was not confined to that of realizing the demands which had been made on the Rajah; indeed that he said expressly, that his ultimate object was the invasion of Berar agreeably to invitation from the Nizam, and the Vakeel had urged this, as a reason, why his master was desirous of an early settlement of the discussions with the Rajah, in order that he might be at liberty, when the season would admit, of his moving to the southward. Meer Khan, Jeswunt Rao added, had formed high notions of the destiny which awaited him, and even his Sirdars affected to pay him part of that homage which, some late predictions had put it into his head, he should shortly be entitled to receive, as King of Delhi. His force, Jeswunt Rao said, was daily increasing, and that he would not want for numbers to follow him anywhere in the hope of plunder. I remarked that if Meer Khan had such intentions he was not acting very prudently in raising to himself so many enemies, as his licentious proceedings could not fail to do. Jeswunt Rao said that he had no other way of collecting an army than by such proceedings. He then asked what would be done, if Meer Khan invaded Berar. I replied that the British Government and the Nizam would be ready to repel attack from any quarter. Nothing further of consequence passed, excepting that Jeswunt Rao mentioned in some part of the conversation that it was said, Meer Khan had sent persons to explore the roads into Berar from the Handia ghaut, by which it was supposed he would cross the Nerbudda. Since the date of my last dispatch Meer Khan's Vakeel has obtained more attentions to his demands than the Rajah paid to them at that time. As he was peremptory in insisting upon being dismissed, the Rajah was induced to make an offer of 4 lacks of rupees to Meer Khan to induce him to withdraw. The terms of the offer, however, were said to be that 20,000 only should be paid immediately, the principal sum not to be liquidated until Meer Khan should be ten marches from the frontier of Curry Mundela. This offer induced the Vakeel to delay his departure until

receipt of further orders from his principal, and it was to the negotiation connected with it, that Jeswunt Rao alluded, as described in the 11th para. of this despatch.

The negotiations with the Pindaries continue in an undecided state. Their demands are said to be the payment of all the arrears of revenue from Singpoor, Babae etc.; the restoration of those places and a sum of 3 or 4 lacks of rupees as a compensation for the death of Setoo's son who was killed by the Rajah's troops at Muhye, when those districts were recovered from the Pindaries. The Rajah is said to offer two lacks of rupees and the places in question, on the condition of 4 or 5,000 immediately joining Sudeek Alea Khan.

I understand that the Rajah yesterday received accounts that Meer Khan had forced a passage over the river which intervened between his army and Tejgurr, and had encamped on this side of Belharee. I have not yet, however, received any regular intelligence on the subject.

No. 130—Jenkins writes to Doveton describing the devastation committed by Meer-Khan north of the Narbada, to which no resistance was offered by the Bhonsle Raja's troops. Jenkins suggests to Doveton advancing to a point near the Raja's frontier.

FROM—R. JENKINS, RESIDENT,
TO—LIEUT.-COLONEL DOVETON, COMMANDING IN BEHAR.

Nagpur, 1st October 1809.

I have had the honour to transmit to you an extract from my dispatch under date the 22nd ultimo to the address of the Right Honourable the Governor General, the last paragraph of which mentioned accounts to have been received by the Rajah of the entrance of Meer Khan into Gurry Mundela. I now deem it proper to describe more particularly for your information, the progress of that Chief's proceedings, down to the date of my latest account.

Meer Khan commenced his operations on the 10th ultimo by bringing up four pieces of artillery to Jhapand Chaut of the River Bhermee, which separates the Rajah's territories from the Sagur District. The force which had been stationed to defend it, was quickly put to flight by the fire of the artillery and the army crossed without molestation and encamped near the Chaut.

The heaviness of the rains prevented Meer Khan from moving further until the 16th when he marched to Tejgurr, with the intention of laying siege to it, or if possible carrying it by a *coup de main*. The badness of the weather prevented any operations against the place, near which he halted until the 19th. During this interval most of the zemindars of the country, who had deserted their posts from the moment of his crossing the

Bherma, came into Meer Khan's camp and the Pindaris penetrated to Kuttnungee, and still nearer to Jubbulpore in their incursions.

Meer Khan marched on the 19th, and arrived at Kuttnungee on the 20th which he completely plundered. Some negotiation appears to have been entered into for the surrender of Tejgurr, but it was still in the possession of the Rajah's troops at the period of my latest accounts.

On Meer Khan's arrival at Kuttnungee, Jeejabba Chautka who had a regular force of only 3,000 horse and infantry with six guns, found himself completely deserted by the zemindars whom he had assembled to defend the province; and on the appearance of the Pindaris near his position, he concluded Meer Khan was coming to attack him. Under this impression he wrote to the Rajah on the 21st that he was prepared to make what exertions he could, but that he was afraid they would be of little avail. The Pindaris continued their incursions to Jubbulpore and the bank of the Nerbudda without coming to any action; and the want of pay, and the hopeless state in which they were placed, seem to have caused the desertion of the greater part of Chautka's force to Meer Khan, and to have compelled him to retire to Mundela with its small remains.

On the 26th which is the date of my last accounts, Meer Khan was still encamped in person one coss on this side of Kuttnungee, which is about 10 coss from Jubbulpore. The latter place was the scene of the plunder and devastation of Meer Khan's troops and the Pindaris at that period. The whole of the inhabitants had deserted it, and the boats in the Nerbudda were crowded with poor wretches who are flying from their homes to seek refuge on this side of the river.

Such is the wretched state of the Rajah's affairs in Gurry Mundela, and I am sorry to say that I cannot give you a much more encouraging account of the state of things in any other part of the Rajah's concerns. The Rajah is indeed placed in a very dangerous and almost hopeless condition, dependent as he is, upon a discontented and moneyless army, and feeble injudicious, and undecided, as are and have been his councils.

At Nagpoor the Rajah has probably about 5,000 horse and 3,000 infantry with 30 guns. His Highness, on receiving the intelligence from Chautka which I have mentioned above, went out to Waregaon about 5 coss from Nagpoor, for the purpose of assembling there all the forces which he could collect. Affairs here having brought him back last night, the greater part of the horse have also quitted their standards and returned to their homes in the town. Some time ago the Rajah appeared inclined to pay his troops, but lulled into a false security by a negotiation with Meer Khan, his exertions to that effect diminished, and he appears now to be so much alarmed and affected at the events in Gurry Mundela as to neglect the most obvious and necessary measures. The small sums which he advanced to his troops under such circumstances, are worse than useless.

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Sadeek Allee Khan's force at Sirnugur, Chynpoor Baree, and Chouragurh may be about 8,000 horse and 6,000 infantry with 23 guns. Of this force a reinforcement said to be 3,000 infantry, 1,800 horse and 6 guns, was preparing to cross the Nerbudda to reinforce Chautka; but there as well as at Nagpoor, the want of money seems to have palsied the efforts of Sadeek Allee Khan, and the reinforcement will be now too late. Altogether the Rajah's army was about 18,300 horse and 13,750 infantry with 7 guns. This however included 1,800 horse and 1,500 infantry with 9 guns of Nana Sahab in Chateesgurrh, and Chautka's force which was originally estimated at 2,500 horse and 2,000 infantry with 9 guns.

Scattered as his forces are and disheartened as well as discontented, there can be no rational expectation even if the Rajah were now to pay up their arrears, that they would be able to cope with Meer Khan. The accounts of that Chief's force are of course greatly exaggerated; but I apprehend that he has with him upwards of 18,000 horse of all description, about 4,000 infantry and 26 guns, including 8 horse artillery guns.

He has written repeatedly to call upon the Pindaries to join him immediately, and his force is daily increasing in number by troops from the services of Sindia or Holkar. The Rajah has been negotiating with the Pindaries to induce them to assist this Government, but I apprehend the call of Meer Khan will be better suited to their wishes and their habits. Vizier Mahomed Khan will also not be an enemy to be despised at such a crisis.

By the accounts of my Hircarras from Jubbulpore, the Nerbudda is said to be falling rapidly, and in the quarter it may be expected to be rendered fordable by the 20th of this month. The instant it is passable, I conclude that Meer Khan, Vizier Mahomed Khan, and the Pindaries will be prepared to cross it in all points, and there is but too much reason to conclude that the capital will be their immediate object. From every appearance too, there is little chance of its being saved by the Rajah's own exertions. The greater part, indeed, of his army may be expected to desert to the standard of Meer Khan, as soon as it may be displayed on the southern bank of the Nerbudda; and the Rajah will have no hope but in the British Government.

I have thus pretty fully described the present state of things as they relate to the Rajah and his enemies. In conveying to you this information I have two objects.

The first is that of enabling you to judge, upon general ground, relating to the safety of Berar, whether it may not be proper for the force under your command to take up a more advanced position.

The second is that of taking upon myself to suggest such a movement, if not inconsistent with military principles as connected with other plans of operation, or with the safety of the Detachment on the following grounds arising out of the state of things above described.

I have the honour to forward for your information, the copy of a despatch which I have this moment received from the acting Resident at Nagpore; and would beg leave respectfully to submit to you the propriety of immediately pushing on the Corps of Cavalry from Seroor. You will perceive that it is in Cavalry only that Meer Khan can be considered as formidable. At the same time the Cavalry might be followed by such other of the subsidiary force as you might deem proper.

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No. 132—This is an important despatch from Mr. Sydenham, Resident at Hyderabad, to the Governor General, detailing the difficulties in the way of sending troops for attacking Meer Khan and arresting his progress as Lt.-Col. Doveton was under trial by a court martial. A sidelight is obtained in this paper about the military operations and discipline in the British army during the early 19th Century.

FROM—SYDENHAM, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD,

TO—LORD MINTO, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Hyderabad, 8th October 1809.

I do myself the honour to submit to Your Lordship's notice, copies of Mr. Jenkins' letters to Lieut.-Col. Doveton and myself dated the 1st of October.

The communication from Mr. Jenkins together with the intelligence received by myself from the northward, appears to me to require that some arrangements should be made for the protection of the frontier of His Highness the Nizam's territories.

The first immediate measure which would naturally occur to me, would be to authorize the movements of the Berar detachment to some advanced point on the N. E. part of the frontier. But to that measure an insurmountable difficulty presents itself to my mind. By Your Lordship's order of the 25th of September Lieut.-Col. Doveton is to be brought to trial for his conduct during the late disturbances, and I perceive by a subsequent general order from the Head Quarters of the Army, that a general court martial is to be held shortly at Bangalore. Under these circumstances and considering the nature of the crime for which Lieut.-Col. Doveton is to be brought to trial, I do not conceive that an officer so situated is any longer qualified to receive from me orders, relative to important military and political arrangements, regarding the interests of the British Government in the Deccan. It appears to me that Your Lordship's decision and proclamation have incapacitated Lieut.-Col. Doveton for the active duties of his command in Berar.

By the operation of the same order, the Commanding Officers of all the corps belonging to the British Detachment at Jalna with the single exception of Major Shave of the 1st Battalion (10th Regiment N.I.), have been disqualified from the further exercise of their military duties, as they are either to be dismissed from the service, or to stand a trial for their late conduct. In this predicament, I do not conceive myself at liberty to authorize the adoption of any active measures without a reference to Your Lordship in council.

One mode of conduct which presented itself to my mind was to order Lieut. Col. Doveton down to Hyderabad, and to transfer the command of the detachment in Berar to Major Shave. But as this is a very delicate point, and as neither Colonel Close nor myself have yet received any intimation of the intentions of Government upon that subject, I was

reluctant to adopt a measure which possibly might not prove correspondent to Your Lordship's wishes.

As no order has been received relative to the time or mode of removing Lieut.-Col. Doveton and the Officers Commanding Corps at Jalna, and as Lieut. Col. Conran has been directed to proceed to that station with a regiment of Europeans, a regiment of Native Cavalry and 4 battalions of Native Infantry, it occurred to me that it was not the intention of Government to remove Lieut.-Col. Doveton and the Commandants of Corps, until Lieut.-Col. Conran should have arrived at Jalna and established his authority in Berar. Under this persuasion I did not feel myself at liberty to make any temporary arrangement relative to the detachment at Jalna without Your Lordship's express sanction and authority.

The Detachment in Berar therefore appears to me disqualified at present for immediate service. Had I conceived it to be in my power to remove the restraint, which circumstances have produced, and to qualify the Detachment for active service, it was my intention to authorize the immediate advance of the 1st regiment of Native Cavalry and two battalions of Native Infantry from Secunderabad. For this service I should have selected the 2nd battalion 5th regiment and the 2nd battalion 21st regiment, because I perceived that these battalions are to remain with the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, and I concluded that they will accompany Lieut. Col. Conran to Jalna on account of their being complete in European Officers. This part of the arrangement would therefore have tended to facilitate the measures proposed for the relief and future situation of the subsidiary force. I should have taken it upon myself to authorize the advance of the 1st battalion of N. C., altho' it would have interfered with the proposed allotment of the corps of cavalry, because I consider it to be of the utmost importance to render the force in Berar as complete and effective in cavalry as possible.

Had these measures been adopted I should have directed the Berar Detachment to march from Jalna towards Ellichpoor, and the troops from Secunderabad to move towards the same point by Nandair and *Bausseem. By this arrangement there would have been collected in the neighbourhood of Ellichpoor, by the 15th of November a force, consisting of 3 regiments of native cavalry with 6 galloper guns; the troops of horse artillery, with 8 guns; and 5 battalions of native infantry with 10 guns, that is 1,200 cavalry, 400 infantry and 24 pieces of artillery. To this force, might be added 2,000 of the Nizam's best horse under Salabut Khan, and 3,000 of the Nizam's contingent infantry.

But the same considerations, which prevented me from taking any immediate measures to place the Detachment at Jalna in a situation to be employed on active service, have restrained me from reinforcing that

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It is probable that the force under Lieut. Col. Conran, will not reach Hyderabad before the beginning of November. It will require some days to prepare the force for its march to Berar, and considering that it will be important to take up the Royal Regiment in as efficient a state as possible, I do not conceive that the force can reach an advanced point in Berar till the middle of December.

By Mr. Jenkins' last advices it appears not improbable that Meer Khan may cross the Nerbudda during the present month, and that he may be at Nagpoor early in November.

As the season for active operations in the field is near at hand, and as the rapid succession of important events may render it difficult to wait for the result of future references to Your Lordship's authority, it is incumbent upon me to submit my opinions respecting the probable condition of our interests in the Deccan, in the event of Meer Khan's carrying into execution his meditated designs against the Rajah of Berar; and to suggest such arrangements as may prevent the successful accomplishment of those designs, from proving injurious both to the territories of the Nizam, and to the interests of our alliance with His Highness.

It is evident that Meer Khan is resolved to invade the territories of the Rajah of Berar south of the Nerbudda, and that the Rajah is totally incapable of defending his territories. It is possible that your Lordship from motives of precaution, may judge it expedient to afford assistance to the Rajah of Berar; but whatever may be Your Lordship's determination upon that point, it appears necessary to provide in time, a sufficient force for the protection of the territories of His Highness the Nizam.

It is of course difficult to form a correct judgment of the nature and extent of Meer Khan's views. They may be confined to the levying of a contribution on the Rajah of Berar, or to the plundering of Nagpoor and the ravaging of the surrounding territory. They may extend to the expulsion of the present Government, and the erection of some other power in its place. They may even be of a nature directly hostile to the interests of the British Government in the Deccan. The progress of his views will no doubt be regulated by circumstances and opportunities; and as his power increases and his resources multiply, his designs will probably extend. There is nothing in the personal character of Meer Khan, or in the character and constitution of his army, to afford any security against unprovoked violence and aggression. On the contrary, we have a right to anticipate the consequences which naturally arise from the proximity of a licentious and predatory army, under the guidance of a leader of distinguished talents and reputation, ambitious of military fame, and of a bold and daring character.

But putting aside both the avowed designs and acknowledged character of Meer Khan, it is only necessary to examine the formation of the army which will probably follow the standard of that distinguished leader, to determine the degree of danger which will arise from the vicinity to the frontier of such a force. Since the termination of the last Maharratah War, the troops which more peculiarly belong to Meer Khan, and which for the sake of distinction may be called his regular force, have been subsisted by contributions and a regulated system of plunder. The Pindaris are open freebooters by profession, who know no distinction of Government, and whose depredations are as indiscriminate as they are injurious. Besides these two descriptions of force, there will be thousands of needy adventurers following his standard, who acknowledge no leader and who subsist by pillage and plunder. Whatever may be the designs or inclinations of Meer Khan, it will not be in his power to restrain the licentious proceedings of the Pindaris and other adventurers who accompany him, and he will no doubt be prepared to assert that he can exercise no authority over persons who are not in his service, or in that of Jeswant Rao Holkar.

It therefore appears to me, 1st, that Meer Khan will invade the territories of the Rajah of Berar. 2nd, that he has it in his power to plunder Nagpur, and to ravage the Bhoonslah's dominions, and 3rd, that the smallest degree of danger to the territories of the Nizam, which will result from that state of circumstances, is the immediate vicinity of a large predatory force, which will be capable of ravaging the most fertile part of Berar in the course of a month. Our only security against that danger is the presence of an efficient British force in the N. E. point of the Nizam's frontier.

It remains to be considered what extent and description of force will be required to afford effectual security to the province of Berar against the irruption of Meer Khan and the depredations of his irregular troops. In estimating the amount of such a force, it will be equally consistent with prudence and policy to be prepared for active hostilities with Meer Khan and his whole army. We have no rational security against his aggressions but the means of resisting it. If he should be so imprudent as to commit an act of aggression, the reputation of the British Government as well as the future tranquillity of these territories will require that we should be provided with the means of annihilating his force, or at least of expelling him with disgrace and discomfiture. Indeed, against such an enemy the only effectual mode of defence is a constant preparation for offensive operations of the most active description. We should have a force capable at once of moving with great rapidity, and bearing upon the main body of the enemy.

If we can give credit to the lowest estimate which has been received of the numbers with Meer Khan, we may calculate his force to consist of 20,000 Horse (including the Pindaries) besides a body of Infantry

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and guns. Against such a force it is necessary that we should have an adequate body of cavalry and horse artillery capable of acting separately from our infantry. If we have only cavalry sufficient to protect the flanks and cover the baggage of our line of infantry, it will be impossible to force the enemy to a close contest which should be decisive of his fate. It would be in his power to avoid our main body of infantry and guns drawn by bullocks, and it would only be in our power to protect the ground on which we were encamped.

The system of military operations, to be adopted against such an enemy as Meer Khan, should be similar to that pursued by Sir Arthur Wellesley against the rebel Dhoondia Waugh,* and by Major General Smith against Meer Khan himself in Rohilcund. This system would hold out the prospect of an early and decisive termination of hostilities. Any other system would lead to a protracted warfare and might admit of Meer Khan's unmolested return across the Nerbudda.

Taking therefore into consideration the immediate dangers which threaten to disturb the tranquillity of these territories, the policy of being prepared for active operations against the whole force of Meer Khan, and the particular system of warfare best adopted to bring the contest to an early and favourable termination, I shall take the liberty of suggesting the amount and description of the force to be assembled on the frontier. Cavalry—1 regiment of Dragoons and 5 regiments of native cavalry with 12 galloper guns. The troop of horse artillery. Infantry—1 regiment of European and seven battalions of native infantry with the usual proportion of field pieces.

If the situation of affairs in Mysore should admit of such an arrangement, I should venture to propose that from 1,000 to 2,000 of the Sillehdar Horse be ordered in advance with the regiment of Dragoons, about 3,000 of the Nizam's regular Infantry and 2,000 of the best Horse, under the Nabob Salabut Khan, might be collected to act in conjunction with the British force. The remainder of the Nizam's troops would be required to defend the country against the depredations of small bodies of Pindaries and other plunderers.

This plan, which I venture to submit to Your Lordship's notice, would admit of the formation of a light corps, consisting of cavalry, horse, artillery, and the flank companies of the infantry, which could act separately from the main body of the force, and would be capable of the most rapid movements.

From the measures which are in progress for the relief of the Hyderabad subsidiary force, an army of the above description could be collected without difficulty in any part of the Deccan; of the cavalry, the 1st regiment is at Hyderabad, the 2nd at Seroor, the 4th and 8th at Jalna, and the 7th with Lieut-Colonel Conran. The horse artillery is at Jalna; of the Infantry,

* in Mysore and Karnatak.

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there are 3 battalions at Jalna, 2 battalions at Hyderabad, 1 regiment Europeans and 2 battalions with Colonel Conran. A regiment of Dragoons would be required to march from Bangalore. The amount of the force may be estimated at 2,600 cavalry with 20 guns drawn by horses; and 6,400 infantry with 16 field pieces. That is 10,000 men, and 36 pieces of artillery.

The arrangements which this plan would require, in addition to the Dragoons from Bangalore; 2nd, the march of the 2nd regiment of Cavalry with Col. Conran from this place to the northward.

As Mr. Jenkins has alluded to the fact of a secret correspondence being on foot between His Highness the Nizam and Meer Khan, and conducted thro' the Buckshiee Begum, it is proper that I should acquaint Your Lordship that I have not been able to procure any knowledge of the existence of such a correspondence. However it is by no means improbable that Meer Khan will communicate his designs to the Nizam, when he crosses the Nerbudda; no reliance can safely be placed on the sincerity and attachment of the Nizam, but it will be inconsistent with the characteristic timidity and irresolution of His Highness to afford any direct encouragement to Meer Khan. His Highness will probably feel no concern at the subversion of the Bhonsla's Government, particularly if a Mossulman power in the hands of Meer Khan be established in its place. If the designs of Meer Khan should extend to the destruction of our interests and influence in the Dekkan, I am afraid that the Nizam would be disposed to wish him secretly the most complete success; but I do not think that His Highness would give him any direct encouragement and fortunately he can afford him no effectual assistance. Your Lordship may be assured that no means shall be omitted to endeavour to detect any secret intercourse that may be carried on between the Nizam or his family and Meer Khan.

No. 133—The Governor General's resolution to oppose Meer Khan in his attempts to subvert the Nagpur Government is communicated to the Resident.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVT.,

TO—THE RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

Fort St. George, 16th October 1809.

The Governor General has had under his consideration your successive reports regarding the proceedings and views of Meer Khan which in His Lordship's decided judgment, require to be arrested by the most

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active and vigorous measures. His Lordship's sentiments and resolutions on this subject will be made known to you by the enclosed copy of my private letter of yesterday's date to Captain Sydenham.

A reply to your despatches together with the necessary instructions will be prepared and transmitted to you with the least practicable delay; in the mean time, as it may be of importance that you should be apprised of the measures in agitation to repress the progress of Meer Khan's ambitious and dangerous designs, I am directed to convey to you this private intimation.

A letter to the Rajah apprising him of the resolution of the British Government to protect or restore his dominions by the expulsion of Ameer Khan, if the remonstrances which the Governor General has addressed to him should be disregarded, is preparing; but without awaiting the receipt either of that letter or of your official instructions, it will be advisable that you should communicate to the Rajah the measures now in progress for his relief, and you will of course make this communication to him in the manner calculated to produce the most favourable impression upon his mind.

The knowledge of our intention may be expected to invigorate the Rajah's counsels and to encourage his exertions for his own defence (if not too late), until relieved and supported by the advance of the field force under Colonel Close, with whom you will now of course directly correspond and to whom suggestions with regard to any arrangements in the power of the Rajah to adopt, in aid of the common cause, you will be careful to attend.

For your further information I also enclose an extract from Captain Sydenham's despatch to which my private letters refer, describing the force proposed by him and Colonel Close to be employed on this occasion.

No. 134—The G. C. informs the Peshwa that the subsidiary force at Sirur was required to advance towards the Godavari to protect the Bhonsle Raja's country from the ravages of Meer Khan.

FROM—LORD MINTO, GC.

TO—THE PESHWA.

Fort William, 16th October 1809.

You have no doubt been informed by the ordinary sources of intelligence, of the hostile measure adopted by Meer Khan against the territories of Malharajah Ragoojee Bhonslah, whose country to the northward of the Nerbudda he has invaded, plundered, and subdued and of the design which he is said to entertain, of crossing the river with a view to the

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subversion of the Rajah's dominion and the establishment of his own upon its ruins.

As the subversion of one of the substantive state of the Dekkan by a foreign power is an event that deeply concerns every neighbouring Government, and as the approach of a large army to the very confines of the territory of His Highness the Nizam would under any circumstances require the immediate adoption of measures of vigilance and precaution, I have resolved, in concert with the Allies, to assemble a considerable force on the eastern side of Berar for the purpose not only of protecting the country of His Highness from insult and aggression, but also of compelling the retreat of Meer Khan across the Nerbudda, if he should actually have advanced and if the remonstrances which I have addressed to him should be disregarded.

Your Highness in particular must be interested in the preservation of a Maharatia state next in rank and consequence to your own.

Arrangements are accordingly in progress for the equipment of a force to be assembled on the eastern frontier of Berar, which will act under the personal command of Colonel Close.

As the ally of the British Government it is my duty to apprise Your Highness of this intended measure, and to inform Your Highness that it will be probably necessary to advance the whole or a part of the British force stationed at Seroor, towards the Godavery for the purpose of covering the north western frontier of His Highness the Nizam's Dominions, during the absence of the force at present stationed at Jaulna. If the cooperation of a body of Your Highness's troops, according to the provisions of the alliance should be required, the necessary communication will be conveyed to Your Highness.

No. 135—An ultimatum to Meer Khan threatening him with hostilities if he invaded the Bhonsle Raja's territory.

FROM—THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL,

TO—MEER KHAN.

16th October 1809.

I have been regularly apprised by the ordinary sources of intelligence of your approach with a large force towards the territories of His Highness Rajah Raghooji Bhonsla, of the demands which you have made upon His Highness in the name of Maharaja Jeswant Rao Holkar, and of the negotiations which have taken place on the subject of those demands between

His Highness and you. I have also recently been informed of your having actually invaded and been employed in subjugating His Highness's territory of Gurra Mundla, and it is confidently reported that you have resolved to carry your arms across the Nerbudda with a view to the entire conquest of the Rajah's dominions.

I am unwilling to believe that you really entertain this design of endeavouring to subvert one of the principal states of the Deccan and to establish your own power on its ruins, but the report of a project of such magnitude which is calculated to disturb the established order of things in India and to lay the foundation of anarchy and disorder in the Deccan, is a subject of immediate concern to the neighbouring Governments. Nor can I tacitly contemplate the approach of a numerous army to the very confines of the territory of an ally of the British Government, independently even of the conquest of the dominions of a regular state contiguous to those of His Highness the Nizam, the expected approach alone of a foreign army to the vicinity of the latter is an event that requires on the part of His Highness the Nizam and his ally the British Government, the adoption of measures of vigilance and security. But when to that is added the apprehension that the object of its approach is the actual subversion of the dominion of one of the substantive Powers of the Deccan, connected also in the bonds of amity with His Highness the Nizam and the British Government by the obligations of the treaty, it becomes the duty of that Government and its allies to endeavour, in the first instance, by a friendly advice and remonstrance to avert the evils attending such irregular and improper design, and at the same time to adopt those measures of precaution which the occasion requires.

I cannot admit the plea that you are acting under the orders of Maharaja Jeswant Rao Holkar, because it is impossible to suppose that the Maharaja could either authorise the prosecution of measures directed to the subjugation of the territories of one of the greatest of the chiefs of his own tribe, or that possessing as he does a sincere desire to maintain the relations of perfect amity and confidence with the British Government and its allies, he could sanction a project tending so directly to sow the seeds of doubt and suspicion in their minds, and to disturb the foundations of existing harmony and concord. It is indeed well known that you have entirely separated your interests and concerns from those of the Maharaja.

For these reasons I must consider your late measures and your present views as proceeding entirely from yourself. I therefore address myself directly to you, and as it is impossible for the British Government and its allies to acquiesce in the prosecution of such design against the territories of Rajah Raghooji Bhonsla, and as they have consequently taken the resolution to oppose them if unhappily you should persevere in the execution of them, I must express my hope that you will abstain from the

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prosecution of those designs, and that if you should actually have crossed the Nerbudda, you will become sensible that the continuance of your army in that position is incompatible with the preservation of confidence and harmony, and will gratify the wishes of the British Government and its allies by immediately withdrawing it, for in a case of this kind the interests of Maharajah Raghooji Bhonsla and those of the British Government and its allies are one and the same.

As the demands that you have made upon Rajah Raghooji Bhonsla are preferred in the name of Maharajah Jeswantara Holkar, the British Government and its allies will be disposed to become the medium of their amicable adjustment upon principles of strict equity and justice between those chiefs. The intervention of your power can neither be necessary nor proper.

No. 136—The despatch intimates the G. C.'s resolution to oppose Meer Khan in his attempt to invade the Nagpur territories; his reasons for doing so; Col. Close put in military as well as diplomatic charge of the campaign. The Raja is not to be asked to bear the costs of the British army.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,

TO—(JENKINS) RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

Fort William, 18th October 1809.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches on the subject of the views and proceedings of Meer Khan, and to express to you the high sense which the Right Honourable Governor General entertains of the judgment and political ability manifested in the discussions contained in your despatch of the 8th of September.

2. It is not necessary to enter into a discussion on all the cases of which you have contemplated the possibility. It is sufficient to inform you that your reasoning is generally approved.

3. His Lordship entirely approves the tenor of your letters of the 1st instant to the address of the Resident at Hyderabad and Lt.-Col. Doveton, copies of which have been transmitted to the Governor General by the former of those officers. It was obviously necessary under any decision that Government might have formed in consequence of a proceeding of Meer Khan, to provide for the security of the frontier of our ally the Nizam, and with reference to that object only it would have been required to move forward to the eastern frontier of Berar a considerable force.

4. But considerations of a more extended nature have led the Governor General to determine to oppose Meer Khan's design of subjugating the territories of the Rajah of Nagpur, and to drive him from the southward of the Nerbudda. Even admitting that the present designs of Meer Khan are not so extensive as those which have been conjecturally ascribed to him, the success of his immediate operations against the state of Nagpur is certainly of a nature to inspire them in the mind of a soldier of fortune, whose power has been gradually and rapidly augmenting, whose independence of the state to which he is nominally subject has systematically been accomplished, and whose ambitious disposition, energy of character and military talents are too well known to warrant a belief, that his schemes of aggrandisement will be limited so long as he shall be left at liberty to mature and extend them.

5. The weak and inefficient condition of every other military power in India (that of the British Government excepted) has afforded an ample field for the prosecution of what appears to be the primary object of Meer Khan's ambition, to become the founder of a new Musalman power in India. The danger to which the security and tranquillity of the British Empire in India would be exposed by its accomplishment is too obvious to need illustration, and it would be difficult to imagine a case, in which the exertions of our arms could be required upon principles more urgently and strictly defensive.

6. The question therefore to be decided is not simply whether it is just and expedient to aid Rajah Raghooji Bhonsla in the defence or recovery of his dominions, although in point of policy the essential change in the political state of India which would be occasioned by the extinction of one of the substantive powers of the Deccan, might warrant and require our interference, but whether an enterprising and ambitious Musalman chief at the head of a numerous army, irresistible by any power but that of the Company, should be permitted to establish his authority on the ruins of the Rajah's dominions, over territories contiguous to those of our ally with whom community of religion, combined with local power and resources might lead to the formation of projects not uncongenial, it is to be feared, to the mind of the Nizam or certainly consistent with the views and hopes of a powerful party in his dominions, for the subversion of the alliance. Of such a question there can be but one solution.

7. The Governor General with reference to these considerations has come to the determination to prevent the establishment of Meer Khan's dominion on the ruin of that of Rajah Raghooji Bhonsla. I am accordingly directed to transmit to you the accompanying letter* from His Lordship to Meer Khan requiring him to relinquish his designs against the state of Nagpur, which you will be pleased to cause to be conveyed

* which has already been forwarded in a private letter with copy. (Sd.) N. B. E.

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we should be prohibited from interfering by the established principles of our Government. If the consequences of his destruction were dangerous to our interest, we could not in truth claim the merit of coming forward exclusively for the Rajah's benefit, and though this consideration cannot be supposed to deprive us of the right to require some compensation for assistance so critical and important, the Governor General is of opinion that it is entitled to some right in dictating a liberal course of policy towards the Rajah.

Second,—The Rajah suffered very severely by the result of the war of 1803. More so comparatively in point of territorial cessions than either Sindia or Holkar by the result of their contest with us. We have often expressed our regret for his losses and our readiness to avail ourselves of any favourable opportunity to repair them. The Right Honourable the Governor General is of opinion, that the gratuitous support to be at present afforded to His Highness may justly be considered a benefit of such magnitude as to supersede whatever claims could be founded on our conditional promises, and in a great degree to meet those pretensions to our favourable consideration which the Rajah has so frequently urged.

14. It is possible also that our military operations may dispossess Meer Khan of his territories (Sironj), in which event its annexation to the Rajah's dominions would be a measure of expediency both as an accession of resources to the Rajah, which events have proved to be politically desirable, and as a further demonstration of the sincerity of our desire to compensate, to a certain extent, for the losses he sustained during the last war.

No. 137—Colonel Close asks Captain Hamilton to arrange for the quick despatch of the subsidiary force at Sirur to Jalna to prevent Meer Khan's ravages.

FROM—COL. B. CLOSE,

TO—CAPTAIN W. HAMILTON.

Secunderabad, 21st October 1809.

In consequence of confidential information from the Right Honourable the Governor General received this morning by express I have to signify my desire that the 2nd Regiment of Native Cavalry, with its galloper guns, may be directed to proceed with all practicable expedition from Seroor to Jalna.

You will adopt the requisite measure for supplying the regiment with 2 bullocks to each horse, and for providing the regiment, with two months' pay in advance.

That according to the obligations of treaty the views and interests of His Highness and of his allies, the Nizam, and the British Government, are one and the same and do not require the aid or interposition of other chiefs and states. That it is now understood that Meer Khan has assembled a large army with a view to subvert the dominion of a Chief of the Marhatta tribe, next in rank and consequence to His Highness himself, and to spread confusion and disorder in the countries of the Deccan. That such designs are inconsistent with the attachment which Meer Khan professes to His Highness, calculated to disturb the tranquillity of the dominions of the allies, and cannot therefore be permitted to take effect, and that His Highness therefore recommends him to afford the only proof which is required of his subservience to the wishes of His Highness, by relinquishing the prosecution of such improper designs. B. C.

Memorandum of a reply on the part of His Highness the Paishwa

to the letter addressed to him by Meer Khan.

No. 138A.

By orders received from the Right Honourable the Governor General Paishwa to the letter addressed to His Highness by Meer Khan. You will be pleased to render it into the Marhatta language and cause it to be communicated to the Paishwa, as containing the matter, which it is my wish, should be conveyed in his answer to the above chief.

Malwat, 8th November 1809.

FROM—COL. CLOSE.

No. 138—Col. Close sends a draft of a reply which the Peshwa was to write to Meer Khan in answer to his letter. The draft follows.

Should Major General Champagne have joined the subsidiary force, you will be pleased to furnish him with a copy of this letter in order that he may be apprised of my anxiety that the corps, thus equipped, should march to Jalna with the utmost dispatch. It is proper that I should state to you that it is my intention to proceed to Jalna, without loss of time, and Major Lewis is to be informed that if he reach Jalna before my arrival at that station, the troops there will be under the command of the Senior Officer present.

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No. 139—Jenkins supplies Col. Close with a description of the forces and camp
equipment of Meer Khan as observed personally by his spies.

FROM—RICHARD JENKINS;

TO—COL. CLOSE AT JALNA.

Camp Ramtek, 30th November 1809.

I have the honour to inform you that my Harcarrahs have this instant returned from Meer Khan's camp, bearing that Chief's answer to the Governor General's letter, which I have forwarded by express, and a letter to my address, a copy of which I do myself the pleasure of enclosing for your information.

2. The Harcarrahs report that they arrived at Meer Khan's camp on the 2nd, but were detained for an answer until the 8th instant at which date they left his camp to return to this place. During their stay in camp, opportunities were purposely given them by Meer Khan to survey his forces, which they mention to consist of about 29,000 men, almost entirely composed of Pathan horse with the exception of three thousand Pindaries, and from fifteen hundred to two thousand infantry. They also say that they counted thirty-six guns in different parts of his camp. The Harcarrahs further state that Meer Khan at the period of their departure, entrusted them with his compliments to me and at the same time expressed before them his determination to plunder Nagpore, unless the Rajah would grant him a pecuniary compensation to the extent agreed upon with Sudeek Alee. The general conversation in camp was to the same purport, but they represent Meer Khan not to have been altogether undeceived with regard to the insincerity of Sudeek Alee's promises, under which he had recrossed the Nerbudda. The Harcarrahs passed through Sudeek Alee Khan's camp on their return which had advanced to Cheerakoonda, four coss from the Telwarry ghaut on the 9th instant.

No. 140—Col. Close informs Russell of the Bhonsle Raja having refused to pay to Meer Khan the amount stipulated by his general Sadik Ali Khan for withdrawing himself from the Nagpur territories.

FROM—COL. CLOSE, camping at Jalna;

TO—H. RUSSELL, acting Resident, Poona.

Jalna, 18th November 1809.

I have the pleasure to acknowledge your dispatches of the 14th instant, and to transmit for your information a copy of a packet, which I yesterday received from the Acting Resident at Nagpore. You will perceive that Meer Khan was on the northern bank of the Nerbudda in force and

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menaced to cross the river and plunder Nagpore, unless the Rajah should discharge the sum, which his General Sudeek Allee Khan had agreed to pay him on the condition of his withdrawing from the Rajah's territory; His Highness, however, refuses to make the disbursement, so that the result will probably be serious. Tomorrow I shall proceed with the troops for Omrawutty, and if circumstances occur to require the movement of the troops at Seroor, I shall address you on the subject.

A dawak under the superintendence of the Hyderabad Residency, runs direct from hence to Aurungabad, where it connects with the Poona dawak. As celerity of communication will now be very desirable, I would recommend that minute and constant attention should be given to promote regularity and celerity in the travelling of the dawak runners under the Poona Residency. The Post from hence to Poona, is at present slow and uncertain. I shall accordingly endeavour to obtain speed in the travelling of the Post from hence to Aurungabad, to which point the Poona dawak extends.

Inclosed are some papers which relate to the system of regulation, which applies to the draft and carriage bullocks of the Poona force, which you will be so good as to forward to the Government of Bombay, who has called for the information they contain.

No. 141—In a letter to Col. Close Jenkins describes the route to the Nerbada through the Rhonsie's dominions and reports the whereabouts of Meer Khan. He assures Close that the Raja's troops will co-operate with him and asks him to respect the Raja's feelings by not killing cows, etc.,

FROM—R. JENKINS, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—COL CLOSE.

Nagpur, 4th December 1809.

I was yesterday favoured with your letter of the 1st and this morning with that of the 2nd instant.

My official despatches of yesterday will have made you acquainted with the latest intelligence I have, or that has reached the Rajah, of Meer Khan's proceedings. The Rajah has a dawak of camel hircarras to the Nerbudda who bring him news in, I believe, two days, but he certainly does not take the steps for receiving early accounts which are in his power.

I had a writer in Meer Khan's camp until he recrossed the Nerbudda, when my intelligence was stopped, but I hope soon to establish another and to get very quick accounts, as I am joining a dawk of hircarras from the latter place to Chawalpatta. It certainly is of great importance that you should have the quickest accounts of Meer Khan's movements. I have often pressed this on the ministers, your advance will be of great benefit in that respect, and if you should adopt the plan proposed by the Rajah of taking up a position at Pandoorina, you can receive the quickest accounts. The roads to Nagpur both from Amner and Pandoorina are very good and the distance small.

Reports say that Sudeek Aleo is thinking of again crossing the Nerbudda at the Kherpanee, or the Chawalpatta Chaut, but I have as yet no correct intelligence; neither have I heard of any movements in Bundelcund.

Deoree, near which place Meer Khan is encamped, has no connection with this Government. It pays tribute as well as Sagur to Sindia, and Meer Khan has several times gained possession of it in the prosecution of similar claims on the part of Holkar.

The Rajah's frontier from Hoshangabad to near Gurraba Mundla was formerly the Nerbudda. He has now only possession to the northward of the river of the districts of Chynpore Baree and Choukeygurh in Bhopaul, which I believe extend between those places and the Nerbudda. They were lately taken from the Nabob of Bhopaul. The enclosed sketch of the Nerbudda fills up a chasm which is void in all maps, and is all the information which Mr. Lloyd has yet been able to obtain of that quarter from want of some known place to work on, which he has now obtained in Sagur, from the Surveyor General.

Besides the districts of Chynpore Baree the Rajah's mother has Gunje Basoudee near Bhilsa from Sindia for *Pam*. Meer Khan in coming down took possession of it, but was gallant enough to restore it, and to give liberty to the old lady's Dewan, whom he had carried away.

With regard to the Nuwab Sullabat Khan the Rajah has made no direct intimation to me: Some time ago when it was expected you might come to Nagpore, Jeswant Rao gave some hints that if Sullabut Khan should accompany you, as he was a great sardar, the Rajah must receive him. To this the Rajah's mother had a great objection. The Rajah wished me to know this although he did not wish his name to be used on the occasion. He had no objection to the troops, but to the Nuwab and Futteh Jung Khan. From this circumstance and from His Highness's request on a former occasion that the Nuwab's troops might not accompany Col. Doveton in the pursuit of the Pindarries through his territories, I should infer that unless absolutely necessary the Rajah would be well pleased if they did not accompany the British troops.

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There is another subject which the Rajah has not touched upon probably from delicacy or a fear of offending. This is the killing of beef in His Highness's territories, which is generally forbidden under severe penalties, although there are some particular places where it is tolerated or winked at, if done privately. It is not allowed publicly, I understand, in any of his camps, although it may be sometimes done underhand by his Musalman troops. An assurance on this subject, would I conceive be very gratifying to His Highness's feelings.

I have the pleasure to send you a surveyed route from Bisnoor to Amner by Ashlee and Sawangee. My latter despatch of yesterday will have made you acquainted with the Rajah's wishes on the subject of your route to Pandooerna. If you should have advanced to Bisnoor, His Highness would not of course object to the advance of the British troops through his territories, if necessary in your opinion.

No. 142—Jenkins writes to Close that the Raja was not indifferent to the valuable British assistance given him against the Pindaris, though that would not persuade him to accept a subsidiary alliance.

FROM—JENKINS, RESIDENT AT NAGPUR,

TO—COL. CLOSE.

Ramleh, 22nd December 1809.

I have this moment had the pleasure to receive your private letter of yesterday. In my communication which it acknowledges, I offered my opinion on the Rajah's feelings and sentiments merely as they might be connected with the subject of a subsidiary treaty, or the proposal of new engagements of a permanent nature with the British Government, which should seem to His Highness to render questionable the purity of our motives in our present liberal proceedings.

I feel myself compelled to doubt from what has already passed with reference to the object of forming a subsidiary alliance with the court of Nagpur, whether any consideration short of a positive and imminent danger, which no other means could avert, would induce the Rajah to listen to any offers which might seem to him to tend in the remotest degree to render him a dependant of the Company. But with regard to the generous and disinterested assistance which we have volunteered, I feel satisfied that His Highness is impressed with sentiments of the most cordial gratitude. It is true the Rajah has not lately pressed your advance to the northward, but this circumstance, I conceive, to be entirely owing

to my intimations that you were waiting for further instructions. If the Rajah now feels any security, it consists probably in this, that from the present position of the British troops even the defeat of Sudeek Allee would not endanger his Government or capital, and it is also natural to suppose that from Sudeek Allee's late good fortune His Highness has some confidence on the success of his own exertions, although I have no idea that he could so far rely upon them as to render him indifferent to our assistance. That assistance liberally and unconditionally offered, he probably expects to be continued by us on the same terms even from a regard to our own interests which, we have told him, are concerned in preventing the subversion of his Government. The very mention of our withdrawing at a moment when the enemy is still pressing upon him and even crossing the Nerbudda to attack his army, would certainly cause great alarm and even lead His Highness to distrust the original motives which had induced us to come forward. Whether he might not under these circumstances, feel such a sense of his insecurity as to induce him to take it on our own terms is a question of opinion and which I am not able to pronounce, but I consider it certain that His Highness has no other wish at present than to co-operate in offensive hostilities against Meer Khan upon the assurance which he has received of our disinterestedness. The Rajah, when asked about co-operation, has always said that it was and ever had been his wish to chastise Meer Khan; he has proposed a plan of co-operation for that purpose; he has offered his forts on the Nerbudda as depots for the British army, and he has always expressed himself in terms of cordiality and gratitude. He does not think that it rests with him to request your advance to the Nerbudda, nor does he, as is natural to expect, show so much anxiety on that subject as he did for your approach to cover Nagpur. His Highness no doubt hopes and expects that you will pursue Meer Khan when you shall have received authority for that purpose. He thinks that the British troops have been sent for his protection and eventually to operate offensively against Meer Khan, without any further application on his part, and he has only lately expressed his wishes that you would do whatever you might deem conducive to the common interest.

I have also always understood that one great object which the Rajah proposed by a meeting with you, was to have an unreserved conversation with you regarding the plans to be adopted against the enemy. The expectation of meeting you therefore and latterly his mother's illness may seem to you to take away from any inference of indifference on His Highness's part, which could be formed from his silence on the subject; indeed His Highness has lately neglected the most urgent and immediate concerns of his Government.

A hint to the Durbar that you were only waiting to know the Rajah's wishes about your advance, would doubtless produce a communication that such a measure would be entirely agreeable to His Highness and

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FROM-COL. MARTINDALE, Bundesleikhand,

co-operate in the campaign against Meer Khan.

I shall do myself the honour of communicating with you a few days hence on further subjects connected with the new position of your force; and at present, have only to request that the movement may be commenced

The aspect of affairs on the northern frontier of the territory of Nagpore, having rendered it expedient that the force assembled in Berar should move forward to a more advanced position, I have the honour of expressing to you my wish that the Serroor Force should proceed to Jalna as early as possible; where you will find the 2nd Battalion 5th Regiment, which is now escorting to that place a convoy of

TO—LIEUT.-COL. MONTRESSOR.

No. 143—Col. Close asks the Commanding Officer of the Poona subsidiary Force to advance to Jalna.

concert with the British troops.

Nerbuddah from Jubbulpore to Hoshangabad, for which I tender my best thanks.

I shall ever be most happy to obey your commands, and accordingly shall about the 7th or 8th be able to march in the direction you have mentioned, though not so well prepared as I could wish, as I fear I shall be obliged to move without a rupee in the treasury.

As a copy of my instructions may not have reached you, I beg leave to enclose herewith an extract of Colonel Carey's letter of the 9th November, from which you will observe, I am not only to cooperate with you, but protect the province of Bundelcund from the incursions of Meer Khan. Should this Chief therefore, fall back from the position he now occupies in the direction of Seronj, it will, in such case, be necessary I should proceed in the direction of Bopaul, by the Ghaut of Maltoon.

Maltoon is nearly 20 coss W by S of the position I now occupy, but should he continue in the vicinity of the Nerbuddah, I will proceed by the route detailed in my letter of the 24th ultimo via Heerapore, Huttah,* and Puttercah.

Agreeably to the instructions contained in your letter, I have directed the battering train at Calpee to move to Adlygurrh, being the most advanced and secure position in Bundelcund.

N. B.—The copy of instructions alluded to in the 3rd paragraph is not forwarded by this dispatch.

No. 145—Col. Close informs Russell that he was well prepared to meet Meer Khan and was proceeding towards Hoshangabad.

FROM—COL. CLOSE;

TO—HENRY RUSSELL, acting Resident, Poona.

Pandurna, 4th January 1810.

I had the honour of addressing you on the 23rd December enclosing a copy of a letter which in order to save time, I transmitted direct to Lieutenant Colonel Montresor, instructing him to march with the Seroor force to Jaulna with all convenient expedition, and altho' sufficient time has not yet passed to admit of my receiving an answer, I trust that by this period, he will have put himself in a state of preparation to move. The enclosed akhbar contains the latest accounts received from the Nerbudda.

*Near Dhamoni, 24° N 80° E.

and as this army is now sufficiently equipped to move in advance, I shall march tomorrow morning towards Hoshangabad.

As two convoys of treasure and grain for the use of the troops, are still on their way from Hyderabad, I shall leave a battalion at Omra-wutty, and another at Annair to wait their arrival, and escort them to camp.

Meer Khan's Pindaries continue to plunder the northern part of the Nagpore territory, and a report prevails that a body of them have lately made their appearance at a point about half way from hence to Nagpore, but the rumour requires confirmation.

According to the latest akhbars received here from Hindostan, Sindia's army is employed against Shawpore, and Holkar's in levying contributions at Rutlaum.

No. 146—Jenkins forwards to Close Meer Khan's reply and comments on the disagreement between the Raja and his brother, Manasahab.

FROM—JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,

TO—COL. CLOSE.

Nagpur, 11th January 1810.

I lose no time in forwarding a Khureetah to your address from Meer Khan which was brought to Ramteeg by a pair of his hircurras, together with a letter to Shreedhar Pandit, and sent to me by the Rajah's orders. I have also the honour to enclose a copy of Meer Khan's letter to Shreedhar Pandit, and of the note from Jeswant Rao which accompanied it when sent for my perusal. I will not delay the packet to make translations of these documents.

The Rajah left it to me to keep Meer Khan's hircurras here for your answer, or to send them on to your camp. For obvious reasons I thought it as well that they should remain here under the care of the Rajah's people. The Rajah encamps today about 3 miles from the city which he does not enter until a lucky day; his family and Nana Sahib arrived at the mahal last night. There is a report of Nana Sahib going to Chanda in consequence of the disagreements which have already begun to break out between him and the Rajah. This measure the Rajah will of course oppose, and every day may be expected to add fresh fuel to the flames of discord which were with so much difficulty kept under during the life-time of their mother.

The untoward disposition of his brother and the tenor of Meer Khan's letter to the minister, ought to have some effect in turning the Raja's mind towards closer connection with the British Government, and I trust shortly to be enabled to open the negotiation directed in Mr. Secretary Edmonstone's despatch of the 14th ultimo with fair prospect of success.

No. 147—Thomas Sydenham, Resident at Hyderabad, writes to the G. G. a full report of a visit he and Col. Close paid to the Nizam, in which they discussed the measures adopted by the G. G. for protecting the territory of the Bhonsle Raja from the attacks of Meer Khan. The document discloses the masterly and clever measures which Sydenham and Close concerted to raise the British power in public estimation.

FROM—T. SYDENHAM, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD,
TO—LORD MINTO, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Hyderabad, 12th January 1810.

Previously to Colonel Close's departure from Hyderabad, I accompanied him to Durbar where he was received by the Nizam with the usual ceremonies and attentions. Your Lordship's letter was delivered to His Highness, and I entered into a distinct explanation of the views with which Your Lordship had determined to collect a large and efficient force on the frontier of Berar.

I stated that the first object of that measure was to afford complete security to the northern possessions of His Highness. The next object was to protect the Raja of Berar from the unprovoked aggression of Meer Khan. I had no doubt that His Highness would recognize in these views, the alacrity and zeal of the British Government in providing for the tranquillity and safety of His Highness's possessions, and the liberal policy of the Governor General in protecting a neighbouring and friendly state from injury and aggression. I reviewed the late proceedings of Meer Khan, and stated that he had obtained possession by force, of the Bhonsla's districts north of the Nerbudda; that he had established his authority over those districts; that he now demanded a heavy contribution from the Raja of Berar; that he threatened to destroy Nagpore, if his insolent and unfounded demand was not immediately complied with, and that he had procured the assistance of the Nabob of Bopaul and of the Pindaris to enforce this menace. I observed that Meer Khan could claim no rights to seize upon the possessions of the Raja of Berar, or to exact a contribution from that Prince. We had no reason to suppose that the Government of Holkar had authorized those licentious proceedings. It was probable that Meer Khan assumed the name of Holkar to cover his own ambitious projects. From these considerations the Governor General was disposed to treat Meer Khan as an unauthorized

an army of freebooters.

inconvenience of an expensive system of defence.

a more frequent intercourse with His Highness; but it was satisfactory

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to him to reflect that the service on which he was about to be employed, was so closely connected with the interests of His Highness.

The Nizam appeared to be pleased at this communication, and employed many polite and complimentary expressions towards Colonel Close.

I then requested that His Highness would authorize the immediate transmission of orders to Rajah Govind Buksh and the Nabob Salabut Khan, announcing the appointment of Colonel Close and directing those officers to comply with such requisitions and instructions as they might receive from the Colonel. His Highness immediately consented to this proposal, and directed the Minister to have the necessary orders prepared for His Highness's signature and seal.

I observed that it was the wish of Colonel Close to disturb as little as

possible the present system of distribution of the Nizam's troops in Berar; that as the presence of Rajah Govind Buksh at Jalna might be convenient for the internal administration of Berar, the Colonel would not require the personal services of the Rajah with the army; and that the Colonel would only call for a select body of cavalry and infantry to act with the British troops, leaving the remainder of the Nizam's troops for the protection of the country. That it would be necessary to collect a large quantity of grain in the neighbourhood of Omrawutty and Ellichpur for the use of the troops; and to furnish a sufficient number of bungalows to attend the camp. I said that I would communicate with the ministers upon those details, and some other points connected with the equipment of the army, and that I was convinced that the measures which I should have to propose would be sanctioned by His Highness's approbation.

The Nizam replied that the resolution which the Governor-General had manifested to support the state of Nagpur was equally wise and honourable; and that the measures which had been determined upon, would no doubt defeat the designs of Meer Khan. His Highness thanked me for the manner in which I had explained the views and policy of the British Government, and assured me that whatever I should suggest for the furtherance of the proposed service, should be immediately complied with. His Highness then turned to Moonir-ool-Moolk and Rajah and cautioned them against any delay in the execution of such measures, as referred to this Government.

The Nizam afterwards directed Intizam-ool-Moolk to prepare the draft of an answer to Your Lordship's letter. In a short time His Highness made the usual presents of jewels to Colonel Close, and after a few complimentary expressions gave the Colonel the pandan of leave.

On the following day Colonel Close joined the detachment proceeding to Jalna, and I did myself the honour to attend him to Pulluncharree, a place about 24 miles from Hyderabad.

[0181]

FROM-THOMAS SYDENHAM,

TO—LORD MINTO, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Hyderabad, January 1810.

I have endeavoured to ascertain whether Meer Khan had addressed letters to the Nizam, or whether any intercourse subsisted between that Chieftain and any part of His Highness's family. I discovered that Meer Khan had prepared a letter to the Nizam, and the news-writer on the frontier wrote to know whether he should receive the letter. But His Highness declined holding any correspondence with Meer Khan, and directed that any letter which might be received from that Chieftain, should be transmitted unopened to me. I have not been able to detect the existence of any correspondence or intercourse between Meer Khan and the family of the Nizam.

I have omitted to report to Your Lordship that when Mr. Russell, the acting Resident at Poona, passed Hyderabad, he was received, and treated with the usual attentions at this Court. Two Omrahs, on the part of His Highness and the Minister, waited upon Mr. Russell to compliment him on his arrival, and Rajah Chundoo Lall came to conduct Mr. Russell to the Durbar. The usual presents were made by Mr. Russell to the two

Omraths and to Rajah Chundoo Lall, and the presents which Mr. Russell received from the Nizam, were placed in the toshakhana of the Residency and have been disposed of on account of the Company. I beg leave to enclose a statement of the presents made and received by Mr. Russell, and the difference, 1,430 rupees, has been carried to the debit of the Company in my accounts for the month of January.

Since the departure of Noor-ool-Omrath from Hyderabad to Aurungabad, which place he selected for his residence, I have maintained a friendly intercourse by letter with that nobleman. I have on many occasions exerted my good offices in his favour, by procuring a house for him at Aurungabad, and by hastening the payment of his allowances from the Government. A short time ago I obtained permission from the Minister for the son of Noor-ool-Omrath to visit Hyderabad, to celebrate his marriage with the daughter of Jemaul Khan Lohani. The young man, whose name is Kamyal-ood-Dowlah, lately arrived at Hyderabad, and brought me a letter and a present of two horses from his father. I received him with much civility, and made him and his principal attendant an appropriate present of jewels and clothes. The two horses have been disposed of on account of the Company, and produced 1,600 rupees. The value of the presents made to Kamyal-ood-Dowlah and his companion amounted to 1,200 rupees.

A short time ago Kistnajee Mankaisur, the Poona Vakil, was invited by his brother Sadasheo to meet him at the family jaghire near Solapoor. After receiving his audience of leave from the Nizam, Kistnajee Mankaisur called upon me,

(Incomplete.)

No. 149—Meer Khan's retreat from Nagpur territory is communicated by Close to Government from Hoshangabad. The Nagpur Commander Sadik Ali returned to Nagpur, leaving his relation Reza Sahab in charge on the Narbada.

FROM—COL. CLOSE.

TO—N. B. EDMONSTONE, FORT ST. GEORGE.

Hoshangabad, 19th January 1810.

I arrived here this morning with a division of the troops, the remainder will join to-morrow forenoon.

The troops are healthy, and the horses in good condition, but the draft cattle have suffered a little from the labour they were put to, in passing through a very difficult country from Betool.

Meer Khan's retreat by the way of Bhilsa, is confirmed through a variety of channels, but to what part he is destined, whether to Seron,

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or to the westward, has not been ascertained. Vizier Mohomed by the latest intelligence is at Raseen, and his brother Mahomed Karreem at Chynpore Barree, with a body of cavalry, and a durrah of Pindaris.

Three durrahs of Pindaris, viz., Seetoo's, Kurreem Khan's and Doast Mahomed's, are said to have accompanied Meer Khan.

Suddeek Ally has proceeded to Nagpur, without having given me any notice of his intention to separate from the troops. The first information of his departure I learned from Mr. Jenkins. I hear that he has deputed a relative of his, called Reza Sahib, to wait on me, and that he is on the road from Sohagpore. Bulshee Govind Row is said to have marched towards Jubbulpore and an officer named Jeswant Row Duttajee, is reported to be now in charge of the Nagpur army at Gardwarra. Jye Kishen Punt who resides in camp on the part of the Rajah, tells me that he is uninformed as to the motives which induced Suddeek Ally to separate from the troops, but conjectures that his object is to prevail on the Rajah to pay off a part of the arrears due to the troops at Gardwarra.

No. 150—Col. Close informs Col. Martindale that the G. G.'s views were limited to the object of clearing the Nagpur territory from Meer Khan's depredations and that they did not authorise an advance on Sirony.

FROM—COL. CLOSE,

TO—LT.-COL. MARTINDALE, Commanding in Bundelkhand.

Hoshangabad, 19th January 1810.

I have had the pleasure to receive your dispatch of the 3rd instant in triplicate.

Meer Khan on being informed that the British forces were approaching towards this place, retired hastily from the position he held near the Nagpur army at Gardwarra, and taking the route of Chynepoor Barree, and Raseen, pursued his march towards Bhilsa, but whether he is destined for Serony, or Holkar's camp, has not been ascertained. Such further accounts as I may receive of his movements, or intentions, shall be communicated to you.

I arrived here this day with a division of the troops; the remainder will join to-morrow.

It is proper I should acquaint you that by an official dispatch from Mr. Chief Secretary Edmonstone, I am informed that the Right Honourable the Governor General wishes me to consider His Lordship's views as limited to the object of compelling Meer Khan's retreat from

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the frontier of the Rajah of Nagpur's Dominions, and of forming such a disposition of troops as would deter him from resuming his project of invasion, and that if on this plan, the employment of the force assembled in Bundelkund should be necessary to compel Meer Khan's retreat from the Rajah's frontier, it will be expedient that it move directly upon the position of Meer Khan, and not upon Seronj, which upon various considerations, His Lordship is desirous should not be attacked. From these instructions you will perceive that my proceedings must be regulated by the destination and future intentions of Meer Khan. As he has assuredly past Raseen, I conclude that when you approach from Chatterpoor you will come by the Ghaut of Maltoon.

No. 151—Sydenham reports to Lord Minto of his having informed the Nizam, in reply to his queries, that the Nagpur territory had been completely cleared of Meer Khan's forces and that the Bhonsle Raja had refused to entertain a British subsidiary force for his protection.

FROM—THOMAS SYDENHAM, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD,

TO—LORD MINTO, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Hyderabad, 3rd March 1810.

As soon as I had ascertained from Colonel Close that the service to the northward was terminated, and that arrangements were making for the return of the troops to the province of Berar, I waited upon the Nizam for the purpose of making His Highness acquainted with the nature of these arrangements.

I recalled to His Highness's recollections that the objects of assembling a large force on the frontier were to afford protection to His Highness's territories, and to prevent the state of Nagpur being subverted by the violence and ambition of Meer Khan, assisted by Vizier Mahomed Khan and the Pindaries. I then stated that Meer Khan and his associates had retreated precipitately from the Nerbudda as soon as the British force advanced towards that river; that Colonel Close had prosecuted his march as far as Seronj, which place had been previously evacuated by the officers of Meer Khan; that Colonel Close had given protection to the inhabitants of Seronj, and had restored that district to the possession of Jeswant Rao Holkar. That the army of Meer Khan had dispersed and continued its flight in detached parties towards the Chumbul. That a small body of Meer Khan's troops who were lurking in the neighbourhood of Seronj, had been attacked and nearly destroyed, by a detachment from

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SECTION 5
War with Bhopal
1810-1814

The territory of Bhopal, situated as it was between the territories of Sindhia and Bhonsle and adjoining them, was the object of a joint invasion by the troops of Sindhia and Bhonsle. The Nabob, Vazir Muhammad Khan, was dispossessed of all his possessions and even the town of Bhopal, by Sindhia and Bhonsle. A partition of Bhopal territory was effected and some provision was made for the Nabob. Sindhia and Bhonsle however could not retain possession of Bhopal for long. As soon as the armies of Sindhia and Bhonsle evacuated, Vazir Muhammad returned and wrested the country from Maratha garrison and in concert with Meer Khan and other Pindaris began aggressive measures against the Bhonsle's territory. Chowkigarth and Baree, two strong positions of the Bhonsle, were occupied by the Nabob's officers.

After the retreat of Meer Khan due to the advance of the British army under Colonel Close, Vazir Muhammad Khan apprehended that Colonel Close's next move would be against him. He therefore made overtures to Colonel Close to abide by British intervention between him and the Raja of Nagpur (31st January 1810 and 1st July 1810). On the advice of Colonel Close he immediately sent orders to his officers to restore

Chowkigarth and Baree to the Raja's officers (6th February 1810) which however were not obeyed (22nd February 1810). Colonel Close referred these matters to the Governor General.

The Governor General in an exhaustive memorandum dated 21st February 1810 dwelt at great length with the question of Bhopal, the occupation of Sironj from Meer Khan and its proposed restoration to Holkar, the permanent stationing of British troops on the northern bank of the Narbada to put a check on the Pindaris, and other allied questions of a far reaching character.

The stationing of British troops in this quarter was to serve as a connecting link between the different military stations of the Company and the measure has been rightly described as the "Key-stone of the political arch in that quarter." This part of the country belonged to the Raja of Nagpur, who was so very jealous and suspicious of British intentions that he thought that the step was the thin end of the wedge of the subsidiary army system, which was being pressed upon his attention by the British Residents for his acceptance, and which he was stoutly resisting. Without this provision the British officers thought that there would be no peace in these parts. The Raja eventually yielded (3rd April 1810), but the terms of the negotiations not being settled, the plan was given up. An alternate plan of stationing British troops at the south western corner of Bundelkhand was then proposed. (28th February 1810).

The question of conquering Bhopal and ceding it to the Raja of Nagpur either on condition of accepting a subsidiary force in his territory, or unconditionally, was also considered and was found to be inadvisable. The retention of Bhopal for themselves by the British was regarded as disadvantageous on the score of its insulated position.

It was therefore considered advisable not to undertake any venture with regard to Bhopal, but to leave the question of an accommodation between the Nabob and the Raja of Nagpur to the mediation of the British Resident at Nagpur (7th July 1810). Colonel Close after opening such negotiations (8th March 1810) was asked to withdraw his troops after the accomplishment of the immediate object of expelling Meer Khan and the Pindaris from the Nagpur territory.

In January 1811 the Raja of Nagpur made a proposal to accept a subsidiary force if his claims to Bhopal and Garha Kota were admitted by the British (6th January 1811). This condition was however not acceptable to the Governor General for obvious reasons.

In 1811 the Governor General called for a report from the Resident at Nagpur on Bhopal and Garha Kota. The Resident's (Jenkins) report

dated 9th December 1811 traces the history of Bhopal and Garha Kota and their political relations with the Maratha states.

In 1812 the Raja of Nagpur concerted with the Sindhia a plan to reduce Bhopal (23rd June 1812). Sindhia's general Jagoo Bapu, after erecting batteries near Bhopal was won over by Vazir Muhammad Khan and moved towards Shujalpur. Sadik Ali Khan, the Bhonsle's general who had arrived to join Sindhia's troops was non-plussed, but after meeting Jagoo Bapu, induced him to resume the task (28th August 1812). The joint armies laid siege to Bhopal, but disagreement and mistrust between Sindhia's general and Sadik Ali Khan soon broke out. Sadik Ali left Bhopal abruptly and was suspected of being corrupted by the Nabob (September 1813). The Nabob took full advantage of this rupture and Sindhia's army had to raise the siege and retire (23rd September 1813).

Vazir Muhammad Khan subsequently went under the protection of the British Government. Sindhia and Bhonsle gave up all hope of acquiring Bhopal, which was thus saved from extinction. (29th October 1814).

Garha Kota.

Garha Kota was part of the cession made by Raja Chhatrasal to the Peshwa Bajirao I. It was held from the Peshwa's Government by Preetising, an illegitimate son of Chhatrasal. Preetising's grandson Mardansing practically made himself independent of Maratha supremacy, though Sindhia for some time recovered something by way of tribute. Mardansing chose to assist Meer Khan in his raids on the Nagpur territory and lost his life in the skirmishes with the British troops. Most of his territory was conquered by Sindhia and the remaining was occupied by the sons of Mardansing. Takhtasing and Arjunsing opened hostilities with Sindhia and defeated the latter's troops at Garha Kota (9th December 1811).

Sindhia and Bhonsle decided to conquer Garha Kota and dispossess Arjunsing. They sent their troops, Sindhia under Jean Baptiste and the Bhonsle under Sadik Ali Khan. Baptiste however occupied it for himself and attacked and routed Sadik Ali's troops which had to beat a retreat (See letters dated 26th April 1811, 13th May 1811, 14th June 1811). Arjunsing regained Garha Kota from Sindhia. In 1818 however British troops under Brigadier Watson in a campaign against Arjunsing captured Garha Kota and restored it to Sindhia. Arjunsing made terms with the British and was silenced with the grant of a jagir. It is noteworthy to see that the Peshwa was not allowed to have any voice in the disposal of Garha Kota, though the suzerainty over it originally belonged to the Peshwa. (See letter dated 13th September 1811).

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No. 152—Description of Bhopal; reference to Dr. Hunter's route of 1790.

FROM—JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,

TO—COLONEL CLOSE.

5th January 1810.

I was yesterday morning favoured with your letter of the 3rd. Malhar, Jeswant Rao's cousin, visited me yesterday and from him I learnt the Pindaries who were said to have come down to Sainwarra returned to the Nerbudda from the neighbourhood of that place. The reports brought in by my hixcurahs who went out to reconnoitre, also contradict the former accounts of their having passed to the south and westward.

I am sorry that we have no information whatever about the places you mention. Neither Seronj or Sagur are, I believe, very strong. The following description of Bhopal, I extract from Doctor Hunter's route in 1790, best you should have it by you.

The town of Bhopal is extensive and surrounded with a stone-wall. On the outside is a large gunje with streets wide and straight. On a rising ground to the south west of the town is a fort called Futehgurh, newly erected and not yet quite finished. It has a stone wall with square towers, but no ditch.

The spot on which it is built is one solid rock. To the south west under one of the walls of this fort is a very extensive tank or pond, formed by an embankment at the confluence of five streams issuing from the neighbouring hills, which form a kind of amphitheatre round the lake. Its length is about six miles. The revenue of Bhopal is estimated at ten or twelve laks of rupees.

Rayseen I have always understood to be a hill fort of considerable strength.

I have the pleasure to send you that part of Mr. Elphinstone's memoir which is at the Residency. I have not had time to get it copied as I have one written at the Residency. In a military point of view I am afraid it will not afford you much information.

The enclosed akhbars have just arrived from the Nerbudda. Mulhar Rao told me that Sideek Allee was much pressed in the articles of supplies, but he gave me no new information.

No. 153—Col. Close's interview with Vazir Muhammad Khan's (Bhopal Nabob's) Vakil; Nabob's readiness to submit to his recommendations.

FROM—COLONEL CLOSE,

TO—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT.

Camp Omeria, 31st January 1810.

The Vakeel alluded to by Vazeer Mohamed Khan in his letter to my address, of which I have had the honour to transmit a copy, arrived in camp on the evening of the 28th instant, and two private elephants which from the misconduct of their keepers had been taken to a considerable distance from camp, and carried off by some Pindaries during the halt at Hoshangabad, were sent back by Vazeer Mohamed Khan and arrived in camp at nearly the same time with the Vakeel. I judged it expedient to defer admitting the Vakil to an interview, but desired my Munshi to hear and report to me what he had to communicate. By this step I learned that he had brought another letter to my address from his master who had further charged him with a message expressive of his attachment and submission to the British Government.

This morning I admitted the Vakeel to an interview. He presented me with the letter before noticed, of which a copy is enclosed. After it had been read, he made a studied speech in which he detailed the calamities experienced by the Bopal Government from the attacks of Sindia and the Rajah of Nagpore, whose views went to the very subversion of the Government, and the seizure of Vazeer Mohamed's person in order to place him in confinement. That overmatched by these chieftains, he had been driven to shifts which otherwise would have never entered his mind, but that still his posts had been taken and his territory laid waste, so that around him there was nothing but desolation. I observed that it did not surprise me to hear that Vazeer Mohamed's administration was subject to difficulties. That of late years he had collected the Pindaries of Malwa and given them a residence within his territories and that as he could not subside them, he allowed them to ravage the districts of his neighbours. That not content with a system of proceeding so blamable, he had called in Meer Khan and united with him in an attack upon the Government of Ragjee Bonslah, who was known to be on a footing of intimate friendship with the Honourable Company. That

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as Meer Khan's demands upon Ragojée Bonsla were groundless and oppressive, the Right Honourable the Governor General had required him to desist and retire, but that he still persevered in crossing the Nerbudda and attacking the Bonsla army, and that on this line of conduct Vazeer Mohamed continued to act in concert with him, assisting him with the whole of his resources, and that during these operations, the Pindaries of the two colleagues entered Berar and plundered its inhabitants. That Vazeer Mohamed must have received communication of the letters written by the Right Honourable the Governor General to Meer Khan, that with such information, he still adhered to that chief and until the present time, had never addressed a line to the British Government to apologise for his conduct, or lesson its resentment. The Vakeel in answer made the most solemn observations that his master had taken no part to call in Meer Khan, that on the contrary, Meer Khan had threatened to deprive him of the administration and assume it himself, if he, Vazir Mohamed, did not join with him in his design of attacking the Bonslah; that in regard to the Pindares, it had long been usual with the chiefs of Malwa to employ them; that any connection or intercourse with them was obviously blamable, and that on the point his master could only plead necessity; that Vazeer Mohamed did learn the contents of the letters written by the Right Honourable the Governor General to Meer Khan, with whom he continued to act merely from compulsion, but that he was certainly wrong in not addressing a letter to the Governor General, explaining the pressure he sustained and apologizing for the part he acted, which though unavoidable, might to some appear to be from choice, but that having lost the goodwill of the Governor General, he was now desirous to show his submission by complying with any requisitions I might be induced to make. In reply I said that the former letters from Vazeer Mohamed I had forwarded for the notice of the Right Honourable the Governor General; that I should likewise transmit his present despatch to be submitted to His Lordship. That there was one point which I thought Vazeer Mohamed should attend to, that while he co-operated with Meer Khan, he had made himself master of Choukey Ghur, and Chynpore Baree, and that it was my opinion that he ought to restore these places immediately to the Nagpore Government. The Vakeel replied that his master would assuredly comply with any recommendation from me. I then told him that I should give him a letter in reply to his master, which he would convey to him without delay. The Vakeel assented, and after receiving the letter returned to Bopaul. A copy of the letter is enclosed.

No. 154—Vazir Muhammad Khan sends orders to his officers to restore Chaintpur and Chowkidgarh to the Bhopale's officers; the same are forwarded to Bhopale's officer, Yashwantrao Dattaji.

FROM—COLONEL CLOSE,

TO—JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

Bhilsa, 6th February 1810.

I have the honour to acknowledge your despatches of the 30th and

31st ultimo.

From my late correspondence you would learn that a vakeel had come in from Vazeer Mohamed Khan and that at my desire he had returned to his master, charged with a message from me stating that as Vazeer Mohamed Khan had made himself master of Chintpoor Baree and Chouky Chur, during the late occasion when Meer Khan was invading Raghoji Bhopale's territories, it was proper that these places should be restored to the Bhopale accordingly. The vakeel returned to camp on the 4th instant and yesterday presented me with two papers of orders from Vazeer Mohamed Khan addressed to his principal officers at Chintpoor Baree and Chouky Chur, directing them to restore both, agreeably to my desire. I immediately delivered them to Jyekishen Punt, in order that he might transmit them to Jeswant Rao Duttajee who commands the Rajah's force within a few coss of Baree. A report prevailed some time ago that this officer had possessed himself of Baree which now proves to have been unfounded. It may be concluded I think that when he presents the above orders to Vazeer Mohamed's officers, no hesitation will be made in restoring both Chintpoor Baree and Chouky Chur to the Rajah's Government.

The disposition which the Rajah has adopted for his troops in advance, is not likely to succeed, I think, to the extent which he expects. Jeswant Rao Duttajee will scarcely be able to do more than keep possession of Chintpoor and Chouky Chur.

I shall be happy if Suddack Allee Khan joins me with a corps of His Highness's troops.

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NAGPUR AFFAIRS.

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No. 155—Memorandum discussing several important questions regarding Bhopal, Seronj and the stationing of a permanent British force north of the Narbada, suggesting policy towards Ameer Khan, the Pindaris etc.

FROM—SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,

TO—COLONEL CLOSE.

21st February 1810.

The warfare in which we are engaged seems to involve questions of peculiar intricacy, and it appears extremely difficult to establish a determined object, the establishment of which with reference to certain limits already prescribed, is practicable and calculated to put an end to military operations and enable us to withdraw our troops into cantonments.

It is true, the original purpose of our interference in the dispute between the Rajah of Nagpur and Ameer Khan may be said to have been accomplished by the retreat of the latter; but affairs are not therefore in a state to admit of our withdrawing our troops. Some arrangement must be made, first, with regard to Seronj, secondly, with regard to the Pindaries, thirdly, with regard to Bhopaul, fourthly, with regard to the Rajah of Nagpur. These points are all closely and inseparably connected with each other.

Whatever measures may be adopted with relation to those points they will apparently want consolidation and permanency, unless we can establish a British force in the territory north of the Nerbudda. This is the key stone of the political arch in that quarter. Scarcely any hope however can be entertained of the Rajah of Nagpur's consent to that measure, and it seems necessary to consider what course of proceeding can be pursued, which may lead to a termination of the present warfare, and to a security against the renewal of the same exigency which has called our troops into the field, without the advantage of that control which a stationary force on the northern bank of the Nerbudda would give us.

Seronj, it seems, must be delivered up to Holkar's Government. Great embarrassment indeed would attend any other mode of disposing of that territory. As far as the credit of our arms is concerned the conquest of Seronj is perhaps necessary and will be advantageous, but when delivered over to the officers of Holkar's Government it will always be liable to revert to Ameer Khan's possession.

With regard to Bhopal there are four modes of proceeding. First—to expel the Nabob and take possession of his whole country. Second—to enter into terms of accommodation without interfering in the dispute

between the Rajah of Nagpur and the Nabob. Third—the converse of the last mentioned proposition, to leave Bhopal unmolested and abstain altogether from any engagements with him.

Supposing the conquest of the Nawab of Bhopal's territory, in what manner is it to be disposed of? It might be offered to the Rajah of Nagpur on the condition of his receiving a subsidiary force. If he accepted the offer all difficulty would be removed, because it is assumed that a British force stationed to the northward of the Nerbudda would secure any arrangement we might form. If he refused, the expediency of retaining it ourselves seems in a great degree, a military question. A post so completely insulated by the possessions of other states and so distant from the nearest possible British station, may be thought untenable unless we take the country under our Government and introduce our own laws as in other parts of our dominions.

Another question arises, viz., whether we shall, in concert with the Rajah, conquer Bhopal and surrender it to him unconditionally, he refusing to admit British force. With regard to this point, it may be asked what advantage we should gain in return for involving ourselves in this enterprise. None I would answer, but that of accomplishing a purpose which combined with the retreat of Ameer Khan before our arms, may appear to be commensurate with the extent of our exertions. In other words the advantage of credit to our arms. For, an opinion may probably be entertained that by merely compelling Ameer Khan to retire and by expelling for the time the Pindarees from their holds in Bhopal, we should not have accomplished objects proportioned to the magnitude of the forces which have been in motion.

If indeed the Rajah could be supposed capable of maintaining the conquest of Bhopal, the question of assisting him in effecting it, might be thought to deserve additional consideration, since his possession of that country would be a barrier to Berar.

Colonel Close has been authorised either to accede to terms of accommodation with the Nabob of Bhopal, or to dispossess him. If we agree to terms exclusively on our own account, what have we to demand of him? We might demand a sum of money and the exclusion of the Pindarees from his country. But we have no security for his adherence to the terms of any engagement (the payment of money excepted, which we could of course exact) unless we have a British force north of the Nerbudda. It would not therefore be advisable to demand terms for the violation of which we should be compelled, by a consideration of our credit and dignity of our Government, to exact reparation. An engagement on the part of Bhopal to exclude the Pindarees would be nugatory. The Nabob is compelled to admit them and he would be

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compelled to employ them against the Rajah of Nagpur, who on the retreat of our troops would renew war on Bhopal.

If we mediate between the Rajah of Nagpur and the Nabob of Bhopal, a measure which in the last instructions is considered to be necessarily involved in any accommodation with Bhopal, we must guarantee it. But the inconvenience of such guarantee would be extreme unless we have a force north of the Nerbudda. If we mediate a peace and decline the guarantee, the peace will not be secured—for no dependence would be placed on the faith of either party—we might indeed compel the Nabob to cede the places belonging to the Rajah which he has usurped, and perhaps this would be a proper retribution and might fairly be exacted without guaranteeing the Nabob against further hostility on the part of the Rajah.

If then we decline the guarantee, it will be useless to mediate, the alternative is (the other suggested modes of proceeding being also relinquished) to leave Bhopal unmolested. It would then be left for us to seize Seronj and deliver it over to Holkar's Government, to act against the places occupied by the Pindarees and, if possible, to attack such part of that predatory force as may be tangible, which would be a positive advantage and withdraw our troops. The two former objects, Colonel Close is actually pursuing.

I would infer from the whole of these reflections that unless either it be resolved on the grounds before stated, to aid the Rajah in the conquest of Bhopal, or the Rajah can be induced to admit a British force into his territories north of the Nerbudda, it would be the wisest plan after the two objects of reducing Seronj and of acting to utmost practicable extent against the Pindarees shall have been accomplished, to withdraw our troops and make the best practicable arrangement for the defence of Berar; leaving the Rajah to pursue his own measures with regard to Bhopal, previously however requiring as the price of our forbearance that the Nabob should relinquish Chynpore Baree and Chowky Gurh.

It seems probable that as the Nabob of Bhopal has offered such unqualified terms of submission, Colonel Close will not, even under the latitude allowed him by the last instructions, aim at dispossessing the Nabob of his country, without specific orders. Under those instructions he will probably proceed to negotiate for the purpose of effecting an accommodation between the Nabob and the Rajah. This must occupy time, because it involves a previous communication with the Rajah in order to ascertain what terms he will agree to. There is time therefore for further instructions founded on Colonel Close's reference on the subject of the Nabob's overtures.

* Mr. Jenkins' despatch No. 11 reporting the Rajah's absolute refusal to admit a force has been received since this memo. was written.

put you in possession of his detailed reflections on the various questions which he has considered, to transmit to you a copy of that memorandum. You will find that the suggestions contained in it which are deduced from the communications which I have had the honour to hold with His Lordship, have been adopted and converted into official instructions with certain modifications.

His Lordship conceives that to mediate an adjustment of differences between the Rajah and the Nabob, even if it were practicable without our guarantee, would be attended with no advantage, and that to afford our guarantee without maintaining a force to the northward of the Nerbudda, is inadmissible. His Lordship therefore deems it sufficient to exact from the Nabob of Bhopal what may operate as punishment to him and advantageously for us, leaving the Rajah to act as he thinks proper with regard to Bhopal.

His Lordship is anxious not to be drawn into an extensive field of operations in pursuing the Pindarees. He is desirous of considering operations against them as a collateral (and not as a direct) object of our proceeding and to close the campaign with the accomplishment of the purposes which, as described in his present instructions, appear to His Lordship to be of a sufficient importance to support the credit of our exertions in the cause of the Rajah of Nagpur, the retreat of Ameer Khan, the occupation of Seronj and its delivery to Holkar, the submission of the Nabob of Bhopal on the terms prescribed, the expulsion of the Pindarees from their present hold in that country.

The Rajah of Nagpur's consent to the permanent establishment of a British force on the Nerbudda would have admitted another and more beneficial arrangement. That important object being unattainable, His Lordship is anxious to withdraw our troops from the field at the earliest practicable moment consistent with our credit.

No. 157—The Killadar of Chowkigarth refused to hand over that fort to the Rhonsle's officers. The Rhonsle's minister did not evince any sense of gratitude for British aid.

FROM—JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,

TO—COLONEL CLOSE.

22nd February 1810.

I have had the honour to receive your despatch of the 10th instant with its enclosure which I forwarded after perusal to Fort St. George agreeably to your directions. Since I had last the honour to address you I have learnt the Killadar of Choukygarh refused to deliver up that

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fort to the Rajah's army, and that in consequence a force of infantry and guns from Jeswant Rao Duttajee has been sent against it.

Nothing of importance has lately occurred in this quarter. I visited the Rajah some days ago to present the Governor General's late letters to His Highness, but no discussion of a political nature took place. His Highness seemed willing to avoid anything that should lead to the subject lately agitated with his ministers and I did not think proper, as I have stated to the Right Honourable the Governor General in my last official address, to press that subject further at present. I have since received a visit from Jeswant Rao on a trifling occasion, and nothing very particular passed. He mentioned what he had heard from Jykishen Pandit regarding your communications with the Nabob of Bhopal and the orders you had obtained from his Vakeel for the restoration of Chynpur Baree, but on my confirming the account he did not use any expressions of gratitude or thankfulness on the part of the Rajah, for so indubitable a proof of your attention to His Highness's interests.

He alluded generally to the question which had been lately discussed, and mentioned that it had again been the subject of the Rajah's consultations with his ministers, but with no appearance of change in the resolution His Highness had already expressed. I did not enter on the subject but expressed in general terms my hopes that the Rajah would yet think better on the proposal, in which His Highness could not but see how much the advantages in his favour preponderated over any which the British Government could expect to reap from it, and consequently the prudence of accepting it now it was offered. He asked some questions regarding your movements and your intentions with respect to Seronj, should it fall into your hands. On the first point I satisfied him by mentioning your advance to Bheelsa, and as to Seronj I mentioned that I believe Holkar had made some application to the Governor General on the subject, and you would act according to His Lordship's orders. There was no regular conversation on any of these points; and I have not since had any particular official communication with the Darbar.

No. 158—The G. C. sends an alternative plan of the defensive measure of stationing British troops at the south western frontier of Bundelkhand.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,

TO—COLONEL CLOSE.

28th February 1810.

Reflecting on arrangements of a defensive nature which next to the establishment of a force on the northern bank of the Nerbudda, would

be most effectual, it has occurred to the Governor General that a force permanently stationed near the south western frontier of Bundelcund, might answer the purpose of preventing the resumption of projects such as we have lately frustrated on the part of Ameer Khan or any other chief, and of covering the province of Bundelcund and the district of Mirzapore. A fortnight having been sufficient to bring Colonel Martindell's force from Chatterpore to the confines of Seronj, a body of troops stationed even at that place, supposing it to be kept to a certain extent in a condition of equipment for the field, would at any time be enabled to intercept a force advancing from the eastern side of Malwa, which in fact was the essential object of the plan of stationing a force on the Nerbudda. If it would have the effect of deterring the approach of a hostile force to the eastward, the strength of the post at Omrawatty or other point on the eastern frontier of Berar might be proportionately reduced. The object of the latter indeed would then be limited to the protection of that province against the incursions of the Pindarees.

Other considerations however must also enter into the question. These refer principally to points connected with the local position of the protecting force—such for instance as the facility of obtaining supplies and of preserving an uninterrupted communication with the interior of Bundelcund, the salubrity of the post, the expediency of maintaining so considerable a force, as it must necessarily be so far in advance of our territories and of our other military stations; whether any objection or impediment to the plan is likely to arise from the disposition of the petty chief who possesses the country in which the force would be stationed, and who is connected with us by engagements which place him to a certain degree in a condition of dependence on the British Government; whether it would not draw too largely upon the disposable force of the establishment of Bengal, for although by this arrangement the force usually stationed in Bundelcund might be diminished, it would still be necessary to retain perhaps two battalions in the interior of Bundelcund, and the aggregate of the troops thus employed might perhaps be more than could be conveniently spared. The additional expense which would be incurred in consequence of such an arrangement, is also a point of importance to be considered.

On most or all of these points Colonel Martindell's local knowledge and experience enable him to form a judgment, and as you are now in communication with him, His Lordship wishes you to consult him and to favour me for His Lordship's information, with the result of your united opinions upon the whole subject with the least practicable delay.

I am directed to take this opportunity of expressing to you the earnest wish of His Lordship to withdraw the troops from the field as soon as may be practicable, with a view to the reduction of the heavy burden of

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expense; and with that view of suggesting to your consideration the measure of immediately sending back the silladar horse to Mysore, which are now maintained at the charge of the British Government.

No. 159—Jenkins informs Col. Close that even if Bhopal is conquered and given over to Bhonsle, he will not consent to a British force being stationed in his territories. He relies on his own and Sindia's power to conquer Bhopal.

FROM—JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,

TO—COLONEL CLOSE.

Nagpur, 28th February 1810.

I have been favoured with your letters of the 20th and 21st instant, in the latter of which you desire my opinion whether the Rajah might be induced to accede to our late overtures on the conditions that Bhopal should be attacked and made over to his Government; the force to be stationed at Bhopal.

From what has hitherto passed on the subject I am not disposed to form any very sanguine expectations that even this proposition would meet with the Rajah's acceptance, unless he were taught to believe that we were determined to settle that part of the country, and that he had only the choice of seeing a British force stationed in that country, either as his own or as a dependancy of the British Government.

I am led to form this unfavourable opinion from the general tenor of Jeswant Rao's communications and from the circumstance that no hint has been given by the ministers of such a plan being likely to prove successful. On the contrary, the advantage of our aid has been treated very lightly and the Rajah has expressed decidedly his confidence of being able to conquer Bhopal himself.

I have before mentioned that I thought the Rajah had hitherto relied much on our finding it necessary, for our own interest, to destroy Meer Khan independently of any terms we might wish to impose on His Highness. I am besides induced to think that the Rajah relied a good deal on the aid of Sindia in future who, he may think, will be equally desirous with himself to prevent hereafter the necessity of our interference in the affairs of Malwa or Bhopal. Jeswant Rao has indeed hinted as much.

I have employed a person to sound on this subject, and hope in a day or two to be able to speak with more certainty relative to the Rajah's disposition.

No. 160—Col. Close describes his meeting with Sadik Ali Khan, the Commander of the Bhonsle; discusses the several plans with regard to Bhopal owing to the Bhonsle's refusal to entertain a British force or to allow it to be stationed in any part of his dominions, even though Bhopal were offered to him.

FROM—COLONEL CLOSE,

TO—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT.

1st March 1810.

After addressing you on the 27th February I had the honour to receive your despatch dated 12th of that month. Sudeek Aleo Khan had arrived in the vicinity of this camp, and he accordingly visited me in the course of the evening. As it was an interview of compliment, nothing passed on business. It was agreed however that he should come to my tent slightly attended on the ensuing day. Jykishen Punt, informed of Sudeek Aleo Khan's approach, had gone out to meet him and I now learned indirectly from Jykishen Punt that Sudeek Aleo had no proposition to offer relative to public affairs, but was instructed by the Rajah to pay me great attentions. When he came to my tent on his second visit, I found this information to be apparently correct. In conversing with him I adverted to the dangers from which the Rajah's Government had recently escaped, pointed out that for a series of years past His Highness had been constantly at war with the Nabob of Bhopal. That His Highness's endeavours to make a conquest of the Bhopal territory had failed and as neither side had showed a desire to come to a settlement, the consequence was that His Highness's territories were constantly harassed by incursions of the Pindarees, which ended in the late serious invasion by Meer Khan. That in this chief the Rajah had not only to sustain the menacing enmity of an ally of Vazeer Mohammad, but the keen resentment of a personal adversary violently bent on revenge. That as Meer Khan had only retired and might return whenever opportunity served, affairs in regard to the Rajah's Government were on the same posture as before the invasion commenced, with this difference only, that from the frustration of his designs Meer Khan must, in any future attempt, be actuated by augmented passion and aggravated feelings of revenge. That Vazeer Mohammad continued in actual hostilities with the Rajah's Government, while Meer Khan only waited another opportunity to come to his aid—that the dangers thus hanging over the Rajah's Government were not limited merely to the Rajah's interests, but extended so as to be the cause of inconvenience to the frontiers of the Honourable Company's allies, the Nizam and the Peshwa. That from this circumstance the British Government had a right to bear an interest in the conduct of the Rajah's

Government respecting its enemies just alluded to, and accordingly did hope that His Highness would now adopt a course of measures calculated to prevent a recurrence of those dangers, from which his interests had been so happily saved. Sudeek Allee affected to speak lightly of Meer Khan and then observed that as the Rajah, his Master, had a sincere and firm friend in the British Government, he had nothing to apprehend from any of his enemies. I replied that the British Government had manifested the extreme friendship towards the Rajah of Nagpur—that it had supported him however at a great sacrifice, at an enormous expense, and that as the insecurity of His Highness's territories exposed the Honourable the Company's allies to the inconvenience before mentioned, it could not be unreasonable in the British Government, to expect that His Highness would not continue to be so far inattentive to his interests as still to leave this territory exposed to future attacks from his inveterate adversaries, without suggesting an arrangement for protecting them. Sudeek Allee again alluded to the Company's friendship; on which I remarked that to be deserving of friendship, we should be reluctant to form unreasonable expectations from it. That the Rajah had experienced the excess of friendship from the British Government in the steps which it had taken for His Highness's support, and in return it only wished His Highness to arrange for the future security of his northern frontier. Sudeek Allee said that the Rajah had no object in view which the Honourable Company could not accomplish for him; that with regard to himself, his orders were to wait on me and act with me to the best of his power. That with respect to the topics of my discourse he imagined that whatever might have been agitated thereon at the Rajah's Darbar, would have been communicated to me by Mr. Jenkins. Here I observed that it was incumbent on every Government to attend to the welfare of its charge, that the British Government was always studious to protect its territories and guard against future evils, and that it would be scarcely allowable to apprehend that His Highness the Rajah was not influenced by similar principles and inclinations. That the relation of friendship between states when firmly established, should not be permitted to decline, but should, if possible, be further cemented. That for the accomplishment of an object which, though of a common nature, went immediately to secure the Rajah's interests, His Highness surely would not wish the British Government to act alone. In answer Sudeek Allee said, that in such a case, he thought, there would be no indisposition towards our views. I now gave the discourse a turn and conversed with him about his former operations in the Bhopal territory, and after some time inquired if Vazeer Mohammad had, when his fortunes were so low, shown any disposition to come to a compromise with the Rajah. He said no, that Vazeer Mohammad though capable and active was only a grassieh—(imputing that he was mean and subtle), and that it was impossible to come to an

accommodation with him, as no pledge of his faith would influence his conduct. In consequence of further inquiries he told me that Kinnoun Ghur and the western side of Bhopal was Vazeer Mohammad's principal place of retreat; that he had not been dispossessed of it at the period alluded to, that it was convenient for his purpose from being surrounded by a thick jungle, but that the fort might be battered from some adjacent heights. Shortly after, the interview terminated. Throughout the whole of the conversation which took place, I could not discover that Sudeek Allée had it in view to prosecute any object at present besides the recovery of Chowky Ghur, which Jeswant Rao Duttaji is besieging. From his manner and expressions however, it appeared that he would willingly co-operate with this force for the purpose of dispossessing Vazeer Mohammad and placing the Bhopal territory under the Government of Nagpur.

It will be obvious to His Lordship that the result of my interview with Sudeek Allée is not a direct confirmation of the disposition shown by the Rajah of Nagpur, and rejection of His Lordship's overtures as described in Mr. Jenkins' correspondence. It would appear that when Sudeek Allée formerly took possession of the town of Bhopal, an agreement had previously taken place between Sindia and the Rajah of Nagpur that the territory of Bhopal should be equally divided between them, and that its posts should be occupied by their troops jointly. At the town of Bhopal Sindia's troops mutinied which ended in the evacuation of the town by Sudeek Allée, when Vazeer Mohammad recovered all that he had lost, except Chowky Ghur and Chainpur Baree.

In regard to the points on which His Lordship has done me the honour to require my sentiments, my opinions relative to some of them will be found in my former correspondence; Lieut.-Colonel Martindale in a reference to his instructions, conceived that he was not at liberty to approach to the Betwah. On the 21st ultimo he marched from Himlassah on his return to Chatterpoor.

My proceedings relative to Seronj are already before His Lordship. I do not think that the Rajah of Nagpur would venture to occupy it, and am of opinion that it could not be taken possession of for the Honourable Company with advantage or convenience, unless with an arrangement by which a British force should be established on the northern bank of the Neibudda, or at some neighbouring position.

I cannot entertain much hope that the Rajah of Nagpur will be ever disposed to come to an accommodation with Vazeer Mohammad. Sudeek Allée has already spoken plainly on this point, and from what I have heard of Vazeer Mohammad's notions, he conceives that the Nagpur Government has unjustly possessed itself of districts belonging to the Bhopal territory, which it ought to restore, and as he is equally at war with Sindia as with the Rajah of Nagpur, a settlement with the latter only would afford him

but little security. Although he gave me an order addressed to his Kiledar of Chowky Gurh, directing him to restore the place to the Nagpur Government, it was not obeyed by the Kiledar when sent to him by the Nagpur Commander. Supposing however that he might be prevailed on to make some sacrifice by way of retribution to the Nagpur Government, His Highness Raghooji Bhoosla might spin out the negotiation to any length, specially as I could not conduct it through Mr. Jenkins, Sudeek Allee having by his own account, no authority to confer with me on any public subject connected with his master's Government. The question of attacking Bhopal, with the view of making a conquest of the principality for the Honourable Company, appears to be of great magnitude. Bhopal is separated from Berar by the Nagpur territory and Sindia certainly considers it as tributary to him, exclusively of the arrangement which he adjusted with the Rajah of Nagpur before alluded to. But supposing neither Sindia nor Raghooji Bhoosla to have any claim to the possession of Bhopal, or to tribute from it, the occupation of it by the Honourable Company, could scarcely fail to excite uneasiness in the mind of Sindia, whose pretensions it would go to circumscribe. It seems not unlikely, however, that such effect might be obviated in great degree by transferring the Bhopal territory when obtained to the Rajah of Nagpur, and on condition of his accepting a British subsidiary force. That for Bhopal however His Highness would be induced to accept a subsidiary force, can scarcely be expected. Mr. Jenkins' correspondence seems to forbid such a hope. The question presents itself then what is to be done to prevent the return of Meer Khan to the Nerbudda, and the inconvenience that would immediately result to the British interests from his again placing the Nagpur Government in danger. The natural remedy of a subsidiary force with the Rajah of Nagpur is not practicable, and it may be apprehended that to place a subsidiary force with the chief of Saugor, would be equally so. Neither Sindia nor Holkar possesses any fair claims upon him, but he enjoys independence, of which he may be as tenacious as the Rajah of Nagpur. One other case only seems to remain for consideration, the Rajah of Nagpur is anxious to possess Bhopal, and it might be placed under his Government without much delay. The principality might be given to him unconditionally, and the British troops withdrawn when the acquisition should be completed. The co-operation on the service would last for some time, and the disinterested nature of the act, added to the use which the Rajah's interests would derive from the presence of the British troops, might reconcile His Highness to the plan of retaining their services. As his interests would be directly benefited by the acquisition, he would probably find means to satisfy Sindia's pretensions to a share of the concern, but should it be apprehended that the accomplishment of this scheme would end in Sindia's obtaining possession of a part of Bhopal, the inconvenience would not be great, as the object of the British Government seems to be that Bhopal should

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not be held by any party in alliance with Meer Khan. I am now on my way to Chynepoor Baree where I arrive in three or four days, and shall not determine to recross the Nerbudda without giving a further consideration to the present state of affairs.

No. 161—Col. Close informs Jenkins that he has opened negotiations, in concert with Sadik Ali Khan, for an accommodation between the Nabob of Bhopal and Raghuji Bhonsle.

FROM—COL. CLOSE,

TO—JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

8th March 1810.

I have the honour to forward open a duplicate despatch to Mr. Chief Secretary Edmonstone which I request you will send on after causing a copy of it to be taken for your records.

I have further to request that you make the Rajah's ministers acquainted with my proceedings in having, in concert with Suddack Allie Khan, opened a negotiation with the Vakeel of Vazeer Mohammed for the purpose of effecting an accommodation between that chief and the Nagpur Government. The articles which it is desirable should serve as a basis for the accommodation, are stated in the accompanying despatch and I shall be happy to learn the result of your communication on the above subject to His Highness's ministers.

No. 162—The despatch communicates the G. G.'s disappointment at the Raja's omission to acknowledge the benefits of British aid and the jealousy and suspicion shown by him in not accepting the proposal to station British troops permanently on the Narbada.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,

TO—JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

Fort William, 26th March 1810.

By direction of the Right Honourable the Governor General I have now the honour to transmit His Lordship's replies to the letters from His

Highness the Rajah and his ministers enclosed in your despatch of the 24th ultimo, together with copies for your information.

2. The Rajah's studious omission of all acknowledgment for the essential aid which he derived from the protection of the British power, under circumstances which menaced the subversion of his Government, and his corresponding exaggeration of the prowess and effect of his arms in compelling the retreat of Ameer Khan, are highly offensive and disgusting, with reference not only to his want of candor and misrepresentation of facts, but also to the motives of jealousy and suspicion which, in addition to the instigations of an overweening pride, have evidently dictated the tenor of his address to the Governor General.

3. His Lordship deeming it by no means advisable that the British Government should be supposed to acquiesce in so gross a mis-statement of facts, and in so offensive a disavowal of the obligation which the Rajah owes to the British Government, for its gratuitous and liberal exertions in his favour in the utmost exigencies of his affairs, has thought it proper in his reply to the Rajah's letter to refute his assumptions and to claim the credit which is due to the important and seasonable relief, afforded to him by the interposition of our protecting power.

4. You will be pleased to accompany the delivery of the letters with such an additional detail of circumstances, as may appear to you to be necessary, not so much to demonstrate a fact of the truth of which the Rajah must be perfectly conscious, as to expose the fallacy of his assumptions and to vindicate the credit of our arms and the merit of our liberality, by depriving His Highness of every pretext of withholding the acknowledgments so justly due for the benefits which he has derived from our assistance, and for the motives which induced the British Government to afford it without any demand of compensation for the heavy charge and inconvenience attending it.

5. You will be careful at the same time to abstain from the language of irritation and to convey your representation of facts to His Highness in terms of dignity, mildness and friendship, and specially to preclude any supposition, on the part of the Rajah, that either the Rajah's uncandid and ungenerous conduct on this occasion or his refusal to concur in the plan proposed for the permanent defence of his dominions, has produced in the mind of the Governor General any sentiment of ill-will or diminished His Lordship's solicitude to maintain, as heretofore, the relations of cordiality and confidence with the state of Nagpur.

No. 163—This is a lengthy memorandum arising out of the Raja's acceptance of the terms of stationing British troops in his territories on the Nerbada; details arising out of the main proposition.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,

TO—JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

3rd April 1810.

The disposition of mind in which the Rajah of Nagpur has at length consented to the establishment of a British force within his territories and the motives and objects of his acquiescence demand consideration. As a general and fundamental principle it will be admitted that two parties concurring in the same arrangement, should concur in the views and purposes to which it is directed. That they should enter upon it with corresponding dispositions or to state the case negatively, that they should not propose from its adoption different and irreconcilable objects, nor in acceding to it be governed by motives not only different but incompatible, and by sentiments and dispositions opposite in their nature and contradictory in their operation and effects.

Although fully aware of the Rajah's reluctance to admit the establishment of a British force within his dominions, we entertained a hope that the manifest advantages of it would induce him to acquiesce in it. That is, we expected that he would be led to concur in all the declared purposes of the arrangement, and to favour the operation of it in a manner calculated to accomplish those purposes. All the arguments, however, employed to produce this train of sentiment in his mind failed of success. He considered protection on our part in the form in which it was offered, to be dependence on his. He desired the benefit of the former without the humiliation of the latter, and judging from past transactions that our own interests would lead us to afford him that protection in every future crisis of danger, he expected to secure the benefit of it without any corresponding concession. As this expectation was unquestionably the motive of his refusal to admit the establishment of a British force within his dominions, so his present acquiescence is to be ascribed exclusively to an apprehension that this expectation is erroneous, and by a reluctant, partial, jealous and guarded acquiescence in the insulated proposition for the establishment of a British force within his territories, he now hopes to secure it. He merely wishes to impose upon us an obligation to protect him against future danger and to employ our troops as auxiliaries for the aggrandizement of his dominions. It is no part of his object to concur in a wise and provident system of defensive arrangement, founded on the basis of common interest and common views. The plan which we

proposed is not in the slightest degree recommended to him by the facilities which it will afford to the operations of defence. He would infinitely prefer a simple declaration that we would not suffer his dominion to be subverted, combined with the return of our troops to their ordinary stations, although the difficulties of employing the requisite exertion in the hour of danger should thereby be multiplied ten fold. He consents therefore to the mere admission of our troops into his territory, not because it is the best arrangement for his protection and for the general defence of the Deccan, but because he conceives that our protection in a season of eventual danger cannot otherwise be secured. He is not consequently prepared to contribute to the efficiency of that arrangement by granting the privileges and advantages which are necessary to render it efficient, such, for instance, as the liberty of moving the force in any direction, a free passage for detachments intended for its relief or supply, a privilege of drawing supplies from any part of his territories and all the varieties of accommodation which a state, sensible of the benefit arising from the presence of a protecting force, would be forward to afford. It is to him an object of jealousy and apprehension. Every movement, every demand connected with the arrangement, will be viewed with suspicion and alarm.

Ought we then without any previous stipulations, either positive with regard to the privileges and liberties which should be annexed to the establishment of a protecting force within the Rajah's territory, or negative with respect to the services on which the troops may be employed, and to the restrictions upon his conduct towards other states, to which under a system of what may be termed protective alliance, he ought to be subjected, in a word, without previously coming to a mutual understanding with regard to the form, objects and conditions of this new connection, instantly to accept this forced and jealous invitation, leaving the adjustment of all subordinate points to future negotiation? The answer is that rather than part with our protection, the Rajah will be induced to accept the terms which we may propose to him. That by immediately stationing our troops on his frontier, we do not commit ourselves to the arrangement, since it will always be at our option to withdraw them if he refuses to agree to necessary terms. That if we fail to take advantage of the Rajah's present disposition to admit a British force, the opportunity may be lost. The course of events may remove the Rajah's present sense of danger and jealousy of his independence again take the lead in his mind. That the force proposed to be stationed to the northward of the Nerbudda, will be sufficiently strong to overcome any that can be brought against it, and that there will always be time to add to it if necessary for its security either from Bundelcund or Berar. That the grand object is to plant a force in that situation, when once stationed there, the Rajah will feel the benefit of its presence, will become accustomed to it, and reconciled to it by finding that in reality his independence is not affected by it, that he will gradually fall into that state of dependence in which the Nizam and Peshwah are placed, and

which is the natural consequence of a connection between power and weakness and that ultimately all our views will be completely attained, although in the early stage of the arrangement we may be exposed to inconvenience and embarrassment.

There is one more point of view in which the question may be considered. The Rajah has manifested towards us a most offensive spirit of suspicion while he owes his political existence at this moment to the aid, which at an enormous expense we seasonably afforded him. Far from acknowledging the slightest sense of obligation, he ascribes his relief from danger exclusively to the prowess of his own arms, and attributes our gratuitous exertions to views directed against the independence of his Government. On these grounds he rejected our proposals for the establishment of a subsidiary force within his territories at the time when the presence of our troops afforded the immediate opportunity of carrying the arrangement into effect. But when their return towards their ordinary stations has excited his apprehensions for the safety of his country, he condescends to accept the benefit of our protection on his own terms. He grants as a concession, the permission to defend him at our own expense and expects, in return, that we should submit to every restraint that his jealousy suggests, and assist him at our own charge in conquering territories for his benefit. Is it consistent with due dignity and sobriety of political conduct, instantly to accept this haughty, reserved and tardy offer? Should we not by this eagerness to obtain a footing in his country on any terms, give a warrant to the suggestions of his anterior jealousy and suspicion? Ought we not rather to maintain the principle of our original proposition and refuse to accept on the basis of an obligation conferred upon us, his consent to an arrangement from which he will derive the principal advantage without any sacrifice, while the burden, inconvenience and expense of it falls exclusively upon us?

It may be said that this would be sacrificing the substance for the sake of the shadow and hazarding the loss of an arrangement highly beneficial to ourselves and hitherto the object of anxious pursuit, for the empty name of dignity—and this argument is valid, if dignity of political conduct is not essential to the stability of power.

It may be useful to consider upon what terms it is consistent with our views and interests, to consent to the establishment of a British force within the Rajah's dominions, and what other military arrangements should be combined with it.

The first point to be determined is, on what services our troops shall be employed? Unless the Rajah contributed to defray the charges of the force he cannot be entitled to claim its services for any other purpose

than the defence of his country against external attack. But it will be necessary to define what is to be considered as such. The protection of his country from external attack seems of necessity to require that we should possess a control over his conduct; we may else be involved in wars the result of the Rajah's policy, his injustice, or his imprudence. This control could alone be established by stipulations relative to our arbitration of disputes, such as are inserted in the treaties of alliance with the Nizam and Peshwah. To this however the Rajah will not certainly be induced to consent, nor to the consequent restriction upon his intercourse with other states, and if these stipulations are rendered indispensable, the arrangement must probably be abandoned. Yet some restraint seems absolutely requisite, supposing for instance, (the present negotiation with Vazeer Mohammed Khan failing) the Rajah should prosecute hostilities against Bhopal, are we to interfere, or rather could we avoid interfering? Could we admit the principles that he may invade his neighbour or otherwise engage in foreign contest without control and when he should be brought in a state of danger, we should be bound to employ our troops for his defence.

Perhaps the only alternative of restrictive stipulations such as are contained in the treaties of Hyderabad and Bassein, is a declaration that we will take no part in any project against Bhopal or directed to the objects of conquest.

It will be necessary to determine whether the incursions of the Pindarees are to be repelled by us.

The troops should have the privilege of changing their position and not be limited as the Rajah proposes to one specific place, namely the place best adapted to the purposes of defence. A free passage for our troops through the country north or south of the Nerbudda must, it is presumed, be demanded.

It is worthy of consideration whether we ought not to insist on the Rajah's contributing at least to the extra expense of the proposed arrangement, as an arrangement of which he so largely partakes the benefit,—more specially under the circumstances of distrust and restriction which have attended his assent to it.

But if this be not insisted on, ought we not to require that he should agree to bear a part of the expenses, which will attend future occasions of exertion for his defence or for his benefit?

All these and probably other points which will occur on further reflection, are subjects of deliberation and some, if not all, of negotiation; can they prudently be left to be determined and negotiated after the actual advance of the troops into the Rajah's country?

It may be observed generally that, had the Rajah cordially and candidly entered into our views of common interests and security and united with us in the principle of the defensive arrangement as originally proposed to him, if he had not invited the establishment of a body of our troops for purposes of separate advantages and under the influence of a disposition inconsistent with that mutual confidence which should form the basis of the proposed arrangement, the necessity of precautionary stipulations would have been precluded. In that event (as was observed in the instructions to Mr. Jenkins of the 14th of December) no stipulation of a nature obnoxious or objectionable to the Rajah, could be indispensably required.

It is further to be considered whether the troops can prudently be so advanced without making some arrangement for their eventual support. This is a military question and military authorities seem to think no such arrangement necessary. The necessity indeed might be precluded by an augmentation of the force. But the expense would be in proportion. If it be necessary, a part should be established on the Warda and another towards the southern frontier of Bundelcund, and the measures for that purpose should be in progress when the troops advance to the northward of the Nerbudda.

There will probably be one great advantage in the immediate advance of the troops in the event, certainly probable, of the failure of the negotiation commenced through the medium of Colonel Close, between Vazeer Muhammad Khan and the Rajah. The former may then be expected to call in the assistance of Ameer Khan and the Pindarees, and if in consequence of the previous discussion and adjustment of all the foregoing points, a body of troops is ultimately to be stationed to the northward of the Nerbudda, we should have to advance it in the face of an enemy, for the junction of Vazeer Mohammed Khan with Ameer Khan and the Pindarees would constitute a case in which we should be under the necessity of interfering. We then commence a new campaign and must regulate our preparations accordingly, whereas by advancing our troops immediately we should be enabled to offer our guarantee to any accommodation between Bhopaul and Nagpur, which apparently is the only obstacle to the conclusion of such accommodation. Indeed, it would be necessary that we should prevent the Rajah from carrying on hostilities against Bhopaul, unless it was our best policy to unite with him in subduing it, and the presence of our troops would prevent the assemblage of hostile troops in Bhopaul and obviate the contingency of a contest.

It would also secure Seronj.

No. 164—The Nabob of Bhopal appeals to the G. C. to protect him from the aggressions of the Bhoonsle, and agrees to accept British mediation.

FROM—VAZIR MUHAMMAD KHAN, THE NABOB OF BHOPAL.

TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Received, 1st July 1810.

For a period of thirty years I have manifested my attachment and devotion to the British Government in the persons of its officers, and rendered it every service in my power, in the hope of acquiring increased consequence and distinction, and of securing protection against the oppressions of the rulers of the present age, who not only hold my feeble Government in contempt and desire its ruin, but are actually employing their endeavours to annihilate it.

Hence Colonel Goddard and the Nabob Roshun-ud-Dowlah most readily executed an engagement promising me the support and protection of the British Government whenever its authority should be established in this quarter. This fact must be perfectly well known to Your Lordship.

From the moment however that I formed a connection with the British Government, I became the object of the envy and jealousy of all the southern chiefs who, in consequence, sought to distress and harass me by every means in their power.

Rajah Seemapat (Raghojee Bhoosla) seized the fortresses of Hoshangabad and Seonee and three years ago wrested from my possession Barree and Choukeegurh, while Dowlat Rao Sindia seized the forts of Islamnagur, Suhwans* and Ramgarh, and plundered my territory and even the place of my residence. Having no alternative I, attended by all my family and adherents, abandoned my home, passed the four months of the rainy season on the banks of the Nerbudda in the fixed determination to risk my head for the recovery of my lands.

The troops of Rajah Seemapat having carried off my son Gous Muhammed Khan at twelve years of age from my house in captivity, I resolved in the first instance to negotiate his release and afterwards, to obtain the restitution of Barree and Choukeegurh. Accordingly Rajah Raggojee Bhoosla restored my son Gous Muhammed Khan to me. He at the same time executed a deed of release for all the lands which he had wrested from my possession, that is to say, Seonee, Hoshangabad, Barree and Choukeegurh. But the Rajah's officers withheld the deed and kept it to themselves.

While I was thus employed in endeavouring to recover my lands from the hands of the usurpers, Meer Khan without any invitation from me and without any necessity arrived at Jubbulpore at the Chaut, where I had taken up my quarters. I earnestly dissuaded Meer Khan from the prosecution of his wicked proceedings and when I found that it was his fixed determination to excite disturbance and commotion, I separated from him and proceeded to the execution of my purpose of regaining possession of Baree and Choukeegurh. About this time Colonel Close arrived and required me to give up the talook of Baree and the fort of Choukeegurh, on the grounds of this delinquency that I had retaken them during the period of the disturbance and trouble excited by Meer Khan, and he had the kindness to promise this much that he would effect an adjustment of our difference according to the principles of equity and justice, and procure the release of my lands.

Although this was just yet in obedience to Colonel Close, and also that there might be no room for complaint against me after a lapse of forty years, in consequence of any demur on my part, I immediately furnished the Rajah's officers with letters to my aumils directing them to retire from the lands.

Colonel Close having since had an opportunity of enquiring into the nature of the offences with which I was charged, is now disposed to manifest the greatest consideration towards me, but the Rajah's officers are not inclined to attend (to his suggestions). I therefore hope that Your Lordship adverting to the relative situation of authority and dependence between Your Lordship and me, will be pleased to adopt such an equitable arrangement as that by the justice and support of the British Government, I may be protected against the encroachments and violence of Maharaja Sindia and Rajah Raghooji Bhosla (who violating former engagements, practice tyranny and oppression and plunder and destroy the houses of the poor) which will command my gratitude to Your Lordship and my prayers for the prosperity of the British Government, with the most ardent devotion to its service.

No. 165—The Governor General refers the Nabob of Bhopal to the Resident at Nagpur, who will mediate between him and Raja Raghooji.

FROM—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL,

TO—VAZIR MUHAMMAD KHAN, THE NABOB OF BHOPAL.

7th July 1810.

I have been favoured with your letter (recapitulate that received 1st July).

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WAR WITH BHOPAL

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With regard to the engagements to which you refer, I long since issued instructions to the Magistrate of Ellahabad respecting the answer to be returned to the letter which you addressed to him on that subject, and you have no doubt received it.

The communications which you had with Colonel Close through your Vakeel when that officer was in the neighbourhood of Bhopaul, preclude the necessity of any discussion of the transactions of that period. Colonel Close endeavoured under my directions to effect an accommodation between you and the Maharaja Raghooji Bhoosla, but his endeavours failed of success from causes with which you are fully acquainted.

The Maharaja is master in his own dominions and the British Government has no right to control his proceedings. If you are desirous of adjusting your differences with the Maharaja, I would recommend your despatching a Vakeel for that purpose to Nagpur, and in that event the British Resident at His Highness's Court will be authorised to assist in bringing those differences to a favourable adjustment on the terms proposed to you by Colonel Close, as I am sincerely desirous of your welfare.

No. 166—Jenkins in this despatch to the Governor General discusses the possible terms upon which a mediation for adjusting the dispute between the Bhoonsle Raja and the Nabob of Bhopal can be undertaken.

FROM—R. JENKINS,

TO—LORD MINTO, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 17th October 1810.

In my official despatch No. 16 to Your Lordship's address I had the honour to mention my expectation of receiving such an answer from Enayet Mussseeh to my note of the 9th September, as should enable me to judge of the line of conduct which I ought to pursue, regarding the proposed mediation between the Rajah and the Nabob of Bhopaul.

On the 16th September, the day on which my despatch was dated, I received the Vakeel's answer, the contents of which seemed to me to repeat so entirely the objectionable proposals formerly made to Colonel Close, and to contain besides such gross misrepresentations of the Colonel's remarks on those proposals, that I thought it best to await the arrival

of an express communication from Bhopaul, before I noticed that of the Vakeel.

Together with a Khureetah for Your Lordship which I received and despatched to Mr. Secretary Edmonstone on the 2nd instant, I received one addressed to myself by the Nabob of Bhopaul. The tenor of this communication was too general to allow me to judge of the real views of the Nabob, and I therefore thought it proper to be as explicit as possible with the Vakeel, in an answer which I wrote to his communication above alluded to. Copies and translations of both these documents of the Nabob's letter to my address, and of a third note from Enayet Mussseeh which I received on the 17th instant are transmitted for Your Lordship's notice in my despatch of this date to Mr. Secretary Edmonstone.

The Vakeel's written communications seem to me to be sufficient to prove, first, that the Nabob of Bhopaul is not inclined to come to an accommodation with this Government without obtaining better terms than those proposed by Colonel Close, and secondly, that the guarantee of the British Government is considered indispensable, and indeed an implied condition, in the accession of the Bhopaul Government to any terms of peace, under our mediation.

Both these conclusions are fortified in my mind by a conversation I have had with a person named Kummul Kishen, whom Enayet Mussseeh sent to visit me, being it appears apprehensive of coming himself. This person said in pretty express terms that the Nabob of Bhopaul could have no inducement to make peace with the Rajah unless he obtained the restitution of Choukeegarth and Chyhpore Barree, and seemed not only to consider a guarantee as inseparable from our mediation, but without a guarantee, either express or implied, the mediation to be but a name.

Under these circumstances and having besides no reason to anticipate a favourable reception by the Rajah of our offers of mediation, bent as he is said to be, on the entire conquest of Bhopaul, I trust I may be considered to have acted right in not opening the subject to the Ministers. Indeed I apprehend that unless the mediation were to be authoritative, our interference, if it did not meet the Rajah's views, might rather injure than benefit the Nabob of Bhopaul, so far at least, as it might tend to increase the Rajah's irritation against him; and some similar consideration seems to have deterred the Vakeel from maintaining a more open intercourse with the Residency. I believe moreover that the Nabob of Bhopaul himself is inclined to come to terms with the Rajah, through our means, not so much from an apprehension of His Highness's power to conquer his whole territory, as from a hope, which he cannot realize, of recovering through us the districts he has lost, and of being considered a dependent of the British Government. The language both of the Vakeel and of his agent, as well as of the Nabob is, of this nature.

It is proper also to mention that whilst urging the objections of the Nabob to the renunciation of his claims on the fort of Choukceegurh and Chynpore Baree, the Agent of the Vakeel wished to place the accession of his master to any terms short of his re-establishment in the territories he has lost, on the footing of a deference to the wishes of Your Lordship. To this kind of deference I of course opposed what Colonel Close had before told the Vakeel, that the terms proposed should be acceded to by the Nabob on their own merits, or not at all.

Unless therefore the Vakeel intimates explicitly his Master's intention to treat on the basis of the terms proposed by Colonel Close, it does not appear to me that any good can arise from entering into any further discussion with the Vakeel, or from making any communication to the Rajah.

I deem it proper to apprise Your Lordship that the Rajah is shortly about to enter his tents, and to form a camp about 10 coss in advance from Nagpore towards the Nerbudda. This step is supposed to have in view, primarily, the defence of his country against the Pindarries who are again collected in force in Bhopaul, and are reported to be in readiness to take advantage of the earliest period of the fall of the Nerbudda, to commence their depredations in this quarter, and in Berar; and secondarily, as circumstances may turn out, a meeting with Sindia, when that Chief may arrive in the vicinity of Sagur, to which place, it is believed at Nagpore, he will shortly repair.

To complete the long projected conquest and partition of Bhopaul, to strike a blow against the Pindarries, and to concert plans for their mutual defence against Meer Khan, are the objects which are said to be in the view of both Governments from the proposed interview. It is very doubtful, however, whether these objects, although of great interest to the Rajah, would overcome his reluctance to expose himself to the inconveniences and embarrassments which would attend such a step; and at all events, it is thought that even should the plan be ultimately adopted, His Highness will not quit the neighbourhood of his capital before the anniversary of his mother's death, which will require his presence at Ramteeg on or about the 22nd of December.

I had the honour to meet the Rajah, as usual, at the Dussarah on the 7th of this month, but nothing beyond mutual civilities, passed on that occasion.

The Rajah's armies in the neighbourhood of Chynpore Baree and Gurrah Kotta, are already beginning to suffer annoyance from the Pindarries; particularly the latter, whose operations have been lately very languid and do not even now promise an early termination of the enterprise so long in prosecution.

No. 167.—The following note written by an agent of the Nawab of Bhopal describes the position of the Pindari leaders and declares his master's readiness to accept British mediation in settling the disputes between the states of Nagpur and Bhopal.

Nagpur, 12th of November 1810.

I have lately understood by a letter from my master and reports of other people, that Kureem Khan and Chheetoo Khan Pindary who were imprisoned in the fort of Gwalior, have been released by the Maharajah of Sindia. The bad habits of these ill-disposed persons are known to all; and my master's letter directs me accordingly to communicate the circumstance of their release to the gentlemen of the Honourable Company, as the chastisement of such scoundrels is certainly necessary.

If an accommodation could take place and we obtain possession of the places seized by this government by a complete ratification and treaty through your means, who are mediator for us, we will co-operate with the forces of Rajah Sena Sahib in the punishment of those marauders. Before the Dusserrah, my master wrote recommending the Ghauts to be secured; otherwise as soon as the Nerbudda should become fordable, these plunderers would commence their depredations, as their profession was plunder and nothing else, and it was well known that they were under no one's control. Timely precaution was therefore wise. To this communication Sena Sahib returned no definite answer whatever.

At this time hearing of the release of Kureem Khan and Chheetoo Khan, they (the Pindaries) have become more unmanageable than ever, and uniting together have commenced their depredations; perhaps they may have been instigated by Sindia. We, who have been long quiet and retired, have not moved a step, and have nothing to do with this refractory set. If these circumstances should, as is likely, be misrepresented here by the falsehood of evil speakers, pay no attention to them. Before also, we represented to Colonel Close that we would make everything known. It was therefore necessary to communicate these things, and no kind of improper proceeding can possibly take place on our part. Now likewise, if an accommodation should be here brought about and we should receive firm possession of the places seized by this Government, and a sincere and entire treaty of pacification be concluded, we will unite with the Rajah's armies in the chastisement of these evil minded enemies.

A person named Dhond Sing, at the head of a party of Sikhs who were formerly part of Duttjee Pandit's army, and Baba Runjeet Sikh, are ready to attack the army; and Dost Mahomed one of Sindia's Pindaries, who was in the neighbourhood of Bheelsa, has joined them. Munnoo

Khan, also Meer Khan's father-in-law, who is at Seronje, has, it is likely, been ordered by Meer Khan to unite with the Pindarries and to proceed to Gurrah Kotta, to co-operate there.

No. 168—The Resident reports to G. C. about the Raja having offered to enter into a subsidiary treaty with the British Govt. provided his claim to Bhopal and Garhakota are recognised.

FROM—R. JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

TO—LORD MINTO, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 6th January 1811.

On the 26th ultimo I received a visit from Jeswant Rao who came with a message from the minister, importing that he had something of consequence to say to me, and that it had been his wish to wait upon me himself for the purpose of having an unreserved and confidential communication with me. The state of his health, however, not permitting him to move about without much inconvenience, he trusted I would do him the favour of calling at his house on the following day, when he would open all his heart to me, and expect in return my candid opinion and advice on the matters which he should submit to me.

According to this invitation I went to the minister's house on the evening of the 27th.

After the usual compliments and some preface, on the minister's part, consisting of apologies for not waiting upon me, and of professions of friendship and regard to me personally, he came to the object for which he had desired to see me. We commenced by alluding to Colonel Close's expedition to this quarter; and to the negotiations which had taken place relative to the establishment of a British force near the Nerbudda. In alluding to those negotiations he frankly confessed that this Government had by some fatuity been blind to the liberality of the offers which I had made on the part of Your Lordship, and had not duly appreciated the substantive benefits which were held out to it under the powerful support of the Company. All this Sreedhur Pundit requested might be attributed to him alone, and be no longer remembered.

He now adverted to the letter which the Rajah had written requesting the force to be stationed, as originally proposed by Your Lordship, and to the tenor of Your Lordship's reply in consequence of which the Rajah had expected further communications on the subject. Many months however had now elapsed and if I had received any orders from Your Lordship, I should of course have made them known. Sreedhur Pundit said, he wished

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NAGPUR AFFAIRS

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me to give him my opinion as to the reasons of Your Lordship's silence, and my advice as to the best mode of removing any obstacles which might have presented themselves to Your Lordship's mind relating the arrangement in question.

I said that I really was not prepared to give my opinion or advice on this subject, as the Rajah was in possession of all the information which I myself had received, relative to Your Lordship's intentions. Your Lordship, I was sure, was as desirous as the minister expressed himself to be, that everything which had formerly passed should be forgotten and nothing remembered but the intimate friendship which subsisted between the two states; and for my part, I said I was convinced of the sincerity of the dispositions expressed by the Minister.

Sreedhur Pundit said that he spoke to me as to a brother; in fact he added we were brothers, connected by the mutual desire we had, for the welfare of the Rajah's Government united with the prosperity of the Company. He was prepared, he said, to be perfectly open and unreserved, he expected the same openness and unreserve on my part; and as he was desirous of removing all obstacles to the happy connexion which had been meditated, feeling as he did, its close relation to the best interests of his master, he trusted I would aid him in giving effect to the object he had so much at heart.

Having had reason to know that the minister was prepared to make some offers beyond anything which had been hitherto submitted to Your Lordship, I thought it my duty not to lose the opportunity of at least ascertaining the extent to which the Rajah is really disposed to go. I, therefore, at the minister's pressing entreaty for my opinion on the probable causes of Your Lordship not having taken further notice of His Highness's proposal, expressed myself in the following manner.

I said the minister would recollect that when I first mentioned the subject, on the part of Your Lordship, I demanded that the extra expense of the force to be stationed on the Nerbudda should be defrayed by the Rajah. I had subsequently from myself offered to submit any request from the Rajah, for the remission of this demand, if there were no other obstacles to His Highness's acquiescence in the arrangements, but as this offer did not succeed, there had been no occasion for Your Lordship to express any decision upon it. Subsequently, when His Highness brought the subject forward, the expense was expressly excepted against, and I had no reason to know that Your Lordship ever intended to station the force on the Nerbudda without some equivalent from the Rajah, who was to receive the principal benefit from it.

Sreedhur Pundit asked what was the best mode of ascertaining whether this was the obstacle apprehended, and suggested that I should write to ascertain it. I told the Minister that I could certainly report anything which was said to me, but that it could answer no good purpose for me to

make any enquiry of the sort, unless I could at the same time satisfy Your Lordship on the point.

The Minister said he was convinced that everything Your Lordship did, was for the Rajah's benefit; and all the Rajah desired was to remove every doubt from Your Lordship's mind. He enquired about the sum, which I told him was about 5 lacks of rupees per annum. He then remarked that the benefits which the Rajah would reap from such an arrangement, would much more than compensate such a sum.

He alluded here, amongst other things, to the ease with which His Highness would possess himself of Bhopaul and Gurrah Kotia when I interrupted him, by remarking that it seemed to me possible Your Lordship might be under some difficulty as to this point, which was also an addition to what had been originally in Your Lordship's contemplation.

On this head, I added, I had a few observations to make. The policy of the British Government was purely defensive, and the objects proposed from stationing a force on the Nerbudda, were merely defensive. A spirit of conquest and extension of dominion was quite incompatible with our policy and as His Highness might seem to have entered into your Lordship's views, at last, more from a desire of exclusive benefit to himself, than from views of common interest and common security, Your Lordship might not unlikely have considered such a disposition to be an obstacle to that complete union of counsels, which ought to animate every alliance.

Sreedhur Pundit said that the Rajah had been at war with the Nabob of Bhopaul for years back, and that we should consider both Bhopaul and Gurrah Kotia as Nagpore, that is, as equally belonging to the Rajah. I said that the subject could not be viewed in such a light, as it was obvious the Nabob of Bhopaul was an independent prince, and that supposing a force to be stationed for the Rajah's protection, and His Highness by prosecuting his views on Bhopaul to bring danger on the territories he at present possessed, we might be brought into a contest originating in circumstances over which we had no control and perhaps untimely in its occurrence, without our being allowed to judge of its merits, whilst at the same time we should bear the principal burthen. I apprehended, I said, that Your Lordship would not consent to be exposed to the possibility of such an occurrence.

The Minister observed that the Nabob of Bhopaul had behaved in the most faithless manner on several occasions and particularly during the war in which the Rajah had been engaged with the British Government. On that occasion he violated the most solemn engagements in seizing Hoshangabad and Seonee, whilst the Rajah's forces were engaged elsewhere. He subsequently contributed with Murdan Sing of Gurrah Kotia to bring down Meer Khan and, but for the seasonable aid of the British Government, might have succeeded in the object of producing

the ruin of this state. As the ally of Meer Khan he was the enemy of the British Government. He could not be considered as the head of a regular state; his country had in fact been given by one of the former Peshwas to Sindia who had made over half of it to the Rajah, including Bhopaul, etc. by a solemn engagement for the consideration of four or five lacks of rupees, which had been paid. On this head he concluded by saying the Rajah trusted to me to remove all difficulties. In fact the minister wished to consider it as a point determined on, that the Rajah was to have Bhopaul and Gurrah Kotta, at the same time that the mode in which he spoke of them was rather that of entreaty than of argument. With regard to Gurrah Kotta, he said, the zemindar of that place had acted with the most wanton and provoked hostility to this Government, and it would be a kind of reproach on the Rajah's military power, were he to abandon the siege of Gurrah Kotta.

I will not trouble Your Lordship with all that I said in reply to the Minister on these points. The tenor of my remarks however went to lead the minister to consent to refer both entirely to Your Lordship's arbitration, as I observed it was evident that in the connection which the Rajah sought to establish with the British Government, all points of exclusive benefit to either party, must yield, if necessary, to those of common interest. The alliances with the Courts of Hyderabad and Poona, I observed, owed their efficiency and stability in a great measure to the circumstance of all disputes with foreign powers being submitted to the arbitration of the British Government, which itself desiring nothing but general peace and tranquillity, was perfectly unbiassed in all its decisions whilst it never permitted the just rights of its allies to be invaded.

Sreedhur Pundit acknowledged that the justice of the British Government was undoubted, and said that the Rajah trusted to it in everything, but still more to its friendship, from which he hoped for the greatest benefits. Bhopaul and Gurrah Kotta he said were nothing, and he seemed still to wish that they should be considered as already a part of the Rajah's territories, intimating that the Rajah would trust entirely to me to remove any difficulties on the subject.

I said that the only way of removing these difficulties seemed to me to be that which I had suggested. It had been proposed, I added, to guarantee the whole of the Rajah's dominions if His Highness had acceded to the plan originally with that spirit of confidence and cordiality which Your Lordship expected, would have been shown. There would have been then, perhaps, less difficulty about Bhopaul and indeed on every point connected with the arrangement.

Sreedhur Pundit confessed that the most favourable time had been allowed to pass, but he said, he trusted everything would be forgotten in the entire union of interests which it was the Rajah's sincere desire to establish. He talked of a position for the force being fixed anywhere

near the Nerbudda, as might seem most eligible, and said he would prepare a draft of the arrangements which occurred to him, and requested me to do the same relating to anything which I thought would be agreeable to your Lordship.

I said that as I had been quite unreserved in my conversation with him on the points already discussed, so I would mention a few other circumstances which occurred to me, as likely to have made an unfavourable impression on your Lordship's mind, towards the conclusion of an arrangement on the basis of the Rajah's former proposal. First, regarding the position of the force: the Rajah's apparent anxiety for its being confined to one distant spot, might have excited an idea in your Lordship's mind that whilst His Highness wished to secure the protection of a British force, he still viewed it, and would view its operations with a distrust ill-suited to the entire confidence which your Lordship's liberal and disinterested conduct ought to have excited, and to the subsistence of that complete cordiality, without which you would never have wished the force to be stationed in His Highness's dominions at all. Without the privilege of moving the force in any direction and of marching other troops occasionally, whether for its support or supply, the objects of placing it in the Rajah's territories could never be attained. 2ndly, with regard to supplies of grain, etc., for the force, the Rajah had also made difficulties on this head, seeming to wish that they should be procured anywhere rather than in his own dominions, although the force was to be there principally for his benefit.

The minister replied that he would not dwell upon anything which had formerly taken place. The Rajah was in every respect and from his heart free from distrust. He looked to a closer connection with the British Government for the greatest benefits, and was confident that your Lordship wished to preserve and support his state. The Rajah only desired, he said, a place to be fixed as the general station of the force which would of course move in every direction, even to Nagpore, in case it were necessary. As a proof that the Rajah was always happy to have British troops in his territories, the minister instanced the permission so readily granted lately for the forces in pursuit of Gopaul Sing.

The minister concluded by saying that if the expense was an obstacle with your Lordship, he would undertake to remove that, and with regard to other points we could communicate further regarding them, as he had proposed; only, he trusted, no doubt would remain of the Rajah's cordiality and confidence in the British Government.

I told the minister that whatever offers he had to make, I should be happy to submit them to your Lordship. I proposed at the same time to show him the treaties of Bassein and Hyderabad, with which it was agreed I should call upon him the following day, and there the conference ended.

Agreeably to appointment I again called on the Minister on the 28th ultimo and carried with me copies of the treaties of Bassein and Hyderabad.

The former of these treaties the minister perused with considerable attention, sometimes asking explanations of parts of it, of which he did not comprehend the full spirit and intent. In satisfying his enquiries, I particularly dwell on the purely defensive tendency of all the stipulations and the entire renunciation of every view of encroachment on their neighbours on the part of the contracting parties, which formed as it were the essence of the treaty. I pointed out at the Minister's request, the principal articles which might form part of a treaty if the Rajah wished to be a party to the general defensive alliance, which I thought might be inferred from the mode in which the Minister several times mentioned the four allied Powers, viz., the British Government, the Nizam, the Peshwa and the Rajah. Those I pointed out were the 1st, 2nd, 9th, 12th and 17th, as appearing to me to contain the leading principles of the general defensive alliance.

The minister made no objection to any of the stipulations, but said he would prepare a draught of what he thought the Rajah would wish, which he would send to me by Jeswant Rao, and I could alter or add such things as I thought proper, and as might be agreeable to your Lordship's wishes, which the Rajah sincerely desired to meet in everything.

The conversation now turned on Bhopaul and Gurrak Kotta, respecting which the minister expressed a hope your Lordship would make no difficulty as the Rajah's honour was involved in the issue of both contests. I said, I thought that should your Lordship be inclined to accept the Rajah's offers, you would rather desire to see His Highness inclined to co-operate in your views for the general tranquillity of the Deccan and the security of the dominions he at present possessed, than to grasp at the territories of his neighbours, and you might not like to make a project of conquest for the Rajah's benefit the basis of a treaty which was hostile to all such views.

The Minister said that the Rajah's views on Bhopaul were not of recent date; that he had employed many years and much expense in carrying them on, and Sindia had received money for the share which His Highness wished to get of that country. I repeated what I had before said, and my former suggestion that the Rajah should offer to submit entirely to your Lordship's decision, hinting at the same time that in the event of the Nabob of Bhopaul not acceding to any reasonable terms of accommodation which might be prescribed by your Lordship, you might then, supposing a treaty to be concluded, consent to assist the Rajah in the settlement of that country.

Sreedhur Pundit enquired what terms your Lordship would be likely to prescribe. I mentioned that the terms formerly proposed by Colonel Close had your Lordship's approbation, and as far as I could say in a

discussion like the present, might be considered as those which your Lordship would prescribe. They were at the same time such as to leave Vizier Mahommed Khan something for which he would desire to preserve peace, and in every respect consistent with the just expectations of the Rajah. After some discussion on the nature of the terms in question, the minister said he would ascertain the Rajah's pleasure on the subject and send Jeswant Rao to me the next day with a draught of articles, as he had before mentioned. I gave the minister, at his desire, a memorandum of the sum which your Lordship originally demanded of the Rajah, and some further general conversation terminated the interview.

Jeswant Rao did not visit me until the 2nd inst. in consequence of a mourning which intervened in the Rajah's family, on account of the death of a distant relation at Omraotee.

The conversation which I had with him turned principally upon Bhopaul and Gurrah Kotta, respecting which he said he was instructed to be particularly urgent, as the Rajah was above all things anxious to have his wishes on that head acceded to by the British Government. On no other point, Jeswant Rao said, was there now any difficulty. I told Jeswant Rao that if, after all that I had said, the Rajah chose to make conditions regarding these places, I should certainly submit His Highness's wishes to your Lordship. At the same time I repeated my doubts whether your Lordship might consider it consistent with the interests of the British Government, or with the objects of a defensive treaty, to meet those wishes.

Jeswant Rao now produced a paper in which, he said, the minister had intended to include all the articles which occurred to him in consequence of our conversations as proper to form the basis of an arrangement, but which owing to a conversation he had held with the Rajah, in which His Highness had expressed a continued desire to have Bhopaul and Gurrah Kotta secured to him, the minister had left unfinished. These articles were in most respects grounded in he remarks which I had made and on the treaty of Bassein.

They contained, 1st, the Rajah's acceptance of a force such as your Lordship originally proposed; to be generally stationed in a position north or south of the Nerbudda, at the option of the British Government, and to move in any direction necessary, as well as to have the privilege of changing that position in case it should be determined on by both Governments. 2ndly, The Rajah's agreement to defray the specified charge in such instalments as might be agreed on. 3rdly, The permission to purchase supplies of every description in all parts of His Highness's territory free of all imposts or duties. 4thly, The friends and enemies of each to be the friends and enemies of both parties. 5thly, In case of differences arising with any foreign power both parties to unite in endeavouring to obtain satisfaction by means of peaceable negotiation, and eventually to pursue such measures of peace or war as might be mutually resolved on. 6th, A mutual engagement not to retain in each

other's dominions the discontended subjects or dependents of either party; on the Rajah's side including members of his family and relations. On the part of the British Government an engagement to guarantee the Rajah's dominions from all external attack, including the incursions of the Pindarries; and a declaration of the Rajah's independence in all internal affairs, and with regard to his family, relations, dependants and servants. With a proviso that the force should not be employed on any petty services.

As these articles were not brought to me for my opinion, to obtain some satisfaction on the subject of Bhopaul and Gurrah Kotta seeming to be the principal object of Jeswunt Rao's visit, I did not enter into any general discussion on them. I remarked however to Jeswunt Rao that if the Rajah expected to obtain all the advantage of a subsidiary treaty, the article relating to the arbitration of disputes with foreign powers by the British Government, which in the treaty of Deogaum already comprehended the Nizam and Peshwa, must probably be made general.

Jeswunt Rao admitted that such a provision would be desirable, but said that whether it were made an article or not, it would be impossible for the Rajah to do anything in foreign matters without the permission of the British Government. He seemed indeed on this occasion to think that the Rajah might be brought to consent to such a stipulation, at the same time that he wished to represent it as immaterial.

I said that it seemed to me to be a very necessary stipulation, and to arise naturally out of the relation in which the two Governments would stand, under a subsidiary treaty. To the Rajah it was certainly not very important, but much so to the British Government; which under the obligation to protect the Rajah from all enemies, must be enabled to exercise a decision as to the justice of considering any power in that light. Jeswunt Rao now requested me, as he had several times done before, to defer making any report to your Lordship until I heard again from the minister, who was himself sensible of the wisdom and foresight which dictated the scruples I had mentioned relative to Bhopaul and Gurrah Kotta, and fully approved my suggestion. He felt that the Rajah ought to meet your Lordship's wishes in everything, and to confide entirely to your friendship and good intentions every point of difference or doubt on the present occasion.

I was subsequently requested by the minister to defer altogether for the present making any report to your Lordship, as the Rajah did not like at present to abandon all hope of getting Bhopaul and Gurrah Kotta, and at the same time did not wish to make any conditions which might offend your Lordship. The minister added that for his part, he should omit no occasion of endeavouring to persuade the Rajah to adopt my suggestion, and hoped it might shortly be brought about. I replied to the minister that although I should of course be obliged to report what had passed for your Lordship's information, it rested with

the Rajah to say whether it was to be a simple communication from myself, or a reference of His Highness's proposals at his own desire. I added that Your Lordship could not, I imagined, be offended at any expression of His Highness's wishes, made in a spirit of cordiality.

Yesterday I received another visit from Jeswant Rao. He came to mention to me the Rajah's wish that I would submit to Your Lordship the offers Sreedhur Pundit had made on his part, together with His Highness's request relative to Bhopal and Gurrah Kotta. The latter request the Rajah trusted to me to mention in a manner which whether it met with Your Lordship's acquiescence or not, might not offend. His Highness confidently hoped, indeed, it would not cause any difficulty, and I could satisfy Your Lordship how sincerely grateful the Rajah would be for a boon, which would at once preserve his honor in the eyes of other states and contribute to the efficiency of his Government, in conjunction with the British support.

I replied to Jeswant Rao that I should certainly submit all that had passed to Your Lordship as His Highness desired. Jeswant Rao said that Your Lordship would of course return such an answer as might seem to you proper; that the minister and himself would omit no efforts to give effect to any wishes which Your Lordship might express, and that the Rajah himself would no doubt feel how entirely it was his interest to meet them, persuaded as he was that Your Lordship desired everything for his benefit.

I believe I have omitted no material part of what had passed between the minister and myself on this occasion.

Several circumstances seem to have immediately concurred to produce the present offers of the Rajah. Of these probably, the release of Kureem and Chheetoo, the late formidable irruption of the Pindaries into his territories, and Nana Sahab's intended journey to the Company's provinces, are the principal. According to the report also of the Rajah's Vakeel, Sindia has given to Kureem a sunnud for Gurrah Kotta thereby not only interfering in a very offensive manner with the Rajah's project of conquering that country, but placing the Pindary chief immediately on His Highness's frontier.

The release of Kureem and Chheetoo is certainly a subject of natural anxiety both to the Rajah and to those powers whose territories are exposed to the annual ravages of the Pindaries. As the seizure of Kureem and Chheetoo and of their forts and territory broke or dispersed the powers of those freebooters at a time when they were advancing gradually to a kind of organized state, so it may be expected that under chieftains of extensive sway amongst them and with circumstances still more favourable to their increase, both in number and strength, arising from the daily augmenting weakness of surrounding states, and their inability to maintain even their present reduced military establishments, the Pindaries will

shortly become more than ever formidable. All accounts assert that under the general name of Pindarries are comprized horsemen of all descriptions; Mughuls, Afghans, Pathans etc. amongst whom are said to be some of the finest and best mounted cavalry to be met with in the service of any native prince in India. The rapidity of their movements and the fatigues which they are able to undergo, are astonishing. They only indeed require to be under one head, to enable them to make regular conquest and establishments. They may be termed in some respects the true Marhattas of the day; or they perhaps rather resembled the Companies, who so long ravaged the finest parts of Europe during the convulsions attendant on the revival of order and regular government in that quarter of the globe.

With regard to the Rajah's present offers the possession of Bhopaul and Gurrah Kotta seems to be a subject of great anxiety to him. It is said to be his intention to send Sudeek Aleo to co-operate with Sindia's Government in completing the original plan of the partition of Bhopaul, and a recent intelligence received by this Durbar of the arrival of some of Sindia's battalions in that vicinity, seems to have excited fresh hopes in the Rajah's mind, which rendered him averse to submit at once the subject to your Lordship's arbitration, although at first I thought the minister would have conceded everything. Sreedhur Pundit slightly mentioned Seronje; and Jeswunt Rao, as well as Vincjee Pedree, Chanderee, which Sindia pretended to cede by an engagement to Nana Sahib, for a sum of money actually paid. Nana Sahib indeed has always expressed great anxiety for the conclusion of an arrangement with the Rajah, and is said to have used his efforts to persuade the Rajah to make no difficulties. Neither the subject of Chanderee nor that of Seronje, however, have been insisted on, and indeed they seem only to have been advanced, at all, in the spirit manifested on all occasions by persons of every description at this court of making a point of asking for everything.

There seems to be a great anxiety on the part of the Rajah to efface the recollection of everything which formerly passed, and to avoid any expressions calculated to show distrust, or in any manner likely to be disagreeable to your Lordship. All parties at the Court are said to have been agreed in recommending His Highness to make his present offers, which is a pretty certain proof that his own disposition on the subject afforded no chance of success to any arguments tending to prejudice his mind against it. It appears to be the general opinion that the Rajah will now come to any terms to secure the British protection; so fully sensible is he of his own weakness, and of the rapid decay of the few resources he has remaining. Any difficulties he may make will no doubt in the end give way to the fear of losing all chance of our aid and support, should your Lordship think it desirable to enter into any negotiation for the conclusion of a treaty upon the Rajah's new propositions.

No. 169—Jenkins informs the Vice-President of the Council that Vazir Muhammad Khan of Bhopal was trying to regain his former possessions with the help of the Pindari chiefs, Kareem and Chetoo, recently released by Sindhia; that the Pindaris were gathering near the Raja's frontier; and that he had conveyed to the Nagpur Court the unwillingness of the British Government to conclude new engagements.

FROM—R. JENKINS,

TO—LT.-GENL. HEWETT, VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL.

Nagpur, 13th April 1811.

Having received Mr. Secretary Monckton's dispatch under date the 5th March enclosing letters from the Right Honourable the Governor General to the Raja and his ministers, announcing His Lordship's intended departure from Fort William, and that the local administration would devolve on Your Excellency during His Lordship's absence, I was prevented by the occurrence of a Hindoo festival from waiting upon the Raja until the 5th instant.

Nothing of particular moment passed in my interview with the Raja. I took occasion however to assure His Highness that Your Excellency's disposition to cultivate the subsisting cordiality between the two states, was not inferior to that which had so uniformly been manifested by the Governor General.

On receiving the Chief Secretary's dispatch of the 9th February, I lost no time in communicating its contents to the Durbar, and in doing so, I took particular care to avoid committing Government to the conclusion of the projected alliance under any circumstances. The Raja had on two or three occasions enquired respecting the arrival of an answer to his proposals, and with some degree of anxiety. The state of things is indeed such as not unnaturally to excite considerable solicitude in his mind.

Kureem and Chetoo, the Pindari chiefs, have arrived in Bhopal and joined their respective Dhurrahs.* They are said to have been received with much attention by Vizier Mahomed Khan, and to have been visited by the various Pindari chiefs. The Nabob of Bhopal with the assistance of Kureem is about to commence vigorous efforts to retake all the places wrested from him by this Government to the northward of the Nerbudda, and there is a report that Kureem has already demanded a large contribution from the Raja.

On the other hand Baptiste, on the part of Sindia, with a force said to consist of 6 battalions and 30 guns, has advanced to Gurrah Kotta after taking possession of Multown and other places belonging to the Gurrah Kotta territory, and has summoned the Raja's commander to raise the siege, alleging that the place belongs to Sindia.

Thus the Raja is on every side surrounded with difficulties.

* Band or gang.

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No. 170—Jenkins submits an interesting review to his Government explaining with respect to the possessions of the Bhonsle Raja the mutual relations and the conflicting claims of Sindhia and Bhonsle on Bhopal and Garha Kote together with a past history of the two principalities.

FROM—R. JENKINS,

TO—THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT.

Nagpur, 9th December 1811.

I now proceed to obey the orders of Government in stating for its information such particulars of the histories of Gurra Kotta and Bhopal, as I have been able to ascertain, and as are of moment with relation to the political objects which have led to the enquiry.

Gurra Kotta.

This country, as is well known, formed part of the territory possessed by Chuttersaul, the first Rajah of Bundelcund. The circumstance of the great Bajee Rao having been of some assistance to the Rajah in completing the extinction of the Moosulman power in that province, is also matter of record. The death of Chuttersaul and the division of his dominions between his two sons Hurdah Sah and Jugut Raj, in exclusion of a claim set up by Bajee Rao to a third of the inheritance under a pretended will or promise of Chuttersaul, brought the Marhattas into the country which they plundered and laid waste in the manner of the Pindarries of the present day.

Prithee Sing was one of the numerous illegitimate sons of Chuttersaul. Discontented and ambitious he hoped to profit by a foreign connection, and is said to have contributed to put the Marhattas in possession of an important fortress in Bundelcund. When a treaty was concluded with the Marhattas by which the Peshwa obtained a territory valued at about 30 lacs, including the districts of Gurra Kotta, etc. Prithee Sing, as the enemy of his family and country, was expelled by his relations, and took refuge with the Marhattas. By them he was invested as a reward for his services, with the principality of Gurra Kotta yielding a revenue about six lacs of rupees per annum. The exact terms of the grant I have not been able to ascertain, but from what I can learn, it would appear to have been absolute in respect of freedom from tribute, although subjecting Prithee Sing to military service to the Peshwa's Government.

The intermediate steps by which the descendants of Prithee Sing, whose grandson the late Murdan Singh is represented to have been, contrived to make themselves independent of the local authorities in Bundelcund, are not well known, but may be easily deduced from the circumstances of the times—and the general history of Bundelcund with which Government

is well acquainted. It seems to be certain, however, that from or even before the succession of Murdan Sing to the Raaje, the authority of the Marhatta Government over Gurra Kotta had become a cypher.

Sindia has occasionally been able to enforce demands for tribute on Gurra Kotta, but I believe it is only of late years that this has been attempted or that the small contributions which could be raised there, have been considered worth the trouble of levying them, but any discussion of Sindia's former rights on Gurra Kotta has become unnecessary, since he now holds possession of the principal part of the country by conquest or pretended cession by the sons of Murdan Singh.

The revenues of Gurra Kotta at the present day are considered to amount to nine lacks of rupees per annum. Maltown and the fort of Gurra Kotta with the adjoining Patta of Wurdanugger, and a territory of six lacks, are occupied by Baptiste; and the remaining three lacks of country with the fort of Lalgurpar possessed by Tukht Singh and Uryoon Sing, the sons of the late Murdan Singh, who lost his life last year in the warfare with this Government.

The Rajah of Berar pretends to no right, founded on ancient claims, to any part of the Gurra Kotta territories, but the conduct of Murdan Singh in aiding Meer Khan, afforded a plausible ground for dispossessing him and adding Gurra Kotta to the Nagpore dominions. This design would probably have in the end succeeded but for the interference of Sindia.

The above account, even if correct, is extremely crude and imperfect, but I have not been able to gain access to any materials calculated further to elucidate the history of Gurra Kotta. Should Government think it of importance to obtain more full information on the subject, I should conceive that it might be afforded by the Governor General's Agent in Bundelcund.

Bhopal.

During the decline of the Moghul empire the State of Bhopaul, from small beginnings, attained to considerable consequence and power. When the Marhattas conquered Malwa, it is said to have extended over a territory valued at 30 lacks of rupees per annum; but although it could maintain itself against the tottering power of Delhi and was even acknowledged by the great Nizam, it could not withstand the rising energies of the Marhatta State to which it was obliged to yield one half of its possessions, under a promise or a treaty guaranteeing the remainder to the Nabobs of Bhopaul.

The present chief of Bhopaul, Vizier Mahommed Khan, is not the rightful Nabob. He is said to be the father-in-law of the late Hyat Mahommed Khan whose weakness of character left the reins of government in his hands, and whose successor Chous Mahommed Khan with his son and family is in confinement at Coonerghurh.

With whatever fidelity the Marhattas observe chief towards the British Bhopaul in the first instance, the conduct of it to bring upon him the force, under General Goddard, was sufficient, appear that any actual resentment of Sindia. It does not, however, taken by the predecessor measures for dispossessing him were ever undone Bhopaul by the latter, of Dowlut Rao. The first demand made up on Vizier Mahomed's brother being sent with a suitable contingent, rupees had been extorted released until a contribution of five lacks of

from the Nabob. e minister at Hyderabad, In a letter from Vizier Mahomed to the Resident, Major Kirkpatrick, which will be found in the despatch of the 18th March 1804, the Nabob to the Governor General No. 305 dated 13th March, as the first pecuniary mentions the extortion, described in the last paragraph as a breach of faith on demand to which Bhopaul had been exposed assent of the requisition the part of Sindia, but seems to admit the core Peshwa; and to my own for military service with his engagements to the Nabob uniformly maintained knowledge, when I was in Sindia's camp, the Nabob as a tributary. Sindia's that Sindia had no right to consider him been long dependent on ministers however asserted that Bhopaul had

and tributary to the Maharaja's Government, hostilities which have so From what I can learn on the subject of the Government and the Bhopaul long been carried on between the Rajah's Gov in the time of the first state, they would appear to have originated for the possession of Raghoe. The contention is stated to have

Hoshangabad. of Bhopaul on a territory This fort had been built by the Pathans of Rajahs of Deogurh as which was granted to them by the Government of right and from its a military jagheer. On this ground as a pretence, Raghoe and his being of so much importance as a frontier for unsuccessful efforts, to successors Janjee, and Moodajee, made was reserved for the present wrest it from the Bhopaul Nabobs; but it was a station. This was accomplished in 1799 by a capitulation and a boundary of the respective Rajah, fixing the Nerbudda as the future boundary of the respective

states of Nagpore and Bhopaul. Hoshangabad was recovered by Vizier Mir of 1803, and the fort and with the Pindaries, during the Marhatta war the Rajah. On his march district of Seonee were besides wrested from him and took Seonee which he from Burhanpore in 1804, Sindia besieged in 1807, and during the cold season of that year Hoshangabad fell again into same time Chynpore Baree the co-operation of Sindia. About the Khan, and in prosecution houkegurh were taken by Seedeek Allee

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of a plan of partition to which Sindia had acceded on the payment of a sum of money by the Rajah, his troops obtained a temporary possession of Bhopaul—which however was soon recovered by Vizier Mahomed Khan, and the districts of Chynpore Baree and Choukegurh alone remained to the Rajah's Government.

The subsequent desultory operations between the two states of Nagpore and Bhopaul down to the period of Meer Khan's invasion are not worth repeating, and everything of consequence connected with the affairs of Bhopaul during and since the presence of the British forces in that quarter, has been too recently under the notice of Government to require to be recapitulated.

It is to be observed both with regard to Bhopaul and Gurra Kotta, that the Poona Government claims a right over them exclusive of any such right on the part of Sindia. The spirit and intent of the Treaty of Bassein however prevent us from admitting the Peshwa to advance any claims of such a nature, but are we bound to admit without proofs any right of Sindia to Bhopaul and Gurra Kotta? If his claims originate in those of the Peshwa, are we precluded from enquiring into the nature and extent of both in order to compare the copy with the original, or if they arise from the prescription of tyranny, the tyranny of the strong over the weak, are we always to admit the exercise of power as a proof of its justice?

If Sindia however, ever had any right to Bhopaul, he seems to have fairly sold it to the Bhosla, and by co-operating in its reduction, may be said to have given up by his own act all claim to be consulted in the future disposal of it. It is not therefore his claims, but those of the state of Bhopaul itself, that in my judgment demand any consideration. With regard to Gurra Kotta the case is somewhat different as Sindia has now actually possession of the principal part of the country. It is besides, not of so much importance as Bhopaul to the accomplishment of our views in an alliance with the Rajah, and without the interest which a regard to our own security and that of our allies and to the general tranquillity of the Deckan, naturally gives us in the settlement of the latter country, we might not be justified in interfering with proceedings which, however unjust they may be, are confined in their operation and effect, almost exclusively to the country which is the scene of them.

No. 171—The Secretary acknowledges receipt of the Resident's report on the Bhonsle Raja's claims to Garra Kotta and Bhopal.

FROM—N. B. EDMONSTONE, CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT.

TO—R. JENKINS.

Fort William, 3rd January 1812.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch to my address of the 9th ultimo containing the report respecting Garra Kotta and Bhopal required by the orders of Government of the 13th September last.

That report as far as it goes is satisfactory and will essentially assist the judgment of Government when the time shall arrive for deciding the question of granting or withholding its interference in the claims and disputes of the Rajah of Nagpore, relative to those places. It is superfluous to observe that the decision of it cannot precede the adjustment of the pending question of the establishment of a subsidiary force within His Highness's dominions.

No. 172—The Resident informs that as the Raja is free from immediate danger of the Pindaris, he has turned his attention to the conquest of Bhopal.

FROM—R. JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

TO—LORD MINTO, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 14th February 1812.

Since the Rajah has been freed from all apprehensions of immediate danger from the Pindaries by the retreat and dispersion of Kureem's force, His Highness has continued the military preparations which were originally intended to avert danger from his own territories and capital, with the view of renewing offensive operations against Bhopal. To this object it is understood that some late communications of Sindia have called the Rajah's attention, by reviving in his mind those hopes of effectual assistance from that quarter in the conquest of the country, which have so often proved vain, and which late occurrences had quashed. The forces of Sudeek Allee Khan and Jeswant Rao Duttajee either have crossed, or are shortly to cross, the Nerbudda to endeavour to retake Chynpore Barree and Choukeegurh which they do not expect to find difficult, although no long time has passed since a detachment with two or three guns which had been sent by the latter officer on an expedition to the neighbourhood, was entirely cut off by the Bhopal troops. A considerable force of horse and infantry newly raised with guns, has been detached from the Rajah's camp near the city, and has moved out to a place about 6 coss in advance. It is the Rajah's intention to proceed himself to review this force, which will then proceed as is understood, towards Bhopal.

The accounts of Vizier Mahommed Khan's behaviour during the late transactions have been very contradictory, and indeed his conduct is likely to have been variously shaped according to the prevailing interest of affairs at different moments. As long as the contest seemed to be between Rajah and Kureem only, he would naturally adhere to the latter, when it appeared that Sindia was resolved on active operations, and that these were likely to be successful.

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interest still to turn to the strongest party. Consequently his troops seem to have annoyed Kureem in his retreat.

A part of the Pindaries appears to be in the neighbourhood of Bhopal and of their former seats. Chheetoo indeed and the two Runjuns who joined Jugoo Bappoo*, retain the establishment granted them by this Government, near the Nerubudda and its northern and southern banks. The families of these chiefs are, I believe, at Ashtah.

Dost Mahomed whose usual seat is Bheelsa, seems to be engaged with Sindha's garrison of Ratgurn in a desultory warfare with Vizier Mahomed Khan, who on his part is supported by Qadir Bakhsh another Pindary chief of Kureem's party. Other bodies are represented to be at Raypoor and Kunode to the westward of Bhopal.

Oodajee Naeeek has arrived in the camp of Sudeek Allee Khan. He is said to have made his escape from Kureem's hands in the confusion of the retreat, which by all accounts was a complete rout.

I waited on the Rajah in his camp on the 8th of last month to present your Lordship's letter descriptive of the glorious operations in Java, and intimating your Lordship's return to Fort William. The Rajah expressed in warm terms his congratulations on the happy result of your Lordship's measures, and I ventured to assure His Highness that your Lordship will have been much pleased with the friendly sentiments he has already expressed in anticipation of any communication from your Lordship relative to the successes of the British arms.

No. 173—Jenkins reports to the Governor General the serious condition of Bala Sahib's health, the departure of Jagoo Bapu, Sindha's General, from Bhopal after receiving a lac of rupees and the disappointment of Sadik Ali, the Bhonsle's general, at the withdrawal of Sindha's forces.

FROM—R. JENKINS,
TO—LORD MINTO.

Nagpur, 23rd June 1812.

Since the date of my last official despatch No. 4 to the address of your Lordship, no event of any moment has occurred in this quarter. Bala Sahib continues in much the same state as he has been for some time past; and the Rajah seems every day to show more of those marks of favour and distinction to his nephew Appa Sahib, which are generally interpreted to mean that His Highness considers the latter as his presumptive successor. Bala Sahib draws on a miserable existence, almost deprived of sight, and disabled from every exertion of mind and body, and no hopes appear to be entertained that he will ever be any better.

*Sindha's General.

Jugoo Bappoo after erecting batteries against Bhopaul, came to a compromise with the Nabob of his demands having received payment, as it is said, of about a lack of rupees, and the person of the Nabob's son as an hostage both for the remainder of his claims and, as I imagine, for the good conduct of the Pindaries of Kureem's party who are in Bhopaul. Jugoo Bappoo then moved off with his army towards Shujawulpore to the great disappointment of Sudeek Allee Khan who, agreeably to his repeated invitations, had advanced to the banks of the Nerbudda with the view of joining in the operations against Bhopaul. Notwithstanding however the apparent abandonment of the enterprise, which was to have been carried on by their joint endeavours, on the part of Jugoo Bappoo, Sudeek Allee proceeded to cross the Nerbudda, and moved with his army to the neighbourhood of Itchawur, where he had an interview with Jugoo Bappoo about the 8th of this month. A meeting also was to take place with Seetoo who was encamped near Ashtah, and it would seem that Jugoo Bappoo was trying to persuade Sudeek Allee himself to attack Bhopaul for their mutual benefit, whilst Sudeek Allee demands Gurrah Kotta. Nothing however had been decided.

Sudeek Allee is mentioned, by my news-writer in his camp, to have with him about 6,000 horse and infantry with 18 guns, and Jugoo Bappoo about 10,000 with 30 guns. Both armies are encamped within a very short distance from each other.

The Pindaries under Dost Mahommed are said to be encamped in the vicinity of Gunje Basonda.

No. 174—Jenkins reports to the Governor General his having explained to Raja's minister the interpretation put by his Government on the treaty of Bassein, as it arose out of a discussion about the investiture of young Holkar in which the Peshwa and the other Maratha chiefs were concerned. He also reports the progress of the operations against Bhopaul carried on jointly by the Sindhia and Bhonsle.

FROM—R. JENKINS,

TO—LORD MINTO.

Nagpur, 28th August 1812.

Sudeek Allee Khan, with a part of the force with which he crossed the Nerbudda, still continues encamped at Doultupore near Itchawur, which is about 15 coss south east from Bhopaul. Near him, Jugoo Bappoo is stationed, and he has lately been reinforced by some battalions and guns under a person named Dansing who since he joined, has taken Kureemghur and the few remaining places in the possession of Kureem's party in the vicinity of Bhopaul.

Preparations are in train on the part both of Sudeek Allee and Jugoo Bappoo for an attack on Bhopaul which, it is supposed, will not long be

delayed. Their principal employment, however, since they have met, seems to have been the raising of money from the surrounding country to pay their starving troops in which object, from the impoverished state to which the Pindaries have reduced the districts in their vicinity, little progress has been made. From this quarter Sudeek Allee is supplied with occasional sums to a small amount; but anxious as the Rajah has so long been to obtain Bhopal, he leaves Sudeek Allee to live almost entirely upon his wits; with unlimited powers to raise troops, and carry on operations, provided the expenses of them are not required from His Highness's treasury.

Vizier Mahomed Khan and the Pindaries who adhere to him, are, in the mean time not inactive in annoying their enemies. Frequent attacks are made by the Pindaries on the foraging parties of Sudeek Allee and Jugoo Bappoo, always with partial success. By my last accounts from Doulutpore, which are dated the 20th of this month, they had even gone further and attempted to beat up the quarters of Dansing, who is encamped within a very few coss from Bhopal, in a night attack which however, was repulsed without any serious loss on either side.

In apprehension of the meditated attack upon the town of Bhopal, the same accounts mention, Vizier Mahomed Khan has taken refuge with all the Sahookars and men of property in his fort of Rayseen. To defend Bhopal he is said to have left a force of 500 infantry and 300 horse under an European, who is stated to have lately entered his service.

My news-writer reports that Jugoo Bappoo had received orders from Sindhia to persuade Seetoo and his party to quit their present seats near the Nerbudda, and to take up their residence about Arun and Shadhowra, places lately conferred upon them by the Maharajah; but Seetoo appears at present to be entirely regardless of Jugoo Bappoo and jealous of putting himself at all in his power. It seems to be expected that as Jugoo Bappoo does not carry on matters to the satisfaction of Sindhia, Baptiste will be ordered to take the affairs of Bhopal and the Pindaries into his hands. Should this be the case, Vizier Mahomed will have to contend with a much more formidable enemy than hitherto, and although strong in his forts of Rayseen and Cinnoorghur, he will probably in the end be forced to succumb. The Rajah too will most likely be deprived of all share in the spoils, and his views on Bhopal be for ever discomfited.

I have been surprised that the late important arrangements with the southern Jagheerdars and the military preparations which they have caused, should have given rise to no remarks, or questions at this Durbar. Some time ago indeed Jeswunt Rao mentioned that he had heard the Rajah of Colapore had invited us to be arbiters between him and the Peshwa's Government, to secure him from the perpetual aggressions he

was exposed to from subjects of the Peshwa acting as independent chiefs, and without the authority of His Highness. He dwelt on the perpetual violences to which the Colapore Rajah was exposed, and asked me what your Lordship would do on the subject. I said that if the Rajah of Colapore and the Peshwa desired it, you would probably with a view to general peace and tranquillity be inclined to arbitrate the existing disputes on the principles of truth and justice. But said Jeswunt Rao, justice is on the side of the Rajah of Colapore. I replied that if the disputes were referred to the arbitration of the British Government by both parties justice would be impartially awarded, and that, close as was our connection with the Peshwa, we could not labour better to promote his prosperity than by leading him to maintain the rules of justice.

Jeswunt Rao on the same occasion alluded to the question of Mulhar Rao Holkar's investiture by the Peshwa which, he said, he had heard the Peshwa had at last agreed to grant for a sum of money. He asked whether the report was true.

I thought this a good opportunity of explaining to Jeswunt Rao the nature of the views of the British Government on this subject, and on the general question of the Peshwa's former supremacy over the Marhatta chiefs. I therefore replied to Jeswunt Rao's question by saying that I had read such reports frequently in the native Akhbars; but I did not believe them. In the first place, I was assured the Peshwa would not confer the investiture in opposition to the declared wishes of the British Government; and in the next place, I did not think that Holkar's Government would make any great sacrifice to obtain so barren and useless an honor, or if it would, it must be strangely ignorant of the actual state of India under the new relations which now subsisted amongst all its principal states, and of what was due to its own lately acquired independence.

Jeswunt Rao expressing himself as I wished he should do, anxious for a further explanation on the subject, I told him that the treaty of Bassein had commenced, and the subsequent treaties between the three great Marhatta powers and the British Government and its allies had completed, an entire new system of international law amongst all the Governments of India, which left every state independent within itself, and had virtually dissolved all the former connections of allegiance (before indeed, a mere phantom) which any of the Marhatta states owed or pretended to owe to the Peshwa. The foreign concerns of the Peshwa's Government fell by the treaty of Bassein, under the sole cognizance and administration of the British Government, which desirous to obtain nothing but its own security in the general tranquillity of India, and not even that by any infringement on the rights of other powers, rendered it an express article of that engagement that no attempt should be made against any of the great branches of the Marhatta Empire,

thereby acknowledging their total independence of the Peshwa. The wars, and the treaties which followed, bound all parties to submit to the arbitration of the British Government in all contested points with any of the allies of that Government, and amongst these, of course, with the Peshwa, securing the other Marhatta powers in the unmolested and independent possession of their rights and territories.

This being the state of the fact, I said, no stronger proof could be demanded of the determination of the British Government to respect the independence of other states, and to make its allies respect it too; and although several indirect attempts had been made to revive the old system of considering the Peshwa as the head of the Marhatta Empire, the British Government had, and ever would set its face against any attempt to disturb the existing order of things. Here was a strong demonstration of the moderation of that Government, which ought to strike every one, and particularly those who strove to renew a connection, of which they probably did not perceive the consequence. Were the renovation of that connection once allowed, the British Government by their own act and deed, would become the arbiter of their fate and master of their independence, as the Peshwa could do nothing against them but with its concurrence.

It was then, I concluded, a regard for the interests of the Marhatta powers and for its own reputation for justice, moderation and consistency which led the British Government to object to the investiture of Malhar Rao Holkar, in opposition to all those views for its own aggrandizement, which the application for it both opened and might have authorized to any state but that to which they were offered.

Jeswant Rao said that this was the view he had always taken of the subject, but he had much wanted to hear his opinion confirmed by me, as others in the Durbar chose to contradict him, and hold out prospects of a different nature tending to prove it an advantage to the Marhatta powers to keep united in their obedience to the Peshwa. I did not think it necessary to take any particular notice of Jeswant Rao's answer, and the subject dropped.

I omitted to mention in my last despatch the celebration of the marriage of a grand-daughter of the Rajah which took place some months ago. It was intimated to me by Jeswant Rao that I was expected to give an entertainment on the occasion. I replied that I should inform your Lordship of the marriage, and should act according to instructions, but that the notice was too short; being only given ten or twelve days before the marriage. Whether this reply was considered as an evasion of giving an entertainment at all, or not, I do not know, but except to be present at the moment of the marriage and at some fireworks which were afterwards given in honor of it, I was not invited to any entertainments where presents are distributed as on former occasions. As the cause

of this circumstance seemed to me to be my not giving an entertainment, I did not think it necessary to make any reference as I intended, feeling convinced that your Lordship is desirous of avoiding such expenses when it can possibly be done, and that you would certainly not have them claimed as rights; and understanding that the Rajah's sole view in taking upon himself to celebrate the marriage of his grand-daughter, a daughter's child, was considered as an unusual circumstance and as a mere device to raise money, by the presents he exacts from almost all classes of people on such occasions.

I am led now to mention the circumstance by having a few days ago been put in mind of it by Jeswant Rao, from whom I can collect that the Rajah is displeased at the omission of what he considers an usual ceremony, and would be glad to receive the entertainment at any future period. In fact, avarice is the ruling passion of the Rajah's heart, and seems to be daily growing upon him to the exclusion of almost every principle which leads to good or deters from bad actions.

In a late conference Jeswant Rao also renewed the mention of a complaint against Jujarsing of Raygureh, for giving refuge to two zemindars who had fled from the Rajah's authority; and that minister informed me of the Rajah's desire that they should be given up. The circumstances of this affair and the Rajah's demand were submitted in my letter to the Chief Secretary under the date 28th March 1811, and in the reply of the Chief Secretary, under the orders of the Honourable the Vice President in Council dated 19th April, I was apprized of the wishes of Government on that subject, that I should address Jujarsing directing him to remove the zemindars in question from his territories and caution him with regard to his future proceedings.

Agreeably to the tenor of these instructions I wrote to Jujarsing, who without hesitation, excepting from some delays which the calls of humanity required, obliged the zemindars in question to quit his territory and promised faithfully to avoid in future giving a similar ground of offence to Government. I made a communication on the subject to Jeswant Rao at the time, and no remark whatever was made upon it.

I reminded Jeswant Rao of all the circumstances above related, when he began to dispute the justice and friendliness of the mode of proceeding directed by Government. I told him that I could not admit now any argument on the subject as even before I wrote to Jujarsing, I apprized the Rajah's Government of the orders I had received and if the Rajah had then made any objection, I should have been prepared to prove both the justice and friendliness of the proceeding,—or if His Highness had been still of a different opinion, there would have been a possibility of reference. That now the affair had so long gone by, I could not enter upon it, unless Jeswant Rao could shew some further fault on the part of Jujarsing,—but in fact, the papers he had brought were the same

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papers of which copies were forwarded with my letter of the 28th March 1811, and no others.

A Chupprasse of mine sent for the purpose did not quit Raygurnh until he had seen the zemindars with their families entirely beyond the frontier of Jujarsing, nor do I learn that they have returned. Indeed I challenged Jesunt Rao to prove that they were now either protected or encouraged by Jujarsing, or had been, since they had quitted his territory a year ago; but I have heard no more of the business.

I can only therefore attribute the fresh agitation of so old a question, to a desire on the part of the Rajah to show the discontent which has lately, not unfrequently, appeared in his proceedings on points of trifling negotiation, and in his conduct towards his ministers.

No. 175—Jenlins informs the Governor General of the restoration of Yashwantrao Ramchandra to his old office at the Residency and of the operations before Bhopal.

FROM—R. JENKINS,

TO—LORD MINTO.

Nagpur, 18th January 1813.

My secret letter to Mr. Secretary Adam under date the 12th of December will have made your Lordship acquainted with the restoration of Jesunt Rao Ramchander to the office of minister for English affairs, and with everything of consequence which passed between the Durbar and me on that subject.

On the 30th of the month I received a note from Jesunt Rao requesting me, at the Rajah's desire, to send my Moonshes to Sreedhur Pundit, who had a communication to make on the part of His Highness. The Moonshes accordingly waited upon the minister at his house. The minister was only attended by Jesunt Rao and Jykishen Pundit and his communication was to the following effect.

First, he said the Rajah had desired him to inform me that his Vakeel at Poona had written to commission ten elephants to be purchased at Nagpore for His Highness the Peshwa, that good elephants were not to be purchased at Nagpore, the Rajah himself having been obliged to send for some from Hyderabad and Madras for his own use; that besides the friendship between His Highness and the Peshwa was not of that nature which would allow him to demand the price of any elephants he should send, and that he therefore proposed to send the Peshwa three of his own elephants as a present. This circumstance the Minister said the Rajah mentioned to me merely in the way of a friendly communication.

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Secondly, the Rajah had last year received an application from the Peshwa to chastise the Pindarries, to which effect orders had likewise been sent to Sindhia and Holkar, but that the matter had since been allowed to drop; that at this time the Rajah proposed to write to his Vakeel at Poona to urge to that court the advantage of punishing the Pindarries who were committing dreadful ravages in all quarters, and that His Highness requested I would write to Mr. Elphinstone to the same effect.

Thirdly, draughts having been prepared of letters to your Lordship in reply to those which I had lately delivered, the Rajah desired I would look them over and make in them any alterations which I might think proper.

The Minister at the same time delivered these draughts to my Moonshiee.

In returning the draughts to the Minister, I noticed the subjects of his communication in the following terms.

With regard to the elephants I said that a communication to me on so trifling an affair was altogether unnecessary, and that I received it merely as a proof of the Rajah's cordiality towards the British Government.

To His Highness's communication respecting his intended application to the court of Poona on the subject of the Pindarries, I replied that the matter being of a nature in which the views and wishes of the Peshwa were entirely those of the British Government, I could venture at once from what I know of the latter and without the necessity of hearing from Poona, to declare that the Peshwa had no intention of entering on any offensive operations against the Pindarries, and that all his preparations as well as those of the British Government and its other allies were merely directed to the protection of their own frontiers. I was convinced also that in the application from the Peshwa to which the Rajah alluded, the utmost that had been wished was that the Rajah should not allow the Pindarries to cross the Nerbudda so as to pass through his territories into the Deccan.

With regard to the contents of the Rajah's letter to your Lordship, I said I had no remarks to offer as they appeared to me to be unobjectionable, if they conveyed the expression of all His Highness wished to say. In the latter part of the letter in reply to your Lordship's of the latest date, I observed the Rajah desired a particular answer. On this point I said I wished to be informed to what part of His Highness's letter the answer was desired, and what was the nature of the answer that would satisfy His Highness's mind.

Sreedhur Pundit, in reply, said that with regard to the communication to Poona, I of course would make it or not, as might seem to me proper, but that the Rajah had felt it incumbent upon him to let his intended application be known to me in the first instance, and that His Highness

wished for such an answer from your Lordship to his letter as should satisfy his mind of the entire removal of all displeasure for what had passed.

Nothing further took place on these subjects and I waited to receive the letters to your Lordship's address, before I troubled you with the above relation. These letters having been brought to me yesterday evening by Jykishen Pundit, I have this day forwarded them to the Persian Secretary.

I believe it would be a great satisfaction to the Rajah to receive from your Lordship an assurance that the past is forgotten.

Since my last address to your Lordship the siege of Bhopaul has not at all advanced and Vizier Mahommed Khan still continues to defend it in person. Continual sorties have been made against the enemy's batteries by the Nabob with partial success, and the place not being entirely invested, he succeeds in introducing all kinds of supplies when required without any possibility of being molested. Daily skirmishes also take place between the Pindaries of either side, with little influence on the main operations.

With the exception of the troops with Sudeek Allee at Bhopaul, and an inconsiderable force employed under Maljee Ahree Rao and Ramgole Seik about Gardwara to check the Pindaries of Dost Mahommed's party, the Rajah has drawn all his troops about Nagpore, and seems perfectly regardless of the devastation of his country, whether despairing of preventing it which from his treatment of his troops he.....or hoping for better times either in our protection or the destruction of the Pindaries.

Dost Mahommed's party seems to be gaining head in infantry and guns, which have been lately placed under the command of an European of the name of Paul or Ball, who was formerly with Kureem. I have not yet been able to ascertain whence he comes.

Some considerable expeditions of the Pindaries of all parties, suspended during the Mohurram, are expected shortly to take place, but the direction they will move in is mere matter of surmise. Hitherto the Rajah's country has principally suffered and where the Pindaries have been, their ravages have been even more destructive than in any former year.

No. 176—The circumstances under which the allied forces abandoned the siege of Bhopal are reported to the Governor General by the Resident. He also writes about the uncertainty of the Rajah's pilgrimage to Jejury.

FROM—GEORGE SOTHEBY, AG. RESIDENT,

TO—THE EARL OF MINTO.

Nagpur, 23rd September 1813.

The raising of the siege of Bhopaul forming an event of some consequence in the transactions of the Nagpore state, I have endeavoured to

collect all the information I possibly can on the subject, so as to bring the whole matter in one view before your Lordship's attention.

Mr. Jenkins' last dispatch will have contained all the information concerning the operations of the allied forces of the Rajah of Nagpore and Sindia, under the several commands of Sudeek Ali Khan and Bala Bhow down till near the period of his own departure from Nagpore.

The rains had materially hindered the employment of very active operations and matters were upon much the usual footing, when on the 12th of July a letter from the Rajah of Nagpore arrived to Sudeek Ali ordering him to desist from further attempts against Bhopaul, to dismount his cannon from the batteries, and to draw off and canton his forces in the district of Chynpore Baree.

Bala Bhow and the other chiefs of Sindia's forces on being acquainted with his intentions, endeavoured by every means of persuasion to prevail upon Sudeek Ali to disregard these orders, and not withdraw his forces from Bhopaul. Sudeek Ali pleaded the total want of all supplies both of cash or provisions, stated the very high price of grain observing the orders he had received were peremptory, and that strict obedience was at all times incumbent upon him, and that in the present instance the circumstances he had alleged, fully proved the expediency also of the measure.

The chiefs of Sindia's troops then seem to have changed their tone, and to have adopted a higher strain of remonstrance, accusing him of treachery to the general cause, of having been bribed by the Nawab of Bhopaul to withdraw his troops from co-operation, and by thus unexpectedly deserting the cause to have frustrated all the plans that had been mutually agreed upon amongst them, and they ended by endeavouring to detain him at all events for the next fifteen days.

Sudeek Ali seems to have been unwilling to comply with this proposal, suspecting that their design in wishing to detain him was to gain time to collect around him the Dhurrah of Dost Mahommed and the forces from Sujalpoore, and either make an attack upon him, or at all events preclude his retiring as he wished.

On the 16th of July having previously withdrawn his guns from the batteries, he commenced his march which was conducted with considerable precaution, as if under apprehensions of being attacked, and having marched eleven coss that day he arrived on the third day from leaving Bhopaul, at Hoshangabad; and after leaving some troops in that fortress crossed the Nerbudda.

Sindia's troops immediately occupied the posts before Bhopaul from which Sudeek Ali's forces had retired, and three thousand Pindarries under Wasil Mahommed spread themselves over the district of Chynpore Baree, a measure which precluded Sudeek Ali from putting into execution the orders he had received for occupying that district. Early in August

of the siege.

of the removal of so great a part of the forces that had been pressing him, and by a vigorous and well directed sally compelled Sindia's troops to abandon their batteries, and about the same time the Pindaries in his interest seem to have made a successful attack on the cattle belonging to Bala Bhow's equipments; these circumstances conjoined appear to have had the effect of influencing Sindia's troops to retire also from Bhopaul. They fell back first to near Futeh Gurrh, but being harassed there both by the Pindaries and Vizier Mahommed, they removed from thence to Sehore, and latterly to Sujalpoore, where they were still remaining when the last accounts arrived from the Nerbudda. They have demanded reinforcements from Sindia and after the Dusserrah threaten again to

invest Bhopaul.

The Pindarries appear to be in their usual places of encampment. The Dhurrah of Dost Mahommed having its headquarters at Bagrode, although great numbers are spread over the district of Chynpore Baree, besides some infantry and four guns-and part plundering for subsistence in the district of Deoree. Seetoo was making some new boats at Seepanur Ghaut, and is supposed to be somewhat at variance with the Kureem shahae Pindaries, who are in Bhopaul. Baptiste was either in or about Chanderee, part of his battalions were besieging Mulhar Gurch, and exacting tribute from the neighbouring chiefs.

The Nuwab of Bhopaul seems not to have been wanting either in bravery and activity to defend himself when attacked, or in the arts of negotiation in taking advantage of the division of his adversaries amongst themselves to prevail upon one party to withdraw, and to compel the other by the force of arms. Sudeek Ali who crossed the Nerbudda with his forces the latter end of July, by constant messengers continued requiring the Nuwab's son to be sent to accompany him to Nagpore. To this request as hitherto he has returned evasive answers, and indeed it can hardly be supposed that having thus got rid of his enemies, he will, whatever engage-ments he may have entered into when pressed by danger and to serve a temporary purpose, entrust his son as a hostage into the hands of the Rajah.

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of Nagpore. In fact, the last accounts from Sudeek Ali mention that after delaying for a considerable time his departure in expectation of his arrival, he had in consequence of the Rajah's repeated injunctions advanced considerably on his journey towards Nagpore where he is now expected to arrive at, or very soon after the Dusserah. His force is left under the command of Sadashoo Govind to watch the motions of the Pindaries.

Mixed motives seem to have induced the Rajah of Nagpore to discontinue his attempts upon Bhopaul, despair of success from want of means of subsisting and paying his troops, suspicion of the intentions and good faith of his allies which might lead him to dread even the success of the enterprise as being likely to expose him to the mortification of seeing Sindia ultimately reap the fruits of his long continued efforts.

Amongst the other reasons which induced the Rajah to withdraw Sudeek Ali from Bhopaul, must be enumerated and perhaps considered as bearing most weight, his intention of proceeding on the pilgrimage to the Godavery and the temple at Jejooory, for the recovery of his son's health, which as it is now to be performed in the midst of the season of the incursions of the Pindaries, would naturally lead him to wish to concentrate round Nagpore the greatest part of his forces and commit the charge of his capital in his absence to the commander in whom he has the greatest confidence.

In my letter of the 14th instant to the address of Mr. Adam, I have stated all that I am able to learn of the Rajah's intentions. Since that time I have had a visit from Jeswant Rao, to whom I communicated both the orders I had received to accompany the Rajah, and my wish to be informed both of the time he intended commencing his journey and of any delays that might take place after that period, and also the number of troops he intended taking with him on this occasion, explaining that I made this last enquiry for the satisfaction of the Nizam's Government to whom it was a matter of considerable consequence to have them confined to as small a number as might be consistent with the Rajah's safety and dignity, and suggesting that into the country of a friend more than two or three thousand would not of course be taken, especially at the season of the year when the crops were on the ground, and the country most susceptible of damage.

Jeswant Rao told me from himself that he understood the number would be about five thousand, that he did think the Rajah would [not] be easily prevailed upon to go with less, and that an attempt of that nature would most likely be considered as an obstacle started for the purpose of preventing his going at all. I shall not press the number being reduced unless the Nizam's Government consider it a point of importance.

The answer from the Rajah to the above enquiries was neither very explicit nor satisfactory. He informed that he intended going after the Dusserah, and would inform me of the day when it was settled and that the number of troops was not yet determined. As I despair of receiving

from His Highness much more precise information of his intentions and as my enquiries will only tend to excite suspicion, I shall content myself with intelligence derived from other sources, which leads me to conclude that it is both the Rajah's wish and intention at present to leave Nagpore about the latter end of October, or the beginning of November. As however his son Bala Sahib is in such a state as almost to warrant his death in case of being moved about, such an ill-omened event may, by its occurrence, either greatly delay or totally put an end to His Highness's motions, and a threatened incursion of the Pindaries might render him unwilling to quit his capital at all.

When the Rajah marches I shall deliver over the care of the Residency to Lieutenant Mlexon according to the arrangement mentioned before by Mr. Jenkins.

No. 177—In response to the Governor General's instructions Mr. Jenkins submits an elaborate report on the proposed arrangements with Bhopal, with a draft of a treaty between the British and the Nabob of Bhopal. The document supplies a graphic description of the complications in the political situation of India before complete British supremacy was established.

FROM—R. JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,
TO—J. ADAM, SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT.

Nagpur, 29th October 1814.

I have already had the honour to report to His Excellency the Governor General my public proceedings under the instructions conveyed in your despatch of the 8th of July. I now proceed to perform the more difficult and delicate task assigned to me of laying before His Excellency the result of my enquiries and reflexions on the subject of an arrangement with the state of Bhopal, of the nature alluded to in that despatch.

2. It has become the more necessary that I should no longer delay my report on this important question as everything seems to indicate, that the entire conquest of that principality is at present meditated by Sindhia, either on his own account or for the purpose of transferring it to the Rajah of Nagpore for a pecuniary consideration, and hence if under former idea of the scantiness of the authentic materials which the great secrecy demanded in my enquiries I have been able to obtain, I should be deterred from now bringing the subject before His Excellency, the time will in all likelihood be past for the adoption by us of any system of measures in which Bhopal can be included. This state of things also introduces into the sphere of discussion, which is prescribed to me by His Excellency's instructions, a new question of some moment to which I shall have occasion to admit in the course of this despatch, viz., the policy of permitting the

state of Bhopaul to be swallowed up by either of its more powerful neighbours. This question however, as well as the other general considerations to which I am directed to advert in connection with the proposed arrangement, will more naturally follow in the order of discussion.

Some account of the state of Bhopaul itself.

3. The territory of Bhopaul in its present boundaries extends generally between 22° 45' and 23° 30' of north latitude and between 77° and 79° of east longitude. Its average length from east to west may be about 120, and its breadth from north to south about 50 miles. Its southern boundary which is the only well defined one, is the Nerbudda which separates it from the dominions of the Rajah of Nagpore, on the east it has Gurra Mundela, on the north-east and north, Deoree, Sagur, and the dominions of Sindia, and on the west the five mahals of the Vinchoor Jagheerdar and south of them the tract occupied by the Pindarries of Seetoo's party, and the Holkar shahae on the north bank of the Nerbudda.

4. The central and southern parts of Bhopaul, particularly the district of Goonohurgurh, are mountainous and covered with thick forests, but it possesses some rich tracts, particularly in the northern and western parts as the districts of Rayseen and Tol, which are the most productive. Chynpore Baree is also a fertile district, although now greatly deteriorated.

5. The actual revenues of the Nabob of Bhopaul at this period, owing to the continued attacks and depredations to which his territories have been subjected for a series of years, are very scanty. According to every account he does not at present realise more than a lack or a lack and a half of rupees per annum from his dominions which, in tranquil times and under good management, and that no other than the system of its present rulers which is well spoken of for its mildness and attention to the happiness and prosperity of its subjects, are calculated to be capable of producing a revenue of from ten to twelve lacks of rupees per annum. A great part of the country is parcelled out to relations of the Nabob and Patans of the same tribe, who maintain contingents of troops for the service of the state.

6. Rice, wheat and cotton were the chief and abundant products of Bhopaul in its better days, but cultivation is at present at a very low ebb, and being confined to the neighbourhood of forts or fortified towns and villages, the grain raised is barely sufficient for the subsistence of its scanty population.

7. Rayseen and Goonohurgurh are the two principal forts in Bhopaul, the one the key to the country on the north and the other on the south. Both are situated on hills, the former is surrounded by a town, formerly of considerable note, though now reduced to little more than a military cantonment. The Pindarries of Kureem's party who from a sense of common danger have adhered to the fortune of the Nabob, have taken

their quarters there, and contribute to keep up for their own support the cultivation of the lands in that district. The fort is of considerable strength, and is supposed to be capable of resisting any native attack.

8. Coonohurgurh or Coonoor is reported to be very strong both from its height and the difficulty of approaching it, or at least of lying near it with an army owing to the total want of water for seven or eight coss round excepting what is contained in the tanks of the fort itself. It is situated about six coss from Hoshangabad.

9. The capital of Bhopaul is a walled town of considerable extent, but now almost deserted. It has a citadel called Fatehgurh, of no great strength, situated on an eminence on the south-west side of the town and is besides considerably protected by a large tank, or rather lake, which entirely covers it on the south, and partly on the east end which renders it difficult to starve the place by blockade. It is the general residence of the Nabob.

10. There are other forts of little consequence, as Islamnugger, about 3 coss to the north of Bhopaul, now occupied by Sindhia, Roongurh situated between Rayseen and Bhopaul, and Choukegurh in the Baree district.

11. The standing force in the pay of the Nabob consists of about 400 infantry and 100 horse. On emergency he can collect about 500 more, which are maintained by his relations and adherents on jaghires which are allotted to them for that purpose, and of course there are never wanting soldiers of fortune to join his standard when he finds it necessary to raise a large number. The Pindaries attached to him are said to be about 1,200 horse, and they have hitherto concluded greatly to enable him to defend his country by harassing the attacking armies and bringing in those supplies from the neighbouring territories which his own do not afford, and without which he could not possibly have stood the long sieges he has lately sustained.

12. It is to the personal character of Vizier Mahomed Khan however, and to the devotion of a small number of adherents that is principally to be ascribed the successful resistance that this petty state has made and continues to make to the repeated attempts of Sindhia and the Rajah to subdue it. He has not indeed, been able to prevent the complete devastation and depopulation of the country, but has failed in no possible effort of conduct or bravery in defending what was defensible.

13. Vizier Mahomed Khan is not the Nabob, but the Dewan or Prime Minister to a pageant who enjoys the state and title of Nabob, without any of the effective prerogatives. The authority of the Nabobs of Bhopaul, seems for many years to have been rested in a succession of persons under this designation, an arrangement which as might naturally be expected, has often distracted the state with dissensions of competitors

for so high an office, and added to the difficulties with which it has for the last twenty years had to contend.

14. Vizier Mahomed Khan succeeded to the office about 1797 after expelling his predecessor and relation Mooreed Khan, whose family held Rathgurn until its conquest by Sindhia, in 1807. The Rajah of Berar had captured previous to his accession Hoshangabad and Chynpore Barea from the Bhopaul state, and the Pindarries who had then taken up a station near Burhanpore, whilst part of them were serving with the Rajah of Berar in his war against the Bhopaul state, had begun their work of destruction, to avert whose ravages in some measures an establishment had been given to Kurem, their principal chief.

15. This then seems to have been the origin of the connexion which has for some years past subsisted between Vizier Mahomed Khan and the Pindarries, a connexion which has been strengthened by the absolute demands of self defence, and yet is urged against him to prove the bad habits of his Government by those very powers, Sindhia and the Rajah, who first invited the Pindarries to plunder his territories and who would cloke their unprincipled ambition under the mask of regard for the tranquillity of India, which requires that the Pindarries should be deprived of the protection of the strongholds of Bhopaul.

16. I thought it necessary to state the view which I have taken of this subject, in order to show that there is nothing in the habits of the Bhopaul state to be inferred merely from its connexion with the Pindarries, unfavourable to its capability or disposition to contract and observe an alliance, which would reduce it to the necessity of reverting to legitimate mediums of Government and policy, which would reduce it in fact to those maxims from which the ambition and irregularity of its neighbours have alone, as far at least as appears from facts, induced it to swerve.

17. The ruined state of the country does not promise much present benefit to the British Government in point of resources from extending its protection to Bhopaul, but from every account of its capabilities and the character of its rulers in better days, there seems to be no reason to doubt that in the course of a few years it would afford to pay a considerable part of the expenses of the British force which might be stationed there. We might either take the country into our own hands, allowing pensions to the Nabob and his relations, stipulate for a fixed share of its collections which would increase as the revenues improve or take a fixed monthly or annual sum, in the two last cases leaving the administration of the country in the hands of the Nabob, with such a control as might be necessary for securing our rights.

18. The military power of the state is no doubt small, but might be improved, and would improve with the increase of its resources under our protection. It would at least suffice for the general duties of an auxiliary force in the protection of its own territory leaving the British force at

liberty to pursue offensive operations wherever it might be called for, and we might stipulate either generally for all the aid it might be in the power of the state to afford, or specially for the maintenance of a contingent. We might stipulate for the possession of the fort of Rayseen, which would probably be the best position for the force as covering the most exposed frontier of Bhopal, and which would give as an impregnable post for a depot, as well as an important point of support to all the operations of the force. We might also stipulate to the occupation of the other forts or military posts in the country in case of need. From the resistance which has for so long a time been made by Vazier Mahommed Khan, with the very limited means he possesses against the united forces of Sindia and the Rajah, we may conclude that no effort of either of those powers or even both combined, could endanger the British detachment in Bhopal during any time in which it would be exposed separately to the danger of being overwhelmed by superior force.

19. This situation of the force would dislodge the Pindarries permanently from their positions to the north-east and the west of Bhopal, would relieve our Bengal provinces and Berar from much of the present danger of invasion by them to which those positions are so favourable, and would afford protection to the districts of the Vinchoorkur and Rajah Bahadoor, the Peshwas Jagheerdars, which border upon Bhopal to the westward, and which besides furnishing a part of the supplies for the detachment might maintain a respectable body of horse to cooperate with it. Each of these districts is supposed to average a revenue of three lacks of rupees. Mulharagurh, another Jagheer of one of the Peshwa's chiefs, is situated not far to the northward of Bhopal and is of about the same value as the other two above mentioned.

20. With reference to future operations on an extensive scale against the Pindarries, we should have the means of forming depots which would probably be necessary to the efficiency of these operations, and for which purpose the central situation of Bhopal would be peculiarly favourable. We should besides always have a strong point of support which would render us in a great degree independent of the good will and assistance of the Marhatta powers, and form a strong check upon their treachery. The occupation of Bhopal would, in fact, be a complete bridle upon any hostile machinations of Sindhia and the Rajah of Berar, and prevent any junctions of forces between them.

21. The long connection which has subsisted between Vazier Mahommed Khan and Kureem and the other chiefs of the Pindarries, also renders it probable that he might be of essential service to us, from his knowledge of their habits and from his influence over some of them in the prosecution of the measures which may be determined upon for their suppression. His character of a soldier too, and his reputation amongst the military chiefs being very high in this part of India, we might derive

considerable advantage in the event of our finding it necessary to employ any kind of native horse, in making use of him as a partizan leader, on whose fidelity, courage and activity we could place reliance.

22. I have hitherto spoken merely of Bhopaul and of those districts adjoining it which we have already interfered to protect from the irregularities of Sindia's armies, and from what I have had the honor to state, I trust that His Excellency will be enabled in some measure to judge of the extent to which the state of Bhopaul ordered by us and with the means we already possess through the Peshwa of adding strength and efficiency to any arrangement we may adopt, could be rendered an useful ally. But before I quit this part of the subject I would venture to suggest that the arrangement might most advantageously—I might almost say must necessarily—be extended to include the petty states of Sagur and Deoree, which lie between our territories in Bundelcund and Bhopaul.

23. With regard to Deoree, I believe, it is a Jagheer of one of the Peshwa's chiefs equal with those formerly mentioned, and it may therefore be considered as naturally comprehended in the means we already possess through the Peshwa, of contributing to the efficiency of the Bhopaul alliance. Its revenue is probably three lacks of rupees per annum.

24. Sagur from its extent of territory and its revenues may be considered to be of importance equal, if not superior to Bhopaul, in the means it possesses of being an efficient ally. In revenue it is at present much richer than Bhopaul, although I have not yet been able to promise any correct account of its resources or of the other capabilities it affords of adding to our strength in that quarter. Sindia has no just claims on Sagur, and I should think there could be little doubt of that disposition of the chief of that petty state to allow us every advantage we could desire in return for our protection. I should imagine that our records in Bundelcund give every information respecting Sagur and our connection with the Nana of Calpee affords us facilities for negotiating the arrangement.

25. By combining Sagur in the arrangement with Bhopaul we should materially strengthen the barriers of our western frontier, continuing a line of dependent states from Jhansi and Duteah to the Nerbudda. The force in Bhopaul would have a secure line of communication with Bundelcund through the territories of a chief under the protection of the British Government and, in short, we should acquire a material accession to our future operations for the total destruction of the Pindaries.

26. With regard to the disposition of Vizier Mahommed Khan towards the British Government, and the inducements which it might be advisable to hold out to secure his attachment, we have had repeated requests from him to be taken under our protection, and I should conceive that he would require no other inducement to accede to our wishes in every respect than

a sense of his present precarious situation. I have lately received private communications from his Vakeel at Nagpore, Enaïet Messeseah, offering either the whole country of Bhopal to the British Government upon the only condition of a provision for the Nabob and his family, or a share in its revenues of six annas in the rupee. At the same time the Nabob never fails to urge the merits of the state of Bhopal towards the British Government during Colonel Goddard's march across the Peninsula in 1779; and on some alleged engagements entered into at that time, founds an expectation not only of our protection from the dangers that threaten him, but of the recovery of his lost possessions, and the restoration of his Government to its primitive respectability.

27. I have already described the present boundary of Bhopal, its ancient boundary including territory of the value of from twenty-five to thirty lacks of rupees per annum, extended northward to near Seronje, westward to Sonekutoh and Sarangpore, and to the southward of the Nerbudda included Hoshangabad and Seoree. The northern parts including Bheelsah, Rahtgurrh and Bairseeah are in Sindhia's possession, who has also encroached still further even upon the present boundary. The western parts include the five mahals and Shujewalpoor, the jagheers of the Vinchoorkur and Rajah Bahadoor, and nearer the Nerbudda the haunts of the Pindarries. To the southward of the Nerbudda, the districts of Hoshangabad and Seoree have been, since 1807, in the possession of the Rajah of Berar from whom they had been recovered by Vizier Mahommed Khan during the Mahratia war of 1803, after their original capture as mentioned above.

28. It seems impracticable then to conciliate the Bhopal state by any extension of its territories as they at present stand, unless perhaps we might transfer to it all the places held by the Pindarries, part of which indeed as Cheepanere occupied by Seetoo, have passed directly from the hands of the Bhopal state into those of their present possessors, whereas the others, have most likely been in the intermediate occupation of Sindhia and therefore might not be recoverable.

29. We might perhaps ensure the personal attachment of Vizier Mahommed, the efficient ruler of the country, by some stipulation for the permanency of his power whilst he perseveres in his fidelity to our interests, and by engaging to promise the release of his son Nuzzer Mahommed Khan, who is now in a kind of honourable restraint at Nagpore. It would further tend to bind him to our interests if we conferred a pension or some landed property on his son within the British territories and promised never to withdraw our protection from his family.

30. From some occurrences which have taken place in Bhopal it might be inferred that Vizier Mahommed Khan, although the only prop of that state, will not be indifferent to such provisions for his own interests

and those of his family. Of the character of the present Nabob, Chaus Mahommed Khan, who succeeded his father Hyat Mahommed Khan about the year 1807, I have been able to procure no account, but it would appear that on one occasion his attempts to shake off the control of Vizier Mahommed Khan caused the latter to retire for a short time from the court, and led to the capture of Bhopaul by this Government and Sindiah.

31. I have endeavoured to give mature consideration to what I conceive to be the principal objections to an arrangement with Bhopaul of the nature contemplated, except as a part of a general system of combined political and military arrangements directed to the extermination of the Pindarry power. I think there can be little doubt that the command of that country would materially contribute to the success of any operations in Malwa. It may have even been considered a matter of doubt, it is certainly one of necessary deliberation, how far the measure can be effected without the risk of present evils which, so however we must in the end have to encounter them, yet under the defensive policy from which it is not deemed expedient as yet to depart, must be decided to militate against the present adoption of any plan whatever which threatens them in a remote degree even of probability.

32. The principal and most important of the considerations on which objections may be founded to any arrangement with Bhopaul under the circumstances of our present defensive policy, seems to me to be the danger of involving ourselves with the neighbouring powers and of precipitating hostilities with the Pindaries.

33. The powers likely most to resent our interference in Bhopaul are Sindia and the Rajah of Nagpore.

34. With regard to the likelihood of Sindia attempting to obstruct our measures in that quarter, there is probably little cause for apprehension. The general question of Sindia's disposition to enter into a war with the British Government in opposition to measures which he conceived hostile to his interests, is ably discussed in Mr. Mercer's despatch No. 7 of the 12th of March 1810 to the Right Honourable Lord Minto. The point under consideration then was the effect which the establishment of a subsidiary force on the Nerbudda would have on Sindia's mind, and the conclusion was that although a degree of jealousy would probably be excited, yet that its consequences were not likely to be immediately detrimental to the interests of the British Government. The alliance between the British Government and the Rajah would appear to be a measure much more dangerous to Sindia than a similar one with Bhopaul, especially since equally with the latter it threatened the establishment of a force in Bhopaul, and deprived the community of Marhatta states of one of its members, adding the weight of its military power and resources to the means which the position of the force on the Nerbudda placed in the

hands of the British Government, of interfering in any manner it pleased in the affairs of Malwa.

In the arrangement now contemplated there is certainly sufficient ground of jealousy to Sindhia, and his disposition to oppose it, if in his power, would be strengthened by the sense of a community of interests with this Government, but they can have no hope singly or combined of succeeding in a war with the British Government and any thing short of what would drive them to despair, would probably fail of exciting them to risk what is left to them in a contest so utterly hopeless.

35. The Rajah has long been deluded by Sindhia with the hope of getting Bhopaul by his assistance, but the most likely result of the operations now contemplated by Sindhia against Bhopaul is that it will be retained by him, if he succeeds in conquering it, and the Rajah's hopes be thus equally disappointed as if it fell into the hands of the British Government. The Rajah is, I believe, beginning to suspect that Sindia is insincere, and under such circumstances, and if we add that Bhopaul in the possession of Bapatte of whose vicinity His Highness has great reason to be apprehensive, would be an object of constant alarm to the Rajah, whilst in that of the British Government it would be the means of procuring to him all the advantages without the burthens of the proposed subsidiary force on the Nerbudda, we may consider the Rajah's interests as less immediately concerned than those of Sindhia. That he would contemplate the occupation of Bhopaul by us without the most extreme jealousy however, is hardly to be imagined. But whatever check such a force may appear to impose on the Rajah, and although he may be apprehensive of our encouraging the Nabob of Bhopaul in the prosecution of his claims to Hoshangabad and Seoree wrested from him by this Government, I see nothing in the Rajah's character, the present state of his affairs, or even in his deep rooted aversion to the British Government and jealousy of any steps towards the aggrandizement, which can lead me for a moment to anticipate any kind of obstacle in this quarter to our acting as our interests may seem to demand.

36. With regard to the danger of precipitating hostilities with the Pindaries, it would certainly be necessary on establishing a British force in Bhopaul that they should be dislodged from their present positions; which are generally Dost Mahomed's at Bagrode, north of Bhopaul near Rahatgurrh; Seetoo and the Holkar shahae party at Sutwas Hurrun-gaon, west of Bhopaul; and the remains of Kureem's party at Rayseen. But I conceive that this would be the natural consequence of the movement of the British troops into Bhopaul without the necessity of any operations for that purpose. It is not unlikely that the Pindaries might occasionally endeavour to harass and annoy the force in its communications and supplies, but the first impression of its advance would lead them to retire to the greatest practicable distance for their own security and I should imagine

that there would be little serious inconvenience from such desultory operations, and nothing to force us more than at present into hostilities with them as a body.

37. It may deserve consideration however, how far the occupation of Bhopal by a British force might indicate our future designs so as to bring at once upon our provinces those evils, which in taking our final measures for the destruction of the Pindarries, can only be averted by their suddenness, secrecy and judicious combination, how far it might be advisable that the Pindarries should be dislodged from their present positions, and whether under all circumstances the vicinity of Bhopal is not the best situation for them as long as they are permitted to exist. To what quarter would they retreat if driven from the present seats, and might not their new ones be more dangerous, or at least as dangerous to some part of the British possessions as their present ones are to those of the Nizam and Peshwa. In short, how far would it be politic to do any thing which would be likely to interfere with or alter their present range of depredation before we are prepared to exterminate them.

38. It is not easy to give any precise answer to these questions. They are probably as necessarily involved in the policy of an alliance with the state of Nagpore as in that of the arrangement under discussion, although the advantages of the former were of too important and substantial a nature to yield to considerations of danger not very evident or certain. I do not think, indeed, that the contemplated arrangement in Bhopal would necessarily betray further designs against the Pindarries, or if it did, would drive them to closer connection with Sindhia and Holkar, which probably Government would not consider an evil. It might be viewed even as an advantage, under the circumstances of a controlling British force being stationed in Malwa, to be able to fix the actions of the Pindarries upon tangible Governments, provided we could render it the interest of such Governments to be responsible for them not in name only; and as an object next in consequence to their entire destruction or perhaps subservient to it. To contribute to this effect, we might declare our present wishes to extend no further than that they should be restored to the obedience of their original masters, whatever we might eventually be forced to do if this habit of indiscriminate plunder continued; and by such a declaration dispose Sindhia and Holkar to exert themselves to reduce their numbers as the means of securing their obedience and to circumscribe their ravages, which would appear to those powers to be requisite to check our further advances in Malwa, as well as to protect their own dominions to which those ravages would be more than formerly confined as the consequence of their expulsion from Bhopal. This view of the subject may be opposed also to the other questions stated in the preceding paragraph.

39. Other objections to the proposed arrangement, as a single and unconnected measure, arise from considering the exposed and insulated

Rajah.

measures which may hereafter be contemplated.

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which may be taken of the policy of allowing it to fall into the hands of Sindia or the Rajah of Berar.

42. The present state of Bhopaul is no doubt very unfavourable to the tranquillity of the Deccan. It is the seat of the Pindarries and a stepping stone for Meer Khan to enter these territories. The settlement of that unfortunate country there is a matter of real concern to our interests in this quarter of India, and it may seem that the annexation of it to the dominions either of Sindia or the Rajah would in this view be advantageous.

43. Would Bhopaul be less the seat of the Pindarries if Sindia had it, or would Meer Khan thereby lose any material facilities to an invasion of this country? The latter question I think, may be answered in the affirmative. In attempting to answer the former we have to consider that Sindia has no wish to destroy the Pindarries, but to keep them in some kind of subjection to himself. Why then, if he takes Bhopaul, should he remove them from its vicinity, since there is no position which they would perhaps occupy in any subordination to Sindia's Government less dangerous to his own provinces. But it may be said, it would give Sindia greater power to prevent them from plundering the territories of other powers. I answer, that Sindia has no interest in preventing them from plundering the territories of other powers as long as he is not considered responsible for them, but it is his interest they should do so and spare his own. The Nabob of Bhopaul is accused of being a confederate of the Pindarries, but we see the Pindarries generally ranged under Sindia's banners in any attack upon Bhopaul. I believe there is no doubt that Sindia and Holkar share occasionally in the profits of their expeditions, if not avowedly, yet in fact. and Baptiste who was sent to chastise them and to punish Jeswunt Rao Bhow for his depredations in the neighbouring territories of the Peshwa's Jagheerdars, unites with both to engage in an enterprise which cannot but entail additional and protracted evils upon those territories.

44. To take a more general view of the subject Government will have observed that Baptiste has already considerably extended the nominal dominion of Sindia and his own substantial power. The greater part of Gurra Kotta, Chunderas and Bahadoor Gurh have within these last few years fallen into his hands. On general grounds it seems to be advisable that Sindia's possessions should not be extended over Bhopaul. The independence of that state would always be a considerable check upon him. The possession of it will add both absolutely and relatively to his power. If left to Baptiste, the country may soon produce a very considerable revenue which, with the strength and the situation of its forts, would greatly extend his consequence, and the efficiency of the only part of Sindia's army which is now at all respectable. The Rajah of Berar would become his tributary, and be exposed to all the influence of military domination in his fears, whilst Sindia would always retain a hold on his

..... in having it in his power at once to gratify his passion for becoming..... of Bhopaul.

45. The occupation of Bhopaul by the Rajah and not likely in my opinion to happen, would not be subject to the same objections. It would be a considerable barrier against Meer Khan and the Pindarries would in all likelihood be dislodged from their previous seats, as there are not the same ties between them and the Rajah as between them and Sindia. It would be decidedly the Rajah's interests to remove them from his frontier, and he would have the means of maintaining a force across the Nerbudda which would deter them from remaining there.

46. There seem to me to be two modes of prosecution under the present state of things according as we may be desirous of Bhopaul immediately under protection and stationing a British force there; or of merely keeping the road open to an arrangement of that nature at some future time.

47. In the first case, we might take advantage of the presence of Vizier Mahommed Khan's Vakeel at Delhi to conclude an engagement with the state of Bhopaul on such terms as may appear advisable, immediately declare that state to be under our protection, proceed to establish the force there without delay, requiring Sindia to withdraw his army from that neighbourhood, evacuating not only Bhopaul but the lands of the Peshwa's jagheerdars which cannot but suffer from its presence there. We might declare that we had no other views in the arrangement than the removal of the Pindarries from a quarter whence they were enabled with so much advantage to make depredations on the territories of our allies in the Deckan, and to afford to the Peshwa's jagheerdars that permanent protection which we were bound by treaty to secure for them, and which we had so long demanded in vain for them at Sindia's hands, whose commanders and troops were the depredators and who was confessedly unable to control them. That under such circumstances we were compelled to conclude engagements with the independent state of Bhopaul which promised us the advantages we required, and which were solely of a defensive nature. That we had no intention of interfering further directly or indirectly in the affairs of Malwa, and that we should strictly regard the rights of other powers, resolved however to maintain and assert our own.

48. I have already mentioned the degree in which we should be required to operate against the Pindarries on occupying Bhopaul, and the effects our measures would be likely to produce on our situation with regard to them. It would, I should suppose, be advisable that the force at first advanced should be sufficient to overcome all possible opposition, even although none may be contemplated. There is no doubt however that this would excite much jealousy, but not so much more in proportion than that which a smaller force would cause, as to counterbalance the advantage of risking nothing in the outset.

49. If it should not be deemed expedient at the present moment to hazard all the consequences of an immediate arrangement of the nature discussed, whilst we may at the same time be impressed with the benefits to be expected from a similar arrangement when our more comprehensive plans shall be matured, we might content ourselves with signifying to Sindia that we expected he would direct Baptiste to drop his plan of conquering Bhopaul, which was a service totally different from that on which the Maharajah at our desire had sent him, and which he had lost sight of. That the purposes of protection to the territories of the Peshwa's jagheerdars were inconsistent with the prosecution of military operations in Bhopaul, and that we insist upon the entire removal of Sindia's troops from any situation which exposed us to the necessity of making such continual and ineffectual complaints, and which might in the end compel us to take the remedy into our own hands by sending British troops into that quarter of Malwa.

50. Both of these plans involve us in dissensions with Sindia, but in the former we fall at once into a set of measures which must be supported and carried through; in the latter we are left free as to our future measures, and although we reckon upon the expression of our wishes as sufficient to deter Sindia from prosecuting the conquest of Bhopaul, we are not committed to oppose it by force. I confess, however, that I do not think it politic to express a wish where we are not determined to support it by something more decided if the matter is one of any considerable interest, as this seems to be. In the latter plan too, it may be added, the disgust that would be given to Sindia by our advancing troops into Bhopaul, whilst we demanded his to be removed, would be avoided and we should have no fear of being involved with the Pindaries or of incurring any of the inconveniences attending the other plan until we were fully prepared to encounter them.

51. Upon the whole it appears to me that the question is one of great delicacy and difficulty, and I do not presume to think that I have done justice to it in the foregoing discussions. The prospective advantages of an alliance with Bhopaul combined with the other arrangements I have touched upon, seem to me to be considerable. The immediate advantages are certainly not so great and perhaps may be resolved into the negative one of preventing that country from falling into the hands of Sindia, unless we allow more weight of laying an early foundation for our future plans. I would presume to add also that it might not be unworthy of a great and liberal Government to consider whether it would not redound to its honour and reputation to preserve the state of Bhopaul from absolute ruin in return for her services to the British cause in earlier times. The objections to the measures are of an important nature and the considerations I have brought forward to weaken them, may not be thought satisfactory. As far as those considerations arise out of a calculation of the opinion of our power and in disregard to speculations of possible opposition

53. If we could so arrange matters as to have it in our power to make it over to the Rajah, should he hereafter accede to our views, our arrangements in that quarter, though calculated to stand alone, might be made subservient to that more perfect one. By taking the country burthened with pensions only to the Nabob and his family we might accomplish this, but it is not certain that we should be able to acquire Bhopaul on these terms, and except by conquest, which is out of the question. I have generally abstained however from advertng to any considerations calculated to make us still look to this quarter, such as the possible consequence of the occupation of Bhopaul by Baptiste, and even of the acquisition of it by the Rajah to induce His Highness to solicit the alliance, because it seemed to me that it would only tend to unsettle a question which was to be discussed on its merits as a substitute for that alliance. Still I have not deemed it proper altogether to overlook such considerations in the despatch.

54. I have the honour to add a draught of the articles of a treaty which might be proposed to the Nabob of Bhopaul and the chief of Sagur, and which seem to me to embrace the principal powers to the efficiency of the arrangements, which may be concluded.

those chiefs.

55. In order that His Excellency the Governor General may be fully acquainted with the situation and geography of Bhopaul, I have also the honour to send with this despatch a sketch of the country shewing its former and present limits, and the relative situations of the neighbouring territories alluded to in the above discussions. For this sketch I am indebted, through Mr. Strachey, to Lieutenant Tod, the surveyor with the Residency in Sindia's camp.

No. 178—*Draught of a Treaty between the British Government and the Nabob of Bhopaul, dated 29th October, 1814.*

Article 1st.—A permanent friendship and alliance are established between the Honourable Company and the Nabob of Bhopaul and between their heirs and successors. In conformity to the friendship and alliance so established, the friends and enemies of one party shall be the friends and enemies of both.

Article 2nd.—The Honourable Company hereby guarantees the Nabob of Bhopaul, his heirs and successors in the possession of all the territory now held by him, and engages to protect his rights and territories in the same manner as its own from all enemies whatsoever.

Article 3rd A.—Four battalions of the Honourable Company's infantry, one regiment of cavalry etc., shall be permanently stationed in the territories of the Nabob of Bhopaul, in part of the expenses of which the annual or monthly sum of () rupees shall be paid by the Nabob to the Honourable Company. In the event of a failure on the part of the Nabob of Bhopaul in the regular monthly or annual payment of this sum, the Honourable Company's Government shall have the right to appoint a person to superintend the collection of an equal amount from the country.

Article 3rd B.—Four battalions of the Honourable Company's infantry, one regiment of cavalry etc., shall be permanently stationed in the territories of the Nabob of Bhopaul for himself, his heirs and successors to pay to the Company's Government six annas in the rupee on the whole amount of the net revenues of his Government, whatever they may at any time amount to, and in order to ascertain its share, the British Government shall appoint an officer or officers to superintend the collections, who shall have free access to all the revenue papers and transactions. The Nabob also promises to attend to all suggestions of the British Government relative to the administration of his Government, civil and military. The Nabob however is absolute in the management of his household, family and relations.

Article 4th.—The Nabob agrees that the possession of the fort and town of Rayseen shall be permanently vested in the Honourable Company, and it shall be at the option of the British Government to keep the Honourable Company's troops in whichever of the other forts or places of strength in the country and at whatever time that Government may deem it expedient.

Article 5th.—The Honourable Company engages never to demand any further sum from the Nabob, his heirs and successors, beyond the amount or share specified in the 3rd article, although it reserves to itself the liberty of at any time increasing or diminishing the number of British troops serving in the Nabob's territories.

Article 6th.—Whenever the Honourable Company shall be engaged in hostilities, the Nabob agrees to assist the Honourable Company with all his forces and the resources of his dominions, and the Nabob will at all times exert himself to facilitate in every possible manner the collection of supplies for the British troops within the limits of his territories.

Article 7th.—As by the 2nd article of the present treaty the Honourable Company becomes guarantee to the Nabob of Bhopal for the security of his country against all external enemies, the Nabob hereby agrees that if any misunderstanding should arise between him and any other state or chief, he will, in the first instance, submit the cause of dispute to the Company's Government and will abide by its decision. If from the obstinacy of the opposite party no amicable terms can be settled, then the Honourable Company engages to assist the Nabob with the force stationed in his territories to obtain his rights.

Article 8th.—Although the Nabob retains the exclusive command of his troops, yet he hereby agrees to act during the period of a war, regarding their disposal in every respect in conformity to the advice and counsel of the Company's Government.

Article 9th.—The Nabob promises neither to enter into nor pursue any negotiation with any foreign state whatever without the knowledge and approbation of the Honourable the Company's Government. He renounces all connection with the Pindarries.

Article 10th.—The Nabob shall neither entertain in his service nor permit to reside in his territories any European or American or any native subject of the Company without the consent of the British Government.

Article 11th.—No duties shall be levied by the Nabob on any articles for the use and consumption of the British troops at any time serving in his territories.

(The remaining portion missing.....).

SECTION 6

*The Pindari Inroads into Nagpur Territory
1805-1817*

No. 178—This is a news-letter sent by one British officer to another, giving an account of the disturbances created by the Pindaris in Berar.

FROM—THE CAMP OF COL. WALLACE, IN BERAR,

TO—RUSSELL, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

16th November 1805.

The following are the accounts we have received of the Pindaries who have entered Berar. Late last night a note to Appah's address from Nuzur Ally, the principal civil officer at Amara-wutty, was received in which it is said on the night of the 13th instant 20,000 pindaries surrounded this place. If you (meaning Appah) march day and night it may be of service. Golam Hyder Khan marched with his troops one and a quarter coss from Amara-wutty and is now opposing them. Make this known to the English officer commanding.

The next report after this tremendous one which reached us, was a very satisfactory letter from Salabut Khan, also dated the 13th instant, one march east of Ellichpoor. In which Salabut says that he has intelligence of a body of pindaries having come through the Gawilghur hills, and appeared at a village called Maholy 16 coss from Ellichpoor on the Nagpoor road, and has in consequence moved so as to place himself between them and the southern part of Berar, and promised to use his utmost endeavours to attack them wherever he can, and to prevent their doing injury to the country. To-day a note of the 13th instant has been received from a Tappal writer at Amara-wutty which states that an action had taken place between the pindaries and Golam Hyder, in which the latter was successful. From the two latter accounts there is strong ground for in part disbelieving the first.

On the receipt of this intelligence from which it appears certain that the pindaries have crossed the frontier, Col. Wallace ordered the Mogul horse and infantry with us, about 4 or 5,000, immediately to march for Amarawutty, and they this morning started. A light corps consisting of the 3rd and 1st regiments of cavalry, 900 picked native infantry and fifty pioneers with 2 six pounders, has been to-day equipped, and will move tomorrow morning one march in the direction of Amarawutty, and next day on towards that place unless the information which is received before tomorrow evening renders their further progress unnecessary, the possibility of which event has induced Col. Wallace to delay giving Col. Doveton (the officer who commands this party) his final instructions till tomorrow, when he will also, it is most likely, be enabled to communicate more certain information to him respecting the numbers and views of these freebooters. If Col. Doveton enters on this service his orders will be to proceed in the first instance towards Amarawutty, and having secured the safety of that place, to act against the pindaries in the manner he may deem best calculated to preserve from their depredations the most vulnerable parts of the Nizam's territory, and to drive them north beyond the frontier. He will of course be assisted by the Nizam's troops in that quarter. The number of pindaries said to have been in the hills west of Batool was never stated at more than 10,000; and these must be those which have entered Berar; I trust that it will therefore appear that the troops stationed at Amarawutty have been sufficient for its defence for a time, and that the arrival of Salabut Khan, who would certainly march there on learning that it was threatened, has completed its safety; on the arrival there of Appah with the Nizam's troops which were here, there should be in that vicinity about 10,000 men.

As we shall, after Doveton's departure, be without any cavalry which might enable any pindaries who came this way to annoy us, Col. Wallace proposes to order here Assaf-ud-Dowlah now stationed at Amdapur.

Col. Wallace is better to-day having had no fever, which gives us all great hopes of his disease now taking a favourable turn. He will, I fear, report the state of affairs to Col. Close officially tomorrow.

Translation of a letter received from Salabut Khan Behader, under date 25 Shabaun (November 17th) describing his pursuit of the Pindaris at Nandgaon adding that Gujaba, Raghuji's nephew, was seen amongst the Pindaris.

In pursuit of the Pindaries I arrived within two coss of Amarawutty, at which place hearing that the Pindaries had gone to Nandgaon, I directed my course to that village. When I reached Nandgaon I found the Pindaries had left it, and had proceeded to Naosa* which they plundered and

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then marched to the Wurdah, two coss distant, which they crossed. I went as far as that river in pursuit of them and having received orders not to cross I encamped on its banks.

The pindaries, I am informed, have plundered Hasty and villages next to it which partly belonged to the Nizam and partly to Boonsla, but did no injury to any village wholly the property of Boonsla.

The inhabitants of Naosa say that they saw Goja Row, Boonsla's nephew, with the party; and the hircarahs, I sent after the pindaries to bring me intelligence of their movements, inform me that they saw, Munnoo, a favourite camel hircarah of Goja Row, in their camp. From the above I am certain that Goja Row is one of the party.*

I have this instant received intelligence from Ellichpoor acquainting me that a large body of pindaries are about leaving the hills and who intend moving towards Ellichpoor, in consequence of which I will march to that place immediately and should the pindaries quit the hills, I will do all in my power to disperse them.*

No. 180—The movements of Yashwantrao Chorpade and the raids of the Pindaries in Berar are reported in this letter.

FROM—COL. WALLACE, COMMANDING IN BERAR,

TO—COL. CLOSE.

Camp near Ahola, 20th November 1805.

Jesunt Rao Goreporah arrived in this camp late yesterday. I have not yet seen him not being yet well enough to receive his visit. I hope shortly to hear from you respecting his being permitted to go to Poona.

All late accounts from Amarawutty confirm the intelligence of the Pindaries who had appeared there having crossed the Wurdah. My Hircarahs report them to be of Setoo's party, whom they state to have accompanied them to the hills on the frontier of Berar where he was taken sick, and remained.

They also say that they came from Hurdah or Hindia.

I have communicated to Mr. Elphinstone all information I possess of these Pindaries.

Lt.-Col. Doveton's detachment should arrive at Amarawutty to-day.

*This is probably another ruse of Salabatkhan. Goja Row referred to is Gujaba Gujar, a maternal nephew of Raghuji Bhonsle. It was a common practice in those unsettled times to spread false reports in order to gain favour with the British Government.

On the receipt of this intelligence from which it appears certain that the pindaries have crossed the frontier, Col. Wallace ordered the Mogul horse and infantry with us, about 4 or 5,000, immediately to march for Amarwutty, and they this morning started. A light corps consisting of the 3rd and 1st regiments of cavalry, 900 picked native infantry and fifty pioneers with 2 six pounders, has been to-day equipped, and will move tomorrow morning one march in the direction of Amarawutty, and next day on towards that place unless the information which is received before tomorrow evening renders their further progress unnecessary, the possibility of which event has induced Col. Wallace to delay giving Col. Doveton (the officer who commands this party) his final instructions till tomorrow, when he will also, it is most likely, be enabled to communicate more certain information to him respecting the numbers and views of these freebooters. If Col. Doveton enters on this service his orders will be to proceed in the first instance towards Amarawutty, and having secured the safety of that place, to act against the pindaries in the manner he may deem best calculated to preserve from their depredations the most vulnerable parts of the Nizam's territory, and to drive them north beyond the frontier. He will of course be assisted by the Nizam's troops in that quarter. The number of pindaries said to have been in the hills west of Batool was never stated at more than 10,000; and these must be those which have entered Berar; I trust that it will therefore appear that the troops stationed at Amarawutty have been sufficient for its defence for a time, and that the arrival of Salabut Khan, who would certainly march there on learning that it was threatened, has completed its safety; on the arrival there of Appah with the Nizam's troops which were here, there should be in that vicinity about 10,000 men.

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then marched to the Wurdah, two coss distant, which they crossed. I went as far as that river in pursuit of them and having received orders not to cross I encamped on its banks.

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No. 180—The movements of Yashwantrao Chorpade and the raids of the Pindaries in Berar are reported in this letter.

FROM—COL. WALLACE, COMMANDING IN BERAR,

TO—COL. CLOSE.

Camp near Akola, 20th November 1805.

Jesunt Rao Goreporah arrived in this camp late yesterday. I have not yet seen him not being yet well enough to receive his visit. I hope shortly to hear from you respecting his being permitted to go to Poona.

All late accounts from Amaratwuty confirm the intelligence of the Pindaries who had appeared there having crossed the Wurdah. My Hircarabs report them to be of Seetoo's party, whom they state to have accompanied them to the hills on the frontier of Berar where he was taken sick, and remained.

They also say that they came from Hurdah or Hindia.

I have communicated to Mr. Elphinstone all information I possess of these Pindaries.

Lt.-Col. Doveton's detachment should arrive at Amaratwuty to-day.

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No. 181—Col. Wallace reports to Elphinstone that the Pindaris had crossed the Wardha, and inquires whether the Raja would object to British troops and the Nizam's contingent crossing the same river in their pursuit.

FROM—COL. WALLACE,

TO—THE HONOURABLE M. S. ELPHINSTONE.

Camp near Akola, 21st November 1805.

Understanding that the pindaries who lately appeared at Amrawutty have crossed the Wurdah and are plundering the villages which lie to the eastward of that river and belong jointly to the Soubah of the Deckan and the Rajah of Nagpore, I request that you would be good enough to inform me whether the Rajah would have any objections to the British and Mogul troops crossing the general boundary in order to afford protection to that part of His Highness the Soubah's dominions which are situated beyond it, and also whether from your knowledge of the wishes of Government on these points such a measure would be advisable.

No. 182—Col. Wallace reports the movements of the Pindaris.

FROM—COL. WALLACE,

TO—COL. CLOSE.

Camp near Akola, 23rd November 1805.

I have the pleasure to enclose you the copy of a letter I to-day received from Mr. Elphinstone on the subject of my communication to you of the 9th instant a copy of which I transmitted to him.

I thought it proper to acquaint you and Mr. Elphinstone with the substance of the message conveyed to me by a confidential servant of Salabut Khan, relative to the purport of the mission of the Vakeel sent by the Rajah of Nagpore to that Sirdar not from wholly believing his statement of that transaction, but from conceiving it my duty to make known a circumstance of this nature to you both. I do myself the pleasure of forwarding the copy of a letter I lately addressed to Mr. Elphinstone on the subject of which for my guidance on future occasions, I should feel happy by being favoured with your opinion.

All late reports from Amrawutty confirm the account of the pindaries having crossed the Wurdah, and entirely quitted that part of the Nizam's territories west of that river. I yesterday sent you the copy of a letter from Sulabut Khan which contains a rumour of the approach to Ellich-poor of some of these pindaries, but this not having been confirmed from any other quarter, I doubt it that Goojabah, the Bhonslah's nephew, is with them. I have only heard from Salabut Khan.

Lt.-Col. Doveton's Detachment would reach Amrawutty on the 20th instant, and will remain on the eastern frontier of Berar, until all apprehension of the pindaries returning into that province be passed.

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I hope that no more of these freebooters will make their appearance from the northward.

Lieutenant Colonel Gore's Detachment arrived in camp on the 19th instant. The 2nd regiment of cavalry I have not lately heard of, but expect it here in a few days.

I get daily better, but cannot regain my strength.

P.S.—I have received your public dispatch of the 14th ultimo.

No. 183—Elphinstone asks Col. Wallace to reinforce the escort of the Nagpur Residency on account of the great alarm caused by the Pindaris.

FROM—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,

TO—COL. WALLACE.

Nagpur, 8th February 1806.

Since I wrote the enclosed we have had a great alarm here owing to a report spread about in course of yesterday evening that the city was attacked. There never was so ridiculous a scene as this produced. The report was supposed to be circulated by thieves who made their own use of the confusion. The Rajah has announced to me his intention of sending his family and valuables to Chanda, and you will see by the inclosed that he is much alarmed. I think very unreasonably so, although I think it pretty certain we shall have a trifle with the pindaries sooner or late. In this last idea I am led to request you send rather a strong party with Hamilton. He will be exposed to sudden attacks on his journey in which the strength of his escort will make the greatest difference, and as I have only 50 men (belonging to the 1st of the 2nd) the party that comes with Hamilton will be a desirable reinforcement to me till my escort arrives, which can scarce be before the end of April. I mention this in the idea that as you are now in cantonment you can conveniently spare me a company which I could not get when I left the army, as the war with Sindhia was not then concluded.

No. 184—Resident Jenkins communicates to the Governor General Nanasahab Bhonsle's visit to Ramtek after his serious illness and the incursions of the Pindaris into Berar via Malkapur.

FROM—RICHARD JENKINS,

TO—SIR GEORGE BARLOW, G. C.

Nagpur, 2nd February 1807.

I have the honour to acquaint you that the Rajah, accompanied by Nana Sahib and all the male and female members of his family, has this day set out on his way to Ramteeg. The object of this visit is to enable Nana Sahib to perform the religious ceremonies prescribed by the Hindoo faith, on the

occasion of his recovery from the severe illness with which he has so long been afflicted, and as the period of his absence will not exceed eight days His Highness has requested me to remain at the capital.

I have had no personal communication with the Durbar since the date of my last dispatch, but I learn that it is in agitation to send a strong force to Sambalpur upon the Rajah's return from Ramteeg. I shall take the earliest opportunity after that event to urge the immediate adoption of some one of Mr. Elphinstone's propositions, should the Rajah intend to take advantage of your friendly offers.

It appears that a party of Pindarries, said to be 3,000 strong, have lately invaded Berar by Mulcapoor, defeated a party of the Nizam's troops under Ufzoor ood Dowlah stationed at that place, and that they are successfully employed in plundering the northwest division of the province. Seetoo is stated to be in the neighbourhood of Shahpoor with his force amounting to six or seven thousand men, but it appears to be uncertain whether Berar or the Rajah's country is his immediate object. The usual precautions have been taken for the security of this city against any possible attempt to surprise it, which may be made by these marauders.

No. 185—Jenkins reports to the Governor General the postponement of the marriage ceremony of the Rajah's daughter owing to the death of the bride-groom's father. He also reports an increase in the Raja's forces to meet the growing menace of the Pindaris. The Raja's officer, Jagannath Chaudhary, is mentioned as having killed Chetoo Pindar's son, Ramzan.

FROM—RICHARD JENKINS,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 9th April 1807.

The interval of time which has elapsed since I last had the honour to address you, has been distinguished by few events which are worthy to form the subject of a dispatch. The principal occurrence at Nagpoor has been the death of the intended bridegroom's father, in consequence of which the ceremonies of the marriage have been postponed until the beginning of May. Previously to this interruption, the Rajah had very politely expressed his wish to see me with the gentlemen of the Residency at the several entertainments which remain to be given to His Highness by the members of his family. We were accordingly invited by Goojabba, the Rajah's nephew, and by Nana Sahib to meet His Highness at their houses respectively and we attended on both occasions. The Rajah appeared in high spirits and good humor, which he manifested in frequent expressions both of attachment to the British Government, and of personal condescension towards myself and the gentlemen with me. An entertainment to which we were invited by Bala Sahib, the Rajah's son, was interrupted by

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the occurrence which I have above mentioned, and all preparations are for the present at a stand.

The Rajah's troops on the Nerbudda have of late been acting with some vigour against the Pindaries and no incursions in this direction have been attempted by these freebooters. Sudeek Alee Khan and Juggonauth Choudree, the former of whom commands the army in the neighbourhood of Chouragur, had an engagement with Seetoo a few days since whom they defeated, killing about fifty and taking a gun and several horses. Juggonauth Choudree was severely wounded but by the latest accounts Sudeek Alee Khan had crossed the Nerbudda in pursuit. Juggonauth Choudree is the person who attacked and killed Seetoo's son Ramzan Khan at Singpoor. He has the command of 2,000 infantry with guns, and is said to be a Sick by birth.

No. 186—The Resident forwards to the Governor General an account of his talks with the Bhonsle Raja and his ministers, criticising British policy in Rajputana, and refers to the concentration by the Raja of his forces near Hoshangabad. The postponed marriage of the Raja's daughter is reported to have been celebrated with all pomp.

FROM—RICHARD JENKINS,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 15th May 1807.

In my last dispatch I had the honor to mention that the marriage of the Rajah's daughter had been postponed on account of the death of the bridegroom's father. The ceremonies of the nuptials are now resumed, and the day before yesterday agreeably to invitation I proceeded, attended by the gentlemen of the Residency, to an entertainment given by Bala Sahib on the occasion where we partook of a zeeatut prepared for us, and received the usual presents. The Rajah, as in all instances, was particularly attentive and gracious.

Since I last had the honour of addressing you I have had little official communication with the Durbar which requires to be entrusted on your notice. I have received several visits from Jeswant Rao, and have paid one visit at the palace but they were for the most part ceremonial and intended for no express purpose of business. In the general topics which have formed the subjects of conversation both before His Highness and at the Residency, the ministers have sometime alluded to reports respecting our intention to support Rajah Maunsing of Joudpoor in his contest with the Jypoor Government, on which occasions I have taken care to explain, to the best of my ability, the general system of your policy and with reference particularly to this question, the express provision of our treaties with Sindhia. The introduction of such subjects by the Ministers, has

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seldom appeared to be directed to any particular points, and they have always expressed themselves satisfied with my explanations.

The Rajah has lately made and continues to make considerable additions to the force of his armies on the frontier, and is in a great degree concentrating them in the vicinity of Hoshangabad. I am informed by the ministers that the Rajah has now great hopes of being put in possession of Hoshangabad and Sheonee, and that a force is actually before the latter place in consequence of express orders from Sindhia for its evacuation. It appears however that the Killadar refuses to obey them. The nature of the agreement between this Government and Sindhia on the subject I do not correctly know, but it is said to be of a pecuniary nature. Engagements of this description, the Rajah is not very forward to perform and indeed, I should conclude, the inclination if not the power of Sindhia, to perform his part to be at least problematical. That engagements of some nature however, have been negotiated, appears to be the more probable as the Rajah, a short time since, had not only put a stop to all fresh levies of troops but had even issued orders respecting the diminution of his forces with a view to the rainy season; and the power of the Pindaries has been greatly diminished by the captivity of their chiefs, although it is likely they will join with Vizeer Mahomed Khan in opposing the progress of the Rajah's troops.

No. 187—Jenkins reports Pindari incursions into Nagpur territory and the preparations made by the Raja for an attack on Hoshangabad.

FROM—RICHARD JENKINS,

TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 26th June 1807.

An incursion of the pindaries into the Rajah's country to the northwest of Nagpur in which those freebooters penetrated to within about 20 coss of the capital, has been almost the only event that has occurred since the date of my last dispatch. The movement of Gunput Rao's* army to Shahpoor enabled them to get in his rear, and in their progress they plundered and murdered a respectable person of Bala Sahib's family who was celebrating a marriage at his native village. The party returned along the Wurdā to the hills, and rejoined their main body on the Nerbudda notwithstanding several strong parties both from hence and Gunput Rao's camp, were detached in pursuit.

The Rajah's troops are now in possession of Sheonee, but no operations have been yet commenced against Hoshangabad, although I am informed by the ministers that it is the intention to attack that fort. Vizeer Mahomed Khan is said to be now in Rayseen and Hoshangabad to be

* Subhedar, who was subsequently Appasahib's chief adherent.

garrisoned by only 7 or 800 Pathans. Neither of the Raja's armies on the frontier have yet received orders to canton, although the rainy season is now advancing. The army from the vicinity of Chouragur has crossed the Nerbudda, and is said to be intended to co-operate with Sindhia's troops in taking possession of the Bhopaul territories.

troops in taking possession of the Bhopaul territories. Two grand exhibitions of fireworks have lately taken place at Nagpore in honour of the marriage of His Highness's daughter, to each of which I was invited, and on both occasions I found the Raja in high spirits and good humour. I have also received a visit of ceremony from Shreedhur Pundit, at which I of course presented him and the person who accompanied him with the usual dresses. I returned the Minister's visit a few days ago, and was received with great attention. At both interviews Shreedhur Pundit was very profuse in his professions of attachment to the

Nana Sahib has been long anxious to visit Chanda, and has only been persuaded to delay his journey to witness the completion of the marriage ceremonies and entertainments. He continues very unwell, but the day of his departure is not fixed. Mahommed Meer Khan departed sometime ago to Sindhia's camp by the route of Boorhanpore.

No. 188—Jenkins, who had again taken charge of the Residency from Elphinstone, reports to the Governor General the distressful and sullen attitude of the Raja at having been asked to recall his troops whom he had sent across the Wardha in pursuit of the Pindaris.

FROM-R. JENKINS,

TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 15th June 1808.

The only conferences which I had with the Ministers on any subject of moment since I received charge of the Residency, took place a few days before the departure of the Resident, and were conducted with the advantage of Mr. Elphinstone's presence and concert. The subject of these conferences arose out of a communication from the Rajah through Jeswunt Rao, of the appearance of a large body of Pindarries on the north western frontier of his dominions. Those free-booters, His Highness mentioned, had endeavoured to elude the Rajah's troops stationed in that quarter to obstruct their entrance, by passing through the territories of the Nizam; and by crossing the Wurdah from Berar at a point not protected by the presence of a force, it was their plan to get into the rear of the army which, they conceived, could not pursue them beyond that river. On obtaining intelligence of these intentions, the Rajah's officer had immediately moved to endeavour to intercept them. At the same time he had written to his Government that if he found it necessary he should cross the Wurdah in pursuit, as he could not otherwise expect to

bring them to action. Jeswant Rao concluded the communication by a request from the Rajah that information might be sent to the British commanders in Berar of the probability of such a movement on the part of His Highness's troops as well as of its object, and that they might be requested to unite in a combined operation to destroy a set of plunderers whose ravages were equally destructive to the dominions of this Government, and to those of the state of Hyderabad.

Mr. Elphinstone and myself expressed our surprise and displeasure at the nature of the proceeding which His Highness's officer intended to adopt, without the permission of the Government to whom alone it belonged to grant or refuse it. The impropriety of such a proceeding would also at the present moment appear to be increased by a reference to communications which had passed between Mr. Elphinstone and Jeswant Rao. The latter had on a former occasion requested, and Mr. Elphinstone had made a representation to the Resident at Hyderabad of His Highness's wishes that his troops might be permitted to pursue the Pindarries into Berar. This permission on the grounds for which it was requested, it was not considered expedient to grant. There were sufficient troops in Berar to render the measure unnecessary and this reason had been assigned when the answer from Hyderabad was communicated to the Rajah. Under such circumstances the entrance of the Rajah's troops into Berar could not but be considered as extremely disrespectful to His Highness the Nizam, and would be likely to involve other consequences of an unpleasant nature, since no communication from hence could be expected to arrive in time to explain to the British officer in Berar the cause and object of such a movement. That these were such as the Rajah assigned, Mr. Elphinstone and myself did not entertain a doubt, but the delicacy which was universally observed, and reciprocally expected by all independent states in regard to the entrance or passage of foreign troops through their territories, being doubly violated in the present instance might be apprehended to give rise to other impressions in the mind of the Nizam and of your Lordship. We therefore earnestly insisted that immediate orders should be issued to recall the troops which might be supposed to have entered Berar, and to ensure their instant return within the Rajah's frontier.

Jeswant Rao in reply urged the extreme anxiety of the Rajah to be enabled to secure his dominions from the dreadful ravages which they had for several years suffered from the Pindarries, and the great distress in which his Government was consequently involved, by the ruin of the few sources of revenue which it yet retained. He said that the Pindarries had been in the habits of returning with the plunder which they obtained in the Rajah's country, through the Nizam's territories, that their movements in the first instance were so rapid as to baffle all efforts to overtake them, but that these exertions could only last during the freshness of their cattle and the lightness of their equipment; that their cattle of

as a sincere well wisher of both Governments.

With regard to the Rajah's wishes Jeswant Rao said His Highness hoped either that some measures would be adopted by the court of Hyderabad to co-operate against the Pindaries, at least to prevent them from passing through Berar; or that his troops would be permitted to pursue them into Berar. In requesting me to communicate these wishes to the Resident at Hyderabad, Jeswant Rao dwelt much upon the depressed state of this Government and the accumulation of evils with which it was oppressed from internal weakness and external attack. The substance of almost everything which he urged on these topics, has been frequently submitted to your Lordship and Jeswant Rao's private communication contains the heads of the remainder. As it appeared that in consequence of the Pindaries having entered the Rajah's territories the troops had not crossed the Wurdah, I promised to communicate the Rajah's wishes to

The answers to these allegations were obvious. The Rajah had no ground of complaint against the Nizam's Government which might not be retorted with equal appearance of reason; the Nizam's Government had suffered little less damage from the Pindarries than the Rajah, and was of course equally anxious for their defeat. At present, however, it was absolutely necessary that the orders before mentioned should be issued, and we could only insist that if the Rajah's troops had actually entered Berar, they should return within the frontier without the least possible delay. The first conference ended with an assurance from Jeswant Rao

to pursue them.

Captain Sydenham, and both Mr. Elphinstone and myself ventured to assure Jeswant Rao that one or other of the arrangements he desired, would be adopted by the Nizam's Government. We said however, we could not admit that the Rajah had any ground of complaint against the Nizam's Government which had already adopted every measure of precaution against the Pindaries, but that, on the contrary, the latter would be highly aggrieved by the violation of its territory, on the part of the Rajah's troops.

The other communication of Jeswant Rao was to the following effect. He commenced by alluding to what had passed on the former day respecting the intention of the Raja's commander to cross the Wurdah in pursuit of the Pindaries. He said that when the conference was communicated to the Rajah, he was very much annoyed and had accused Jeswant Rao of being unfaithful to him and devoted to our interests. The Rajah had said, that he had before mentioned his wish for his troops to be permitted to follow the Pindaries into the Nizam's country, as he had before given free permission for the British troops and those of the Nizam to enter his territory for the same purpose. That he had been told in answer that there was no necessity, as there was a sufficient force in Berar—but still that the Pindaries always passed through the Nizam's country with their plunder without molestation, whereas if his troops were permitted to pursue them when there was a strong chance of overtaking them, a few defeats would entirely discourage the Pindaries, and save his country; that in the same way the Pindaries passed into the rear of his troops by entering the Nizam's territories and when his officer was going to pursue them to extremities, he was desired to recall him. As it was the pleasure of the British Government, he certainly should recall him, but he need take no further measures for the security of his territories as they would be useless. These and many other expressions of the same kind Jeswant Rao said that the Rajah had used, and some particularly harsh towards himself. But that His Highness had immediately issued the orders which we desired. Jeswant Rao went on to say that the Rajah was too much irritated against him to listen to his defence, although he had used every argument to pacify him. Mr. Elphinstone repeated that the Rajah's complaints were totally unfounded and that the Nizam's Government must be supposed, as it had suffered equally from the Pindaries, to be equally desirous to repress their depredations. To this Jeswant Rao assented and nothing else of importance past.

It may be added that in both conferences Jeswant Rao said that the Rajah's officer had no orders to cross the Wurdah in pursuit of the Pindaries. The correctness of this assertion however from the tenor of his discourse will perhaps appear doubtful to your Lordship.

In this incursion a party of Pindaries received a severe defeat from one of the Rajah's Moosulman chief, but the main body after making

a circuit to the eastward of Nagpur, recrossed the Nerbudda in safety with a very rich booty. Copies of my letters to Captain Sydenham, which I also communicated to Colonel Montessor in consequence of the conferences above described, I shall do myself the honour of transmitting to the Political Department.

No. 189—Jenkins thanks the Governor General for confirming him in his post as Resident of Nagpur and reports violent irruptions of the Pindaries into the Nagpur territory, almost up to the outskirts of the capital.

FROM—RICHARD JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,
TO—LORD MINTO, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 27th December 1810.

Since the date of my last official address, a very formidable irruption of the Pindaries into these territories has taken place. Scarcely any regular intelligence had been received of their having crossed the Nerbudda, when on the same day, the 15th, I had accounts of their arrival at Beitoole and a few hours afterwards of their having carried off one of the Company's elephants from a place called Tuckia, about 5 coss from the Residency.

Bodies of Pindaries appeared in the vicinity of the city about nightfall, some indeed on the heights close to our quarters, over which they paraded entirely unmolested and plundered some detached hamlets and a cantonment called Gunput Rao's camp, during the night.

Early in the morning of the 16th a very considerable body of Pindaries suddenly made their appearance near Tellingkhere about a mile from the Residency, and a small party, apparently as a bravado, scoured the fields within a hundred yards of our bungalows. These did not wait longer than to plunder a few stragglers on the roads, but proceeded to sack a village about half a mile off, whilst the main body continued their march in a southerly direction. Other parties made similar demonstrations on other sides of the city, and a skirmish took place in one quarter with some of the Rajah's troops who killed one or two Pindaries and made one prisoner.

There is scarcely a village or a hamlet in the immediate neighbourhood of Nagpur, or for many miles around it, which has not been visited by these freebooters on this occasion, and it is very generally believed that their original intention was to have attempted the city itself, but that one of the Dhurras had lost sight of this object, and proceeded on other plans of devastation.

The principal part of these freebooters who came down in this direction, proceeded to the southward, plundering all the principal villages, and

committing their usual cruelties. Amongst other places plundered by them is Girhur, a place held in great veneration both by Hindus and Mahomedans, and which the Pindaries themselves had hitherto scrupulously respected. On this occasion they distinguished their entrance into the place with the most savage outrages on the inhabitants who had flocked thither from all the neighbouring villages, and particularly on the women several hundreds of whom are said to have destroyed themselves, and many to have been carried off by those merciless ruffians.

Other parties of Pindaries continued plundering in different directions not far from Nagpore, but the Rajah confined his attention to taking precautions for the safety of the city with little regard for the sufferings of the surrounding country.

In consequence of this unsettled state of things Nana Sahib has not yet left Nagpore, but is expected to set out in the course of next week.

A large body of Pindaries seems to have entered Berar which, whilst plundering in the vicinity of Ellichpore, received a severe check from the troops of the Nabob Sulabut Khan, under Futtehjung Khan who, with very unequal numbers, gave them a complete defeat, although with some loss to himself. All the Pindaries seem to be now out of the country.

The Rajah is much alarmed at the prospect of the release of Kureem and Chheetoo by Sindia, and I believe puts every spring in motion to dissuade Sindia from his intention, who on his part offers to keep the Pindary chiefs provided the Rajah will pay the sum of ten lacks of rupees, which is the amount fixed for their ransom. It appears to me to be scarcely problematical that, should the Pindary chiefs obtain their liberty, one of their first enterprises will be against this city and with the great increase of number, which the name and reputation of the leaders will doubtless draw to their standard, I am afraid they would find little difficulty in making themselves masters of it. At all events the danger would be very serious, and little is to be expected from the Rajah's foresight or energy in providing against such a calamity.

I am convinced that even on the present occasion the Pindaries would have had little difficulty in plundering at least a part of the city; and although considerable resistance would probably be made by those of the Rajah's troops and others who have families to defend, the Pindaries have shown on more than one occasion that with a rich booty in view, they do not mind the loss of men, which it may cost them to obtain it.

On a former occasion, your Lordship is probably informed from Mr. Elphinstone's despatches, the Pindaries remained encamped for some days within a few miles of Nagpore, having come down with guns and infantry. At that time they were prevailed on to retire by an agreement which gave them a considerable jagheer near the Nerbudda.

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This agreement was kept by neither party; and revenge for the death of Chheetoo's son, who was killed by the Rajah's troops when retaking Singpoor from the Pindaries, will no doubt be an additional incentive to that leader to push matters to extremity against the Rajah on any future opportunity.

I have to add that we have been fortunate enough to recover the elephant taken by the Pindaries. Our small party cavalry went out under Lieutenant Lloyd, supported by a strong party of infantry and succeeded in forcing them to abandon the elephant. The cavalry cut up two Pindaries and brought in one prisoner, with three horses.

I beg to take this opportunity of returning your Lordship my acknowledgments for the appointment to this Court, which I have just received. As I consider it a proof that my conduct hitherto has been honoured with your approbation, so I hope, and it shall be my constant endeavour to merit your Lordship's future countenance.

No. 190—Jenkins reports from Nagpur to the Resident at Poona that the Pindaries were pouring into the Bhonsle Raja's territory.

FROM—R. JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,

TO—M. ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT, POONA.

Nagpur, 20th October 1811.

I have just received a report from my news-writer at Betool that on Sunday the 18th instant, 4000 pindaries of the Holkar shahjee party crossed the Nerbudda near Hindia, and are supposed to have proceeded towards Boorhanpore.

On Tuesday the 20th the same news-writer mentions a considerable body of Dost Mahommed's pindaries also crossed the Nerbudda more to the eastward in the neighbourhood of Chynpore Baree, and took the direction of Sreenugger. The destination of this body is not known and they may either come down in this direction, or proceed on a more distant expedition to the eastward.

No. 191—Jenkins communicates several important items of a political nature to the Supreme Government, viz., that the Bhonsle Raja was negotiating with the Pindari chiefs, Chheetoo and Kareem, and had sent Udaji Naik to divert their activities into different channels as they were preparing to enter the Nagpur territory: that the Bhonsle's General Sadik Ali was at Srinagar; that the Nawab of Bhopal had recovered Chinpur Bari and Chowkigarah and that the Raja's troops were sitting in dharna for payment of their dues.

FROM—R. JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,

TO—Lt. GENERAL HEWETT, VICE PRESIDENT, G. C.'s COUNCIL.

Nagpur, 15th November 1811.

When the Pindary Vakeel, Khan Mahommed, left Nagpore to return to his constituents, he was accompanied by Odajee Naek a person

formerly employed by the Rajah in his negotiations with the Pindarries. It seems to have been the Rajah's policy to take advantage of the divisions which have subsisted between Kureem and Seetoo since their release, and to prevail upon the latter by bribes and promises, to oppose the designs of the former, or at least of his followers which have lately been openly avowed, of invading His Highness's territories and attacking his capital.

Oodajee Naek has lately joined the camp of Seetoo, but his negotiations do not seem to have been very successful in their issue, although they appeared promising in their outset. Seetoo interested himself in the first instance, in bringing about an intercourse between the Rajah's agent and Kureem, and even, as I have heard from Jeswant Rao and other quarters, signified to Kureem his intention to oppose by force any attempts against the Nagpore territories.

Kureem, if the accounts from my news-writer in his camp may be relied on, had designed, in obedience to orders from Sindia, to proceed towards Kotta with his whole force, and had moved, himself, with that intention. His followers refused to attend him, and he has since encamped on the Nerbudda, waiting for the fall of the river which although not generally fordable, is however passable at present in several places. Indeed, a body of Pindarries a few days ago made their appearance within about 12 miles of Nagpore having crossed the river considerably to the eastward of Hoshangabad, and nearer its source than the positions occupied by the Pindarries. This party has gone to the southwest.

Since Kureem's arrival on the Nerbudda, and communications with Seetoo, Oodajee Naek has written to the Rajah representing that his negotiations are not to be relied on and that Kureem will certainly cross the Nerbudda. Kureem speaks ambiguously of his own intentions in crossing the Nerbudda, stating that there are other countries besides that of the Rajah to afford subsistence to his followers. At the same time he is said to demand a contribution of fourteen lacks of rupees, or a jagheer of four lacks per annum with an additional douceur of two lacks from the Rajah.

Sudeek Allie Khan left Nagpore in the middle of last month, and proceeded to Sreenugger. He was by the last accounts at Gordwarah* with a force including that under Jeswant Rao Dutajee, which is in the neighbourhood of about 4000 horse, 2000 infantry and 12 guns. A force of about 1800 horse and 500 infantry is at Tejgurrh on the frontier of Gurrah Mundela, and another near Saoleegurrh, towards the fords of the Nerbudda occupied by the Pindarries of about 500 horse, an equal number of infantry and 2 guns. The Rajah has continued encamped at Waregaon, and has a force of from three to four thousand horse, five hundred infantry and eight guns.

The alarm excited by the approach of the party of pindaries mentioned in paragraph 3rd, induced His Highness to send in all his baggage to the city, and a small camp has been formed in the vicinity of the Residency. The Rajah is himself expected to encamp with his army in a position near the town which, however, he seems to be desirous to avoid as long as he can with safety, owing no doubt to the difficulty of keeping his undisciplined troops in a body, when encamped so near their houses.

A short time will probably bring matters to an issue with regard to Kureem, but it is evident that a formidable irruption will, ere long, be made either in this direction or on the territories of either the Nizam or Peshwa.

Vizier Mahomed Khan has lately recovered possession of Chynpore Barree and Choukegurh. They were given up, I believe, at the first summons, and no measures for dispossessing him will probably be attempted until the pending crisis shall have passed over. The Rajah can have little confidence in his troops and they are both dispirited and disaffected.

A severe example was some time ago made of a Moosulman Sудар of some rank and his followers who placed the Rajah in close Dhurna* for their arrears of pay. His Highness who has usually escaped personal indignity was surprized and surrounded by the clamorous party in his bungalow at Waregaon, and was beset by them for a whole day in a rigorous confinement. In this situation the Rajah preserved the utmost composure; examined and wrote down with his own hand their accounts, beat down their demands and prevailed on them in the end to retire to their quarters. The party was afterwards surrounded, and those who would not desert their commander on promises which were afterwards shamefully broken, were cut up or dispersed, and plundered.

The chief himself was wounded and taken, treated with the utmost indignity in the Rajah's presence, and afterwards confined in a fort where he has since died.

Chautka (Chatge) also who distinguished himself so much during Meer Khan's invasion of Gurra Mundela, fled from Nagpore some time ago from apprehension of some extortions which the Rajah was meditating to make on him.

Since writing the above paragraphs I hear that accounts have been received by the Rajah, of a large body of pindaries having crossed the Nerbudda, four or five days ago.

I take this occasion of mentioning for Your Excellency's information that Lieut. Close left Nagpore in the end of October, to join the Poona Residency.

*Sitting at the door for money.

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[Nov.
No. 192—Major Constance informs Colonel Conran, commanding the Hyderabad
Subsidiary Force, that Mana near Bishnoor was attacked by the Pindaris
and that he was proceeding to Nagpur with all expedition.

FROM—MAJOR CONSTANCE,
TO—COLONEL CONRAN.

Camp Bishnoor, near Mana, 16th November 1811.

I this morning received your letter of the 14th instant express from Oonderry, and without delay send a copy of Mr. Jenkins' letter to you of the 12th instant which I got at 8 p.m. on the 13th at Konerry, about 10 miles from Oomrauty. Your letter may have fallen into the hands of the Pindaries, as yesterday we learnt from Captain Freeman that 400 of them slept at a short distance from my party on the night of the 12th at Mannah, which place they attacked the next day.

In consequence of Mr. Jenkins' advice I considered it my duty to endeavour to reach Nagpur with as much expedition as possible, and wrote to him that I hoped to reach it on the 21st December, if the Pindaries did not harass us on the march.

In my report of yesterday to the Acting Deputy Quarter Master General I mentioned having taken upon myself to hire nineteen extra bullocks for the purpose of carrying men with sore feet. For the first week after my departure from Jauna we experienced very cold morning, which principally occasioned so many to be sick with rheumatism and sore feet. I am happy to say none are very bad—but they cannot march. The artillery man with fever will be for duty in a day or two, and all the sepoys with sprains, rheumatism and sores will be well after three or four days' halt.

Captain Freeman of the Nizam's service, mentioned there were about 10,000 pindaries about Oomrauty, but they are in different parties and continually moving. He also informed us that he had intelligence of 15,000 pindaries with elephants and two guns having crossed the Nerbudda at Jubblepore, who had destroyed several villages of the Nagpur Rajah, and report added they were to cross the Wurdah and come into the Nizam's country.

In passing through Tewsa this morning the head man informed me about five thousand pindaries, three days ago, had been plundering a village on the Wurdah about 10 coss south-east of Bishnoor.

I hear everywhere of pindaries, but cannot place much dependence on these reports.

I am sorry to report that the two tarpaulins for covering our ammunition are now unserviceable, after two or three days march they began to crack and split in all parts.

Enclosed is a return of the sick from Mr. Mickie.

No. 193—Jenkins reports the great alarm felt at Nagpur from an impending attack of the Pindaris under Kareem and asks for additional escort for the Residency.

FROM—R. JENKINS,

TO—N. B. EDMONSTONE, Chief Secretary to Government.

Nagpur, 17th November 1811.

I have the honour to submit for the notice of His Excellency the Vice-President in Council, the copies of a despatch and its enclosure, which I yesterday addressed to the Resident at Hyderabad and Colonel Conran.

I trust that my application for a temporary reinforcement to the escort from the British force at Jalnah under all the circumstances of the present conjuncture, will not be disapproved by His Excellency in Council. Indeed the extent of our premises, the number of our followers, and the impossibility of preventing the latter from being swelled into a multitude by people from the town; the combustible nature of our bungalows, all thatched; these circumstances in themselves not less inviting to a plundering attack than they are adverse to purposes of defence with an handful of men, are in direct contrast to the advantages which the addition of a gun and another company or more of sepoys would give us. The hill of Seetabuldee has every part of the Residency within cannon shot, and leaves no approach uncovered. It commands the bazar immediately in contact with the only buildings of the Residency which from being tiled are not exposed to great, although certainly to possible danger from fire, and which can contain most of the property and a great proportion of the immediate followers of the Residency; and it furnishes a position from which nothing but a very superior force of infantry and guns could dislodge us, when reinforced to the extent I have mentioned. A part of the force only, would be required to afford every requisite additional protection to the line of buildings necessary to be occupied. Neither these buildings however, nor any part of the Residency could be maintained against a force in possession of the hill.

I am aware it may be thought that as the plunder of the city would be Kureem's chief object, that object and giving employment to the Rajah's troops, would take up the attention of his followers sufficiently to prevent their molesting the Residency; that the complete possession of the city by Kureem, which alone would expose us to serious danger, is scarcely an event to be contemplated; that he would be content with the plunder he would carry away, without forcing the Rajah to desperation in defence of his palace and family; that admitting the worst to happen, Kureem would respect the British Residency from motives of prudence and fear of future consequences, and finally that nothing but a very large force could protect us in the only case with relation to which a serious attack might be expected.

All these arguments have their due impression in leading me not to overrate our danger, but in allowing them any further influence they would lead to the imprudence of neglecting the most obvious of measures of self-defence, in order to rely upon the result of events not under our control, or upon the honour and forbearance of a robber; or, to the still more dangerous error of abandoning all efforts to ward off inferior degrees of danger, from the despair of being able to face those at the highest step of the scale.

There can be no occasion for me to trouble His Excellency in Council with any discussion on the other subjects of my letter to Mr. Russell. No apprehensions I can express, regarding the power of the Pindarries to reduce the Rajah to the greatest straits, would equal the alarm actually felt by His Highness and by all ranks of people at Nagpore. Whether the danger to which Berar* may be exposed, requires any measures of precaution beyond those already adopted by the Nizam's Government, it was out of my province to decide, although not I hope, to offer my opinions on the subject.

I received a visit from Jeswant Rao yesterday who seemed to have no other object than to enquire regarding the return of Lord Minto, when his Lordship might be expected, and whether I had received any late intimations from Calcutta.

Jeswant Rao confirmed the account of Kureem having crossed the Nerbudda, with infantry and guns, and his family. The Rajah he said, seemed to think that Kureem would not venture to bring down guns and infantry, which would render it necessary for him to carry on operations in a mode contrary to the usual practice of Pindarries; and that the circumstance of his bringing his family did not look as if he were come with hostile intentions. He was silent however on the subject of any pending negotiations between the Rajah and Kureem, but he mentioned that the Rajah did not believe that any real dissensions existed between Kureem and Seetoo, who indeed are reported to have had a friendly meeting.

The Pindarries who went to the southward seem now to be on their slow return to the northward along the left bank of the Wurd.

The whole of the Rajah's force at Nagpore divided in a very inefficient manner amongst the different avenues round the City, seems to amount, according to calculations which are generally much above the truth, to 5,100. horse, 1,040 infantry, and 14 guns. His Highness has many more guns but not as yet in a state of equipment. Out of this force the only concentrated bodies are 3,500 horse, 250 infantry and 4 guns with the Rajah, encamped on the north-east quarter of the City, and 1,000 horse, 50 infantry and 2 guns near the Residency, the number of the latter in

* The Nagpur Raja's territory. The Bhonsle was always called though wrongly the Raja of Berar.

horse, seems to be rated nearly double to what it actually is, and as may be inferred, that of the Rajah's own force in a proportion almost equal. Additional levies both of horse and infantry are in train, and the Rajah is said to have called for the best part of his troops from Tejgaurh, for Sudeek Allee Khan with the small force personally attached to him.

No. 194—Jenkins reports the appearance of a party of the Pindaris at the gates of the capital and their attack on a part of the city.

FROM—R. JENKINS,

TO—LIEUT. GENERAL HEWETT, VICE-PRESIDENT, G. C.'s COUNCIL.

Nagpur, 18th November 1811.

In the last paragraph but one of my despatch of the 15th instant, I had the honour to mention a report received by the Rajah of a large body of Pindaries having crossed the Nerbudda.

In the course of the 16th some parties in advance of the main body plundered and burnt several villages and hamlets distant only a few miles from the city, and during the night came still nearer.

The Rajah, who had come into Nagpore on some business, returned, in the course of the same evening, to his camp at Waregaon, and on hearing of the near approach of the Pindaries, sent one or two small parties of horse with two guns to the city intending, as was understood, to follow with his whole force immediately.

About 7 o'clock yesterday morning the Pindaries appeared on the heights close to the Residency, in considerable numbers, and a skirmish took place between them and a party of horse and infantry sent out against them under Amrut Rao Bukhshee who kept his ground although opposed to an overwhelming force which, however, did not venture to charge him. The few rockets which were thrown amongst the Pindaries although sufficient to check them, did not seem to do any execution, but after making in the course of about an hour a few indecisive attempts to get between the Bukhshee and his quarter of the town, they moved on to another part, to protect which Gunput Rao Soobehdar was stationed with a small party of horse and infantry and two guns.

Here the same kind of desultory movements and attempts on the part of the Pindaries to surround and cut off the Soobehdar's party was continued for a considerable time. The Soobehdar retreated slowly to the town, and kept up a cannonade, too distant to do execution but sufficient to prevent the Pindaries from approaching so near as to endanger his flanks and rear.

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The Pindaries, however, succeeded in getting into a quarter of the town, called the Mungulwaree, and set fire to it in several places. They did not, I fancy, obtain much plunder, and the arrival of the Rajah about noon with his guns and infantry, caused them to move off to the southward. They carried away three of the Rajah's elephants from the town, which a party of His Highness's horse attempted in vain to recover.

Thus the Rajah has suffered the disgrace of seeing a quarter of his capital attacked and set fire to, and the Pindaries have broken the ice preparatory, as may be expected, to future more decisive and daring attempts against the capital of one of the principal independent powers of the Peninsula.

As the former of the affairs of the day took place within gun shot of the Residency we had a full view of, I fancy, the whole Pindary force, which on the most moderate computation, could not have been less than four thousand horse. This body was, I hear, commanded by three relations of Kureem and is only a part of his force. It is therefore a formidable specimen of the numbers with which, if united, the Pindaries could invade a country, and which when joined to infantry of guns will soon become irresistible by any native power.

None of the Pindaries entered the boundary of the Residency although they were plundering in small parties of ten and twenty, quite close to it. All the people of the neighbouring parts of the town were flocking to the hill of Seetabuldee under which is the Residency and to the Residency itself, and would have been a terrible embarrassment to us in case of an attack. The Pindaries however did not seem inclined, on this occasion, to expose themselves to suffer any loss and I believe their whole experiment scarcely cost them a man or horse.

Amrut Rao Bukshree was wounded in the shoulder by a shot from a matchlock in his skirmish with the Pindaries, but the distance from which it was fired, prevented the wound from being very severe.

11. The Pindaries have gone off in a south-easterly direction.

No. 195—Jenkins warns his Government against the growing menace of the Pindaris and suggests active interference in the Governments of Holkar and Bhonsle to save them from destruction.

FROM—R. JENKINS,

TO—EDMONSTONE, CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT.

Nagpur, 21st November 1811.

In order to convey to Government a better general idea of the present proceedings and actual situation of Kureem and the Pindaries than

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I could by any other mode of description, I deem it my duty to transmit the enclosed series of Akhbars from the camp of that Chief extending from the 25th of October to the period of the commencement of their present incursion.

Kureem's ascendancy in the competition for superiority between him and Seetoo seems now to be pretty well established by the secession of some of the principal leaders of the party of the latter, and Seetoo himself appears inclined to meet Kureem's proposals for an union of interests. The progressive increase of the influence of Kureem amongst his associates and his continued acquisition of territorial resources which can only be maintained by the establishment, apparently becoming formidable, of a standing force in infantry and guns, and the language which he holds towards Sindia's officers contrary, it is true, to the professions of obedience which he makes to the Maharaja himself; the style of confidence in which designs are avowed against Nagpore, and even, if the Akhbar account is correct, against the territories of the Company, the retreat of a force belonging to Sindia of three battalions and 20 guns at Kureem's hat, and other features of the intelligence contained in these Akhbars, are striking proofs of the increasing reputation and power of that predatory Chief.

It is possible that Kureem may not, whilst he entertains any jealousy of Sindia's designs against him, think it prudent to come down in person with guns and infantry to this quarter; but as such an event may be not unreasonably expected under the existing unfriendly relations between Sindia, and the Rajah, Government may think it expedient to take into their consideration the line of conduct which such a proceeding might require, on our part, to be pursued. The expression to Sindia also of the light in which Government views the undoubted culpability of that Chief's measures in contributing to the present increase of the power of the Pindaries may not, unlikely, when combined with the above consideration, although of course contrary to the wishes of Government, have the effect of turning this power entirely on the Rajah in the first instance.

Subsistence and plunder must be every day becoming more difficult for such a number of people, who I fancy, destroy in their incursions as much at least as they consume and carry away, and although at present little inclined to face unnecessary danger, necessity must in the end make them bolder and more enterprising.

It is not uninteresting to remark that gradual and, as it may be said, yearly progress of their confidence in themselves and contempt for the Rajah's power. Every year, since I have arrived at Nagpore, has been distinguished by a nearer approach of these plunderers to Nagpore, and the present attempt on the City is only a higher step in the scale of their approach to the complete sack of so rich and populous a place.

Perhaps, such an apprehension may be considered to be premature, but as I imagine that Government would never view with indifference the execution of a design so fatal to the Rajah's power and resources, and at the same time calculated in so much greater a proportion to swell the numbers, activity, and reputation of a tribe whom it is the interest of every regular Government to exterminate, I trust that the expression of it will be received with indulgence, if not with the same views which have dictated it, of the necessity of an early and decided remedy being applied to the growing evil.

The impression on my mind is greater when the rising power of Kureem in this quarter is associated with the actual state of that of Meer Khan, and with the crisis of Holkar's death, which may probably suggest to Government the necessity of its interference to prevent the consolidation of the Holkar state with the power and influence of so restless and ambitious a partizan, to which end, as well as to the formation of the projected alliance with this state, the present situation of affairs is apparently favourable. At all events I hope I shall not be considered to be intruding upon called for opinions on subjects which have been long under the contemplation of Government and on which Government alone, from a general view of all their relations and bearings, can competently decide.

No. 196—The Resident asks for reinforcements for the Nagpur Residency from the troops stationed at Jalna.

FROM—R. JENKINS,

TO—HENRY RUSSELL, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

Nagpur, 26th November 1811.

I have the honour to transmit to you the copy of a letter which I have this day addressed to Colonel Conran.

The necessity of the moment will, I should hope, be considered to justify my call for a reinforcement from the only British cantonment within any moderate distance, and as the occasion will probably be only temporary, I feel confident that you will find yourself at liberty to confirm my application to Colonel Conran.

My late despatches will have made you fully acquainted with the state of affairs in this quarter, and with the sentiments which the progressive increase of the power of the Pindarries has led me to entertain. My suggestions, in consequence of Kureem having crossed the Nerbudda with guns and infantry, regarding the probability of his continuance to the southward of that river, and the danger to which Berar would be exposed, is merely noticed to Colonel Conran. Kureem is said to have brought his family with him and to have been led to the step in some measure by the military preparations of Sindia, which I conclude to be those mentioned

You will probably have heard of the irruption of a body of Pindaries belonging to Kureem into these territories, of their near approach to this

[illegible]

city, and of their actual success in setting fire to one quarter of it, although without gaining any plunder of consequence.

These Pindarries proceeding to the southward plundered the large town of Pownie* and other places. They were by the last accounts near the Wurd in the direction of Wune Wurroora and are not yet apparently returning to the northward, although it is ten days since they made their appearance here. Their number is certainly not less than four thousand.

The Rajah has since received intelligence that Kureem himself has crossed the Nerbudda with six or eight thousand and more Pindarries, some infantry, and rocket men, and four guns. It is understood that the party now down will form a junction with him, and that unless the Rajah makes some arrangement in time to buy him off, he will come down to Nagpore.

In anticipation of these occurrences I some time ago suggested to Government the danger to which the British Residency might eventually be exposed, and solicited a temporary augmentation of the escort by a gun or such other reinforcement as might be thought proper. I am in daily expectation of an answer; but as the call may be immediate, I have this day written to the Nabob Salabut Khan requesting a reinforcement from him, with a gun, if he can spare it without danger to the country he has to protect, and one of the objects of this letter is to make you acquainted with this state of circumstances and to request that if you should think yourself authorised to comply with my application, you will have the goodness to send such a reinforcement to our escort which consists of two pretty strong companies of infantry and twenty-five of the Madras Body Guard, as you may judge adequate.

Our premises are too extensive to be defended by our present force, especially without a gun, and with this to secure ourselves against the attacks of infantry we ought to have at least one hundred additional firelocks, besides the probability that a formidable appearance would deter the Pindarries from those attempts against us which they might otherwise be emboldened to make.

Another object of my communication to which however I shall briefly allude as from its being of more importance, you may not think yourself authorized to act upon it, is the suggestion that Kureem may probably continue on this side of the Nerbudda during the greater part of the present season, and that should matters be amicably settled with the Rajah, Berar may require the presence of your force for its protection. I shall forward a copy of this letter to Mr. Russell and at the same time that I hope you may be able to comply with my request for a reinforcement on your own authority and without the delay of reference, you will of course at no distant period receive his instructions applicable to both this communication.

* Pownie, 79-5 / East 21 / North; Warora, 79 / East 20-5 / North.

Sunday 29th. Qadir Bukhsh brought to the Nuwab Kureem Khan Surtezazood doula, letters from Rajah Raghojee addressed to the Nuwab, Cheetoo Khan and others, and to Oodajee Naek, which contained treasonable matter, in consequence of which Namdar Khan and Mahommed Buksh Khan were sent to seize and bring back Oodajee Naek to camp. Such an alarm prevailed in the camp as is not to be described, and the Nuwab seized all the specie in the possession of the Sahookars and Buneas as a fine. On hearing of the approach of Bappoo Sindia and Juggenauth Rao Bappoo with a large force, the Nuwab had a consultation with Narrain Sing, Sindea's Vakeel, whom he despatched with copies of Rajah Raghojee's letters to Bappoo Sahib and sent a news-writer and Hircarras with him for intelligence.

Tuesday 2nd. Orders were sent to Kureemgurrh and Shujawalpore to be circumspect and ready in case of danger. On hearing that Vizier Mahommmed Khan had put a Pindarra to death, the Nuwab held a consultation, and it was determined to be proper to seek for friendship with Bhopaul.

Friday 5th. Fifty infantry were entertained through Nana Bhasker the Assteh Wala. A letter arrived from Chheetoo to this purport "Be easy with regard to this quarter and dismiss Oodajee Naeek. Saturday 6th. Two hundred and fifty Rohillas, Tellingas, etc. arrived for service. On hearing that Bappoo Sindia was near Turnah, and that

Monday 8th. The Nuwab was praising Holkar, and disparaging Sindia and some of his chiefs Bappoo Sindia, Ramchunder Fálkeea, Fakeerjee

Garwa* and others in terms too gross to be mentioned. Ramchunder Falkaea's Vakeel who was present, said that this kind of discourse was not proper as Sindia had services for him to perform, had released him for the purpose of plundering Mirzapore and Bundelcund, and had demanded from the Company Agra, Muttra, etc. which if he did not get, other means must be pursued. The Nuwab said, if Sindia knew his own mind and was to be relied on, I would have done everything required.

Tuesday 9th. Qadir Bukhsh arrived from Bhopaul. He said that Vizier Mahommed was much displeased with Kureem, but had now written that if Bappoo Sindia, Juggoo Bappoo and Baptiste came against him, he might, without apprehension, send his family and baggage to Bhopaul. The Peerzadah this day arrived. Bhuwane, the Jumadar of Hircarras, represented that 50 thousand horse and infantry had been appointed by Sindia to chastise Kureem, and arrived near Shahjehanpore. Wednesday 10th. The Nuwab visited the Peer Zadah and presented him with a valuable Khillut.

Imam Bukhsh, Sahib Khan and other Jemnadars represented that they were all firmly attached to the Nabob, but that Chetoo was treacherous, that he had made his peace with Sindia through Meena Bae, and had obtained territory from Rajah Raghojee. A pair of Hircarras brought a letter from Heeroo Pindarra to this effect. "March toward Ketchee-warrah. Aronne and other five mahals are allotted as your Jaedad. If you delay, troops will be sent against you." An arzee arrived from Ruttunkoowur and others mentioning that they were at Shujawulpore with the three battalions. A reply was sent directing them to proceed to the Oomutwara.

Thursday 11th. The Nuwab visited the Peerzadah and had a consultation with him and the principal Jemnadars. Oodajee Naek was also sent for and presented a nuzur to the Peerzadah. The Nuwab at this moment asked the Peerzadah to give him his hand as a token of his protection. The latter replied that he had urged Chetoo and Runjun Khan to unite with Kureem and they had promised to do so. The Peerzadah then wrote letters to those chiefs, and prevailed on Sahib Khan and Imam Bukhsh to go to bring them. He also wrote to Dost Vali Mahommed, and it is reported that he also will come. A letter was then written by the Nuwab to Heeroo, promising that when the parties which were to the southward returned he would, according to the Maharajah's orders, proceed towards the Ketchee-warra. Since the news has been received of Sindia's troops proceeding against him, the Nuwab has been thinking of sending troops to cut off their supplies and foraging parties, and will proceed to attack them when his whole force is collected. The zamindars of Oomutwara and Shujawulpore and other places belonging to the Nuwab are becoming refractory.

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Friday 12th. Letters arrived from Sindia's Vakeel, Naraeen Singh, and the news-writer who went to the camp of Bappoo Sindia, mentioning that the whole of his army was encamped at Teraneh, and that they had settled all matters in the Nuwab's favour, but the Hircarras represented that the army would certainly march to Shujawulpore on the arrival of Jeswant Rao Bhao. A letter arrived from Chheetoo respecting Oodajee Naek's release. The Nuwab returned an answer and sent copies of Rajah Raghojee's intercepted letters.

Saturday the 13th. A Shooka from Maharajah Sindia and letter from Heeroo arrived. The contents were, "You have not acted well in proceeding towards the Nerbudda contrary to the pleasure of the Sirkar. Now, however, come immediately towards Raghooghur".

Sunday the 14th. The Nuwab wrote letters in answer to Sindia and Jugoo Bappoo, promising to march immediately on the return of his parties from the southward, towards Raghooghur. He talked with his jemadars about the forces of Sindia and the Peshwa with 2 English battalions coming against him, and sent letters to Chheetoo and Runjuns and others, from himself and the Peerzadeh, exhorting them to join with him.

Monday the 15th Zeelqad or 2nd Decr. Fresh letters arrived from Heeroo to hasten the Nuwab's march to Raghooghur, with promises that immediately on his arrival there the territory agreed on should be given up to him, besides other advantages of Moolkgeeree. With the contents of these letters the Nuwab was much pleased.

No. 199—The Resident comments on the activities of Kareem, the Pindari.

FROM—R. JENKINS,

TO—H. RUSSELL, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

Nagpur, 28th November 1811.

I have the honour to forward for your information the copy of a letter which I have this day addressed to Colonel Conran.

To the intelligence contained in it, I have little to add excepting that, according to my news-writer Kureem makes a merit with the Rajah's Vakeel of sending the second party, which is said to have quitted his camp to join one of Seetoo's, on a plundering expedition to operate in the Nizam's instead of His Highness's country. This is cited by Kureem as an instance of moderation and forbearance towards the Rajah whilst his demands are still unanswered.

A greater part of the body of Pindaries who visited Nagpore, has passed up near Omraotee in the direction of Balapore.

No. 200—Jenkins writes to Conran of the demands made by Kareem on the Raja of Nagpur, reports the strength of the hordes accompanying him and asks him to strengthen without loss of time the small escort of the Nagpur Residency.

FROM—R. JENKINS,
TO—COL. CONRAN.

Nagpur, 28th November 1811.

Having last night received accounts from my news-writer in Kareem's camp, dated twelve days ago, and from that of Seetoo, of as late a date as six days ago, I deem it proper to make you acquainted with the substance of them.

The Rajah's intelligence, which I communicated in my letter to your address dated the 26th, of Kareem having crossed the Nerbudda, seems to have been premature. Seetoo, however with his followers, said to be about 18,000 horse, 1,000 infantry and 8 guns (the guns, my Hirkarras say, they counted) is certainly encamped on the southern bank of the Nerbudda, at Neelee about 4 coss from Sutwas, which is to the northward of the river. Seetoo has his family with him.

My Hirkarras left the camp of Kareem at Khyree, about 20 coss north of the Nerbudda in company with Odajee Naick, who was sent by the Rajah to negotiate. Kareem's demands now under reference to the Rajah, are said to be six lacks of rupees in cash, and the cession of Gurra Mundela, and to settle the matter in case the Rajah will treat on such a basis, Kareem proposes to send a person to Nagpore as his Vakeel. Odajee Naick had returned to Seetoo's camp, but was afterwards recalled to that of Kareem.

The demands of the Pindary chief, if they are correctly stated, must reduce the Rajah to the necessity and the disgrace of dismembering from his Government its richest province; or of risking the plunder of his Capital, announced as the alternative. Kareem was understood to be on the point of moving down to the Nerbudda to give weight to his negotiations.

He had, with him, two battalions of infantry, said to be two thousand strong, disciplined and commanded by an European of the name of Ball; fourteen guns of different calibres; and six or eight thousand horse, which are independent of the body, still in the Rajah's territories and in Berar. They are also said to be independent of many parties of horse and infantry, scattered over the districts he has usurped.

My writer further describes the most solemn oaths of fraternity and mutual support to have been lately exchanged between the chiefs of all the principal parties of the Pindarries, and Kureem.

Seetoo had written to Kureem that he was about to send a body of his followers to plunder in the Nizam's territories, and they were to be joined by a reinforcement from the other great body. I believe the two parties, united, have since taken the direction of Burhanpore.

The alarm in Nagpore is, as you may suppose, very great, and does not appear to be less in the councils of the Rajah, than elsewhere; but it does not lead to the most rational measures of defence. Nothing in the present intelligence, although in some respects different from the former, alters, indeed, it is rather calculated to confirm, the opinions I have already expressed relative to the dangerous state of the Rajah's affairs, to the eventual risk to Berar, and to the necessity of the British Residency being early placed in a respectable posture of defence. To this latter object, I am convinced you will contribute as far as may be in your power.

No. 201—Jenkins reports the preparations of the Raja at Nagpur to meet the impending attack from Kureem.

FROM—R. JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,
TO—COL. CONRAN, JALNA.

Nagpur, 2nd December 1811.

The Rajah is preparing for the defence of his Capital with renewed activity in consequence of the intelligence above described, and is calling in all his troops to meet the impending danger. Batteries are erecting in different points round the town and all the streets are barricading. Should time be given to mature all these preparations, one may hope that the doubtful success of any attempt against the city, besides the fear of our operations should your force advance for the better security of Berar, will deter the Pindarry chief from bringing down infantry and guns, although he would then in all probability, endeavour to possess himself of the Rajah's northern territories which will be completely open to his attacks.

No. 202—*Extracts of Akhbars from the camp of Kureem (describing his doings) Tuesday, 3rd December 1811.*

The Nuwab to-day forwarded copies of Rajah Raghjee's intercepted letters for the inspection of Maharajah Sindia, and wrote to Heeroo promising to march to Raghoghur when the plundering parties should arrive. Shekh Buhadoor Qadir Bukhsh's manager represented that Rajah Raghjee had stopped the Chauts of the Nerbudda and the Pindaries would probably be molested in recrossing. The Nuwab immediately sent to tell Oodajee Naek that if any molestation was given, his head should be immediately struck off and directed him to write immediately to forbid it in the name of the Rajah, which Oodajee accordingly did.

Letters arrived from Chheetoo addressed to the Peerzadah to this purport. "According to your desire I shall attend you accompanied by Rajee Mohummud Khan (Runjun), Imam Bukhsh, Sahib Khan, Ghazee Khan and Tukkoo Jummadar. News arrived that Jugoo Bappoo had arrived near Sohungunge. The Nuwab was much alarmed at this intelligence. Qadir Bukhsh had sent all his family off towards Bhopaul but was persuaded to recall them.

In the evening Girwur Sing and Mr. Ball arrived from Shujawulpore. They represented that all the zamindars were in revolt, and that Jobba Mannia had gone off to Jugoo Bappoo's camp. The Nuwab was very angry on hearing these things.

Wednesday 4th, December. The Nuwab wrote letters to Chheetoo, Runjun and others and sent them with the Peerzadah to their camp. The Nuwab then had a conference with Sindia's Vakeel, whom he amused with professions of obedience and attachment. He then spoke of Chheetoo and said that if he would not come, he would chastise him in the first instance. Qadir Bukhsh applied for some money threatening to march away. The Nuwab visited him and pacified him with a Tunkhah for six thousand rupees on Sohungunge and Burseea.

Thursday, 5th December. Letters arrived from Dost Mahommed, saying he could not come just now; and from Chheetoo, promising to come as soon as Oodajee Naek should arrive in his camp. Sindia's Vakeel represented that it was of no use to detain Oodajee Naek, and that hitherto Vakeels had been respected whether in peace or war, that the Nuwab should therefore dismiss Oodajee Naek.

The Nuwab then sent for Mr. Ball and Girwur Sing and told them that they had not done well in writing treasonable letters to Jugoo Bappoo. They both took oaths that they never had and never would be guilty of treason, "As the whole was false". The Nuwab dismissed them again to Shujawulpore. Qadir Bukhsh, Burrun's son, had written to Sindia,

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who through his Vakeel directed him to join Jugsoo Bappoo without apprehension. Qadir Bukhsh has not visited the Nuwab for some days, being discontented about money matters.

Friday, 6th December. Ghazee-ud-deen Khan, Nuthoo, Sydoo, Sahib Khan, and other Pindarries who went to Nagpore, etc. paid their respects to the Nuwab and represented their exploits of plundering and burning at Nagpore. The Nuwab sent for Oodajee Naek and asked him about these things, comforting him about his dismissal. In Ghazi-ud-din Khan's quarters are an elephant, many camels, horses, tattsos, bullocks and some children which have been carried off in the expedition.

The Jemadars represented what they had suffered from Jeswant Rao Lad at the ghats of Asseer and they said they would revenge it. Chheetoo's Pindarrahs have also got a great deal of plunder.

No. 203—Col. Conran advises Jenkins of his having despatched a force to Nagpur.

FROM—COL. CONRAN, JALNA,

TO—HENRY RUSSELL, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

Jalna, 4th December 1811.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th ultimo and am extremely happy to find that the measure I took upon myself in despatching a force for the protection of the British Resident at Nagpore, has been approved; of the amount of which I considered as absolutely necessary to ensure safety, and as there is a latitude allowed on this point in your last letter I have made no alteration in it but ordered Major Constance to pursue his route, with all prudent expedition. My original instructions to that officer and a return of his detachment are enclosed.

The force under my command is ready to move on the shortest notice, but as your instructions of the 30th ultimo appear to have been written under the impression of Kureem Khan having crossed the Nurbudda, which intelligence Mr. Jenkins now informs me was incorrect, I think it advisable not to march until I hear further from that gentleman.

It is my intention to leave one hundred men of each battalion of infantry with a full proportion of European and Native Officers for the protection of the cantonment.

The light field artillery intended to accompany the force will consist of two 12 pdrs., 6 pdrs. and two $5\frac{1}{2}$ inch howitzers, exclusive of the regimental guns of the cavalry.

Copies of all letters I may have occasion to write to you concerning the Pindarries, shall be sent to the Residents at Poona and Nagpore.

No. 204—This is an interesting news-letter received by Jenkins from his informant in Kareem's camp. It illustrates the Pindari activities.

FROM—R. JENKINS,

TO—HENRY RUSSELL.

Substance of a letter from my news-writer in Kareem's camp at Khayree, dated Friday the 6th December 1811.

A Shogga from Sindia has arrived directing the Nuwab to march towards Raghogurh, and letters from Heeroo are continually received to the same effect. Jugoo Bappoo also writes from Turaneh on the subject, and calling upon the Nuwab to evacuate Shujawulpore and other places. From this quarter excuses have been hitherto written that the Nuwab is waiting for the return of the parties from the southward. These have now all come in, and it remains to be seen what will follow.

I hear that Jeswunt Rao Bhao has been sent to this quarter with his forces and that Vizier Mahommed Khan in obedience to Sindia's orders, has agreed to join Ambajee Punt who has three of the Maharajah's battalions with him. Vizier Mahommed however pretends friendship for the Nabob Kureem and urges him to obey Sindia's orders, but, as a burnt child dreads the fire, Kureem does not think proper to go to Raghogurh although the Rajah of Kotta also recommends him to go, he evades it by various and contradictory excuses.

Hearing that a force of English battalions and of the Peshwa's troops are coming against him, he is cultivating the friendship of Chheetoo and Dost Mahommed. Chheetoo makes the release of Oodajee Naek as his excuse and in consequence it is proposed to send him to Chheetoo with Namdar Khan. Dost Mahommed excuses himself on account of the other mahals in the Nuwab's possession are in a state of disturbance, plundering and robbing night and day.

I have heard from some of the Pindarries who have come back, that on their return (after setting fire to some houses in Nagpore which they did on hearing of Oodajee Naek's seizure and plundering Pownie, etc.) by the route of Asseergurh, the Killadar of that place Jeswunt Rao Lad occupied the different ghauts with his infantry, and killed and wounded

a great many of the Pindaries. He also made a night attack upon them which obliged them to leave behind many horses and tattoos laden with plunder.

It is now in contemplation to send the finest horses and men towards the army of Jugoo Bappoo. It is probable that in a few days they will go on a plundering expedition.

This day (the 6th December) the Nuwab had a conference with Odajee Naeek, in concert with Nuthoo Bhao and Namdar Khan. It is said that Odajee and Nuthoo Bhao will be despatched to Chheetoo's camp, and that from thence Nuthoo Bhao will accompany the Naeek to Nagpore to negotiate.

No. 205—Jenkins recommends for Russell's consideration the beneficial effects of moving a British force near the Bhonsle Raja's frontier in order to ward off Pindari inroads and requests him to strengthen the escort of the Nagpur Residency.

FROM—R. JENKINS,
TO—HENRY RUSSELL, RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

Nagpur, 11th December 1811.

I have the honour to transmit for your information a copy of my letter of this date to Colonel Conran.

I cannot but consider the movement of the Jalnah force to a more advanced position, as a measure not only of prudence and wisdom, relatively to the protection of Berar, but of great advantage in the collateral effects likely to result from it.

Whilst the direct benefit will be to secure Berar from any formidable irruption, and in its security to prevent the destruction of a part of those resources to which we must look in any future military operations on the Nerbudda, there is little doubt but that Kureem will not venture to come down even into the Raja's country, with guns and infantry, whilst a British force is so near at hand. At the same time the Raja will have more confidence to resist his insolent demands, and to prevent himself from becoming the instrument of increasing the resources and the reputation of that predatory chief by acceding to terms so humiliating to a once respectable state.

The advantages gained in this point of view, although principally accruing to the Raja, will of course be considered, when obtained at so small an expense, and weighed in the scale of a liberal and comprehensive policy, as extremely beneficial to us and our allies. If it is the interest of all regular governments to check the rising power of the Pindaries, it is still more that of the British Government, which must in the end be called upon to humble and reduce it.

The idea that we would not be quiet spectators of the plunder of the Rajah's capital, generally entertained from the late campaign against Meer Khan has probably been of considerable weight in deterring Kureem from proceeding directly to attempt to accomplish it. The late partial attack may have been in some measure directed to feel our pulse on this head, and the advance of the Jalnah force will most likely be considered a decisive proof of our disposition. Although that force might not have been advanced in the first instance, Kureem might nevertheless wait until he thought the season too far advanced for any decisive movement on our part, and relying on this supposition, and on the distance of the position occupied by our troops, he might bring down a force of infantry and guns, contemptible enough to us, but sufficiently formidable to subdue the Rajah's spirit, and if not to plunder his capital, to force from him any contributions and cessions, he might demand.

I may perhaps overrate the boldness and decision of Kureem, and the depressed state of the Rajah's power, but I am convinced that the Rajah's Government could only stand for a day against Kureem by the effects of that prejudice in favour of old states, which long supports them when their real power is gone, or by the fear of our interposition to check and punish any attempts at its subversion. The Pindaries every day allow themselves to be beat off from the plunder of a village by a few shots, and they certainly as a body did not shew any great boldness in their attack on Nagpore; but with regard to that attack I conceive it was little more than an experiment; and from the rapidity of their plundering movements, they seldom stay for their dismounted and wounded comrades, who are thereby exposed to certain death from the rage of the villagers. They not unfrequently, however, punish a trifling resistance by dismounting in considerable numbers and storming such places as resist, and in the event of success, by putting every man to death.

To speak of them in the most unfavourable terms, it may be said that they can produce a body of horse superior in numbers to any force of the same description which any native power in India can produce, and not inferior as fighting men; and that they only require to be under a popular and daring leader and to be supported by a regular force of infantry and guns which they now seem to be in a fair way of establishing, to bear down all resistance which any native powers of the present day can oppose to them. In forming a judgment, therefore, of what they can do, I do not think that we can safely come to any conclusion from merely considering what they have been accustomed to do. If the Rajah will reap a great advantage from the advance of the Jalnah force, he will no doubt be also much benefited and encouraged by the arrival of the strong detachment which Colonel Conran has ordered for the protection of the Residency.

This detachment is certainly of greater strength than I should have at it necessary or proper for me to require. No doubt, however,

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under all the circumstances of my application, and under the expectation that Kureem might have been encamped in the neighbourhood with infantry and guns, as well as a large body of horse at the time of its arrival, Colonel Conran's judgment of the imprudence of sending a smaller force was perfectly sound on military principles, but as the distance of support and the danger of attack will be less in the advance of the whole force to the neighbourhood of Ellichpore, I would suggest that, unless a great necessity should arise, two companies and a gun being left here, the remainder of the detachment should be recalled to camp.

No. 206—Jenkins, while communicating to Colonel Conran the movements of the Pindaris, thanks him for speedily rushing reinforcements to the Nagpur Residency.

FROM—R. JENKINS,
TO—COLONEL CONRAN.

Nagpur, 11th December 1811.

I should sooner have acknowledged the receipt of your letter of the 30th November, and returned you my thanks, for your ready compliance with my request for a reinforcement had I received any intelligence of importance to communicate relative to the Pindaries. I have now further had the honour to receive your dispatch of the 4th instant.

Kureem, by the last accounts, was still at his former encampment and Odajee Naeek, although released from his fetters at the intercession of Seetoo, is represented to be kept by Kureem as an hostage, for the granting of his demands by the Rajah. Those demands, it has been confirmed to me by the Rajah's minister, Jeswant Rao Ramchunder, extend to the cession of Gurra Mundela; terms impossible for His Highness to accede to, without confessing a degree of weakness incompatible with any kind of resistance to that predatory chief.

In the meantime the Rajah's country has continued to be overrun by the Pindaries. A part of the large body which came down by Nagpore in the middle of last month, has plundered part of the town of Chanda, without the walls, and was, four or five days ago on its return to the northward, near the Wurd, about Wunee Wuroora. As nothing further has been heard of it it has probably followed the great body through Berar to Burhanpore.

Another party of four or five hundred remained in the neighbourhood of Gishir and Bipse*, places not far south of Nagpore, until within these few days. Where they have gone I have not heard.

A third large body said to be five or six thousand encamped at Adegaon near the Nerbudda, in the Jubbulpore direction for five or six

days. Parties from it plundered the country about Seonee, Chupparah and the whole were last heard of in Gurra Mundela, near Jubbulpore. My news-writer at Beetool mentions a new horde to have been prepared to move from the Nerbudda, on Sunday last, but whether in this direction or towards Berar does not yet appear.

An attempt was lately made by a party either of Pindaries, or of the Nabob of Bhopaul's horse, to cut off some infantry with four guns on their march to join Sudeek Alee Khan at Sohagpore. In this they did not succeed. The Bhopaul troops with some infantry and 8 guns are said to be about to cross the Nerbudda near Chyhpore Baree to attack the Rajah's force under Jeswant Rao Duttajee, encamped near the confluence of the Shukur Nudda with the Nerbudda.

These various operations of the Pindaries and their ally Vizier Mahommed Khan would seem to show that Kureem has not yet resolved to carry into execution his threat of attacking the Rajah in his capital. It may be observed, however, that by allowing his followers to supply their immediate necessities by indiscriminate plunder in the first instance, he will be better able to concentrate their exertions, when he requires them, to that one object. The difficulty of doing this is, no doubt, the greatest and almost the only obstacle to the success of any attempt of the kind, if Kureem seriously intends to make any, whilst the Rajah's preparations for defence are still imperfect.

The impression on the Rajah and his ministers seems to be that such an attempt will be made, and the orders are reiterated to the different forces on the frontier to proceed hither without delay. Excepting however the small force of Anund Rao Dhondeeraj arrived at Pandoorna, the others are still at a distance.

No. 207—News of Kareem Khan's activities.

Translations of extracts from Alibars from the camp of Kureem received, Nagpur, 1st January 1812.

*Saturday, 7th December, 1811—*News was this day received that on the 6th Cheetoo and Runjun according to the orders of Sindia had gone to join Jugsoo Bappoo. Narain Sing, Sindia's Vakeel, was sent for. After speaking on the subject of Cheetoo and Runjun, the Nuwab told him that he would march from this place (Khyree) and having halted for some days in the pergunnah of Tuleyn,* he would proceed to Raghooghur according to Sindia's orders. The Nuwab desired Shekh Hinga, Commandant, to raise two battalions,

* Tolen in Central India?

and inspected one hundred infantry which he had brought with him. Wrote to Rutten Koowur to make his own bundobust in the pergunnah of Sarungpore.

Sunday, 8th—A letter was received from Nana Bhaskur from Ashteh,

mentioning that Jugoo Bappoo was coming on by continued marches to that quarter, and that Seetoo and Ranjun had joined him. The Nuwab then had a fruitless conference with Odajee Naek. It seems that the Nuwab intends to carry the Naek with him. Dhunna Pindarry represented that there were about 200 Pindaries connected with him in Seetoo's camp, and offered to bring them over. The Nuwab immediately gave the shawls from his own shoulders to him, and dismissed him.

Syed Ahmed Allee was sent as a Vakeel to Jugoo Bappoo. At night the Nuwab held a consultation separately with all those of his own tribe on the subject of marching, which lasted till near midnight. Letters were also despatched to Imam Bukhsh, Ghazee Khan and other brothers of the Mulhar Shahae who are at Sutwas, to unite with the Nuwab.

Monday the 9th—Tookoo Jemmadar has agreed to take upon him the task of bringing over Ranjun and set off for Sutwas. Intelligence was received that the Bhopaul Nabob had sent parties to act against the Pindaries, who had taken from them many horses and other property.

Tuesday, 10th December—Sindia's Vakeel represented that if the Nuwab desired his own good, he would march immediately towards Raghogurh. It is reported that we shall shortly march from hence towards the Oomutwarra. The Nuwab received letters from the Rana of Kotta urging him to march, in consequence of which he promised to Sindia's Vakeel that he would march.

Wednesday, 11th December—A pair of Hirkarras was despatched to bring Nuthoo Jemmadar who is still plundering in the Nagpore country, having secretly remained behind the rest. Letters were received by Sindia's Vakeel from Jugoo Bappoo, by Hirkarras in the dress of Nanuck Shahae Fackees urging Kureem to join him as Chetoo had done. The Nuwab gave orders for preparations to march and told the Vakeel that he would move from Khayree to-morrow.

Thursday, 12th December—The army marched this morning 5 coss on the Itchawur road. Qadir Bukhsh, Burtun's son, encamped one coss in front separately at the village of Seerree. The Nuwab wrote letters to Jugoo Bappoo and to Sindia informing them that he had marched. At night all the head Pindaries (Thoogdars) represented that the Nuwab had before promised to give them money in the Oomutwarra, but had yet given nothing and that they would no longer accompany him; also that it was not advisable to march until the arrival of Nuthoo Jemmadar, from the Nerbudda. The Nuwab replied that he would halt in the pergunnah of Seoor.*

* Sehoore.

Friday, 13th December—This day the army marched seven coss and encamped at Bejoor, one coss in advance from Seeoor. Dost Mahomed, son of the late Heeroo, came this day with fifty horse from Bheela to visit Qadir Sahib, the Peerzadah, who recommended unanimity which he promised as far as was in his power [Incomplete].

No. 208—Colonel Conran of the Hyderabad subsidiary force informs the Resident of Hyderabad of his having moved forward towards Nagpur.

FROM—COLONEL CONRAN,

TO—THE RESIDENT AT HYDERABAD.

Camp Chichooli, 18th December 1811.

I have the honour to inform you of my arrival at Chichooly and by the enclosed letter you will be informed of the situation of Major Constance who has performed his march with great celerity and judgment.

The intelligence I received of the motions of the Pindaries is so various and contradicting that I feel at a loss how to proceed, but I think it is probable I shall halt after the next march at Chandore* until I receive further advice either from you or the British Resident at Nagpur.

Postscript—My private intelligence from Baitool of a late date states that all the head Pindaries with their different parties were still to the northward of the Nerbudda in their huddled cantonment.

Kureem with his force was also stated to be at a village called Keeree 20 coss from the north bank. The above intelligence has this moment reached me.

No. 209—The Governor General entirely approves the measures taken by Colonel Conran and the Resident at Hyderabad to reinforce the escort at Nagpur.

FROM—CHIEF SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,

TO—THE RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

Fort William, 21st December 1811.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your three dispatches to my address of the 30th ultimo and 3rd and 4th instant, and to signify to you the Right Honourable the Governor General in Council's entire approbation of the measure of requiring the advance of the subsidiary force from Jaulna to Ellichpore, and of the instructions which you transmitted on that subject to Colonel Conran and Lieutenant Sydenham.

* Chandur near Amraoti.

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PINDARI INROADS INTO NAGPUR TERRITORY

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2. His Lordship in Council entirely approves Colonel Conran's compliance with the application of the Resident at Nagpur for a reinforcement of his escort, and considers that officer to have acted with much prudence in detaching a body of 650 men to Nagpur as a body of troops not exceeding the required reinforcement, might certainly be exposed to danger in the march from the bands of Pindaris traversing the country.
3. A copy of my letter of this date to the Resident at Nagpur is enclosed for your information.
4. I am directed to take this opportunity of observing that it is unnecessary for you to transmit copies of dispatches addressed to you by the Resident at Nagpur, as according to standing orders, copies are regularly transmitted by him to the Presidency.

No. 210—Jenkins writes to Russell at Hyderabad describing the movements of the Pindaris and the temporary check they had received in the direction of Nagpur on account of the presence of a British force in the vicinity.

FROM—R. JENKINS, NAGPUR,
TO—H. RUSSELL, HYDERABAD.

Nagpur, 29th December 1811.

I have the honour to transmit for your information the copy of a letter which I have this day addressed to Colonel Conran.

The present inactivity of the Pindaries is, I have no doubt, to be attributed to the advance of the Jalnah force towards Omraotee and that of the corps under Major Constance to Nagpur, of which from their good intelligence the Pindary chiefs must have received the earliest notice. The forces sent against Kureem by Sindia do not seem to be yet advanced far on this side of Ojein, but in the progress of their operations it was to have been expected that whether or not Kureem could face them in the field, he would endeavour to escape all danger of treachery by crossing the Nerbudda as long as he had no apprehension of a British force being so near as to endanger his rear. No opposition on the part of the Rajah of Berar in the state of his military preparations a short time ago, could have been expected, or rather the fear of having his capital attacked must have obliged His Highness to grant to the Pindary chief anything he might have demanded for his security. Hoshangabad and Seonee were indeed actually required by Kureem, the former as a place of refuge for his family and in lieu of Gurra Mundela, if the Rajah would not cede that province.

If any vigorous operations on the part of Sindia could be reasonably expected, it might be said that the Pindaries would be too much employed

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in securing themselves and families, to think of plundering incursions even if they were driven across the Nerbudda, but a Pindarry must either plunder or starve, and Sindia's operations must be much more decided than in all probability they will even be, to prevent large detachments of the Pindarries from scouring the countries within their reach for the means of their subsistence. I still think too that Sindia would have been happy to hear of Kureem at the gates of Nagpore.

From the time which has been gained, the Rajah is now much better prepared than he was to oppose Kureem and to reject his insolent demands without any great fear of the consequences, and this favourable posture of his affairs is the result, in my opinion, exclusively of our precautionary measures. For nothing indicates that the Pindarries have yet been seriously pressed..... by Sindia's forces. The last accounts from Kureem's camp mentioned that he was preparing to harass those forces and until now, the reports from the Nerbudda were such as to lead to an expectation of a new and formidable incursion to the southward, perhaps under Kureem himself.

Kureem may now, if endangered in Bhopaul towards which place he is said to have moved, retire in the direction of Gurra Mundela—at present quite uncovered, but I think, that he will not venture to cross the Nerbudda however pressed, although plundering parties may still infest the countries to the south of that river, not immediately protected by our forces. I shall forward copies of this despatch to the Chief Secretary, for the information of the Right Honourable The Governor General and to the Resident at Poona.

No. 211—In this weighty despatch, which evinces the circumspection and foresight of the writer, Jenkins analyses the various political aspects of the Pindari menace and suggests measures to root out the evil.

FROM—RICHARD JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,

TO—LORD MINTO, C.G.

Nagpur, 30th December 1811.

On a review of the present political state of India with reference to objects of British policy, there appear to be circumstances which threaten considerable future dangers to our Asiatic Empire, unless they should be obviated by timely measures of vigorous preventive operation on our part. Two leading principles which dictated the terms of our treaties with the Marhatta states of Sindia, the Bhooosla and Holkar, were, I believe, first, to reduce the power of each, individually, to the extent necessary to secure us from their future aggressions; and secondly, to leave them

in such a situation of relative reciprocal strength, as might preclude the chance of any great change in the political balance being caused by the aggrandisement of one at the expense of the others, and the danger which would accrue to ourselves from such a concentration of power in the hands of any particular state.

From a combination of causes, however, obvious to the most careless observer of Indian politics, two predatory powers have started up, whose increasing strength menaces the subversion of that state of things which alone can ensure the objects of the policy, just mentioned. I allude to Meer Khan and the Pindaries.

It would be premature, in this place, to discuss all the grounds for my apprehensions of the evils to be expected from the further consolidation of these predatory powers. Merely assuming, therefore, that Government considers these evils to be of sufficient magnitude to suggest the expediency of adopting at an early period, something more than a temporizing policy to avert them, I take the liberty to offer to your Lordship's consideration the following ideas which I have thrown together on the subject; without, I trust, the hazard of being considered to exceed the limits of my official duty in intruding them on your notice.

The rise and progress of the power of Meer Khan is too well known to require any additional elucidation.

I have not yet been able to obtain any regular history of the origin and earlier state of the Pindaries, nor is this of importance in considering their present advancing establishment in numbers and organization, and the lines of policy which present themselves for selection, when that establishment is discussed in connection with its probable future influence on the tranquillity of India. It may be sufficient to observe that, as the Pindaries are mentioned in some of the earliest accounts of the Marhattas as attached to their armies, and even, I believe, in the earliest periods of the history of the Deccan, they may be considered as a plundering band, which has sometimes been less and sometimes greater in number according to the settled state of the Indian Governments, but whose continued existence, during so long a period, is a proof and a consequence of the continual anarchy that has prevailed, for ages past, in some of the richest countries in the Peninsula.

Whilst the Marhatta Governments preserved their superiority amongst the states of India, the Pindaries were as obedient to the two principal chiefs Sindia and Holkar, as any irregular predatory force can ever be. The late depression of the power of these chiefs gradually weakened, and has now almost dissolved every bond of subjection between them and the Pindaries; and the natural result is, that the increasing consequence of these freebooters threatens to prove not more dangerous to the Marhatta States than to the British Government, and to all the peaceful Govern-

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Applicable to these circumstances, there seem to me to be but three great and decided lines of policy which present themselves for selection to the British Government.

First.—We may remain neutral spectators of the convulsions of the neighbouring states, confining ourselves to measures of purely defensive policy.

Secondly.—We may unite our exertions with those of the other states of India in reducing the power of Meer Khan and the Pindarries without, however, extending our subsidiary relations beyond their present bounds.

Thirdly.—We may ourselves adopt a decided system for suppressing the power of Meer Khan and the Pindarries; and combine this system with the extension of our subsidiary alliances to the Rajah of Berar, Holkar, Sindia and the Rajpoot states.

The discussion of the third line of policy is susceptible of a three-fold division, with regard to the means by which its leading object may be purchased: for we may either undertake a war of extermination against Meer Khan and the Pindarries; or provide for them with territorial establishments; or combine these two systems into a middle course.

First.—The advantages expected from a neutral line of policy, I should suppose, must rest on some or all of the following grounds, and be calculated on the following chances.

By declining, in any respect, to extend our political relations, and by leaving open to Meer Khan and the Pindarries the whole field of the central and northwest parts of India and even in some measures the territories of the Nizam and Peshwa, we hope to be able as hitherto, secure in the reputation of our arms, to preserve our own territories free from their devastations and to nourish our resources for a length of time in peace and prosperity. We trust that the exertions of Sindia and the other unallied powers will be sufficient to check and overawe the Pindarries from time to time, and to stem the torrent of their accumulating force; and that they will also be able to make head against Meer Khan, so as still to preserve a political balance.

We take the chances of any distant dangers which may arise whether from the inability of these states to resist Meer Khan and the Pindarries, the consequent establishment of new predatory states on the ruins of the old, and the ultimate concentration of their efforts to the attack of the British territories; or from the possibility of intermediate foreign invasion aided by such hordes of plunderers, and joined to other hostile powers in the heart of India; and finally, by the time we shall gain by this line of policy, we hope that our internal strength will be consolidated in a degree much superior to any means, which the same time may ripen for our serious annoyance, whether in the hands of European invaders, or

The first question, then, to be asked is whether it is probable that we should long be able to preserve our own territories from predatory invasions by adopting and pursuing the line of policy here discussed, and consequently, whether we should not be forced, at an early period, to deviate from that policy with the disadvantage of a predatory warfare in the heart of our own provinces.

in the heart of our own provinces.

First.—If we consider the exhausted state of the countries at present

plundered by the Pindarries, it does not seem likely that they will long

afford a sufficient held for their maintenance and subsistence. Great

and the fact that the system is not yet fully operational, the Commission has decided to postpone the final decision on the system until the end of 1991.

to weigh between the alternatives of directing their strength to the

acquisition of adequate territorial establishments, and, as the only means

of securing them to the gradual subjection of the Marhatta Governments,

or of praying the danger of invading the British territories. But even allowing them to pursue as their main object the former alternative, their

predatory habits cannot be expected to be restrained from hurting them

to seek for plunder where it can alone be found, nor could their necessities

be immediately supplied, even if they had acquired the most considerable

territorial establishments in countries already reduced almost to deserts

by themselves, increased too, as their numbers must continually be, by

of propagating their race by the adoption of numerous youths whom

as well as women, they always carry off from the countries they plunder.

The Pindaries have long continued to plunder the territories of our

allies without fear of the consequences of provoking our vengeance, although

they know that our armies are placed for their protection. They may

think that we would be more zealous for revengeing any incursions into our own provinces and their position has hitherto perhaps been too

own own provinces, and their position has hitherto perhaps been too distant for such incursions: but they cannot be expected to understand

the policy which dictates our forbearance towards them in the territories

of our allies, and they may naturally conclude that if they are not molested

in plundering the latter, it is, because we do not think we could act against

them with effect, or do not like to enter into hostilities with them for fear of exposing the former. Thus the habit of seeing our armies quiet

inspecting their operations in countries which they know are under

our protection, will lead them to think the danger of invading our own

territories less formidable than it has so long appeared to them to be.

3. It could never be our policy to wage a merely defensive war, the

seat of it our own territories or those of our allies.

If, then, this question must be answered in the negative, it is decisive

against the first line of policy.

But superior in importance is the consideration of the possibility of invasion from without, aided by such hordes of plunderers, perhaps acting in concert with hostile Governments in the heart of India; and next to this, and perhaps not much more distant in prospect, is that of the entire subversion of the present weak Governments and the substitution of new predatory states, more dangerous to our Empire.

With regard to the probability of early foreign invasion, whether from the Seiks, or from the French, I cannot pretend to give an opinion, but it is sufficient to know that the former of these powers is by no means friendly, and the latter studiously bent on the subversion of our Indian Empire, whether by force or intrigue; whilst there are predatory powers like those of Meer Khan and the Pindarries, ready to co-operate in attacking us, the former, because he considers us as a bar to his ambitious views, and the latter, because, even supposing them to be indifferent to either party, their plundering habits would render them more disposed to unite with an invader who would promise them the riches of our provinces for their booty, than with our regular efforts for defence, to which they could never be of any service, even if we could condescend to employ them by ransoming our territories with pecuniary payments. A course of policy which would leave a peril of this magnitude unprovided for, even if the chances against its occurrence were ten times greater than they can be said to be, can never be that which a wise Government from mere dread of the present inconveniences of a warfare, so trifling in its comparative evils, would think proper to adopt.

With regard to the likelihood of the early establishment of new predatory powers in place of those who have been reduced to their present weakness by our exertions; in one quarter this apprehension seems already to be nearly realized by the submission of the Holkar State to Meer Khan. With similar views and similar interests the present leader of the greatest body of the Pindarries has begun to lay the foundations of independent power, and an union of the forces of Meer Khan and the Pindarries, seems to be no unlikely event, destroyed as every tie of former allegiance to Sindia on the part of Kureem and his followers must be from past transactions, and transferred as the authority which was formerly exercised over a considerable part of the Pindarries by Holkar is, to the person of Meer Khan.

Even allowing that Sindia, whether from a sense of his own immediate interests, or from the fear of affording to us grounds for carrying our military operations into the heart of Malwa, should be inclined to exert his power to reduce the Pindarries, it would only be to the extent of securing their submission to himself that he would be inclined to go. A restless desire to recover his former power, and even the wish of preserving a degree of present consideration in the command of so large a predatory force, would be sufficient to render an Indian prince of much greater foresight than Sindia blind to the dangers of such a policy. With regard

to us the root and trunk of the evil would remain unimpaired, whilst a few of its branches might be lopped off.

Of the danger to be expected from the establishment of a new Moosulman power under Meer Khan, Government is too well aware to render it necessary for me to say anything; and the whole question relating to that chief has been brought before it by abler hands.

Without therefore entering further into this part of the subject, I think the strongest grounds exist for rejecting the first line of policy, as one which cannot be permanently pursued, and as only deferring the danger to a future day, not only without any adequate object of permanent benefit, but with a moral certainty of increased difficulty in meeting the crisis when it occurs.

A great master in politics speaking of the successful policy of the Romans in Greece, expresses himself in nearly the following terms:—"They did what all wise states ought to do, that is, they had not only regard to present but future dangers and to the assiduous prevention of them; for in providing against distant evils, you have an easy task, but if you wait until they are at your door, the medicine is out of date, because the disease is become incurable. They never neglected future dangers to escape a present war, because they knew that it would be only deferred, and that, to the advantage of others. In fine, they fought with Philip and Antiochus in Greece that they might not have to contend with them in Italy."

A British Government placed in similar circumstances need not blush to take a lesson of policy from the Romans. If their ends were generally ambitious, yet they always adopted the best means to obtain them, and we may surely profit by their example, when it holds out just and prudent maxims of defensive policy, without exposing ourselves to the imputation of being imitators of their ambition.

2. To the second line of policy, viz., uniting our exertions with those of the other unallied Governments to suppress the power of Meer Khan and the Pindaries, without extending our subsidiary relations, there seem to me to be great objections of a general nature.

We should not have it in our option to direct our forces and those united to them, in the mode best calculated to attain the end in view, clogged as our exertions would be by the obstinacy, weakness, jealousy, and shortsighted views of the powers on whom we should rely for co-operation, but over whose measures we could exercise no legitimate or salutary control. We should not be able to secure the future operation of any arrangements which might result from our measures, if successful, by that continual and decided weight of influence which alone could render them permanently effectual to guard us from a recurrence of the same dangers, and the exertions we should be required to make could only be repaid by such a result as would place our affairs on a basis of

general and permanent security, not liable to be shaken by any future efforts of independent power in India.

Other objections might be easily offered, but those above stated, are sufficient I think, to render such a line of policy inadmissible.

3. I now come to the third course, viz., of undertaking ourselves the extinction of the predatory powers of Meer Khan and the Pindaries, and combining this plan with the extension of our subsidiary relations to the remaining independent states of India.

The consideration of the possibility of French invasion, independently of all others, seems imperiously to demand that we should at once resolve to place our Indian Empire, as far as good policy can place it, beyond all fears of the description I have formerly mentioned. Threatened as we know our Indian Empire has been by the enemy, and favourable as circumstances at one time seemed to be for an attempt at invasion, it is impossible not to be impressed with a sense of the great difficulties which we should have had to encounter in repelling such an attempt, with materials of so dangerous a nature for predatory warfare in the heart of the peninsula. There is no doubt, too, that all the Marhatta States of the former confederacy and even some of our allies could scarcely conceal their satisfaction at the prospect which was opening upon them; and can we say that we were in a situation to mock their efforts to aid the cause of the enemy?

The case is now altered. Fortune has for the present turned against the enemy in Europe, and India is in temporary security from his attacks. Now then is the time to strike at the root of those dangers which would have distracted and divided our efforts in case he could have formerly invaded us, and would, at the least, have endangered seriously the result of the contest. If we ever shall have again to contend with the French in India, the fate of the contest will no doubt turn greatly on our application of the present time, and it has not often happened that states have had so good an opportunity of preparing for a struggle on which their existence has depended.

Were the peculiar situation of Meer Khan and the Pindaries as rising predatory states, and the former as a rising Mahomedan state, placed out of the question, the policy of forming subsidiary alliances with the remaining unconnected states would still be wise and necessary. We can never expect either that they will forget their former situation and sympathise with us, whilst a hope remains of recovering their former possessions and consequence; or that they will be led to consider a French invasion, or that of any formidable foreign state, in any other light than as affording them an opportunity of breaking forth from the shadow under which our superiority has eclipsed them. Nothing but a strong hand on our part, a fear of our immediate vengeance and a

sense of strict dependence which no slight effort could shake off, on theirs, would prevent them from joining our enemies at the first onset.

They would be the rallying points for all discontented and disaffected subjects or dependants of our own, particularly of the greater part of the military class who cannot appreciate the blessings of our rule, because it affords them no chance of employment or subsistence, but in turning their swords into ploughshares.

They do not now expect a French invasion and a sense of present interest, both in the Rajah of Berar and in those in Holkar's Durbar who are disposed to resist Meer Khan, promises an easy introduction of subsidiary alliances, with at least two of the remaining states: the latter certainly at the hazard of a warfare with Meer Khan, whom however, other deep considerations of policy urge us to put down. Sindia perhaps from his fear of Meer Khan might be inclined to renew his former subsidiary engagement, and the Rajpoot states call aloud for our protection.

If then, such weighty considerations exist to demand our early and decided exertions to secure ourselves from the perils they threaten, we ought surely not to neglect the favourable opportunity which is presented to us, of providing against these perils whilst they are yet objects of prevention.

An alliance with the Rajah should perhaps be our first measure. Besides being sought after anxiously by His Highness, it seems to be the best foundation for our further proceedings. By it we should have a force advanced to the Nerbudda, which would be supported by the Hyderabad Subsidiary, and the latter by the Poona Force, with the usual Corps at Hyderabad and Poona; and a communication would thus be opened between the armies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay of great importance to our further operations. The settlement of Bhopaul would follow in the train of this arrangement, and its further immediate consequences would be to throw the Pindaries back to positions more remote from the frontiers of the Nizam and Peshwa than those which they at present occupy, and to give us the command of new and strong lines of defence, as well as of additional resources of no small importance to our future operations.

The next step or perhaps contemporaneous to the former, might be the attempt to free the Holkar state from the thraldom in which it is held by Meer Khan, by a subsidiary alliance with its young representative, and in the provisions of the treaty we might be able to get removed any objections to our interference with the Rajpoot states, which arise out of our engagements with his father. We might at the same time endeavour to bring Sindia into the cause and to prevail upon him to admit the introduction of similar provisions; but whatever disposition he might shew we do not seem to be under any necessary obligation of consulting

either his disposition or that of the Holkar state, with regard to a Rajpoot alliance further than to offer a fair adjustment of their common interests in the affairs of the Rajpoot states.

Our treaties with Sindia and Holkar certainly under common circumstances would preclude, by their obligations, any interference on our part with these states. But were the French, by any means, to gain the same footing amongst them as Meer Khan has, can it be said that we should not have a right, and that we should not exercise the right of supplanting that footing, and of taking advantage of the friendly disposition of these states towards us, to substitute a ruling influence of our own. We should say to Sindia and to Holkar, "you have not been able to preserve them from our enemy. We have expelled him at an expense of our own blood and treasure, and we cannot consent to be exposed again to a similar danger arising from your weakness or bad policy. We will maintain the military command of the country and grant to its inhabitants that protection which they loudly call for at our hands, but we will respect your tributary rights, the only rights you possess over these states and guarantee their regular adjustment in future."

If there is any essential difference with regard to the principle of right in the actual circumstances of the case, when we substitute the name of Meer Khan for that of the French, I confess I cannot discover it. But I of course mean to offer my opinion with great deference and submission, although, at the same time, with a deep impression of the dangers which every accession of power to Meer Khan seems to me to threaten the interests of the British nation in India.

With regard to the Pindarries we have a right to call for Sindia's unreserved co-operation against them, and it is on his head and not on ours that the consequence of his own bad policy would rest, if he should demur to the measures which our own security demands us to adopt.

These measures, according to my humble conception of them, I now proceed to touch upon, under the threefold division into which the subject of the third line of policy, as it relates to Meer Khan and the Pindarries, resolves itself. 1st. We may undertake a war of extermination against them.

However authorized we might be by the Laws of Nations to proceed to this extremity, and however loud the calls of the suffering countries laid waste by the Pindarries to excite us to vengeance against their merciless ravages; however desirable, too, it may seem, to pluck up so serious an evil by the roots, it is impossible to contemplate, even as a measure of necessary policy, the extirpation of such numerous bands. A war of extermination, as a fixed system of action, even against robbers and pirates, has seldom been found politic or practicable, and in our own Bengal provinces we have experienced a policy more humane to be at the same time consistent with our interests and our security. If then, there is any

other less severe mode of curing the evils, a wise and humane Government will not hesitate to adopt it.

2ndly.—We may provide for Meer Khan and the Pindaries with territorial establishments.

If this policy would operate as a decisive remedy to the evils it is in-

tended to cure, and if it should be practicable to provide so great an extent of territorial resources as the full prosecution of it would require, there could then be little difficulty in adopting it. The extension of the British power in India appears as the ostensible cause of the great increase which has lately taken place in the numbers of indigent soldiers of fortune, who, unable to procure a subsistence under our dominion by a profession which they would deem it a disgrace and, perhaps, would not be qualified to abandon for any other, unable at the same time to obtain that subsistence in the service of the native powers who either want resources to maintain them, or from the operation of their alliances with us have naturally diminished their military establishments, are reduced to the occupation of professional plunderers and banditti. How pleasing then would be the idea that a liberal policy on our part could conciliate this class of people to our interests, render us strong in their strength, and turn those hands which have so long been exercised in blood and rapine, to the happy work of restoring cultivation and prosperity to the fields which they have ruined and depopulated.

It is not, however, the work of a day to change the habits and propensities of men, and it would be very difficult to provide the requisite checks on the conduct of a large military and plundering body during the uneasy period of their transition from a life of turbulence and plunder to one of peace and regularity. The lands wasted by their depredations would not immediately furnish an harvest sufficiently plentiful to repay, in their consideration, the sacrifice which they must make to obtain them, of their accustomed mode of life.

In one point of view too, the extension of our alliances to all the remaining independent powers would tend considerably to augment the unemployed portion of the military class, and thus to aggravate the evil which we propose to remedy. No doubt, a proportion of this class would be still maintained by the native states for the sake of their dignity and the purposes of internal administration, and we could provide, as we have already done in the treaties with our present allies, for the continual establishment of a certain proportion of troops with our new ones. Our own increased army would, besides, be another source of counteraction, but our service does not employ many of that class of men who usually serve in the Cavalry establishments of the natives, and who now swell the bands of Meer Khan and the Pindaries.

With regard then to Meer Khan we might, as suggested by Mr. Strachey, acknowledge him as a dependant of the Holkar Government,

and guarantee to him the enjoyment of the territories he at present possesses, under as strong restrictions upon his ambitions and restless spirit as could be imposed.

We might also adopt a similar policy with regard to the Pindarries, dividing them into portions which should each hold its lands in strict subjection to the Government which granted them. All the great states including ourselves should provide its share of the allotments according to its means and its stake in the cause, but the whole arrangement should be consolidated by the guarantee of the British Government which, from the terror of its arms on the one hand and its known justice on the other, would be feared by all as the avenger of their misdeeds, and respected as the humane and equitable arbiter of their fate.

For a time it would be necessary to keep possession of the families of the principal chiefs of the Pindarries as the only hostages for their good behaviour, on which any reliance could be placed. Each Government would retain those of its own party, under the same guarantee for their good treatment, as would be requisite in all the points of the arrangement. This, I think, must be done, but further details cannot now be gone into. As I much fear, however, that an unmixted system of conciliation would never succeed, whilst the power of Meer Khan and the Pindarries is unbroken, I shall add a few words on the last division of the line of policy now under discussion.

3rd.—We may adopt a middle system of active operations and conciliation. The particulars of a course of military operations, the extent to which they should be carried, and the point at which they should stop, are obviously not subjects of previous decision, but I do not hesitate to say that we ought not to stop until we had decidedly broken the power, and diminished considerably the numbers of the predatory bands against which our operations were to be directed. The principles on which a course of conciliation might arrive, are those which I have above ventured to sketch.

The arguments which recommend this middle course of conduct, may be deduced from the nature of the objections which oppose themselves to the adoption of an unalloyed system, whether of severity or conciliation, and from other general considerations arising out of the foregoing discussions.

Sensible how loose and imperfect those discussions will be considered to be, whilst abler pens, directed by wiser views and sounder judgments than I can lay claim to, either have or might have done justice to subjects of such extent and importance, I can only offer in excuse of my presumption in submitting them to the notice of your Lordship, my sincere zeal for the service of my country and of the Government under which I have the honor to act, and, I may add, the encouragement which your

Lordship's favourable reception of my former humble efforts of this nature has afforded me, to-day my further speculations before you, so indulgent a tribunal.

No. 212—Jenkins communicates to Col. Conran the retreat of Kureem in the direction of Bhopal.

FROM—R. JENKINS,

TO—COL. CONRAN.

Nagpur, 20th December 1811.

I have had the honor to receive your despatches of the 12th and 24th of this month, and have been furnished by Major Constance with a copy of your instructions to him, alluded to in the latter.

Major Constance marched this morning, leaving the two companies and six pounder at the Residency.

I have lately had no direct accounts from the Camp of Kureem—but my last intelligence from the Nerbudda mentions that he has moved from Khyree in the direction of Bhopal. Seetoo is said to have gone slightly attended to meet the officer of Sindia appointed to chastise Kureem, and although my Hirkarras who had visited the camp of the former positively asserted on a former occasion that he was encamped on the left bank of the Nerbudda, it does not appear that any part of the Pindaries are now to the southward of that river.

No expedition to the southward seems at present to be contemplated, alarmed as Kureem must be by the advance of Sindia's troops on the one side, and that of your force and of the corps to Nagpore on the other. The Rajah's army lately stationed in Gurra Mundela, is now arrived within a short distance of this place, and a second body of horse and Infantry with guns which was formerly stationed near Seonee is also within call. His Highness is making the greatest exertions to raise more troops, many are daily entertained both horse and infantry, and he is actively employed in equipping his field artillery.

No. 213—Jenkins informs Conran of the advance of Sindia's force towards Kareem's position. The force was commanded by Jago Bapu.

FROM—R. JENKINS,

TO—COLONEL CONRAN, Commanding the H. S. Force Camp near Kolapore.

Nagpur, 2nd January 1812.

I have the honour to forward for your information a translation of extracts from Akhbars, which I received yesterday evening from Kureem's Camp.

My Hircarras left the Camp on the 16th ultimo and came to Ashtah on the 17th where they were detained until the 21st. During their detention Sindia's Army under Jugoo Baupoo arrived there and Chheetoo with him. On the 21st the day on which they left Ashtah, that army marched towards Kureem accompanied by Chheetoo who left his family and his guns and infantry in Ashtah. I shall forward a copy of this despatch to the Residents at Hyderabad and Poona, and to Fort William.

No. 214—Jenkins reports to the C. G. his interview with Appasahab upon the latter's return from Benares. An irruption of the Pindaris in the vicinity of Mirzapur and Sindia's operations against Bhopal are also described in this communication.

FROM—R. JENKINS,

TO—LORD MINTO.

Nagpur, 15th April 1812.

I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Rajah returned to Nagpore on the 7th instant and entered his palace on the 8th with his nephews Appa Sahib and Gojabba Dada.

The 10th being fixed for me to pay my respects to Appa Sahib for the purpose of offering both my condolences on his father's death and my congratulations on his safe return, I proceeded to the palace on the evening of that day accompanied by the gentlemen of the Residency.

Both Appa Sahib and Gojabba expressed themselves highly pleased with the attentions they had received during their stay in the Company's provinces. Your Lordship's letter permitting Lieut. Cook to accompany Appa Sahib to Rutenpore, His Highness mentioned, had not reached him until his arrival at that place. His Highness however expressed his sense of the indulgence. I noticed these expressions by saying that I was sure your Lordship would be much pleased to learn that Appa Sahib and Gojabba were so much gratified with the attentions they had received, and that your Lordship had been happy to have an opportunity of showing your friendship for the Rajah in the consideration you had on all occasions been desirous of showing for such relations of His Highness.

Very little conversation of any description took place.

The Rajah adverted to the reports which have for some time past been prevalent here, of the irruption of a body of Pindaries into the Company's provinces in the direction of Mirzapore. He affected to disbelieve them, and I only replied to his question respecting any intelligence I might have received on the subject, by saying that I had heard similar reports, but that no official communication had reached me.

At a visit I received from Jeswant Rao some days before the Rajah's return, he introduced the same subject, and endeavoured to ascertain my opinion relative to the steps the British Government would take, should the reports of the Pindaries having plundered part of the Mirzapore district be well founded. He, at the same time, pretended to take it for granted that the Pindaries were now running to destruction which could not fail to overtake them as the just punishment for having offended so great a power as that of the Company.

I did not give Jeswant Rao any encouragement to expect from me the expression of any opinion on the subject. Indeed, I merely told him that the accounts of the incursion of the Pindaries into the Company's provinces seemed to rest (as they did at that time) on no good authority, and that it was absurd to ask me any such questions, to which Jeswant Rao had just good grounds as I had, for enabling him to give an answer.

The body of Pindaries who, I had the honour to mention in my last despatch, were said to have been plundering about Jubbulpore, seems to have proceeded from thence towards Mirzapore. Their intention to invade the Company's provinces must have been kept very secret or been suddenly formed, as since the former reports of Kureem's designs on that quarter, and indeed until accounts were prevalent of a party of Pindaries having actually reached the provinces, not a whisper of their having any such object in view had reached even the places immediately in the vicinity of their seats. My news-writer with Kureem was unfortunately killed in the retreat of the Pindaries when pursued by Jugoo Bapoo, which has deprived me of the means of any direct communications from any of their camps, nor have I yet received any report on which I can rely, of the numbers of the Pindaries who went on the expedition, or of the parties to which they belong.

One body is said to have returned to the vicinity of Bhopal with a considerable booty which they collected from some Gosaeen and Pathan merchants who on their way hither from Mirzapore, are represented to have been plundered by them on the banks of the Soane within the Company's provinces. Another body is supposed to be still behind. Bala Sahib still continues very unwell, although I believe somewhat better than he was at the date of my last despatch.

Some of Vizier Mahommed Khan's troops seem to have re-occupied Chynpore Barea on the movement of the Rajah's army towards Bhopal. Nothing has yet been settled between Jugoo Bapoo and Sudeek Allee, nor have any serious operations been commenced by the former against Bhopal. Indeed, the latest reports mention his being inclined to take anything he can get from the Nabob, and to retire from the neighbourhood. Seetoo's Pindaries are still acting in concert with Sindia's troops under Jugoo Bapoo, and some trifling hostilities occasionally take place between these Pindaries and those of Kureem's party.

No. 215—Jenkins reports to the G. C. that he was able to make but little progress in the negotiations for a subsidiary alliance, as the Raja's ardour in that direction appeared to have cooled. Pindari activities in the Raja's northern provinces and the fighting at Bhopal are also reported.

FROM—R. JENKINS,

TO—LORD MINTO, G. C.

Nagpur, 25th April 1813.

In the substance of my communications with the Durbar since the date of my secret despatch to Mr. Secretary Adam of the 11th March, I have found little cause to expect an early commencement of the negotiation committed to my charge.

Some days after the conference with Narain Pandit described in that despatch, I received visits both from him and Jeswunt Rao, on successive evenings. As I conceived I had already gone as far with Narain Pandit to induce the Raja to make distinct proposals for a negotiation as I could, without raising vain expectations of our being induced to abandon the pecuniary stipulation on which he seemed to lay so much stress, and as besides, even in the discussions I had already held with him, I had perhaps done everything but shew too much anxiety to bring on a negotiation, I had determined on this occasion to avoid all subjects which might lead to a renewal of the topics of our last conference unless they were expressly brought forward by Narain Pandit, and accordingly we had no conversation which is worthy of being reported to your Lordship. Jeswunt Rao, at his visit which took place on the day following that of Narain Pandit, after some general conversation, alluded to the communication which I had made at our last conference, of the opening which was now afforded to the Raja of renewing his proposals for a subsidiary alliance, by my having received authority to enter upon the subject with His Highness's ministers whenever His Highness should express in specific terms, his wishes to that effect.

Jeswunt Rao said that he has repeated my communication to the minister, who had taken what he thought a favourable opportunity of conveying it to the Raja, that the Raja had received it without shewing any disposition to take advantage of it at the moment, nor had the subject been renewed and that the minister concluded from thence, that the Raja had at present no thoughts of entering upon the negotiation, however advantageous its conclusion promised to be to His Highness's state. I only observed on Jeswunt Rao's statement that it was sufficient for me, that the Raja knew that I was prepared to meet His Highness's ministers on the subject whenever he thought proper, and that it would now be His Highness's fault if his Government were any longer exposed to the dangers and losses he had so long complained of.

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This subject has not since been touched upon in any of my conferences with Jeswant Rao, excepting incidentally on one occasion with other circumstances, which I think it as well to mention.

The Rajah, it seems, from the dictates of a jealousy which pervades all his measures as well of internal as external policy, affects to maintain a system of espionage at foreign courts, totally his own and not subject to the control or interference of either of the parties at his Durbar. On his intelligence by these peculiar channels the Rajah by Jeswant Rao's account, professes to place implicit reliance.

Jeswant Rao was mentioning that the Rajah had lately communicated to Naroba Chitanavese several of the articles of intelligence which

His Highness had lately received, as having heard them from no other channel. Amongst others it was one that I was authorised to expend considerable sums of money to accomplish a treaty of alliance with the Rajah. Jeswant Rao said that Naroba Chitanavese had mentioned this to him, that he had asked Naroba whether he thought the Rajah at all inclined to the alliance, and that Naroba had replied in the negative, adding that the Rajah said he would turn Fakere if the subject were pressed upon him. Jeswant Rao asked me whether there was any truth in the Rajah's intelligence, professing himself to disbelieve it—and I merely told him that he was right in his appreciation of the truth of the intelligence, the improbability of which would readily occur to any one who knew the relative situation of the two states.

I have to observe that Naroba Chitanavese has lately through Narain Pundit, expressed himself in strong terms in favour of the alliance, but he, in common with the other ministers, complains of the Rajah's blindness in this instance to his real interests.

Events in this quarter have not been of a nature calculated to press the Rajah to a decision on the subject of the alliance, and perhaps the reports of the renewed attacks of the Pindaries upon the British territories on the western side of India, have had rather an unfavourable operation on His Highness's mind in that respect.

On the side of Berar the Rajah's districts have been restored to tranquillity or at least they are only now exposed in common with those of the Nizam, to the ravages of Shekh Dulla, a predatory chief in alliance with the Pindaries. The Rajah's troops in Berar have been ordered to co-operate with those of the Nizam in the destruction of that freebooter, and his suppression is now becoming a matter of serious concern to both Governments.

The Pindaries, since their first incursions in the beginning of the season have confined their ravages in the Rajah's country to the districts near the Nerbudda. Gurra Mundella too has suffered from Dost Mahommed's party, who however has been too much harassed lately to undertake any distant expeditions.

The siege of Bhopal still proceeds. In three successive assaults from the 14th to the 16th of this month the besiegers have been repulsed; and as long as the besieged are not starved, there seems to be little chance of the place being taken. Gurra Kotta is again suffering a siege from Jean Baptiste, from whose hands it was lately recovered by the sons of Murdan Singh, who seemed determined to defend it to extremity. The latter have applied for assistance to the Rajah who, I have no doubt, is sufficiently inclined if he were not afraid, to assist them.

On the 16th of this month I was invited with the gentlemen of the Residency, to an entertainment given to the Rajah by His Highness's nephew, Goojabba Dada, on the occasion of a reconciliation being expected between His Highness and Nana Sahib's widow. Nothing particular passed. The Rajah and Appa Sahib with all the principal persons of the court were present, except Sreedhur Pundit who is laid up with the gout. Balla Sahib's health is improved, and he is at present considered to be out of danger, but not strong enough to undertake a journey to Jyjoory whither he himself is very anxious to be carried.

No. 216—Sotheby, Jenkins' assistant, describes the Raja's preparations to meet the threatening Pindari advance upon his northern frontier and upon his capital itself, having given up his attempt on Bhopal. Jenkins was expected to return in the beginning of December. Lord Moira's assumption of the supreme Govt. was announced to the Raja.

FROM—GEORGE SOTHEY,
TO—THE EARL OF MORRIS, K. C.

Nagpur, 12th November 1813.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letters addressed to the Rajah of Nagpore and his Ministers, as forwarded by the Persian Secretary to the Government and which by appointment yesterday delivered to His Highness. Little passed on the occasion. The Rajah expressed his satisfaction at your Lordship's having assumed the Government and his confidence that the friendship between the two states would be confirmed by such an event.

Your Lordship will have been informed of the state of affairs at this Durbar. Nothing of any consequence has lately occurred in the internal concerns of this state, and its foreign relations since the Rajah has renounced the ambitious hopes of subverting Bhopal, have been confined chiefly to negotiations with the Pindaries, which together with the exhausted condition of the whole of this country, seem to have had the effect of diverting the first irruption of those freebooters into another direction;

but as nearly the whole of the season now lies before us, it will remain to be seen whether disappointment in other quarters will not again induce them to overrun this country, which they consider nearly their own, and again to appear before Nagpore either with the expectation of being able to plunder it, or at all events by their menacing position, work upon the fears of the Rajah to purchase their retreat by large sacrifices, either of money or land on the Nerbudda.

The Rajah has not neglected to collect a large body of forces around Nagpore. Camps are spread in every direction and the principal roads and passes are plentifully supplied with guns, but the spirit that should pervade the whole is wanting. The exertions of his troops would neither be stimulated by the liberality, nor animated by the personal courage and example of their prince. Should such an event take place the fears of the Rajah might induce him, did he not look up for instant aid from other quarters, to betake himself and family to the walled town of Chanda, a measure which would instantly devote Nagpore, which has no walls, to be sacked and plundered by the Pindaries.

As long however as the Pindaries ever find easy access to richer countries, it is not probable that they will make the attempt. They could not expect to plunder Nagpore without some considerable opposition, if not on the part of the Rajah's troops, at least by the inhabitants themselves. Besides, the Rajah would not fail to employ all the varied artifices of Indian negotiation, and would not be wanting in making an advantageous use of the circumstance of the probable movement of the force from Jahnah to cover the frontier of Berar, which in all probability he would not hesitate to ascribe to an intention of assisting him either in defending or revenging such an outrage.

The only part of the Rajah's country that has as yet suffered from their incursions, is some of the suburbs of Jubbulpore which they fell upon by surprise. The attack however was almost instantly repulsed by Khundojee Inglia, the Rajah's manager of that town and district. The Pindaries under Seetoo certainly crossed the Nerbudda on boats on the 10th of last month. During the whole season of the rains there were frequent reports that they were preparing boats, but the intelligence seems to have been disregarded and their incursion towards the westward from being so early and so wholly unexpected, has probably been attended with considerable booty.

Their families are lodged in the fort of Handia on this side of the Nerbudda and which belongs to Sindia, and their head quarters are at Nimbgaoon for the present. A report seems to be prevalent in Berar that it is their intention to move more to the westward towards Sindia's districts immediately about Assere and Boorhanpore, and there to take up their station, and no more to recross the river. Sindia probably would wish to remove them from his own territories to the north of the Nerbudda,

and his wishes in this respect might be aided by the jealousy and suspicion with which the Pindarries must view our advanced post on the Bundelcund frontier. It may however, be reasonably doubted whether they would expose themselves to the chance of being attacked by the forces of the Peshwa and Nizam, or the effect of any other measures which it might, in such a case, be deemed necessary to employ against them.

The Rajah's forces which were formerly employed at Bhopaul, are still on this side of the Nerbudda and I do not hear any intelligence of their intentions of crossing that river. Sudeek Ali himself is still at Nagpore and has the command of one of the camps. All intentions of proceeding towards the westward for the present seem to be given up by the Rajah. The state of his son Bala Sahib is such as to preclude his being removed, and the season of the year would, in common prudence, forbid him from thinking of leaving his capital. Mr. Jenkins is consequently on his return back, and I have reason to expect that he will reach Nagpore by the time I before mentioned, the middle of next month.

No. 217—J. Adam, Secretary, explains to the Resident the general plan of operations formed by the G. G. for the final extermination of the Pindarries. The strong and vigorous policy adopted by the G. G. becomes plain.

FROM—J. ADAM, SECRETARY TO G. G.,

TO—RICHARD JENKINS.

Cawnpore, 30th September 1817.

I am directed to transmit to you the enclosed copy of instructions addressed to the Resident with Sindia on the 28th instant and on this date, relative to the course of measures to be pursued with relation to that Chief, connected with the intended operations against the Pindarries and the extirpation of the predatory system throughout India. When Sindia's views and intentions shall be ascertained and the consequent policy of the British Government finally determined, you will be prepared to make known generally to the Rajah of Nagpore the resolutions and intentions of the Governor General with relation to the former Chief, and to call for his cordial co-operation in our measures.

You will observe that Captain Close's negotiation may eventually include a demand for the delivery into our hands of the fort of Hindia during the war, and that in the supposed event he has been instructed to transmit the orders of surrender to Lieutenant-Colonel Adams from whose force it will be most convenient to furnish a garrison for Hindia. You will accordingly be pleased to instruct Colonel Adams to be prepared on the receipt of the orders from Captain Close, to occupy Hindia and

The Governor General is not aware that any instructions are required for your guidance beyond those already in your possession, with regard to the co-operation of the Rajah of Nagpore's Government in the approaching contest with the Pindarries, whether supported by Sindia or not. You will have concerted with Brigadier General Sir John Malcolm under the directions of Sir Thomas Hislop and with Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, the most suitable disposition of His Highness's contingent, of the other troops in his service that may be required and available, either for acting with our divisions offensively or for the security of the country against predatory incursion, the danger which it is most necessary to provide against. The system of defence adopted in the Rajah's country may be completed and supported by a corresponding disposition of the force to be assembled on the line of the upper Soane under Brigadier General Toone, with whom it will be advisable for you to open a correspondence.

The Governor General is not aware that any instructions are required for your guidance beyond those already in your possession, with regard to the co-operation of the Rajah of Nagpore's Government in the approaching contest with the Pindarries, whether supported by Sindia or not. You will have concerted with Brigadier General Sir John Malcolm under the directions of Sir Thomas Hislop and with Lieutenant-Colonel Adams, the most suitable disposition of His Highness's contingent, of the other troops in his service that may be required and available, either for acting with our divisions offensively or for the security of the country against predatory incursion, the danger which it is most necessary to provide against. The system of defence adopted in the Rajah's country may be completed and supported by a corresponding disposition of the force to be assembled on the line of the upper Soane under Brigadier General Toone, with whom it will be advisable for you to open a correspondence.

The time is now arrived when it is expedient and proper to decide on the course to be pursued and the relations to be established with the Nabob of Bhopaul. The propositions of Wuzzir Mahomed Khan though hitherto unanswered except by general assurances, have not been overlooked by the Governor General. His professed and approved attachment to our cause which has entailed on him the peculiar enmity of the Pindaries, renders him deserving of every assistance and support, while the local position of his territories, the bravery of his troops and the energy of his personal character enable him to become a most useful and efficient auxiliary in the approaching crisis and an important branch of the system to be established for preventing the revival of predatory associations. The territory of Bhopaul is, in fact, so situated and the interests of the Nabob so involved in the measures about to be adopted, as to render it impossible for him to remain neutral, or even if it were, for us to admit of his neutrality. He must either place the resources of his country at our disposal and join us with zeal and ardour in the prosecution of our plans, or he must leave them at the command of our enemies, and the same circumstances which would render him an useful auxiliary to us, would make the throwing his weight into the opposite scale detrimental to our cause. Fortunately his interests and his disposition are both in favour of his uniting himself strictly with the British Government, but that Government cannot in honour avail itself of his service without affording him a corresponding benefit. The return he would require may be comprized in two points, namely, protection against his enemies, and the restoration of such part of the former territories of his family as the operations of the war may place at our disposal. Whatever portion of that territory may be in the hands of the Pindaries can certainly be restored

and suspicion of the British Government that they were the allies of the Government of India, a right to be exercised in England, we are not prepared to concede. It is not the business of the Government of India to be concerned with the internal affairs of the Government of England, and it is not the business of the Government of England to be concerned with the internal affairs of the Government of India.

to the Nabob, and if the conduct of Sindia should force us into a war with that Chief, it will probably be in our power to recover for Bhopaul what has been usurped by Sindia. Our own interest will in fact be promoted by the consolidation of the resources and strength of this little Mussulman state which, surrounded by Mahratra neighbours, must necessarily lean on the aid of a powerful protector, and will be faithful to us from interest and inclination. Our protection of Bhopaul will in fact involve no further burthen on us than we must otherwise incur, since the effect of other measures that we must unavoidably adopt on principles of self defence, must be to bring it within the pale of our protection.

With regard to the conditions to be required from the Nabob the Governor General is not aware that any others are necessary than those specified in the proposals communicated to you by Inayet Musseeh, as detailed in his letter forming an enclosure in your dispatch of the 25th of January, with the addition of an engagement to give us the services of his troops.

In the present condition of his territory and resources the Nabob certainly is unable to contribute to the payment of the expenses of any portion of the troops that may be employed in supporting the system, of which the defence of his territories will form a part; but after the reannexation to his possessions of the tracts that are occupied by the Pindarries and eventually others, accompanied by the improvement which the restoration of tranquillity may be expected to effect in his resources it will be equitable that he should contribute in a fair proportion to the charge. An eventual arrangement of this nature must be kept in view therefore, and in the meanwhile the mode in which the Nabob is to promote the general cause is to employ his troops in co-operation with ours, to admit the British troops at all times into his territory and to place at our disposal a fort for a depot if we shall require it. In a word, the propositions of Inayet Musseeh above referred to may be made the basis of the arrangement, with the addition of a pledge on the Nabob's part to employ his troops in co-operation with those of the British Government.

Adverting to the frequent and friendly intercourse established between Lieutenant-Colonel Adams and the Nabob of Bhopaul, it appears to the Governor General that the most convenient mode of communicating to him the assent of the British Government to his proposals, will be by a letter addressed by you to the Nabob, and transmitted through Colonel Adams. This letter and the Nabob's reply may be considered as an engagement sufficiently binding and supersede the necessity for a formal treaty. If however the Nabob should express a desire to have the conditions reduced to that form, his wish may be complied with. The Governor General does not anticipate any lengthened negotiation on a subject on which there is apparently no difference of interest or sentiment.

PINDARI INROADS INTO NAGPUR TERRITORY

1817.

As soon as this arrangement shall be settled, Lieutenant-Colonel Adams may correspond with the Nabob on the subject of the employment of his troops, and concert the necessary measures regarding the supply of our troops entering his country, the establishment of depôts, etc.

No. 218—Secretary Adam sends to the Resident a copy of the general plan of operations entrusted to Sir Thomas Hislop for the suppression of the Pindaris.

FROM-J. ADAM,
TO-RICHARD JENKINS.

Caunpore, 6th October 1817.

I am directed to transmit to you for your information, the enclosed copy of a dispatch which has this day been addressed by the Governor General to His Excellency Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Hislop relative to the general plan of operations to be prosecuted against the Pindarries, and any State or Power which by refusing to co-operate in the suppression of those freebooters, shall place itself in the condition of a supporter of the predatory system and in consequence become an enemy of the British Government and its allies.

It is unnecessary to repeat the expression of the Governor General's reliance on your utmost efforts to induce the Government of Nagpore to bring forward the whole of its resources in support of this important object, and your cordial co-operation with His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop and the officers acting under his orders.

From the enclosed copy of a letter to Brigadier General Sir John Malcolm, you will perceive that in the event of Sir Thomas Hislop being prevented by illness or other cause from assuming the personal direction of the advanced divisions, these instructions are to be executed by Sir John Malcolm or the senior officer in advance.

The only point in the enclosed instructions to His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop to which it is necessary particularly to advert is that which refers to the employment of the Bhopaul Horse. You will of course with adherence to the general authority, political and military, vested in His Excellency Sir Thomas Hislop, have understood the instructions of

[Oct. 1817]

the 30th of September for employing Lieut.-Colonel Adams in completing the arrangements with the Nawab regarding the co-operation of his troops with those of the British Government to be in force only until the arrival of Sir Thomas Hislop on the Nerbudda, or in his absence that of Brigadier General Sir John Malcolm, (who in this case will of course command all the troops in advance), should enable His Excellency or Sir John Malcolm to assume the immediate direction of that arrangement. It is probable that the same considerations of inconvenience and expediency which suggested the instruction to you to commit that duty to Lieut.-Colonel Adams will induce Sir Thomas Hislop to leave it in his hands, but this is a point connected with the exercise of the principal authority on the spot, with which his Lordship would not wish his general instructions to interfere.

You will observe that although the best destination in His Lordship's opinion of the Bhopaul Horse is their employment with Lieutenant Colonel Adams' division, the decision of that point has been left to Sir Thomas Hislop.

Lieut.-Colonel Adams will also of course be prepared to make over to Sir Thomas Hislop, or the Officer Commanding in advance, the order which the Nabob of Bhopaul may furnish him with, for the surrender of Nuzzerghurh or the fort selected for a depot.

The subject on which you do me the honour to desire my opinion, is one of such importance and difficulty that I am not willing to express more than very general sentiments, with the limited grounds I at present possess on which to found a decided judgment. My opinion, as expressed to Government, has generally been that the Rajah considered his accession to the general defensive alliance as the last humiliation to which circumstances could oblige him to submit. A nominal independence has hitherto appeared to have more charms for him than the advantages, however great and certain, of a subsidiary treaty which, in his idea, would surrender the reins of his Government into our hands.

The anxiety and suspicion which the Rajah manifested, regarding the gratuitous nature of our present aid is a strong and late demonstration

I have the pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your private letters of the 15th and 16th instant.

Nagpur, 19th December 1809.

TO—COLONEL CLOSE.

FROM—R. JENKINS, Resident, Nagpur,

No. 219—Jenkins gives it as his opinion that the Bhonsle would not accept a subsidiary force for any temptation without a sense of immediate insecurity.

1809-1816

and their ultimate success

Renewed attempts for a subsidiary alliance with Nagpur

SECTION 7

[Oct. 1817]

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of his disinclination, even in times of great danger, to draw closer his connections with the British Government, and he may be now besides impressed with the idea that he can reckon upon our assistance on any occasion of similar difficulty. When urged formerly to accept a subsidiary force he expressed this expectation. The result will be calculated to make him applaud his own sagacity, and to generate in his mind a confidence of receiving our support on any great emergency from a mere regard to our own interests. This impression would be unfavourable to the attainment of any permanent arrangement of mutual defense between the two Governments against Meer Khan on the footing of a subsidiary treaty. The immediate danger removed, the Rajah may be inclined to trust to fortune for the rest.

I am really disposed to doubt whether the gift of Seronje or even of much more extensive provinces, would appear to the Rajah an equivalent for the sacrifice of any part of his fancied independence. The destruction of the Pindarees, although an object in which, I believe, the Rajah would willingly cooperate, would not I am afraid be more alluring. The strongest ground, then, upon which a hope may be founded, is the immediate danger into which his own authority and the lineal succession to the musnud may be precipitated by his mother's death. I say immediate, because the remote fear of his brother's designs, although they have been long notorious, has not hitherto had the weight which might have been expected in turning His Highness's thoughts towards an alliance with the Company.

The Rajah ought to be sensible that the same regard to our interests which might lead us unconditionally to protect his Government from foreign violence, would not have that weight in a case which only tended to change the course of succession to the musnud. But events can only develop the actual degree of danger which the Rajah may think to exist in this respect from the efforts of Nana Sahib, and Nana Sahib may be overawed from any immediate attempts by the fear of throwing his brother into our arms. Thus the danger being uncertain, I am apprehensive that the Rajah might still sacrifice a permanent good to his jealousy for the preservation of a mere shadow.

These reflections are very vague and loose; a mere speculative reasoning would decide favourably to our views in proportion as the advantages to the Rajah, both immediate and remote, are unquestionable; but the empty sound of independence has hitherto deafened the Rajah to the voice of his real interests, and until this sound is in its turn overpowered by the more forcible impressions of immediate personal fear, I am afraid that no advantages will persuade the Rajah to accede to a treaty of subsidiary alliance.

The Rajah's present cordiality is founded on his persuasion of our disinterestedness. Even the name of engagements would, I am afraid,

not only dissolve this cordiality by removing the basis of it, but from the vicinity of your force would be apt to excite very alarming apprehensions as to our designs.

As the Rajah has always shown such decided aversion to subsidiary engagements, although nothing in the way of pecuniary or territorial cession was required, it is evident that it is the radical conditions of those engagements, which I consider to consist in the entire dependence of the party in its foreign relations on the British Government and the permanent establishment of a British force in its territories, to which the Rajah is not inclined to submit. He has never shown any unwillingness that our troops should enter his territories without such stipulations, and he has even offered money for their assistance.

If I were better acquainted with the conditions which you think would be required, I might be able to give a more connected opinion on the question, although I cannot at present form a favourable judgment with regard to the success of the most liberal propositions, convinced as I am of the Rajah's rooted aversion to any permanent additional engagements with the British Government. It must, in my idea, be a strong sense indeed of immediate insecurity which can operate so great and sudden a change upon his mind as to overpower so decided an aversion, and it is a misfortune that the very grounds of the Rajah's present gratitude and confidence in the British Government are inauspicious to any presumption which might be entertained of his showing these sentiments in the mode we wish.

The last news of the Pindarries is that they were proceeding in the direction of Natchangaon, after plundering the country from Comer to Canowlee Barea. A party is said to have plundered Bazargaon yesterday so that it is likely they may have divided, and I fancy they mean to attempt to return through Berar to Burhanpur.

No. 220—Jenkins who was absent from Nagpur between June and December 1813, reports to the Governor General his failure to induce the Rajah to accept a subsidiary alliance, as he still clung to the exploded myth of the Peshwa being the head. He also reports about the Peshwa reviving his claim to Garha Mandla and the growing differences between the Bhonsle Rajah and his nephew Appasahab.

FROM—R. JENKINS,

TO—THE EARL OF MOIRA, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 20th January 1814.

A few days after my arrival I took occasion at one of Jeswant Rao's visits to intimate that I had a letter to present to the Rajah from the late Governor

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General, and that I wished an early day might be appointed for the purpose I at the same time explained the circumstances which had hitherto prevented its delivery, and allowed Jeswunt Rao to carry with him the copy of it with which I had been furnished from the Persian Office, thinking it as well that the Rajah should be prepared for the advantage he might be inclined to take of the opening afforded him in the contents of that letter, for renewing the negotiation for a subsidiary alliance.

The intervention of the Mohurrun and of a serious quarrel between the Rajah and his nephew Appa Sahib, which led to the retirement of both for several days to separate garden houses in the vicinity of the city and caused a temporary suspension of all public business, delayed my being invited to the Durbar until yesterday, when I had the honor of presenting the letter to His Highness. No observation was made by His Highness on any part of its contents, nor any desire evinced for any explanation on the subject on which it was intended to invite discussion. I was prepared to meet the smallest appearance of an inclination on the part of His Highness to converse on topics which might have the wished-for tendency, but I thought that it would be both useless for the present and inconsistent with the dignity and efficacy with which the negotiation may at some future day be recommenced on the part of the British Government, to offer explanation where none was required.

I have said that I allowed Jeswunt Rao to carry with him the copy of the letter. He had previously read it over, in my presence, and he did not fail to comprehend the drift of the paragraph which alluded to the former negotiations. He observed that neither Sreedhur Pundit nor himself would omit any occasion of calling the Rajah's attention to the benefits of the projected arrangement. He regretted however, that no appearance at present existed of His Highness's mind being brought to contemplate its adoption with that spirit which should lead him to estimate in a correct manner its advantages.

The Rajah still, he said, entertained some undefined expectations of benefit from renewing a closer connection with the Peshwa. These expectations, absurd as they seemed, were sedulously kept up by a party in this Durbar, aided by the deceptions practised on His Highness by Narrain Rao Wide, formerly the Peshwa's Vakeel at Nagpore, but lately recalled to Poona. This person urged the Rajah not to abandon his designs of visiting Jejoory which would ensure a personal meeting with the Peshwa, and vaunted highly of his own influence at the Durbar of Poona. The Rajah lately, Jeswunt Rao said, had begun to suspect the imposture, and he had therefore desired Narrain Rao Wide* to return here with such credentials from the Peshwa as should satisfy His Highness's mind of the authenticity of his communications.

Jeswant Rao seemed to think that Narrain Rao Wide would get leave on the pretence of visiting his family to return to Nagpore, and he more than hinted a wish that the British Government would prevent the Peshwa from letting him leave Poona, as being a person whose counsels had that weight with the Rajah which led him to resist all overtures from us for a closer connection.

It is difficult to say what are the precise hopes which the Rajah entertains from the Peshwa, or what are the grounds on which His Highness can be led to entertain any. There is a considerable and, perhaps, a natural bias in the minds of all the Marhatta chiefs still to look up to the Poona State as their head, and to attribute to it a degree of weight and authority, and even independence in its connection with the British Government, which enables them to consider it as their rallying point in case of a future revival of better prospects. Hence the Rajah either has, or affects to have, expectations of the suppression of the Pindaries by the Peshwa, and of recovering part of his lost territory through the same means.

But one point which the Rajah is particularly anxious to gain from the Peshwa is the abandonment of certain claims, with the nature of which I am not sufficiently acquainted, of the Poona State on that of Nagpore on account of the district of Gurra Mundela, which the Rajah can scarcely consider to be his own whilst those claims have any force. This it would certainly be very desirable for the Rajah to accomplish, and it is sufficiently intelligible as an object of pursuit, but a serious intention to cling to the Peshwa as the power on whom his actual destiny depends is almost too absurd to be attributed to the Rajah, even infatuated as he appears to be in his aversion to the only connection which can save him from final ruin.

I, of course, take every occasion of pointing out the folly of expecting substantial benefits from any state but the British Government, the great ruling Power in India, and of thinking that the Peshwa will be induced to abandon a well-founded claim to a territorial possession for any advantage His Highness can hope to derive from the Rajah's friendship. Of this Sreedhur Pundit and Jeswant Rao are well aware, as well as in fact the Rajah himself, who is represented to be alarmed with accounts from Poona that the Peshwa intends with our assistance to resume all lands belonging to the Poona State that were occupied by any of the Marhatta powers without authority, in which description Gurra Mundela is supposed to be included, and that these lands are to be ceded to the British Government to enable it to maintain an additional body of troops for the suppression of the Pindaries. When Jeswant Rao asked me whether this report was well founded I replied that I knew nothing about the matter, but that I was convinced the Peshwa would be supported by the British Government in no measures which should not be founded in justice. At the same time I took occasion from the allusion it contained to the suppression of the

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Pindaries, to hint that although the views which the British Government entertained at present for the relief of the Deekan from the depredations of those freebooters turned entirely upon the projected alliance with the Rajah, future emergencies might arise to force the British Government into another course of measures in which, although the Rajah's just rights would never be invaded, he might not find his interests so much consulted as they would now be, if he united heartily in the cause.

In hinting this I had in view the possibility of the British Government being forced by the Rajah's obstinate refusal to accede to conditions of alliance to form some connection with the Chiefs of Bhopaul and Sagur, adopted to the end of driving the Pindaries from those quarters, a measure which would completely insulate the Rajah within the territories of the British Government and its allies, and be a death blow to his hopes of ever extending his dominions.

The terror of such a measure, if submitted to the Rajah as the alternative of his continuing to reject the alliance, would, I have little doubt, bring him into our terms, and it is the expediency and not the justice of such a course of proceeding which can, I conceive, be a question, should its adoption ever become a subject of deliberation.

I am still however in hopes that the Rajah will, not long continue deaf to the voice of his interests in pursuing his present line of conduct, and although all arguments directed to work upon his fears have hitherto been unsuccessful, the alarm of the approach of an actual danger with which he is at present threatened, may have a better effect. The danger to which I allude is a renewed attack by Meer Khan who, by all accounts, meditates an expedition against Nagpore. I have not heard that the Rajah's fears are as yet very considerable on this head, although he has certainly received intelligence on the subject, and is taking pains to keep himself informed of Meer Khan's movements. Your Excellency may depend upon my endeavouring to make the most of anything that may occur to favour the views of the British Government at this court.

I have mentioned a quarrel between the Rajah and his nephew Appa Sahib which lately took place. Your Excellency will have learnt from my former dispatches that Appa Sahib is likely to succeed the Rajah in the Government of the Nagpore state owing to the deplorable state of the heir-apparent Balla Sahib, who is perfectly blind, and otherwise in a very helpless condition. The Rajah had assumed the management of the appanage which fell to Appa Sahib by the death of his father Vincojee Bhcosla*, but Appa Sahib now about seventeen years of age, is beginning to consider this as an invasion of his rights, and hence one source of disagreement between him and the Rajah. The late disagreement however arose out of circumstances which it is not important to detail, but in the course of which Appa Sahib forgot all the respect due to the

Rajah. He was with much difficulty prevailed upon to make submissions, and it is likely that greater dissensions will in future arise.

It is difficult at present to form decided judgment of the character of Appa Sahib. He has not hitherto shown any promise of great talents, but he is represented not to be destitute of abilities which time and opportunity may render efficient for the purposes of Government. His disposition is not of the most amiable cast. He is said to be hasty, obstinate and revengeful. Whether from the common effect of the situation in which he is placed, or from a natural propensity, strengthened by its subservience to his grosser amusements and the want of employments calculated to give his mind a bias towards better pursuits, he is addicted to low company, and the tool of low advisers. Weaned by the Rajah's arts from all reverence for his mother with whose conduct the Rajah had been dissatisfied, and who wished herself to act as her son's guardian, Appa Sahib has recently returned to a submission to her influence and has signalized it by retorting his own lesson upon his uncle, who having once lost the attachment through which alone he has hitherto attempted to govern his nephew, is little qualified to inspire him with the respect which should supply its place. That respect, if not habitual, can only be enforced by a strength of personal character and well-tempered authority, to which the Rajah is a stranger, both in his private and public capacity.

No. 221—Jenkins writes how he was working on the fears of the Nagpur Court in order to persuade it to accept a subsidiary treaty and how he was using the Pindari menace towards this end. He also mentions how the Raja's nephew Appasahib had secretly expressed his support for the views of the British Government.

FROM—RICHARD JENKINS,
TO—THE EARL OF MOIRA, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 23rd March 1814.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Mr. Secretary Adam's despatch under date the 11th of February together with the copies of instructions to the Resident at Hyderabad of the 11th and 26th February.

Since my last official address to Your Excellency and of my secret dispatch to Mr. Secretary Adam of the 3rd instant, the reports of the design of Meer Khan to renew his attacks upon this state have appeared to force themselves on the belief of the Rajah from the variety of sources, direct and indirect, through which they have reached Nagpore. Aware

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that any anxiety shewn on my part to bring such reports to His Highness's notice might have a bad effect on his suspicious and jealous mind, by leading him to think that they were designed to frighten him into the alliance, I have never alluded to them in my occasional conferences with his ministers unless drawn to it by direct questions on their part. On several late occasions these questions had been put to me by Jeswant Rao as the suggestions of his own curiosity, accompanied by insinuations that the Rajah gave no credit to the intelligence he had yet received, but at his two last visits Jeswant Rao has put the questions in the name of the Rajah, professing at the same time that the Rajah now no longer doubted the intentions of Meer Khan, but that His Highness thought it likely that he would not advance beyond the Nerbudda before the rains.

Jeswant Rao told me that the Rajah had lately consulted with his ministers about the best means of warding off the impending danger. The advice of some of them was to raise more troops, to endeavour to get the aid of Baptiste, and to send a Vakeel to Holkar to try what could be done by negotiation. Sreedhur Pundit, Jeswant Rao said, had taken that opportunity of pointing out to the Rajah the folly of relying upon such means to repel so formidable an attack as that with which he was menaced, in defiance of all the lessons of his past experience. Sindia would require large advances of cash, and in the end deceive him; to send a Vakeel to Holkar was sending one in fact to Meer Khan, and would expose His Highness to humiliation and insult from a chief of his arrogant and insolent character. A reliance upon his own army in its present state or in any degree of efficiency to which it could now be brought, was equally futile. The continual devastation of His Highness's territories to the very gates of his capital by the Pindaries shewed a contempt for his military power, justified by its impunity. In short, Sreedhur Pundit told the Rajah that his only hope was in the protection of the British Government.

This counsel Jeswant Rao informed me, had displeased the Rajah, and caused a temporary coolness between him and his Minister. In the mean time the other advice was at present likely to be acted upon. My replies to Jeswant Rao on the subject of Meer Khan's designs were plain and direct. Without giving any opinion upon their merits, I communicated all the reports that had reached me.

To his statement of what had passed between the Rajah and Sreedhur Pundit, I replied that the advice of that minister was such as became his wisdom to give, and that of the Rajah to follow. The support of the British Government, I said, it was yet in the Rajah's power to obtain by means of an alliance which would at once secure his Government from external attack, and according to the judicious use His Highness might make of that advantage would lay the foundation of its internal prosperity. His Highness had yet time to enter into the alliance with some appearance

The ravages of the Pindarries have been of late more frequent and destructive than ever in these territories. Such is their confidence of the British Government.

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not being molested by the Rajah's troops that they now carry off cattle and grain from the villages, and they have distinguished the sack of some rich places which endeavoured to repulse them, by massacres and by cruelties the most brutal that their wanton vengeance could suggest.

Some time ago the Rajah sent two persons to Lahore under the plea of purchasing horses. His Highness took that occasion to forward presents of some value to Runjeet Sing, which he said was merely common civility. These circumstances were communicated to me by the Durbar, and I granted at its desire a passport to the agents, by name Narrain Rao and Kishen Sing. The rising power of Runjeet Sing, it seems, has attracted the Rajah's attention, with views or at least wishes (as it has been hinted to me), corresponding with his jealousy of the British Government.

I have further to mention that I have lately received secret messages from Appah Sahib and Gojobba, the Rajah's nephews, indicating a desire of being considered supporters of the views of the British Government, and the latter besides avowing his discontents at the prospect of the former's succession to the Government. To these messages I have replied in terms of civility which, especially with regard to Appah Sahib, might encourage his good dispositions towards the British Government without seeming to consider his interests as at all separate from those of the Rajah's. I promised with regard to the former, at his particular desire, to make Your Excellency acquainted with his friendly professions, and I of course avoided showing any interest about the discontents of the latter.

No. 222—Jenkins reports the unfavourable turn the discussions for a subsidiary alliance had taken owing to the Raja having received assurances of support from Sindhia and Holkar.

FROM—R. JENKINS.

TO—THE EARL OF MOIRA, K.C.

Nagpur, 13th May 1814.

Since my last official address to Your Excellency the state of affairs has undergone an alteration not favourable to the immediate accomplishment of Your Excellency's views at this Court.

In the latter part of that address I had the honour to mention the intelligence which I had received from what I considered to be good authority, that the question of applying to the British Government for aid against Meer Khan was actually in agitation. A few days afterwards I received a visit from Narrain Pundit, who confirmed the intelligence as to

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by asking what was my last intelligence of that chief's situation. When I had satisfied his enquiry, he told me that the Rajah was now perfectly at ease about Meer Khan's intentions, on the subject of which he had received a communication from Holkar's Court to the following effect:—"that Holkar had been repeatedly urged by the Peshwa to take steps for suppressing the power of the Pindarries, with threats that if he and Sindiah did not resolve to do it effectually, the Poona State would be obliged to take the matter into its own hands, and to send troops into Malwa, which might not be for the benefit of the other Marhatta States; that the Government of Holkar had accordingly at length formed a plan for reducing the Pindarries by dividing them, for which purpose the release of Kureem had been resolved upon; that Meer Khan was to command the armies of the Holkar State destined to act against those freebooters, and to his charge Kureem was to be committed as an instrument to facilitate the execution of the political part of the plan; that these measures had been everywhere interpreted into a design of attacking Nagpore, a design which had never been in contemplation; that in consequence Kureem had been again put in confinement, and Meer Khan had remained at Shergurh; but that as the Pindarries were numerous, the assembly of an army was necessary if their suppression was desirable, and nothing could be done without the release of Kureem, as it would be difficult to subdue them but by a mixture of finesse and force."

Notwithstanding the removal of all grounds for immediate apprehension Jeswant Rao said that the Raja persisted in sending troops to his frontier, who would act with those of Sindiah either in attacking the Pindarries or in opposing Meer Khan, if he should approach the Rajah's territories, and it was in contemplation to send Appa Sahib and Gojabba, the Rajah's nephews, to command on the frontier.

I merely remarked in answer that it was prudent in the Rajah not to trust solely to the forbearance of Meer Khan for safety from his attacks; and that the British Government would be happy to see any measures for the suppression of the Pindarries attended with success.

By my last accounts of the Pindarries Seetoo was at Ougein soliciting assistance from Jeswant Rao Bhaa, one of Sindiah's chiefs, and the Nabob of Bhopaul with the Pindarries of Kureem's party having seized the principal chiefs of that band which is known by the name of the Holkar Shahae, was besieging Seetoo's fort of Sutwas. Appa Kanra, the possessor of Rahtgurh, who formerly rebelled against Sindiah was prosecuting active and successful hostilities against the Pindarries under Dost Mahommed, in which it was supposed he would be joined by the chief of Sagur and most of the petty zamindars in that quarter. The Rajah of Nagpore has also a force across the Nerbudda in that direction, and Dost Mahommed seemed likely to retire either towards Bheelsa or to Bhopaul.

A force belonging to the Rajah, of about 3,000 horse, 900 infantry and ten guns, under Chundjee Bhoosla, who was formerly employed in Sumbulpore, has lately moved from Nagpore in the direction of Hoshangabad where it will be joined by some infantry, the remains of the army formerly employed against Bhopaul.

No. 223—Jenkins writing to the Governor General analyses the various points that arose during his discussions with the Raja's ministers regarding the advantages of a subsidiary alliance: the negotiations however failed, mainly, owing to the Raja's own repugnance to such an alliance.

FROM—R. JENKINS,
TO—THE EARL OF MOIRA.

Nagpur, 14th June 1814.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's instructions conveyed in Mr. Secretary Adam's dispatch under date the 20th of May.

My several addresses to Your Excellency at Fort William, from No. 3 to No. 5 inclusive, will have made Your Excellency acquainted with the general results of what has passed between the ministers of the Rajah, Narrain Pundit and myself on the subject of the projected alliance from the first rumours of Meer Khan's intentions to invade these territories to the late apparent suspension of these intentions. I propose in this despatch to bring the substance of my several conferences more fully under Your Excellency's notice than I have hitherto thought it necessary to do, with the object of presenting in one view the considerations which seem to lead the Rajah to strengthen himself in his aversion to the alliance, and the arguments which I have used for the purpose of weakening those considerations and disposing His Highness to accede to the alliance; and thence to enable Your Excellency to judge of the further measures which may be pursued, either to accomplish the grand point of your policy at this Court, or to dispose the Rajah to declare his final resolution, so as to leave Your Excellency at liberty to adopt such other plans as may appear to be best calculated for the interests of the British Government and its allies in the points affected by that resolution.

The principal considerations which have been brought forward by the ministers and Narrain Pundit, as weighing with the Rajah to induce him to persist in thinking a treaty of alliance with the British Government unnecessary for his protection against Meer Khan, have been, his former success against that chief to which more than to our aid, he has always affected to attribute the defeat of his former designs, and his consequent

expectations of again being able to repel his attacks by his own efforts, the assurance he had received from his agents at Poona and other places that the whole force of the allies was preparing to chastise Meer Khan, His Highness's hopes of aid from Sindiah by the battalions of Baptiste, and a reliance on our anxiety to conclude the alliance for a ready acquiescence in his proposals for a treaty, whenever his necessities might force him to have recourse to us for aid, not indeed expressed in these terms but including them by a fair implication.

To these considerations have been latterly added a persuasion that Meer Khan will not now make the attempt, and the expectations of an open rupture between Sindia and Holkar which the Rajah thinks will give sufficient employment to Meer Khan, or in case he ventures to attack these dominions, will ensure a cordial co-operation against that chief on the part of Sindia, without those pecuniary sacrifices which the Rajah would have been obliged to make to procure the assistance of Baptiste, if that assistance had been required for His Highness's special protection.

When the Rajah's reliance on his own exertions has been brought forward as the result of his former experience, I have given every credit to the judicious and well supported measures of Sudeek Allee Khan in the former war, but I have thought it my duty to call to the minister's recollection the dangerous state in which the army of the Rajah was placed when Meer Khan crossed the Nerbudda in October 1809, the capitulation into which Sudeek Allee Khan was forced to enter, and to which Meer Khan agreed merely, as he himself asserted, because he was informed of our resolution to assist the Rajah; and the retreat of Meer Khan which could be attributed to nothing but his being apprized of that resolution, since it could not be the consequence of the exertions of an army which was in his power, and which had, as it were been, ransomed. The partial success of Sudeek Allee against the rear of Meer Khan whilst on his retreat, was evidently the result of the same interference; and the subsequent operations of the Rajah's army were barely defences of a position which it was only able to maintain by the presence of the British troops, which prevented Meer Khan from making any movement in the direction of the capital which those troops covered, nor did Meer Khan, provoked by the attack made upon him in his retreat, finally abandon his object until the pressure of the British forces on his front and rear, rendered it dangerous for him to remain any longer on the Nerbudda.

Even allowing however, what was contrary to the fact, that the Rajah's unaided exertions had caused the retreat of Meer Khan in 1809, it must be granted that the Rajah's army was not now even what it then was, whilst Meer Khan would make his attack with greatly superior forces. But to prove that the Rajah was not really of the opinion that this minister asserted, I remarked on the reluctance with which the Rajah had been

led to give credit to the reports of Meer Khan's designs to renew his invasion, not because that chief was afraid of suffering new defeats from the Rajah's army but, as the ministers themselves had acknowledged, because he was afraid of suffering new defeats from that the British Government would again interfere as in 1809, and in the former discussions on the subject of a subsidiary treaty the Rajah had himself opposed its necessity for his protection on the ground of the impression which had been made on all the powers of India that the British Government would oppose any future attack upon him.

With regard to the object of the preparations in the territories of the Nizam and Peshwa, I remarked that the ministers would undecieve the Rajah on that head, as those preparations were merely intended as precautionary for the defence of the possessions of the British Government and its allies against the possible dangers of invasion from a plundering force collected in their vicinity. I told them plainly that I was authorised by Your Excellency to declare that the British Government and its allies would not interfere for the Rajah's protection unless he acceded to its views for the general defence, nor even would His Highness's accession to those views unless signified at an early period, be likely to obtain for him our aid.

As to the Rajah's expectations of aid from Sindiah, it was easy to shew from past experience how little reason His Highness had to rely upon any efficient co-operation from that Court, and it was plain that without considerable payments even that co-operation would not be obtained. It besides seemed likely that Sindiah would have other services for Baptiste than to send him to co-operate against Meer Khan, besides the aversion which Sindiah must feel to break with that chief and expose his own dominions to be plundered and laid waste merely out of friendship to the Rajah. It might moreover be a question which of the two would be the most dangerous neighbour, Meer Khan or Sindiah, and each generally acting the part of independent chiefs; the former, it was true an open enemy, but the latter though a friend, likely to be at least as peremptory in his demands of recompense, as the former in those of another nature, and not less powerful as it might prove, in his means of enforcing them. Those Powers too who might be interested in checking the ambition of Meer Khan as a leader of predatory hordes, might not feel themselves called upon by similar considerations to oppose Baptiste, if he brought forward demands on the Rajah on the ground of his services, and still less the British Government, to avoid whose alliance His Highness had exposed himself to such an inconvenience.

How little reason His Highness had to expect our aid on any terms, if he did not shortly signify his wishes for the alliance, I pointed out

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considerations. First, that if the Rajah had acceded to our views by two com- ally proposed, the present crisis would not in all probability have arisen. The establishment of a British force on the Nerbudda in 1810, would have for ever secured His Highness from such attacks as that with which he was now threatened, and it would be in the recollection of the British Government might not find it for its interest to step forward again in His Highness's defence considering the great expense to which it must expose itself, an expense which the Rajah might spare it by entering into the measure then in contemplation. But His Highness had disregarded that consideration then. The circumstances were much the same as to the increased embarrassments and expenses which every day's delay on His Highness's part in concluding a treaty would bring upon us in the end, should we undertake his defence, and it surely would not be reasonable for him to complain if we now totally abandoned all concern about his state, when it was indifferent to himself how great the burthen he imposed upon our friendship, or rather when he had preferred that course which involved the greatest trouble and expense and whose aid he expected, to one which would have caused those inconveniences in a comparatively trifling degree.

In the next place His Highness had long known that the establishment of a British force on the Nerbudda and his accession to our plans of general defence, were points which the British Government had much at heart, and the benefits offered to His Highness in the arrangement were most evident. If then whilst the Rajah thought he did not require our immediate aid he would not join in our views, how could he expect that we would undertake his protection when he should be forced by his necessities only to demand it? It was plain that His Highness had hitherto preferred all the humiliations which were daily brought upon his state from other quarters, to an honourable alliance with us on terms which, without any sacrifice of his independence justly considered, would secure the tranquillity of his dominions, and the permanent respectability of his power.

I observed that every day's delay on His Highness's part in concluding engagements with the British Government on the basis proposed, would add strength to these considerations, and augment the chances of Your Excellency being led to form other plans of policy, independent of any reliance on His Highness's friendship. The efficiency of His Highness's state to form an useful ally was daily diminishing and it seemed to be His Highness's wish to join the alliance if at all, merely, as his last resort, that is when he should be reduced to a situation in which all the burthen of supposing his state must fall upon the British Government. I need not say that to expect that Government to enter into the alliance under such circumstances, was a speculation which from the proofs it afforded of the total absence of all feelings of common interest with the state with

which His Highness might hope to connect himself, was placing a value on His Highness's alliance which no impartial estimate of that value could assign to it, and which would easily vanish if His Highness would but reflect on the subject.

As a further inducement to an early application on the part of the Rajah for our aid, I more than once warned the ministers of the probability of the British Government being called upon by Holkar or Meer Khan to declare the intention with which its forces were assembling, and the difficulty there would be in giving an answer which would not rather encourage Meer Khan's expedition, however unwilling we might be to give any encouragement to it. Yet we could not be expected to bring upon ourselves the hostility of Meer Khan out of bare regard for a state which shewed no desire to promote our views.

To such arguments the rejoinder has generally been that the Rajah believed, against all reasoning, whatever his inclinations led him to wish to be true, that his agents at Poona gave him assurances of the nature mentioned, which no one could dispute without exposing himself to the imputation of being in a league to frighten the Rajah into the alliance; that His Highness would not be persuaded that we would allow him to be reduced to extremities, and that if everything else failed, he had repeatedly declared that he would resign his dominions and go to Calcutta.

To these rejoinders which exclude all further argument, I could only oppose my opinion of the Rajah's wisdom which would not allow itself to be always eclipsed by false fears and jealousies, and which would duly appreciate the advantages to his state of the proposed alliance not only on temporary, but permanent grounds of policy, my right to expect to be believed as the accredited representative of Your Excellency in preference to the Rajah's agents at Poona on subjects on which, I asserted, I had positive instructions from Your Excellency, and in which His Highness well knew that the views of the British Government directed those of its allies from the very nature of subsisting treaties, and my conviction that the Rajah would not remain any longer in doubt of the futility of his expectations from the defensive arrangements in train, as well as from the British Government generally, if the Ministers would faithfully report to His Highness the substance of my communications. The desponding ultimatum of the Rajah's resolution to retire to Calcutta, which has often been brought forward to cut short a disagreeable subject or to express His Highness's disappointment in his hopes from the friendship of the British Government, I could only notice by wishing His Highness a long and happy reign, and pointing out that the whole conduct of the British Government had shown its peculiar regard for the State of Nagpore, and that it was in His Highness's power to give it a still nearer title to interest itself in his welfare and prosperity, provided he adopted the resolution soon of considering your

Excellency as his only true and disinterested friend, and of joining cordially in your views for his benefit, and for the general tranquillity of the Dekkan.

I have mentioned in my several despatches the efforts which, Jeswunt Rao informed me, had been made by Sreedhur Pundit to persuade the Rajah to enter into the alliance, and the intelligence which I received from more than one quarter, which I thought entitled to credit, that the Rajah had for a time contemplated a recurrence to our assistance. Those good dispositions were asserted by Narrain Pundit to have been checked by the statements of His Highness's agents at Poona, subsequent to those which I had to combat, as above mentioned. In fact, the statements mentioned by Narrain Pundit seem to have communicated with certain additions the tenor of the letter of Holkar's Vakeel at Poona to his court, the answer to which implying in the letter itself something like remonstrances on the part of the Peshwa in Meer Khan's intended expedition against Nagpore, is mentioned in Mr. Elphinstone's address to Your Excellency No. 5 alluded to in Mr. Adam's despatch, and of which a copy reached me on the 18th of May.

That answer as well as Jeswunt Rao's communication to me on the 9th of May, show the impression which had been made totally different to what it would have been if he had merely communicated Mr. Elphinstone's answer to his first questions, and Holkar's letter to the Rajah was naturally calculated to impress His Highness with the belief of the correctness of the reports of his agents at Poona. Moreover, the positive assurances which the Rajah received from Sindia's camp of the destination of Baptiste to act against the Pindarries, and eventually to assist His Highness in repelling the attacks of Meer Khan, contributed not only to lessen his fears from the latter quarter, but to revive his hopes of making conquests in Bhopaul, hopes which he has never abandoned, and which have always constituted a principal obstacle to the conclusion of engagements with the British Government, as His Highness conceives he must, in such a case, abandon all views against that country.

The continued operations of the latter consideration on the Rajah's mind which receive daily strength from the reports of Baptiste's preparations to quit Sindia's camp for the direction of Bhopaul, and latterly from the direction of operations against the Pindarries and Meer Khan, superadded to the persuasion that Sindia would now enter into the war with Meer Khan, not merely as an ally of His Highness, but as a principal, did not seem to me to afford much promise from the immediate effects of communicating to the Durbar what had passed between the Resident at Poona and Holkar's Vakeel, although I should have undoubtedly considered such a communication as likely to overcome all the Rajah's remaining scruples to enter at once into the alliance, if I had been able to

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Nagpur, now at Poona, maintains his post in the Rajah's favour by coinciding in all His Highness's prejudices, and endeavouring to gratify them by such false accounts as may tend to confirm His Highness in his aversion to an alliance with the British Government. Of this nature are those communications from Poona above discussed.

There seems then to be no mode of influencing His Highness's mind but through his sense of immediate danger or his hopes of immediate benefit. His whole conduct proves how much his resolutions are swayed by the former principle, but even that is frequently weakened by the effects of a desire of self-deception, which will admit no danger to be real that is not at his door. As however we have no opportunity, even if we had the desire, of holding out to the Rajah the inducement of immediate benefit by extending his dominions or by any other mode, it is evident that we must still depend on the effect of his fears alone, and therefore that we must rely for success as hitherto, principally on the course of events, and secondarily upon such means as these events may present to us of following up the impression which they may have made on His Highness's mind.

The state of His Highness's mind at present is, I am afraid, unfavourable for receiving any strong impression even from the knowledge of what has passed at Poona, if it is not already known to him, and unless his apprehensions from Meer Khan should by some other means be revived, or he should be seriously affected by the thoughts of losing all expectation of future aid from us in the possible time of need, I apprehend that the communications I am directed to make will lead to no consequence. Your Excellency may however depend upon my putting the matter in the most forcible light I am able, and I shall do myself the honour of submitting as soon as practicable, the result.

It has sometimes occurred to me that the Rajah having himself twice solicited the alliance, and failed in his object and knowing that we adhered to the point of not making the first direct offers, might be under some feelings of mortification or jealousy, which determined him not to bring forward the first proposals. My endeavours, however, to ascertain this point have terminated in convincing me that the Rajah's silence arises from a total aversion to the alliance and from no punctilio, which indeed His Highness is not much in the habits of regarding when he has an object seriously at heart.

I shall only add that I trust Your Excellency will excuse the length of this despatch, which has arisen from my desire to omit nothing which occurred to me as likely to throw any light on this interesting subject, or as calculated to point out any path by which it may be possible to arrive at the accomplishment of Your Excellency's views at this court.

No. 224—Further discussions with the Raja's ministers on the subject of a subsidiary alliance are reported by Jenkins in this despatch.

FROM—RICHARD JENKINS,

TO—THE EARL OF MOIRA, GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 16th July 1814.

On the 15th ultimo I had an opportunity, of which I did not fail to take advantage, to carry into execution Your Excellency's instructions conveyed in Mr. Secretary Adam's despatch of the 20th of May.

Jeswunt Rao visited me on that day, and after disposing of some unimportant matters which had brought him to the Residency he turned the conversation to the subject of Meer Khan's movements, and asked me whether I had any late intelligence respecting that chief's plans. I said I had none of very late date, but that he was, I believed, at Shergurh preparing to join his army, and that the Akhbars talked of his going to Admire, after he had settled accounts with his troops. I enquired whether the Rajah had heard anything new.

Jeswunt Rao said that His Highness's last accounts left Meer Khan at Shergurh, that Holkar's Vakeel here had received a letter from Cundo Punt the Vakeel at Poona, reproaching the Rajah with the reports which had been circulated about Meer Khan's designs against Nagpore, and the military preparations of which those reports had been shown to the Rajah, who had replied sharply to the Vakeel, remarking that it was very well now to disavow such intentions on the part of Meer Khan, but that all the world knew what was the state of the case, and he did not care what were Meer Khan's intentions.

I took this occasion to observe that it was extraordinary that while Meer Khan's intentions which had been so publicly reported, were thus disavowed, the Vakeel at Poona should take such pains to ascertain what we would do if that chief were to attack the Rajah; and I reminded Jeswunt Rao of what I had before told him regarding the conferences between Mr. Elphinstone and Cundo Punt. I asked whether the Rajah had been made acquainted with them.

Jeswunt Rao said that the Minister had not thought it advisable to touch upon the subject to the Rajah, because he had found no favourable opportunity, without which the Rajah would only be angry with him for pressing him on the subject of the alliance.

I remarked that I had not wished the Minister to press the matter, but to mention the circumstances for His Highness's information leaving the

rest to the effect which the knowledge of them might produce on His Highness's mind. I said it was not a matter to be withheld from the Rajah, since it would be the means of shewing him to what a dilemma he had reduced the British Government, disposed to be his friend, by his persevering disinclination to accede to its views, that the Rajah would be aware that the British Government could give no other answer to such questions as those put to Mr. Elphinstone by Holkar's Vakeel, under the persuasion that the Rajah was averse to its alliance, and that the tendency of such an answer would no doubt be to encourage Meer Khan in his hostile designs against His Highness, which it might be inferred, from the circumstance of Cundoo Pundit having thrice pressed Mr. Elphinstone on the subject, he had not yet abandoned, notwithstanding Holkar's disavowals. Your Excellency, I said, was still at liberty to assist the Rajah if he desired it, on the basis often discussed, that this was the time to make the necessary arrangements whilst the rains afforded a breathing time, and we might assume the protection of the Rajah's dominions without involving ourselves in hostilities; but that if the Rajah waited until he was actually engaged in hostilities, he must abandon all hopes of our coming forward to assist him with the certain risk of a war, since by a frank and open conduct now he might avoid reducing us to such an inconvenience. It was therefore absolutely necessary to let the Rajah know the actual state of the matter, as well with a view to His Highness's interests as to those of his Ministers. I had done my duty in warning them long ago what was likely to be the consequence of the Rajah's unwise conduct; and if in a moment of future urgency the Rajah expected to experience the benefit of our friendship, and was only then apprized of what I now told Jeswant Rao, and of what I had repeatedly told the Ministers, His Highness would no doubt have good reason for accusing them of having kept him in the dark. I said it was obviously narrowing the ground merely to talk of Meer Khan, since that was only a temporary matter, but that the Rajah must shortly resolve either to meet our views, or to give up all future expectation of seeing his state placed on a secure footing by means of an union with the British Government. The answers which had been given to Holkar's Vakeel, would shew the Rajah that Government was determined not to expose itself to the inconveniences of a general belief that it would become a party in all the Rajah's wars, whilst His Highness did not concern himself about its interests or views, and did not choose to give it a title to interfere in his favour, and I hoped that the Rajah would now reflect seriously on the matter and come forward at once openly and cordially to meet our views. I concluded by saying that it was likely if I could not report favourably soon of His Highness's disposition to the alliance, Your Excellency would definitely abandon all thoughts of the arrangement, which however desirable for purposes of general defence, was certainly much more advantageous to the Rajah than to us; and turn your attention to such

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other plans directed exclusively to secure the interests of the British Government and its allies, as might render us independent of the Rajah's cooperation.

Jeswant Rao promised to make the communications to the Rajah, but he hinted that the Rajah would probably defer giving any answer on the ground of Sreedhur Pundit's absence, who had lately left Nagpore on a pilgrimage to Chinnoor on the Godavery. With regard to this matter, I told Jeswant Rao that if the Rajah expected us to undertake his defence, there must be time given for completing all our arrangements before the end of the rains, so as to be prepared to meet whatever the cold weather might produce; that all delays would be to His Highness's detriment, and I could only hope that the Minister's absence would not be suffered unnecessarily to stand in the way of His Highness's best interests.

On the 18th I happened to send my Moonshree to the Durbar on the subject of a dispute at present pending between the Nizam's and Rajah's officers in Berar. I directed the Moonshree also to endeavour to ascertain privately from Jeswant Rao whether he had mentioned the subject of our late conference to the Rajah. The Ministers seem to have thought that the Moonshree's visit was for the purpose of making some communication of the same nature, for, when the Moonshree took an opportunity of asking Jeswant Rao the question I had directed, that Minister, although the Moonshree assured him it was not the case, immediately made a sign to the others that their expectations had turned out to be correct, and when the Moonshree had executed his instructions in an audience with the Rajah and was about to take his leave, Jeswant Rao still following up the misconception whispered to the Rajah, that the Moonshree had enquired about the result of my late communication, on which the Rajah said aloud that he had written to Sreedhur Pundit on the subject, by whose advice he would be guided.

Yesterday evening I was visited by Jeswant Rao, who came agreeably to the orders of the Rajah for the purpose of shewing me a letter which His Highness had received from Sreedhur Pundit, in answer to the call made upon him for his opinion respecting the alliance. The terms of the letter were nearly as follows.

The Minister acknowledged the receipt of a letter from the Rajah mentioning a communication His Highness had received from me through Jeswant Rao, and my Moonshree's subsequent visit to the Durbar and requiring his opinion about the reply that should be given; he went on to observe that the matter was of a very delicate and important nature, and he could not venture at such a distance to give a decided opinion, that six or seven days after the new moon (occurring on the 17th of July) he would set out on his return to Nagpore, and make all possible haste in his march; that the British Government had always been the Rajah's

best friend, and His Highness had never swerved from his engagements; and that I was a well-wisher of His Highness, which rendered it proper to give due deliberation to what I had communicated, but this could only be done under the advantage, on the Minister's part, of a personal intercourse with the Rajah.

Jeswant Rao told me that the Rajah intended to defer giving an answer until the Minister's return which might be expected in the course of a month, and that the Minister hoped I should approve of his answer, and that the delay would not be of consequence.

I replied to Jeswant Rao that what I had communicated was only intended to shew His Highness the necessity of his applying soon, if he expected any assistance from the British Government, but that I hoped a short delay in coming to a decision would not be detrimental to His Highness's affairs; that the Minister's answer was no doubt prudent and considerate, since the Rajah's future welfare depended so much on his present determination, and that I sincerely trusted, for the Rajah's best interests, that the deliberations would terminate in establishing on His Highness's mind a due sense of the advantages of an alliance with the British Government, which he had now perhaps, a last opportunity of obtaining.

Jeswant Rao brought to me, also at the Rajah's desire, a letter dated about six weeks ago, which His Highness had received from Holkar, and another which Holkar had written to his Vakeel here, evidently for the purpose of being communicated to the Durbar. Both letters were full of respectful and amicable expressions towards the Rajah, but complained in friendly terms of the Rajah's suspicions of Meer Khan, and military preparations. They asserted that no intention had ever been entertained by Meer Khan of attacking the Rajah's territory, and that Meer Khan had not quitted Shergurh.

I remarked on these letters that Holkar had formerly disavowed Meer Khan's proceedings, but that it was not likely that Meer Khan would be much influenced in his measures by any considerations but those of his own interests or safety. I said, however, that I thought Your Excellency would hardly desire the alliance if His Highness's motives for acceding to it should be solely the removal of a temporary danger and not the establishment of a permanent system of defence, calculated to secure the tranquillity and prosperity of His Highness's dominions in conjunction with those of the British Government and its allies, which was Your Excellency's only object in the arrangement. I added that even should Meer Khan now desist from any hostile attempt, it was probable that he would resume his designs at a more favourable period, especially when it should become evident that the Rajah had no chance of being assisted by the British Government and this consideration alone, I had no doubt, would lead the Rajah to look beyond the present danger, if His Highness,

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which I could hardly think, was not already impressed with the general benefits of the alliance, in the protection his country would receive against the Pindarries, and in the stability and prosperity which it would give to his Government.

No events of consequence have occurred lately in this quarter. The division of the Rajah's army which marched some time ago upon Hoshangabad under Chundojee Bhoosla, has gone into cantonments for the rains at Betool, and another force of equal strength which was prepared to march in the same direction with the Rajah's nephew, Goojabba, and Suddak Allee Khan, has been retained for the present about the City.

No. 225—Jenkins reports to the Governor General the continuation of the discussions about the proposed subsidiary alliance.

FROM—R. JENKINS,
TO—THE EARL OF MOIRA.

Nagpur, 26th September 1814.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's instructions, conveyed in Mr. Secretary Adam's dispatch under date the 3rd of July.

My address to Your Excellency, No. 2 of the 17th of July, will have made Your Excellency acquainted with the effort which I made in conformity to your instruction of the 20th of May, to impress upon the Rajah the imprudence of any longer neglecting to apply for the British alliance. The Rajah having referred to Sreedur Pundit for the answer he should give, and Sreedur Pundit's return being daily expected at the period of my receipt of the instructions of the 8th of July, I thought that Your Excellency would approve of my delaying the communication prescribed by those instructions until I could judge finally and decisively of the Rajah's intentions. The Minister was prevented by sickness from leaving the Godavery until sometime after the date he had appointed, but he arrived at Nagpore on the 11th instant.

I did not conceive it to be consistent with Your Excellency's views that I should press the Rajah for an answer to the communication I had made during the Minister's absence, but Jeswant Rao having incidentally alluded to the subject in a visit which I received from him on the 22nd instant, in terms which served to confirm all my previous impressions of the dislike and aversion which the Rajah entertained towards the

alliance, I thought it due to the dignity of Government to anticipate any direct communication from the Rajah by intimating at once that an answer was now unnecessary.

In conformity however with the commands of Your Excellency, I made that intimation in the most friendly and conciliating terms. I said that the British Government had for some time past contemplated an alliance with the state of Nagpore as an arrangement which, while it tended more particularly to secure the stability and prosperity of that state, would contribute materially to the tranquillity of the Deccan, that Your Excellency had expected that the Rajah as well from a sense of his own interests as from considerations of general and liberal policy, would have embraced with readiness a project so wise and beneficial, but that after every effort to convince His Highness how much it would be for his interest and credit to concur in your views, Your Excellency was now convinced that the Rajah was too much confirmed in his own ideas of what he conceived to be for his good, to concur in yours. That you had therefore abandoned all hopes of changing His Highness's opinion, and had directed me in consequence to abstain from any further agitation of the subject. That in communicating this to the Rajah I was further directed to state that Your Excellency now considered yourself at liberty to adopt such other measures as might appear advisable for the British interest and those of its allies without any further reference to His Highness's views or benefit, but that Your Excellency wished it to be understood that no difference in the views of the two states could produce any diminution either of the public friendship which subsisted between them, or of the personal regard between Your Excellency and the Rajah, which was both a consequence and a pledge of the former.

Jeswant Rao said that he believed the Rajah intended to wait to be reminded by me of his promise to give an answer on the return of the Minister, and wished to know whether I would not first make an enquiry on the subject. I replied that it was inconsistent with your Excellency's orders that I should agitate the subject again directly or indirectly excepting to make the communication he had just heard; and that from what he had mentioned of the Rajah's embarrassment about a reply, I conceived His Highness would be better pleased to be thus relieved from all further anxiety on the subject. I therefore desired he would convey my communication to the Rajah in the exact terms in which he himself received it.

On the next day Jeswant Rao again visited me. He was sent to carry the Rajah's answer to my communication of the preceding day—which was nearly as follows.

That His Highness was sensible of the friendship and regard for his interests which had dictated the offers which had been made him; that he always had considered and still should consider the British Government

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as his best friend, and that on this very account he did not wish unnecessarily to draw upon its friendship which he considered as a kind of treasure set apart for the time of need. That Meer Khan abandoned his hostile designs; that he was besides only the servant of Holkar and consequently His Highness's servant, but that in any case His Highness thought him too contemptible an enemy to require a recourse to our assistance, which he repeated, he always relied upon in time of need, besides that the general belief of the interest we took in His Highness's welfare was a shield from the threat even of attack. The message concluded after some general professions of friendship and of His Highness's personal regard for Your Excellency and of consideration for me as your representative, with an offer of His Highness's services to the British Government in any way in which they could be useful. His army of forty thousand men he said was at my command, and he begged I would consider it in every respect as the Company's army. All that His Highness complained of was his poverty.

I thought it sufficient to notice this reply in general terms of friendship, and on being pressed by Jeswant Rao to answer more particularly the Rajah's offer of his services, I said I should not fail to mention it to Your Excellency who would doubtless duly appreciate such a proof of His Highness's friendship.

The principal political occurrences at this court since the date of my last address No. 2 have been the arrival of Vakeels from the Nabob of Bhopal, from Sindia, and from the Pindary chief Dost Mahommmed.

The mission from Bhopaul is said to have in view the conciliation of the Rajah, with the view of lessening the number of the enemies with which that unfortunate state seems likely to have to contend in the ensuing cold weather. As the projected attack upon Bhopaul by Baptiste has in view the transfer of that principality to the Rajah, or at least is so understood in the engagements between this Durbar and that of Sindia, the mission as might have been supposed, has been without effect. At the same time assurances have been given to the Vakeels that the Rajah will interest himself with Sindia in behalf of the Nabob, whilst the Rajah's armies are now preparing to advance to the Nerbudda with the avowed purpose of co-operating in his ruin.

The mission of the Vakeel from Sindia, by name Nersing Rao, seems to be connected with the same subject, and to have in view as mentioned in Mr. Secretary's despatch to Your Excellency No. 15, to obtain from the Rajah some pecuniary aid. The Rajah, I understand, agrees to pay a sum of money said to be three or four lacks of rupees, after being put in possession of all Bhopaul, its forts and territory. For the present expenses of Baptiste His Highness is also willing to advance a sum on the security of Sindia's district of Hindia and Hurdah, to be held until

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the debt is satisfied by their revenues. These districts it would be very convenient for the Rajah to have, as giving him the command of the Nerbudda in the whole extent of its course from Hoshangabad to Hindia, the furthest point at which the Pindaries generally cross it to invade these territories, and consequently strengthening his frontier in that exposed quarter. This negotiation has not been brought to any decisive issue.

The mission from the Pindary chief Dost Mahommed had in view the acquisition of some territorial assignment from this Government as a consideration for not molesting its territories. The Vakeel however, finding that his master's demands were not likely to be obtained, departed secretly from the city a fortnight or three weeks ago, and the matter is left to be negotiated in Dost Mahommed's camp where the Rajah has an agent.

The Rajah's whole attention seems now to be taken up with military preparations for the purpose of bringing the principal part of his army into the field by the time of the Dusserah. His nephew Goojabba, and Sudeek Allee Khan are to have the chief commands, and it has been mentioned to me both by Jeswunt Rao and by other authorities that the Rajah himself means shortly to pitch his camp in advance towards the Nerbudda, probably at Pandoorana which is about fifty miles from Nagpore.

The avowed object of all these movements from Nagpore, Bhopaul and the purpose of the Rajah in taking the field in person is represented by his ministers to be merely that of superintending the military arrangements in train, and settling all accounts with the troops previously to expediting the march of the different detachments to the Nerbudda. I think however, I can collect from some hints which I have received at different times from Jeswunt Rao, that the Rajah considers it a matter of policy to put himself at the head of his armies in consequence of the reports of the assembly of the British forces in Hindoostan under Your Excellency. I have of course noticed the subject, whenever it was mentioned, in terms calculated to remove all ideas of Your Excellency's visit to the upper provinces being directed to any other object than the inspection of the different corps of the army as commander-in-chief, but the Rajah no doubt is willing to have the credit of great political wisdom and foresight amongst his neighbours, and from the mode in which his intercourse with Sindia and Holkar is always alluded to by Jeswunt Rao, I am inclined to think that His Highness in that intercourse does not spare insinuations attributing ambitious projects to the British Government, and exhorting to union amongst themselves as the only means of defeating those projects.

In his last visit Jeswunt Rao told me that accounts had been received of Baptiste having pitched his camp at Islamnugger near Bhopaul; that the Pindaries of Kureem's party who are allied with the Nabob, had

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carried off a considerable number of bullocks laden with grain from his camp and otherwise distressed him for supplies; and that he had in consequence, for the present removed his camp to a more distant position. Baptistie had declared his resolution of establishing his authority in all the places held by the Pindarries, to the westward of Bhopaul down to the Nerbudda, and Seetoo, in consequence, is reported to have removed his family from his fort of Sutwas to Neemawur in the direction of Ougein. Jeswant Rao Bhaohad hitherto refused to visit Baptistie in his camp but had offered to act in concert with him, but not under him.

Vizier Mahommed Khan was by the last accounts at Rayseen, making every exertion to strengthen himself against his enemies. His fate must turn principally upon the result of the sieges of that place and Ginnoorghur, as it is not supposed that Bhopaul itself can make a long resistance—but he seems resolved to dispute every inch of ground to the last extremity.

No. 226—Jenkins conveys to the Governor General a strange proposal of the Raja to the British Government to take into its service one of his relations with a force of about ten thousand men and thus relieve the state of a heavy financial burden.

FROM—R. JENKINS,

TO—THE EARL OF MOIRA.

Nagpur, 2nd November 1814.

On the 20th ultimo I received a visit from Jeswant Rao who had previously intimated that he had something particular to say to me from the Rajah. The communication he made to me was to the following effect.

The friendship between the state of Nagpore and the British Government, he said, had been of very old standing; so old that there was no power in the Deckan which could contend with the former in priority of attachment to our interests. That this friendship had been strengthened and drawn closer by time, and having formerly been only inferior, in the intimacy of the ties on which it depended, to that which subsisted between the Rajah and Peshwa, had now taken the place of that, as well as all other connections. That the favours which the Rajah had formerly expected from the Peshwa, he now hoped to obtain from us. It was not his expectation to recover Berar or Cuttack from us;

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he gave up all hopes of that sort. But he could not refrain from stating his situation to us without reserve, to justify the request he had to make.

He had long borne as well as he could, the multiplied distresses of his Government. He had never been able to reconcile his mind to reduce his establishments to the level of his circumstances, to dismiss any of the numerous retainers, civil and military, of his family or even to leave off the habit of entertaining in his service any chief who offered himself for employment. The little he had, he had been content to share with as many as he could, and he had endeavoured to increase that little by every means in his power to the impoverishment and ruin of his country. Beyond his own territories indeed he could not look for resources. The door was shut upon all attempts to increase them by foreign conquest, and he again repeated he no longer expected to get back what he had lost in the war with the British Government.

His Highness was now at the last extremity of embarrassment, and felt totally unable to support the burthens of his situation. To the British Government alone could he look for any alleviation of these burthens, and what he had to propose would not only have that effect, but bind him for ever to a dependence upon us. The proposal was for the British Government to entertain in its service any one of the Rajah's nearest relations, with a force of thirty, twenty or even ten thousand men; this force to be paid by that Government and to be entirely and at all times at its disposal, to be stationed wherever we liked within or without the Rajah's dominions. This was not a new proposal. It had been made in early times, I think Jeswant Rao said, when Mr. Chapman or Mr. Forster was Resident at Nagpore.

The Rajah wished by this measure to be able to provide for some of those who had claims upon him, whilst he rendered the union between himself and the British Government indissoluble, whilst he made himself in fact a dependant upon our bounty.

The Rajah earnestly hoped that this request would meet Your Excellency's approbation. He desired that I would second it with every topic which I might think likely to render Your Excellency favourable to his views, and His Highness would write to Your Excellency on the subject referring to me for particulars. His Highness, Jeswant Rao concluded, relied upon my attachments, for every exertion to obtain his wishes.

I told Jeswant Rao that for my own part I felt highly flattered by the confidence His Highness was pleased to repose in me. That I certainly should always feel happy to be the medium of procuring the accomplishment of any of His Highness's wishes, at any time. That His Highness's present views however did not seem to me to be attainable,

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because they were not consistent with the general policy of the British Government, as His Highness had only to look about him to be convinced what was the case. That under such circumstances, His Highness would judge of the advantage of addressing Your Excellency on the subject. That if he did think proper to write, I should endeavour to state faithfully the substance of the communication I had received having, as I thought it incumbent upon me to do, prepared His Highness for the probable disappointment of his hopes.

Yesterday Jeswant Rao again visited me, and brought the letters of the Rajah and his ministers to the address of Your Excellency.

The Rajah, he said, still hoped Your Excellency might listen to his request and therefore begged I would forward the letters, and state everything to Your Excellency in the most favourable point of view. If Your Excellency should not think it proper to comply with His Highness's request the Rajah hoped, you would not be displeased with it, resulting as it did from the difficulties of his situation and his desire to owe everything to the British Government. To which alone he could appeal with any chance of bettering his condition.

The letters of the Rajah and his ministers I shall do myself the honour of enclosing to Mr. Secretary Swinton. They merely refer, as Jeswant Rao said they would, to my communications.

It is difficult to tell exactly to what this application may be intended to lead, or what the Rajah wishes us to infer from it. His Highness cannot expect it to be complied with, and I have no idea that he wishes to give an opening for us to renew the offers of a subsidiary treaty. He is probably willing to shew that he has no objection to be connected with us in the closest manner in his own terms, although not on ours and to keep up in professions, a display of that sense of dependence upon the friendship and support of the British Government which his actions in the only case in which he could prove it, he must feel, are calculated to contradict.

I had the honour of waiting upon the Rajah on the 23rd ultimo on the occasion of the Dusserah festival. Nothing but general conversation passed. His Highness enquired particularly after Your Excellency's health and progress in your tour.

None of the Rajah's army has yet been put in motion for the Nerbudda. Googabba, His Highness's nephew, and Sudeek Khan after moving into tents, have returned to the city, and no date has been fixed, as far as I can learn for their ultimate departure, nor have any measures been taken to satisfy the arrears of the troops, which are usually settled at this season.

Although Jeswant Rao told me yesterday that the Rajah still thought of sending troops to cooperate with Baptiste in the conquest of Bhopaul and of going out into tents for the purpose of adjusting their pay, and sending them off, I hear from other quarters that the Bhopaul campaign is no longer thought of, and I shall be inclined to think the latter intelligence the most correct until I see more decided steps taken for settling the indispensable preliminary of payment to the troops. I have not yet heard of the commencement of Baptiste's operations which, it was supposed, would immediately follow the Dusserah.

No. 227—The Governor General compliments Mr. Jenkins and expresses his satisfaction at the conclusion of a subsidiary treaty with Appa Sahab of Nagpur. The treaty is ratified by the Governor General and instructions are sent to the Resident for his guidance.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,
TO—JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

15th June 1816.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 13, dated the 28th of May, transmitting the treaty of general defensive alliance concluded by you on the part of the Honourable Company with Appa Sahib, the regent of the state of Nagpur, on behalf of Maharaja Pursojee Bhoosla.

2. The general tenor and the specific provisions of the treaty being in exact conformity to the instructions of the Governor General in Council, or conceived in the genuine spirit of those instructions, it has received the entire approbation of Government, and has this day been ratified by the Governor General in Council. The ratified treaty is herewith transmitted for the purpose of being delivered to Appa Sahib.

3. I am now directed to communicate to you such observations and reflections as have occurred to the Governor General in Council on the perusal of your despatch above acknowledged, and the minutes of your conferences with Appa Sahib's ministers during the progress of the negotiation.

4. In the first place however, I am instructed to convey to you the expression of His Lordship in Council's high and entire approbation of the judgment, ability and address which distinguished your conduct in the prosecution of the negotiation, and which have effected the accomplishment

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procedure with relation to Appa Sahib.

8. On general principles the Governor General in Council is averse to the practice of securing the services of the ministers of a foreign state by means of pensions from the British Government. Those general views are of course however subject to modification according to particular circumstances, and His Lordship in Council considers those in which you were acting to constitute sufficient grounds for a departure from that rule to which on all occasions he would be desirous to adhere. The

grant being made not only with the knowledge but at the particular solicitation of Appa Sahib, is divested of one of the main causes of objection to arrangements of this nature. His Lordship in Council has therefore no hesitation in ratifying and confirming your promises to Nago Pandit and Narain Pandit of pensions of the amount assigned to them respectively, namely 25,000 rupees per annum to the former and 15,000 rupees per annum to the latter, to commence from the date of the execution of the treaty. Sunnads for the pensions will be prepared and transmitted to you by the Persian Secretary to Government.

9. The Governor General in Council has few remarks to make on the several provisions of the treaty as it stands. The amount of subsidy as it has been finally settled will, it is supposed, cover the extra expense of the force, beyond which His Lordship in Council adverting to the financial circumstances of the Government of Nagpur, did not extend his views. That payment and the charge which must be incurred in maintaining, in a condition of due efficiency, the stipulated contingent of troops, will perhaps constitute as large an appropriation of the resources of the state of Nagpur to the particular purposes of the alliance as could reasonably be expected. The provisions for securing the due efficiency of the contingent are satisfactory, and it will no doubt be your special care to see them observed, without however exercising our right of interference in such a manner as to give dissatisfaction to the Government of Nagpur as long as it performs its engagements with punctuality and good faith.

10. The provision for the eventual commutation of the pecuniary payment for territorial cession is perfectly satisfactory to the Governor General in Council. The remaining articles and your explanations do not suggest any remark further than the renewed expression of His Lordship's approbation.

11. Adverting to the circumstances under which the diamond ring mentioned in the 25th paragraph of your despatch No. 13, was pressed on your acceptance by Appa Sahib, the Governor General in Council approves of your conditional reception of it and further authorises you to retain and wear it.

12. Your previous despatches of the 21st, 22nd and the 25th (two letters) of May have been received and the tenor of your correspondence with Colotel Doveton is approved. His Lordship in Council trusts that the force has been actually established in the Nagpur territory in the manner proposed by you. The Governor General has remarked with satisfaction the characteristic promptitude and alacrity with which your applications have been met by Colotel Doveton, and requests you to convey the expression of this sentiment to Colonel Doveton.

* Vaidya. Similarly orders were sent to all other Courts recalling the Bhonsle's vakcels. This was in accordance with the terms of the subsidiary treaty, according to which all foreign affairs were to be transacted through the medium of the British. (B.D.)

I have the honour to forward orders to the Rajah's Vakeel Khandoo Govind to return forthwith to Nagpur. Khandoo Mookoond, the Peshwa's Vakeel, has moved out but has not yet marched and Anand Rao, the brother of Narayan Rao Wide*, has also at my desire been told to depart, but I understand he waits for orders from Poona. As Narayan Rao Wide has always been the channel of the clandestine intercourse carried on between the two courts, it seems desirable that no one belonging to him should be allowed to remain.†

4th August 1817.

TO—ELPHINSTONE, RESIDENT, POONA.

FROM—JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,

No. 228—Jenkins sends order to the Bhonsle's vakeel at Poona to return to Nagpur and asks for the recall of Narayanrao Vaidya, the Peshwa's vakeel at Nagpur.

14. His Lordship in Council will immediately take into consideration the arrangements for the permanent establishment of the subsidiary force in the territories of the Rajah of Nagpur and will communicate, to you the result of his deliberations with the least practicable delay.

13. The earnest desire of this Government to confirm the attachment of Appa Sahib and the principal personages of the Nagpur state by every conciliatory procedure, will induce His Lordship in Council to approve of your instructing the officer commanding the subsidiary force to refrain (unless in real necessity) from allowing the slaughter of cattle, though the Governor General in Council is well satisfied with your having opposed a stipulation to that effect in the treaty, whence, in possible circumstances, embarrassment might have arisen.

1816] RENEWED ATTEMPTS FOR A SUBSIDIARY ALLIANCE

SECTION 8

Appasaheb

1817-1818

No. 229—R. Jenkins reports the death of Raja Raghuji Bhonsle and the accession of his son Parsoji Bhonsle.

FROM—JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR,

TO—THE RESIDENT, HYDERABAD.

23rd March 1816.

I am concerned to acquaint you that His Highness the Raja Raghuji Bhonsla died yesterday evening. He is succeeded by his son Bala Sahab, now Raja Parsojee Bhonsla.

No. 230—The Resident reports to the Governor General the death of Parsoji Bhonsle in the 39th year of his age, and the movements of Appa Sahab.

FROM—R. JENKINS,

TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL.

Nagpur, 1st February 1817.

I have the honor to acquaint Your Excellency that His Highness Raja Parsojee Bhonsla died early this morning. The infirm state in which he has so long continued, has been lately aggravated by a severe stomach and bowel complaint, but his death was rather unexpected, as last night he went to bed in apparently better health than usual. His Highness was in his 39th year.

Appa Sahib is at present at Chanda, where he lately went to settle some affairs relating to that part of his territories. The city however is perfectly quiet although the necessary measures of precaution to prevent disturbances have been adopted. Expresses have been sent and relays of horses posted to bring back Appa Sahib who will be immediately proclaimed Raja.

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NAGPUR AFFAIRS
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No. 231—The Resident communicates to the Governor General details of the funeral ceremony of Parsoji, the arrival of Appasahab from Chanda and his intended nuptials on 25th instant.

FROM—R. JENKINS,
TO—THE GOVERNOR GENERAL (MOIRA).

Nagpur, 21st February 1817.

In my address to Your Lordship under date the 1st instant, I had the honour to report the death of His Highness Rajah Parsojee Bhooosla on the morning of that day. At about noon the funeral ceremonies were performed, and his principal wife Cashee Bae, burnt herself with the body.

I proposed to attend the funeral, but as Appa Sahab was absent, the ministers suggested that I should not. I however sent my Marhatta Moonshee.

Appa Sahab did not return from Chanda until the 10th instant, and on the evening of that day I paid His Highness a visit of condolence. He was attended by all the principal civil and military officers of the state, and replied to the consolatory expressions which I made use of in the name of Your Excellency as well as on my own part, with saying that he had now neither father, mother, nor relation to look up to, but Your Excellency, and myself as your representative, and His Highness's brother by adoption.

The ceremony of seating His Highness on the musnud, was to have taken place this day, but the time was not thought auspicious and the ceremony is put off for the present. In the meantime His Highness who has no children by his present wife, has been pressed by the ladies of the palace to contract a second marriage, and the day fixed for the nuptials is Tuesday next, the 25th instant. His Highness asked my advice on both points and expressed some reluctance to celebrate his marriage so soon after the Rajah's death, but alleged the pressing instances of the principal Bae his aunt, and some circumstances of Hindoo superstition regarding the proposed bride, which rendered it necessary the ceremony should take place on a particular day, or not at all. I said that the sooner the ceremony of seating His Highness on the musnud was performed the better; and that with regard to the marriage, I thought His Highness ought to follow the Bae's advice.

Public business has been, until lately, much impeded by the sickness of the minister, and the mourning for the death of the Rajah has caused still further delay. The inefficiency of the Contingent and the affairs of Sirgoojah have formed the principal subjects of discussion, and I trust that something decided respecting both matters, will shortly be accomplished. As a preliminary step to any reform of the contingent,

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I have requested Colonel Walker, with the concurrence of Appa Sahib, to muster and inspect the troops now serving with him, and to report to me on their actual state. With regard to the affairs of Sirgoojah, Bheekajee Copaul is now at Nagpore, and an early settlement is promised.

I have the honour to report the arrival here of Lieutenant Jenkins who will immediately begin to raise the battalion for the Rajah's service.

No. 232 Appasahb Bhonsle is reprimanded by the Governor General for his having entered into a correspondence with the Peshwa in contravention of the terms of the subsidiary alliance.

FROM—EARL OF MOIRA, GOVERNOR GENERAL,
TO—HIS HIGHNESS THE RAJA OF NAGPUR (APPASAHB).

Fort William, 16th August 1817.

Mr. Jenkins has communicated to me the unpleasant discussions which arose between him and Your Highness during the late crisis of affairs at Poona. The concern I felt at learning that Your Highness had been seduced into acts at variance with the obligations of your public faith so recently and solemnly plighted to the British Government, and had even distinctly violated one of the most essential stipulations of the treaty by carrying on a clandestine intercourse with a foreign power, was equalled only by the cordial satisfaction which I have derived from Mr. Jenkins' assurances that Your Highness has reverted to a course of conduct becoming your wisdom and exalted station, and consistent with the maxims of honour and public faith and the true principles of the alliance.

Your Highness cannot have failed to mark the consequence of an opposite line of conduct on the part of the Peshwa, and the peril to which that prince exposed himself by yielding to the advice of mischievous counsellors. I am firmly persuaded that Your Highness will never again afford ground for doubt and suspicion of your intentions in the mind of the British Government, and that it will be your uniform aim henceforward to mark by your zeal in the prosecution of those measures which may be undertaken for securing and promoting the interests of the alliance, the cordial unity of sentiment and action which has been established between the two states. In this confidence I forbear from further remark on what has passed, and shall only entreat Your Highness to be assured that while no machinations against the British Government can long escape detection and defeat, its favour, regard and fostering protection will invariably be extended to those powers who act towards it with fidelity, honour and zeal.

Your Highness in particular, the very commencement of whose public administration was distinguished by the formation of the alliance, must feel how deeply your interests are interwoven with its existence and may

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justly expect to reap your full share of its advantages. By a strict adherence to the stipulations of the treaty, especially those most important ones relating to negotiations with foreign states without the privy and concurrence of this Government, and the maintenance of the contingent of troops which the state of Nagpore is engaged to furnish, Your Highness will establish your claim to the confidence and friendship of the British Government on a foundation which, I trust, will never be shaken.

The operations which will be undertaken in the approaching season for the suppression of the Pindarries whose outrages have long been the scourge of the Deccan, will afford Your Highness an opportunity of manifesting the cordiality and efficacy of your attachment and your anxiety to fulfill the provisions of the treaty by placing without delay, a select portion of your troops on such a footing as shall enable them to act with vigour against the common enemy, and to perform every service required from the contingent you are engaged to furnish. I request Your Highness to communicate confidentially with Mr. Jenkins on this subject, and to listen to his advice as that of a person no less attached to Your Highness by the ties of personal regard than solicitous for the honor and prosperity of your Government. Your Highness knows that Mr. Jenkins possesses my entire confidence and will receive whatever he may represent to you as if proceeded from myself.

No. 233—The Secretary conveys to the Resident at Nagpur the approval by the Governor General of the measures adopted by him to counteract the Raja's secret designs. Appasahb was induced to recall his agents from Poona, Indore, Gwalior and other states and to consent to the British occupation of the Fort of Hoshangabad.

FROM—J. ADAM, SECRETARY TO GOVERNOR GENERAL,

TO—R. JENKINS.

On the Ganges, near Chapra, 16th August 1817.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 25, dated the 10th of July, and to signify to you the Governor General's approbation of your proceedings as reported in that despatch.

The effect produced on the mind and conduct of the Rajah by the termination of the late discussions at Poona was such as the Governor General anticipated, and His Lordship trusts that the example afforded by that event will make a lasting impression on His Highness and have a salutary influence on his future views and proceedings. It cannot fail to prove a warning to him of the peril to which he will expose himself and his state, by engaging in designs hostile to the British Government

to which he is bound by the strongest obligations of gratitude and public faith, under the fallacious hope of a successful combination against our power.

The Governor General concurs in the justice of your remarks on the probable views and motives of the Rajah during the late crisis of affairs at Poona, and on the degree in which he has violated one of the most essential articles of the treaty. On a consideration of all the circumstances however, His Lordship is disposed to accept the Rajah's tardy repentance and to abstain from the exercise to the extent which strict justice would warrant, of the right we have acquired of imposing closer restraints on His Highness's freedom of action.

The Governor General has marked with satisfaction the promptitude (howsoever induced) with which the Rajah has dismissed the Peshwa's Vakeel and recalled his own from Poona, and the disposition which he has manifested to withdraw his Vakeels from the Courts of Sindia and Holkar, and to dismiss those in attendance on him, on the part of those Chiefs. No useful purpose can be effected by the maintenance of that intercourse, and while the discontinuance of it is the spontaneous result of His Highness's own reflexions or proceeds from the unprompted counsel of his ministers, it must necessarily be satisfactory to the Governor General as indicating their desire to remove every cause of doubt and suspicion from His Lordship's mind. In this point of view therefore His Lordship approves entirely of your having encouraged the belief that it would be so felt by the British Government. But His Lordship would not judge it expedient to found on the Rajah's late proceedings a compulsory restriction of a tendency so hurtful to his feelings and so much calculated to lower him in the estimation of other states, while there is a hope that his future conduct will be regulated by principles more consistent with the obligations of his public faith. His Lordship entertains little doubt that the Rajah sincerely regrets his past misconduct and will be slow to engage in similar pursuits again, and it is His Lordship's opinion that our endeavours should be applied to confirm this disposition by rendering the alliance as palatable to him in every way that may be practicable, and that we should abstain from any procedure calculated to disgust him with it from making him feel the weight of the restraint which it unavoidably imposes on him. On this principle then, the Governor General has determined not to require him to abandon all intercourse with foreign states, but to be contented with insisting on the due execution of the provisions of the treaty in that respect as they stand. At the same time you will not deem it necessary to take any pains to remove from the Rajah's mind the impression that his abstaining from such intercourse is acceptable to the Governor General, or otherwise to discourage any disposition he may show to conduct his communications with other powers through the agents of the British Government alone.

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The Governor General entirely approves of your having availed yourself of the present juncture to obtain the Rajah's consent to our occupation of the fort of Hoshangabad, an object in His Lordship's judgment of considerable importance and to induce His Highness to place the contingent on a proper and efficient footing. This is an arrangement of primary consequence, and every endeavour ought to be made in the short interval which remains before the season for active operations, to accomplish the formation of an efficient body of Horse in the Rajah's pay.

It is with great regret that His Lordship perceives the obstacles which oppose such an arrangement, resulting chiefly from the manner in which it would affect private interests, and the burthen it would impose on the Rajah's finances, if it were not accompanied by a reform of the remainder of his military establishments. The latter point is especially deserving of consideration on grounds both of equity and expediency; and although less entitled to indulgence, the former description of plea must be allowed its due weight in the adoption of a practical remedy for the existing defects of the Rajah's military system.

The pressure on the Rajah's finances occasioned by the subsidy and the expenses of the contingent, supposing it to be maintained to the extent stipulated by the treaty and properly kept up, must oppose a serious obstacle to the due execution of the latter stipulation, and have the effect of alienating the Rajah's mind from a connexion which exposes him to the necessity of curtailing his expenditure to such a degree as to impair his dignity and reputation. It is true that this effect might be avoided if the retrenchments were applied to the useless and inefficient troops composing the principal portion of the forces of the state, but the impediments to such an arrangement and the resumption of Jaidaud Lands held by powerful individuals, which would be the consequence, necessarily make His Highness averse to resorting to that mode of meeting the expenditure resulting from the treaty. It is, however, to this source His Lordship apprehends that the Rajah must look for ultimate alleviation, for with every disposition to render the stipulations of the treaty as little onerous to His Highness as possible, the sacrifice which the Governor General would be justified in making, could not be to any great extent.

With a view to the relief of the Rajah's finances however, and to facilitate the organization and equipment of a good and efficient body of horse, His Lordship would be content to dispense with the infantry of the contingent altogether, or to allow the Rajah's regular battalion with such addition as he may think proper to make to it, to be reckoned for the infantry of the contingent. His Lordship would even be disposed to abate for a time some portion of the subsidy if by that means he could secure the efficiency of the contingent of horse, a species of force which it is obviously advantageous to maintain at the present time, and with reference to the character which the approaching military operations will probably

assume. The remission of the subsidy is an expedient which His Lordship would not wish to resort to if it can be avoided, or unless the attainment of the object were placed beyond the reach of hazard, since it would, in fact, be charging ourselves to the extent of the abatement with the expense of protecting the Rajah's country.

The arrangement most acceptable to the Governor General with regard to the horse would be to assimilate their organization to the reformed horse of the Nizam and the Poona auxiliary force; but you do not appear to entertain much hope that this can be effected. Next to that arrangement any that would provide for the regular maintenance and pay of the quota stipulated, and for securing efficient men and horses would be satisfactory. If the Rajah could be induced to assign special funds for this purpose and afford some reasonable security for their being faithfully applied, much would be accomplished. An assignment of territory both for this purpose and in lieu of the subsidy or such portion of it as may be retained, would perhaps, under all circumstances, be the most expedient arrangement. You are fully aware however of the objections to it on account of the difficulty of selecting territory generally and the distance and insulated position of any that might be selected for the purpose. The expected cession of the fort of Hoshangabad might however facilitate an arrangement of this description, and the country in that neighbourhood and near the position of the subsidiary force would naturally be chosen. Land equal to defray the charges of the contingent and the subsidy, would be of such considerable extent and value as to be less open to the objections just adverted to than a smaller tract.

You will be pleased to take these remarks and suggestions into your consideration and communicate your sentiments on the subject at the earliest convenient period. In the meanwhile you will not remit your efforts to obtain the due execution of the stipulations regarding the contingent, as far as may be compatible with the considerations above referred to.

With a view to confirm the impression which the Governor General is desirous of producing on the Rajah's mind and of aiding the effect of your representations, His Lordship has determined to address a letter to the Rajah in the terms of the enclosed English draft. You will receive the letter from the Persian Secretary as soon as it can be prepared.

It is satisfactory to the Governor General to learn the recall of Narayan Pundit to a share in public business, and His Lordship will be much gratified at learning that he and Nagoo Pundit have been restored to His Highness's entire confidence, although any direct interference on our part would, His Lordship still thinks, be less likely to secure that object than the leaving it to the unbiassed operation of His Highness's own disposition.

No. 234—The Governor General conveys through the Secretary his approval of the steps taken by the Resident for bringing about the submission of the Raja to the dictates of the British Government, although entirely against his own will.

FROM—J. ADAM,

TO—R. JENKINS.

On the Ganges near Mirzapur, 28th August 1817.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 26 of the 10th of August reporting the result of your negotiation with the Rajah of Nagpore for the attainment of the following objects; the assignment of Hoshangabad to serve as a depot for the military stores of the subsidiary force, the dismissal of the vakeels of foreign Powers and the recall of the Rajah's vakeels from other Courts, the restoration to office and to an efficient share in the administration of Narayn Pundit and the establishment of the contingent in a condition of efficiency.

My despatch of the 16th instant conveyed to you the expression of the Governor General's sentiments on the general course of proceeding to be held towards the Rajah, and the extent of His Lordship's views and wishes with regard to the vakeel, the assignment of Hoshangabad and the contingent. In a former despatch the opinion of the Governor General regarding the expediency of pressing the restoration of Narayn Pundit and Nagoo Pundit also was stated.

The Governor General observes with approbation that you ceased to urge the restoration of the minister when you found the objections of the Rajah to the measure insuperable by argument and exhortation. Without meaning to ascribe too much eagerness to your proceeding in this respect, His Lordship acknowledges his opinion that it was apparent from the time when the Rajah first retreated from the declaration of his intention to employ Narayn Pundit again, there was no ground for expecting that his reappointment, had it even been attainable, would have been attended with a restoration of confidence, or with a real benefit to our interests from the arrangement.

The Governor General certainly considers the dissolution of intercourse with other states by accredited vakeels as an object of desirable attainment; you are already apprized of His Lordship's reason for thinking that it should have been left to the spontaneous operation of the feelings of the Rajah and his advisers, and it is with satisfaction His Lordship perceives that strongly as you urged the point on the footing of it being acceptable

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NAGPUR AFFAIRS

No. 235—The Governor of Bombay acknowledges receipt of the letter informing him that the person of Appasahab has been seized in consequence of hostile designs on his part.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, BOMBAY,

TO—THE RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

I am directed by the Right Honourable the Governor in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, dated the 25th of last month, announcing the seizure of the person of the Rajah in consequence of hostile designs on his part, against the British Government, having been discovered.

No. 236—Capt. Browne reports the escape of Appasahab from custody.

FROM—CAPTAIN E. C. BROWNE,

TO—JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

It is with real concern I have the honour to inform you that Appa Sahib made his escape between the hours of 2 and 3 o'clock this morning, accompanied by six sentries of the 22nd N.B., five of unknown rank with them * * * but only two of his attendants have accompanied him, named Joteeba and Narain.

No. 237—Search for Appasahab; Ramchandra Wagh, Nago Pandit and Rajaram sent to Jubbulpore.

FROM—CAPTAIN E. C. BROWNE,

TO—JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

Camp Baitawal, 14th May 1818.
I have the honour to inform you that on my learning the very distressing news of Appa Sahib having made his escape, I sent off to Jubbulpore Ramchunder Wagh and Nago Pandit, also Rajah Ram

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NAGPUR AFFAIRS

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Appa Sahab was about 40 miles from Hurrat, a strong place in possession of Chain Sing and said to be about 70 miles from here.

As I find Luchadon is not more than forty miles from Hurrat, I propose proceeding there tomorrow and having procured people here who have undertaken to bring me information the day after tomorrow, I propose halting at Luchadon until their return; from what I can learn my proceeding direct to Hurrat would answer no purpose, there being a strong hill fort in the centre of the ghaut and on the summit of a high hill, and the people represent it as being stronger than Chowragarh.

In my present state of mind, I am afraid I do not write very intelligibly, but after a service of seventeen years while I am in, I hope I have conducted myself in a soldier-like manner. When I reflect that through the treachery of my own men I should draw upon me the censure of my superiors, and more particularly after having been placed in a situation of trust by one from whom I have received such marked flattering attention as to prove myself undeserving of that trust, is more than I feel myself equal to supporting, but I hope you are satisfied that let my error be ever so great, it was more an error of judgment in placing the best confidence in men who have proved themselves unworthy of it, than any willful neglect of duty on my part, but the plan he had laid through the means of bribing my own soldiers, was so well arranged that nothing but having him in irons could have secured him in my humble opinion.

No. 239—Commissioner Malony communicates the arrival at Jubbulpore of Ramchandra Wagh, Nago Pandit and Rajaram and their confinement in the fort. Search for Appasahab continues.

FROM—MALONY, COMM., JUBBULPORE,

TO—RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

Jubbulpore, 14th May 1818.

I have the honour to acquaint you that Nago Pandit and Ramchandar Wagh arrived here yesterday afternoon under charge of Lieutenant Nicolson of the 8th Bengal Cavalry. With them is a third prisoner named Rajaram a Brahmin, who I understand, had been put in confinement on the discovery of Appa Sahab's escape. I requested Major O'Brien on the arrival of the prisoners to place a sufficient guard over them, and they have been confined in the fort as affording the best means of securing them. They will be detained here till your instructions can be received, unless

Independent of my having been disgraced through the treachery of the troops I had with me, I understand that I have drawn upon me the censure of Major O'Brien for not accompanying the remaining prisoners to Jubbulpore, more particularly as he thought it indispensable to constitute a case of enquiry upon my conduct as also for having sent them under a small party, but I conceived I should be of more service in endeavouring to regain the fugitive, and with respect to an enquiry into my conduct as I consider myself (answerable) to you, and all those who can give any information on the subject (are) with me, I consider Nagpore the most proper

I hope you will excuse my having sent off under charge of Lieutenant Nicolson the remainder of the prisoners without furnishing that officer with any written instructions for..... As I was aware of my misfortune my first object was to get them into a secure place to enable me to move in any direction, and also for the same reason I took upon myself to sell the tattoos, cooking-pots, bed etc., the ex-Rajah had left

It is with real concern I have to inform you that all the parties I sent out have returned unsuccessful, and although the same man who gave me the information of the Ex-Rajah having proceeded towards Hurrai, came again yesterday and (declared) he had been at the place where he learnt that the fugitive arrived there on the morning of the 14th, collected 250 horse and 200 foot and proceeded towards Amrawati the following morning, still from the report a Subedar of Cavalry made this morning makes me believe that Appa Sahab did not take that route as he says that Major of the 7th Cavalry had been at Hurrai some time with four troops, and that Chain Shah had been absent 7 days.

I have the honour to report my arrival at this place in consequence of a letter I received from Major O'Brien recommending the movement.

Camp near Chhapara, 17th May 1818.

FROM-CAPTAIN BROWNE,
TO-JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

No. 240—Capt. Browne intends returning to Nagpur for the enquiry into his conduct.

any circumstances should occur and render it advisable that they should proceed without delay. On the intelligence being received here of Appa Sahib's escape Major O'Brien immediately sent out parties in that direction as seemed expedient, and information was of course communicated by express to Brigadier General Watson.

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Enclosed is a descriptive roll of those sepoy who accompanied Appa Sahab, also a Marhatti chit I received last evening from the headman at Dhoomar, which information I suspect is incorrect.

Agreeably to instructions I received from Major O'Brien I left the troop with C. Kellat at Lachnadon with directions to return to Jubbulpore, and have now with me only four companies of the 22nd B.I.

No. 241—A reward of one lakh of rupees is offered for the seizure of Appasahab, dead or alive.

FROM—CAPTAIN DUNSMURE, CHHUPARA,

TO—JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

Chhapara, 18th May 1818.

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter by express, received last night about 12 o'clock, authorising me to offer a reward of one lac of rupees for the seizure of Appa Sahib, ex-Rajah of Nagpore. Immediately that I received intelligence of this distressing circumstance from Captain Browne which I did by express on the 13th at 3 p.m., I took upon myself to offer a reward of one thousand rupees for his apprehension, and sent out the horsemen under my command in every direction I thought it likely he might have taken. I regret to state that the different parties have all returned without bringing me any tidings of the fugitive.

I have this morning despatched another party of horsemen to Murree* to give publicity to your reward of one lac of rupees for the seizure of Appa Sahab, dead or alive, and am about to despatch an express to Seoni informing Kurruck Barty and Mohommmed Zemaun Khan of the reward.

I have thought it advisable to order Captain Browne with his detachment to halt here until he receives further instructions from you. This measure may meet with your approbation, I trust. Any intelligence I may receive regarding the ex-Rajah shall be promptly communicated to you.

* Pachmarhi, the present summer residence of the C. P. Government. (Ed.)

No. 242—Detailed account of the storming of Chanda.

FROM—LT.-COL. ADAMS,

TO—JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

Chanda, 22nd May 1818.

My despatch to your address of the 20th instant will have acquainted you that the strongly fortified city of Chanda was carried by assault that morning, and I have now the honour to state for your information the details which led to this glorious result.

During the night of the 17th instant a battery for 4 twelve pounders, a small one for 2 howitzers and a sunken one for 2 six pounders were finished and opened in the morning of the 18th instant, the former at a distance of about four hundred yards from the wall, and I received with high satisfaction on visiting them at sunrise the vivacity and excellent effect with which they played against the place.

The requisite materials being ready, the breaching battery for 3 eighteen pounders was marked out at a distance of about 250 yards and erected during the ensuing night; at this time I also invested the west and north (gates) with the 6th Cavalry, a squadron of 8th Cavalry and Captain Pedlar's reformed horse in detached squadrons and parties at convenient distances.

A breach was effected at 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the 19th instant, but the immense extent of Chanda and the assurances of Major Genham that he should be able the night to prevent the enemy from throwing up any work inside, induced me to defer the attack till the following morning with the view that I might have the whole day before me.

The result was as already reported in my letter of the 20th instant to your address, and I have herewith the honour of transmitting a copy of Division order which I deemed it proper to issue on the occasion.

I have likewise the honour to submit a return of ordnance taken as of the killed and wounded, and it is with deep regret I report the death of my assistant Surgeon Davies on the 19th instant from fatigue, and of that of Major Genham on the evening of the 20th instant from severe exertion and exposure to heat.

P.S.—I beg leave to add that the number of killed and wounded of the enemy may be between four and five hundred altogether, and that the Killedar Gangadin and a Gond chief called Miyah were amongst the former.

No. 243—Malony reports that Ramchandarra Wagh and the other two prisoners are sent to Allahabad; he sends three letters from them to the Resident.

FROM—MALONY, COMMR., JUBBULPORE,

TO—RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

Jubbulpore, 23rd May 1818.

I have the honour to acquaint you that Nagoo Pandit and Ramchandarra Wagh left Jubbulpore on the 21st instant on their route to Allahabad. I have made an arrangement for supplying provisions for them and their attendants till their arrival at Lohorogong affording them in this respect every indulgence practicable. The enclosed three letters have been transmitted to me by the prisoners since their departure with a request that I would forward them to you. It is proper to notice that they have not been examined.

No. 244—Detailed instructions for the Government of Nagpur during the minority of Raghuji III are conveyed to the Resident from the Governor General.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,

TO—JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

Gorakhpur, 18th June 1818.

(Previous portion missing), the Governor General might think fit to adopt. Your resolution was founded partly on your increased conviction of Appa Sahib's deep personal concern in the transactions which had excited your suspicions, coupled with the apprehension that he would effect his escape from Nagpur, and partly on the reason you now had for believing that the late Rajah Parsojee had been murdered at his instigation. It suggested itself to you that the Governor General might think it proper to institute an enquiry into that charge which would have little prospect of being successfully prosecuted while he remained on the musnud, and which indeed could scarcely be undertaken against a prince actually possessing the name and character of sovereignty. 5. The Governor General does not think it necessary in this place to discuss the question of the sufficiency of the latter charge to form a ground of proceeding against Appa Sahib. It is enough to state that the strong circumstances of suspicion of his treachery increased by your

commendation.

7. The brilliant success of our arms at Mundeloh and Chanda has completed the overthrow of the party of Appa Sahab and the establishment of our superiority throughout the country, and it only requires to determine the principles on which the new Government is to be established, so as to proceed with the least practicable delay to arrange the details of the administration.

9. The first step therefore ought to be to declare him de throne d and to proclaim his successor. You are apprised that the Governor General contemplated elevating to the musnud of Nagpur the infant son of Nana Guzar by a daughter of the late Rajah Raghooj Bhoonsla, and you will have

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 I think it to
 be a very good
 one, which I
 would have
 been glad to
 have had for
 my own use.
 I am, Sir,
 very respectfully,
 Your obedient
 servant,
 J. B. Young

been prepared to give effect to that resolution. Should you not already have done so under the general sanction deducible from the former instructions, you will be pleased to proclaim the young prince Rajah of Nagpur and to invite Bakabai to exercise the office of guardian of the young Rajah and regent of the state. You will issue a proclamation to this effect, stating the arrangement to be made with the sanction of the Governor General who has been compelled to remove Appa Sahab from the musnud in consequence of his repeated and incorrigible enmity, perfidy and ingratitude.

10. You will proceed to conclude with the new Government a treaty corresponding with the modifications that may be requisite to adapt it to the new state of circumstances and the change of line.

11. The Governor General apprehends that it will be indispensable for the British Government to exercise, for a time at least, a degree of direct interference in the internal Government of the country which otherwise, on general principles, his Lordship would consider to be highly undesirable. The total dissolution of the Government by the events of the last eight months and the apparent want of persons of integrity and capacity to fill the principal offices of the state, seem to render this course nearly unavoidable. It is the earnest wish and positive instruction of the Governor General however that this interference be restricted within the narrowest possible limits, and that even in exercising it when necessary, the earliest practicable restoration of the ministerial and executive duties of the state to their natural and legitimate channels be not lost sight of.

12. It would be infinitely desirable even the military force of the state of Nagpur, with the exception of a small and select body, could be confided to its native chiefs, but this, his Lordship apprehends, is altogether unattainable at present, and that there is no choice between making the principal part of the army, in fact a British force, or of exposing the state and our just and legitimate influence in it to imminent hazard.

13. The same necessity does not, however, apparently exist, at least to the same degree, with regard to the civil administration and we ought, if practicable, to limit ourselves to the selection of a minister in whom we can place confidence, and who will recur to the British Resident for counsel and assistance, and make the interests of the alliance which is identified with the prosperity of the country, the rule of his policy, while he is left unshackled in the exercise of the executive details of the administration, as long as it is kept free from oppression and gross abuse. To prevent the latter he must necessarily be accountable to the Resident who will not fail to point out and require him to correct such abuses as he may perceive, but will leave the minister to be the ostensible agent of the measures of the Government.

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14. Conformably with the declared intention of gradually receding from the exercise of direct interference in the administration, you will be careful to avoid any material departure from the established and constitutional forms of the ancient Government which, if recalled to their original principles, will probably be found sufficiently adapted to ensure regularity and integrity in the transaction of the ordinary affairs of the state. It will be no less your duty than your inclination to detect and reform the corruptions and abuses that disgraced the late administration, and lay the foundation for an improved order of things in the restoration of those wholesome institutions of the ancient Government which have been perverted by the errors and vices of the policy of the Rajah Raghujy Bhosla and his successor. In the pursuit of this legitimate and laudable purpose, however, we are not to seek the attainment of that degree of perfection which it would be practicable to reach under a system to be permanently administered through the British agency. With the deliberate intention of restoring to the native Government the direct executive administration as soon as the agitations and disquietudes arising out of late events shall be composed, and the new Government shall have attained sufficient security and solidity to enable it to conduct its own affairs without our direct assistance, it would not, in his Lordship's judgment, be either judicious or equitable to attempt the establishment of a system which, when it ceased to be administered by the integrity, energy and vigour of British agents, would cease to operate beneficially either for the country or the state.

15. Our views then in the reform of the civil administration must be limited to restoring it, as nearly as may be practicable, to the character of its original institutions, to correcting and punishing gross abuses and frauds in the collection and appropriation of the revenues, to introducing order, regularity and economy in every branch of the administration and to establishing such plain, simple and efficient regulations on the basis of the ancient usages and laws of the country, as shall enable the Rajah's Government to assume the administration with every reasonable assurance of being able to carry it on under the protection of the British Government with credit and success.

16. Even when the British Government withdraws from that direct share in the administration which imperious circumstances compel it to exercise in the outset, it will retain, under the terms of the treaty, the right of offering its advice and aid; will be able, by timely and judicious interposition, to prevent any gross mismanagement and to recall the native administration to the just and legitimate principles of Government.

17. These general observations will suffice to explain to you the principles on which it is his Lordship's opinion that the internal Government of Nagpur must be established. It is one of those cases in which the judgment, sagacity and discretion of the agent will have more

influence than any prescribed rules, and his Lordship entertains a perfect reliance on your exercise of those qualities for giving effect to the arrangement now contemplated.

18. The choice of efficient ministers will be one of the most important as well as the most difficult practical questions arising out of this system. The treachery of Nago Pandit has deprived the two Governments of the benefit of his ability and experience. As far as the Governor General can judge, our choice must rest upon Narain Pandit whose tried fidelity and respectable character and the confidence with which he is generally regarded, may compensate in a great degree for the want of extensive knowledge of the details of business and natural weight in the country. His Lordship concludes, however, that the Government cannot be without able and efficient instruments in the subordinate departments, whose services may be rendered beneficial to the state under the guidance and control of a minister of integrity, supported by the favour and confidence both of his own and of the British Government.

19. The military branch of the Rajah's establishment must, his Lordship apprehends, as has already been stated, be virtually a British force. It is desirable, however, both to confine the extent of the description of establishment to which this principle must apply, within the narrowest boundary consistently with the attainment of the object, and with regard to the horse, at least to allow them to retain as much of their original character as is consistent with efficiency, so as to render their return under the command of their native chiefs more easily attainable whenever circumstances may admit of that arrangement.

20. The Governor General has already authorised the increase of the regular infantry on the Rajah's establishment to a brigade composed of two battalions, and you have very properly and judiciously been employed in completing that corps, and have called for the services of several officers to aid you in the work. This proceeding is entirely approved, and I shall have the honour in a separate letter to communicate to you his Lordship's resolutions on the subject of this establishment, and to signify to you the names and stations of the officers to be attached to it. His Lordship approves in like manner of the measures taken by you to form a body of efficient horse on the model of the reformed horse of His Highness the Nizam, whose services have been so exemplary during the late campaign. This establishment will also be the subject of a separate communication. For the present it is sufficient to state that the infantry brigade and the select body of horse you are now engaged in forming, appears to his Lordship to be sufficient for what may be termed the regular army of the state of Nagpur which will stand in the place of the contingent stipulated by the original alliance, and will at all times be an efficient force to act in cooperation with the British troops. A force of a more irregular

description, including subundis, will of course be required for the service of the distant provinces and for the realization of the revenues and the tribute of the dependent Rajahs. The amount and distribution of this force must be regulated by circumstances which cannot be within the knowledge or cognizance of the Governor General. It is only necessary therefore to enjoin the utmost attention to economy in this branch of public establishment, without overlooking the advantage of giving employment to such a number of the military class as shall attach them to the new order of things.

21. With a view to this object also, it will be desirable to endeavour, as much as possible, to compose the horse of the contingents of the different military sardars of the state, whom the unavoidable results of the late revolution have deprived of their natural consequence in the country, and whose interest in the success of the present arrangement it will be desirable to secure, by rendering it a means of giving employment to a portion of their followers. Satisfied as the Governor General is of the advantage, in point of discipline and efficiency, of attaching European officers to the native horse on the plan which has succeeded so well at Hyderabad and Poona, the adoption of this plan to the great extent in proportion to the whole amount of the military establishment, to which in order to render it at all adequate to the purpose it must be carried a Nagpur, is not unattended with inconvenience. The intrinsic power and respectability of every native state and its self respect and confidence must mainly repose on the character, attachment and just weight in the counsels of the state of its military chiefs which it is the tendency of this system to undermine. The necessity of adopting the present plan is, however, one of the unavoidable results of the treachery of Appa Sahab, and the consequent obligation imposed on the British Government of destroying the power of that prince which has forced upon us a direct concern in the affairs of Nagpur.

22. In the actual state of that Government and country however, it does not appear to his Lordship that any other system could be adopted with equal promise of security to our interest and advantage to those of the other party. The course of events has frustrated the military strength of the Government of Nagpur and rendered it incapable of any well directed effort, if left to itself. The military character of the Nagpur army never stood high, and it is undoubtedly expedient to take the opportunity now afforded of improving that branch of its establishment by restricting its amount and increasing its efficiency. There seems, therefore, no solid objection to the introduction, even to the extent proposed, of the plan already tried on a proportionately smaller scale at Hyderabad, while its positive advantages with reference to the security of our interests are manifest.

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23. These are the only remarks his Lordship judges it necessary to make to you, regarding the civil and the military establishments of the Government of Nagpur and the principles on which those branches of the public affairs are to be conducted. They have been made with due advertence to the contents of your despatches of the 17th of January and 13th and 15th of February and those of my letter to your address of the 1st of March, and are in fact, founded on the principles explained in those instructions, modified according to the altered state of circumstances since they were framed.

24. Your knowledge and experience will enable you to follow out his Lordship's views and to establish, in concert with the regency and ministers of the state of Nagpur, such a system of administration as shall best secure the tranquillity of the country, the prosperity of its people and Government, and the security of the British interest as involved in its connection with Nagpur.

25. An early object of your attention will be the establishment of the authority of the new Government in the more remote provinces. The Governor General is not led to suppose that any resistance will be offered to it excepting perhaps, by the refractory jagirdars of Sirguja, unless Appa Sahab should be able to make his way into Ratanpore and collect adherents. It will not be practicable to undertake military operations on any extensive scales until after the close of the rainy season, should they be necessary. His Lordship trusts however that will not be the case, and the success which has attended Major Roughsedge's proceedings in Sirguja, the arrangements made by him for maintaining our ascendancy in that province during the rains, his presence with a commanding force in Sambalpore and the deputation of Captain Edmonds to Ratanpore (a measure which the Governor General entirely approves) will have the effect of establishing the British authority in the districts ceded in that quarter, and that of the Government of Nagpur in those which will remain in its hands. You will perceive from my despatch of this day's date to Major Roughsedge, a copy of which will accompany this letter, the view taken by his Lordship of that officer's proceedings and intentions and the arrangements proposed for the future management of those countries, as far as his Lordship is yet enabled to form a decided resolution. Major Roughsedge and Captain Edmonds will of course correspond on all points connected with their respective duties, on which their co-operation can be at all conducive to the success of each other's measures.

26. You will have observed from Major Roughsedge's despatch of the 30th of May, the earnest recommendation of that officer that the pargana of Kowreeah Bukho adjoining Sohagpur should be included in the cessions from the state of Nagpur, and that the river Hudson should form the boundary of Sirguja and Chhattisgarh which would include in the British possessions the taluq of Koorba. These suggestions appear to the Governor General

to be very judicious and if no objection, unknown to his Lordship, exists to the proposed arrangement, I am directed to desire that the lands in question may be comprehended in the cessions specified in the schedule to be annexed to the treaty. You will of course correspond with Major Roughsedge on the subject of his arrangements in Sambalpur and Sirguja, as far as they are connected with the settlement of the adjacent territories of the state of Nagpur, or may otherwise affect the public interest committed to your charge.

27. The Governor General has nothing to add on the subject of the management of the ceded territories on the Nerbuda to what is contained in my letters of the 13th of March to Mr. Malony and to yourself. The conciliation of the Gonds in that quarter will be an object of your particular attention, both as connected with the tranquillity of the ceded districts and those of the state of Nagpur. His Lordship is not sufficiently acquainted with the interest and character of that tribe to prescribe any particular mode of proceeding for the attainment of this object. Your own knowledge and experience will guide your measures and you will, his Lordship is assured, derive much useful information and able assistance from Mr. Malony in the formation and execution of any plan directed to the conciliation of the Gonds. The nature of the country they occupy would render the conduct of military operations very difficult and inconvenient, and this consideration as well as others of no less importance recommend the endeavour to conciliate them to our interest by amicable measures.

28. The Gonds of this part of the country are an object of special attention at this time from the circumstance of Appa Sahab's being still concealed in the fastnesses of those hills and jungles. It is of course an object of great consequence to endeavour to prevail on them to deliver him up or to require him to leave the country.

29. I take this opportunity of referring to your letters of the 17th, 21st and 31st of May and 1st of June, relative to the escape of Appa Sahab and the measures taken for his re-apprehension. In my letter of the 6th instant I communicated to you the sentiments of the Governor General relative to the terms of the proclamation offering a reward for his person. The whole of your proceedings with the reservation stated in that letter are approved by the Governor General. Should Appa Sahab be apprehended or delivered up, he is to be sent to Allahabad according to the former orders. After the experience we have had of the hazard of affording him any indulgence, he must of course be confined under such precautions as shall effectually bar all chance of escapes, and consideration of delicacy must give place to those of security. Even in the case supposed, however, it will not be proper to subject him unnecessarily to any degrading mode of confinement, nor to any greater personal inconvenience than his safe custody demands.

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30. To return to the subject of the territory acquired by the British Government of cessions from Nagpur, I am directed to communicate to you the following observations and instructions relative to that portion of it which is so situated in Berar, including Gawilgarh and Nernalla.

31. The local position of those districts will render them a valuable acquisition to the Nizam's Government, while the circumstance of their being nearly insulated by His Highness's territories would make them a less profitable possession to us. It is the intention of the Governor General therefore ultimately to assign those lands to the Government of the Nizam under an arrangement which shall secure the grant of the whole or a portion of them to Salabat Khan on a Saranjamy tenure. Your having placed these possessions for the present in the hands of the Nizam's officers to be held in trust for the British Government is entirely approved.

33. It is desirable to obtain from the Nizam any lands he may possess to the eastward of the Wurdah and His Highness's share of lands held jointly by the two Governments within the general limit of the Nagpur territory. His Lordship is not aware of the extent or value of such possessions, but he believes them to be inconsiderable. There will be an obvious convenience however in rendering the Government of Nagpur in this part of its course and within the general boundary of its territory. You will be pleased in concert with Mr. Russell to obtain an accurate statement of the lands coming within the above description, and to transmit it to me for the information of the Governor General.

34. Although the arrangements just adverted to will be ultimately carried into effect, yet it is desirable to suspend any immediate proceedings with that view and to render them a part of the more comprehensive settlement with His Highness the Nizam, which will arise out of the conquest of the territories of Bajirao and the rights which will have been acquired by the accession of the British Government to the sovereignty of that country. These arrangements will form the subject of future instructions to Mr. Elphinstone and the Resident at Hyderabad which will be duly communicated to you, with corresponding instructions for your own guidance.

35. The only remaining point which it appears to His Lordship necessary to advert to in this dispatch, is the British Force to be maintained in the Nagpur territory, its amount and distribution.

41. The artillery men and establishments must be furnished from Madras, and the necessary application will be made to the Government of that Presidency to furnish them at the earliest practicable period.

47. In confirming Lieutenant Colonel Scott in this command the Governor General experiences the most cordial gratification in the opportunity it affords, of expressing his high sense of the merit of that distinguished officer throughout the late service in Nagpur, from the day of glorious defence of Seetabadi to the concluding operation of the campaign, the gallant assault of Chanda which was led by Lieutenant Colonel Scott in person.

[The following text is mirrored from the reverse side of the page and is therefore illegible.]

No. 245—Malcolm advises Appa Sahab to come over to him, when he will be amply provided for and given a good place for residence, and assures him that no harm will ensue.

NAGPUR AFFAIRS

July

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FROM—SIR JOHN MALCOLM,
TO—APPASAHAB BHONSLE.

28th July 1818.

My friend Appa Sahab,

Lala Seo Persad has made a statement which I fully understand. He says it is your wish to come to me; do so quickly; it will be well for you; you shall not be imprisoned or kept in a fort. The Governor General will appoint a good place for your residence and all your family will join you there; if you come soon this will be done, but if you delay misfortune will be the consequence.

You and all India know that there is no difference between my words and actions, rest satisfied therefore with the sincerity of the communication and hasten to my camp.

No. 246—Terms to be offered to Appasahab, if he submits.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,

TO—SIR JOHN MALCOLM.

7th August 1818.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 10th ultimo reporting the receipt of an overture from Appa Sahab, and the tenor of the answer returned by you to his Agent.

2. It is doubtless an object of considerable importance, with a view both to the maintenance of the general tranquillity and to the peaceful settlement of the new Government of Nagpur, that Appa Sahab should be induced to place himself in the hands of the British Government, and it will be satisfactory to the Governor General in Council to learn that he renews his offers of submission either to you or to Mr. Jenkins.

3. In order to secure his submission and retirement to a station within the Company's provinces, the Governor General in Council can have no hesitation in pledging the faith of the Government for his personal liberty

within certain limits, and a competent provision for his future maintenance with his family at a station within the British territory to be selected by this Government, with as much attention to the wishes of Appa Sahab as may be consistent with a due regard for the public interest.

4. The Governor General in Council is not prepared to prescribe the extent of pecuniary provision which it may be expedient or proper to assign to Appa Sahab, since it must depend in a great degree on the number and composition of his family concerning which his Lordship in Council does not possess requisite information. Mr. Jenkins will however be instructed to state to you his sentiments on this point, and if it should become necessary to give Appa Sahab a specific assurance beforehand of the amount of provision to be assigned to him, you will be pleased to regulate your communications on this point by the suggestions that may be conveyed to you by Mr. Jenkins who has been desired to exercise his discretion within the limits of one lac of rupees per annum.

5. If Appa Sahab then should renew his proposition to you, you will convey to him, in the name of the Governor General in Council, an assurance to the foregoing effect and to concert with him and with the officers commanding the nearest post or stations of British troops or with other public authority, the necessary arrangements for his retiring to some convenient point where he will be under our immediate protection, until the place of his permanent abode and other details regarding his future condition can be settled.

6. A copy of this letter will be transmitted to Mr. Jenkins.

No. 247—Terms to be offered to Appasahab, if he submits.

FROM—THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT,

TO—JENKINS, RESIDENT, NAGPUR.

7th August 1818.

I am directed to transmit to you the enclosed copy of a letter addressed on this date to Brigadier General Sir John Malcolm in reply to that officer's despatch of the 10th ultimo, of which a copy has been communicated to you.

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2. You will be pleased to take into consideration the amount of pecuniary allowance which it may be expedient to assign to Appa Sahab with reference to the number and composition of his family in the event of his throwing himself on the British Government and fixing his residence within the Company's provinces, under an arrangement such as is sanctioned by the enclosed instructions to Brigadier General Sir John Malcolm. It does not appear to the Governor General in Council that the stipend to be allotted to Appa Sahab should, under any circumstances, exceed the sum of one lac of rupees per annum, but with this limitation you will be pleased to exercise your own judgment and to communicate your sentiments to Sir John Malcolm as well as to Mr. Malony or any officers acting under your authority, whose situation may render it probable that Appa Sahab should refer himself to them.

No. 248—News is communicated to the Governor General of Appasahab having left Ranjit Singh's territory and gone to Onah.

FROM—DAVID OCHTERLONY, RESIDENT AT DELHI.

TO—CHARLES METCALFE, SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT.

Delhi, 11th August 1820.

Sir,

I have the honour to transmit copy of an extract of my Lahore intelligence, from which it would appear that some proposals made by the ex-Rajah of Nagpur by his Vakeel, had induced Runjeet to send his own servant with a message requesting his departure from the country, and he had accordingly gone to a place in the hills, called Onah, possessed by Sahab Sing Bedee.

2. The intelligence mentions as a supposition that Runjeet may have been influenced by caution, the apprehension that the British Government might be offended and be involved in a dispute, from a respectful attention to the treaty, or acting on some hint by letter received from some Sahab.

3. It is not improbable that the Rajah may have made proposals to which he was not inclined to accede, and his stay at so public a place may have excited alarm, but the asylum to which he has been sent under the charge of a very turbulent but very sanctified character, does not indicate that the Surdar has withdrawn his protection, or intimated any desire that he should altogether quit his country.

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the 1990s, the number of people in the United States who are 65 years of age or older is projected to increase from 20 million to 35 million, and the number of people 75 years of age or older is projected to increase from 10 million to 15 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996).

the 1990s, the number of people in the world who are illiterate has increased from 1.2 billion to 1.5 billion. The number of illiterate people in the world is projected to reach 1.7 billion by the year 2015. The number of illiterate people in the world is projected to reach 1.7 billion by the year 2015.

the 1990s, the number of people in the United States who are 65 years of age or older is projected to increase from 20 million to 30 million, and the number of people 75 years of age or older is projected to increase from 10 million to 15 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996). The number of people 85 years of age or older is projected to increase from 2 million to 4 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996). The number of people 90 years of age or older is projected to increase from 500,000 to 1 million (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996). The number of people 95 years of age or older is projected to increase from 100,000 to 200,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996). The number of people 100 years of age or older is projected to increase from 10,000 to 20,000 (U.S. Census Bureau, 1996).

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